People vs. Datu Ambis

A killing is murder qualified by treachery when the victim is fired upon while his back is turned; dwelling may attend as an aggravating circumstance but can be offset by the mitigating circumstance of lack of education and instruction, and the medium period under Article 248 is reclusion perpetua.

Ambrosia Puton (alias Fortunata, alias Ambuyong) became a widow, and Datu Ambis desired to take her as one of his wives. She declined, alleging that he already had five. The accused did not insist but he resentfully threatened her that should she marry again he would kill her second husband.

Ambuyong, for the second time, married Esteban Fameron, and both spouses, together with Ambuyong’s five children from her first husband, lived in their new residence in Baracatan, municipality of Sta. Cruz, Davao. At about 7 o’clock in the evening of May 13, 1938, while both spouses were seated at the table preparing for supper and Esteban Fameron was taking some viands from a saucepan, a report of a firearm was heard and Esteban fell face downward to the floor, dead. Ambuyong looked toward the door where the report came from and to which Esteban had his back turned and saw the accused carrying a gun and leaving the place.

Upon hearing the cries for help, Saito Puton, brother-in-law of Ambuyong, went to the latter’s house and on his way thereto he recognized the accused and saw the weapon carried by him. The body of the deceased was examined by sanitary inspector Manuel Jumilla who found several wounds therein all of which were produced by buckshots from a shotgun cartridge. According to him the wounds received by the deceased on the left side of the stomach, below the ribs, were mortal and produced his instantaneous death.

The accused denied having been the author of the crime and attempted to establish the defense of alibi, which was rejected by the trial court.

• Qualification of the Crime: Datu Ambis, as appellant, maintained that the crime committed is homicide, not murder; his attorney de oficio did not question the established facts.

• Qualification of the Killing: Whether the killing of Esteban Fameron is murder qualified by treachery, with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, rather than homicide.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed is in accordance with law.

• Qualification of the Killing: Yes. The killing is murder qualified by treachery because the deceased was fired upon while he had his back turned; dwelling attended as an aggravating circumstance but was compensated by the mitigating circumstance of lack of education and instruction.
• Penalty: Yes. Article 248 punishes murder with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, and its medium period is reclusion perpetua; the penalty imposed is therefore in accordance with law.

• Qualification of the Killing: The appellant’s counsel did not question the established facts and argued only that the crime was homicide. The SC rejected this: the deceased was fired upon while he had his back turned, which qualified the killing by treachery. The SC also noted that dwelling attended as an aggravating circumstance, but it was correctly compensated by the mitigating circumstance of lack of education and instruction. The qualification as murder was therefore correct.
• Penalty: Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime committed by the appellant and punishes it with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The medium period is reclusion perpetua. Because the penalty imposed by the trial court was reclusion perpetua, the SC held it in accordance with law.

• Treachery — The SC treated the fact that the deceased was fired upon while his back was turned as treachery, qualifying the killing as murder.
• Dwelling as an aggravating circumstance — The majority appreciated dwelling as an aggravating circumstance, but it was compensated by the mitigating circumstance of lack of education and instruction.
• Lack of education and instruction — The SC recognized lack of education and instruction as a mitigating circumstance that compensated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
• Penalty for murder under Article 248 — Murder is punished with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death; the medium period is reclusion perpetua. The SC applied this to affirm the penalty imposed.

• “The qualification is erroneous and is not in accordance with the facts because the crime is qualified by treachery, the deceased having been fired upon while he had his back turned, and was also attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, which was correctly compensated by the mitigating circumstance of lack of education and instruction.” — This states the SC’s core holding on the qualification of the killing and on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
• “The crime committed by the appellant is defined by article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and punished with penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the medium period of which is reclusion perpetua, for which reason the penalty imposed by the court is in accordance with law.” — This states the SC’s basis for affirming the penalty.
• “The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the cost of this instance to the appellant. So ordered.” — This is the SC’s dispositive order.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines murder and punishes it with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death; the medium period is reclusion perpetua. The SC applied it to hold that the penalty imposed on Datu Ambis was in accordance with law.
• Aggravating circumstance of dwelling, Revised Penal Code — The majority appreciated dwelling as an aggravating circumstance but held it compensated by the mitigating circumstance of lack of education and instruction.
• Mitigating circumstance of lack of education and instruction, Revised Penal Code — The SC treated lack of education and instruction as mitigating and used it to offset dwelling.

• Justice Villa-Real (Dissenting) — Dissented from the majority insofar as it appreciated dwelling as an aggravating circumstance, because the accused did not penetrate the house of the deceased in committing the crime. He cited Viada, Groizard, Cuello y Calon, and Jimenez de Asua on the basis of dwelling as an aggravating circumstance—the sanctity of the home and the abuse of confidence or violation of its sanctity—and concluded that when the offender does not penetrate the house but commits the crime from without, dwelling cannot be appreciated.
• Justice Laurel (Dissenting) — Concurred in the preceding dissent of Justice Villa-Real.