People vs. Dang Angeles

Implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons, by their acts before, during, and after the commission of the crime, demonstrate a common design and concerted action, even without proof of an express agreement. Treachery cannot be appreciated when the victim was already aware of the actual danger posed by the assailants at the time of the attack, but abuse of superior strength may be appreciated when multiple armed assailants attack an unarmed victim. When actual damages proven by receipts amount to less than the amount claimed, temperate damages of P50,000 (for death) or P25,000 (for non-consummated crimes) is awarded in lieu of actual damages — except where the victim's full claim itself does not exceed that threshold, in which case only the amount actually claimed and proven is awarded.

The case arose from a stabbing incident on April 27, 2010 in Barangay Gayaman, Binmaley, Pangasinan, involving members of the Evangelista family and a group composed of appellant Dang Angeles y Guarin and his co-accused James Santos alias "Chita," Dennis Ramos, and Sonny Baynosa alias "Jong." The Evangelista brothers — Eric, Mark Ryan, Elmer, and Abelardo — were at their family residence celebrating the eve of their sister's wedding when the incident occurred. Only appellant was apprehended; his co-accused remained at large throughout the proceedings. Three separate informations were filed charging appellant and his co-accused with murder for Abelardo's death, frustrated murder for Mark Ryan's injuries, and frustrated murder for Eric's injuries, all alleging conspiracy, treachery, and abuse of superior strength.

On the evening of April 27, 2010, Eric and Mark Ryan Evangelista were inside their residence in Barangay Gayaman, Binmaley, Pangasinan, celebrating the eve of their sister's wedding with family and guests. Around 11:30 in the evening, a loud noise from the engine and muffler of a nearby parked tricycle interrupted the celebration. Eric and their youngest brother Elmer stepped outside to investigate, with Mark Ryan following shortly after. Sonny "Jong" Baynosa occupied the driver's seat of the tricycle, accompanied by appellant Dang Angeles, James "Chita" Santos, and Dennis Ramos.

According to the prosecution, as Eric and Elmer approached the tricycle, appellant alighted and walked straight to Elmer, forcefully stabbing him in the right abdomen; the knife snapped upon impact. When Eric rushed to help Elmer, Baynosa stabbed Eric in the back just below his right shoulder. Mark Ryan, who had followed his brothers, was stabbed by Santos in the right waist. Abelardo then rushed to his brothers' aid, but Ramos stabbed him in the left stomach. Santos turned to Abelardo and stabbed him in the right abdomen. Appellant grabbed an icepick and stabbed Abelardo in the left chest, followed by Baynosa, who also used an icepick to stab Abelardo in the right chest. After sustaining multiple stab wounds, Abelardo fell to the ground. Santos stabbed him again in the back. Appellant then walked away while Baynosa, Ramos, and Santos fled on the tricycle. A cousin of the Evangelista brothers, Rolando Quinto, witnessed the incident from a distance but was too frightened to intervene. Only after the assailants had departed did Rolando and others rush the four wounded brothers to the hospital. Abelardo was pronounced dead on arrival, and Elmer died in the hospital. Dr. Cipriano Fernandez treated Eric and Mark Ryan: Eric sustained a non-fatal stab wound in the back that would have healed in seven to ten days even without adequate medical attendance, and he was discharged the following day. Mark Ryan suffered a fatal stab wound to the waist that punctured his liver, requiring intensive care and surgery; his survival was attributed solely to timely and adequate medical attention, and his recovery took approximately three months.

Appellant presented a different account. He testified that his brother-in-law Marlon, Domingo Evangelista's nephew, had invited him to the party. Around 11:45 in the evening, while appellant was outside the house, Baynosa arrived on the tricycle with Santos and Ramos. Eric and Mark Ryan came out and called out Baynosa for the loud noise. Santos and Ramos alighted and asked the brothers to stop shouting, but Eric yelled louder and Mark Ryan cursed Baynosa and his companions. Eric and Mark Ryan then walked up to the group and repeatedly punched Ramos. Abelardo and Elmer arrived and hit Ramos in the head with a bottle; Abelardo struck Ramos a second time. In retaliation, Ramos drew a knife and stabbed Abelardo and Elmer. When Eric and Mark Ryan moved to punch Ramos, Baynosa and Santos repelled them with their respective weapons. Appellant claimed to have been a silent witness, too frightened to intervene, and left for home. While buying cigarettes from a nearby store, he saw Domingo Evangelista and the police approaching; Domingo pointed him out as one of the assailants, leading to his apprehension, though Santos, Ramos, and Baynosa were not arrested.

The trial court found the prosecution witnesses — Eric, Mark Ryan, Domingo Evangelista, and Rolando Quinto — to have testified in a categorical, straightforward, and spontaneous manner, consistent on material points regarding how each victim was stabbed by appellant and his co-accused. The trial court further found that the credible and positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prevailed over appellant's denial, that treachery attended the commission of the crimes because the perpetrators suddenly stabbed the unarmed victims without warning, and that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused, as evidenced by their synchronized and coordinated manner indicating unity of purpose and design. These factual findings were sustained by the Court of Appeals.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant argued that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were incredible, illogical, and grossly inconsistent with human experience, noting that the Evangelista brothers did not seek help from the relatives and guests present at the party, and that it took their relatives an hour to report the incident to the police.
• Grudge and Target Selection: Appellant maintained that Eric admittedly had a grudge against him, yet he purportedly attacked Elmer first rather than Eric, which was illogical.
• Relationship of Witnesses: Appellant argued that the trial court should not have readily accepted the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who, being relatives of the victims, were not disinterested witnesses and had material and emotional ties to the cases.
• Strength of Denial: Appellant contended that denial, although generally weak, gains commensurate strength when the credibility of prosecution witnesses is wanting and questionable.
• Identification by Domingo: Appellant pointed out that it was Domingo, the victims' father, who implicated him as the assailant, even though Domingo did not actually witness the incident.
• Absence of Conspiracy: Appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy among him, Baynosa, Ramos, and Santos, and that his mere presence at the locus criminis did not mean he agreed to assault the Evangelista brothers.
• Absence of Treachery: Appellant insisted that treachery was absent because the Evangelista brothers knew of his notorious reputation in the community and were thus forewarned of impending danger, making the attack neither sudden, unexpected, nor unforeseen. He prayed that his conviction be reduced to homicide, frustrated homicide, and attempted homicide.

• Trial Court Findings: Respondent countered that the trial court's factual findings are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal absent overlooked or misappreciated facts of substance that could alter the outcome.
• Relationship Does Not Impair Credibility: Respondent argued that relationship per se does not affect the credibility of witnesses.
• Positive Testimonies over Denial: Respondent maintained that as between the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of appellant, the former deserve more credence.
• Treachery Properly Appreciated: Respondent argued that even assuming the Evangelista brothers were forewarned of possible danger from appellant, they were not aware that appellant and his group actually intended to kill them, and the sudden and unexpected attack rendered the victims unable to defend themselves.
• Conspiracy Inferred from Acts: Respondent maintained that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the crime, indicating a common design, and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy existed among appellant and his co-accused such that appellant is liable for all acts committed by his co-conspirators.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who were relatives of the victims, are credible and sufficient to sustain conviction notwithstanding appellant's denial.
• Treachery (Abelardo): Whether treachery attended the killing of Abelardo Evangelista.
• Treachery (Eric and Mark Ryan): Whether treachery attended the attacks on Eric and Mark Ryan Evangelista.
• Classification of Crimes: Whether the crimes committed are murder, attempted murder, and frustrated murder, or homicide, attempted homicide, and frustrated homicide.
• Civil Liabilities: Whether the awards of damages were properly computed and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.

• Conspiracy: Yes. Implied conspiracy was established from the concerted actions of appellant and his co-accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, indicating a joint purpose and concert of action even without proof of express agreement.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Yes, the testimonies are credible. Relationship per se does not equate to bias or ulterior motive, and positive and categorical testimonies prevail over unsubstantiated denial.
• Treachery (Abelardo): No. Treachery cannot be appreciated because Abelardo was already aware of the danger appellant posed when he came out to help his brothers, making the attack not unexpected. Abuse of superior strength was appreciated instead.
• Treachery (Eric and Mark Ryan): Yes. The execution of the attack made it impossible for the unarmed victims to defend themselves or retaliate, notwithstanding their knowledge of appellant's reputation.
• Classification of Crimes: The conviction for murder, attempted murder, and frustrated murder was affirmed. Abuse of superior strength qualified Abelardo's killing; treachery qualified the attacks on Eric and Mark Ryan. The non-fatal nature of Eric's wound did not negate attempted murder because intent to kill was established from the attendant circumstances.
• Civil Liabilities: Modified. Awards were adjusted per People vs. Jugueta: civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages were increased; temperate damages of P50,000 was awarded in lieu of actual damages for Abelardo; actual damages of P7,032 was awarded for Eric instead of temperate damages of P25,000; actual damages of P68,712 was awarded for Mark Ryan.

• Conspiracy: The Court applied the doctrine of implied conspiracy, which exists when two or more persons are shown by their acts to have aimed toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, are in fact connected and cooperative. The Court found that appellant and his co-accused arrived at the crime scene together on the same tricycle, alighted together, successively assaulted the victims in a coordinated manner, and fled together immediately after the stabbing. These concerted actions before, during, and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointed to a joint purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest. Even without proof of express agreement, conspiracy was held to exist. Having established conspiracy, appellant was liable as co-conspirator for all the acts of his co-accused, pursuant to the principle that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court accorded the highest respect to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility, noting the trial judge's unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand, their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under examination. This deference was applied with even greater stringency where the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's findings. The Court rejected appellant's argument that the prosecution witnesses' failure to seek help from relatives was contrary to human experience, citing jurisprudence that different persons react differently to startling or horrifying occurrences — some may shout, some may faint, and others may simply freeze. The Court also rejected the argument that the witnesses' relationship to the victims impaired their credibility, holding that relationship per se does not equate to bias or ulterior motive; a witness related to the victim is naturally interested in securing the conviction of the guilty, not the innocent. Against the prosecution witnesses' positive and categorical testimonies, appellant only invoked denial, which, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving defense carrying scant evidentiary value. The Court further noted that appellant never imputed exclusive criminal liability on his co-accused before the investigating prosecutor and did not even file a counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation.

• Treachery (Abelardo): The Court found that treachery could not be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in Abelardo's killing. Treachery requires a deliberate, swift, and unexpected attack on a hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim, leaving the latter no chance to resist or escape. When Abelardo came out of the house and approached his brothers, he already knew that appellant and his companions had violently attacked his brothers. Abelardo was thus already aware of the danger appellant posed to his person, and the attack against him could not be considered unexpected. Abelardo was not an unsuspecting victim. However, the Court found that abuse of superior strength was present, as there was a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressors — four armed assailants attacked the unarmed victim. Citing People vs. Casillar and People vs. Garcia, the Court held that where multiple armed persons attack an unarmed victim, the fact of numerical superiority constitutes abuse of superior strength.

• Treachery (Eric and Mark Ryan): The Court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance for the attacks on Eric and Mark Ryan. Citing People vs. Pulgo, the Court pronounced that treachery may be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person; what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate. Even assuming the Evangelista brothers knew of appellant's reputation as a troublemaker, there was no showing that they had any idea that appellant and his companions would launch a deadly attack on them that night. The brothers merely approached the group to ask them to tone down the noise. Appellant was the first to launch a deadly, swift, unexpected, and sudden attack on Elmer, and Baynosa and Santos joined in stabbing Eric and Mark Ryan. The unarmed victims were rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. The severity of the wounds forestalled any possibility of resisting the attack.

• Classification of Crimes: For Abelardo's death, the Court found murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, all four elements being present: a person was killed, the accused killed him, the killing was attended by abuse of superior strength, and the killing was not parricide or infanticide. For Eric's injury, the Court found attempted murder. Although Eric's wound was not fatal, the Court held that intent to kill was established from the attendant circumstances — the means used, the nature and number of wounds sustained by the other victims, the conduct of the malefactors, and the fact that three other brothers sustained multiple fatal stab wounds. The Court applied Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, distinguishing the attempted from the frustrated stage: the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Citing Rivera vs. People, the Court held that non-fatal wounds do not negate criminal liability for attempted murder when intent to kill is established. For Mark Ryan's injury, the Court found frustrated murder. Dr. Fernandez testified that Mark Ryan's wound was fatal and could have caused his death were it not for timely medical attention. Under Article 6, the felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony but which do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Mark Ryan's survival was due to timely medical attention, a cause independent of the perpetrator's will.

• Civil Liabilities: The Court adjusted the civil liability awards in accordance with People vs. Jugueta. For Abelardo's murder: P75,000 civil indemnity, P75,000 moral damages, P75,000 exemplary damages, and P50,000 temperate damages in lieu of actual damages (since the receipts presented amounted to only P40,650, which did not exceed P50,000). For Eric's attempted murder: P25,000 civil indemnity, P25,000 moral damages, P25,000 exemplary damages, and P7,032 actual damages. The Court corrected the Court of Appeals' award of P25,000 temperate damages for Eric, holding that it would be unjust to compel appellant to pay more than what Eric actually claimed and proved to have spent for his treatment, which was only P7,032. The general rule that temperate damages of P25,000 is awarded when actual damages proven is less than P25,000 was not applied where the victim's full claim itself did not exceed that amount. For Mark Ryan's frustrated murder: P50,000 civil indemnity, P50,000 moral damages, P50,000 exemplary damages, and P68,712 actual damages, the latter being duly supported by receipts. All monetary awards were imposed with 6% interest per annum from the finality of the decision until fully paid.

• Implied Conspiracy — Implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown by their acts to have aimed toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, are in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiments. It is proved by the mode and manner the offense was committed, or from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest. Direct proof of an agreement is not always required. In this case, the Court found implied conspiracy from the concerted actions of appellant and his co-accused: arriving together, alighting from the same tricycle, successively assaulting the victims, and fleeing together.

• Treachery — Treachery means the offender directly employs means, methods, or forms for the purpose of ensuring the execution of the crime without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery lies in the deliberate, swift, and unexpected attack on the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim, leaving the latter no chance to resist or escape. Treachery may be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person; what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate. However, treachery cannot be appreciated when the victim was already aware of the actual danger at the time of the attack. In this case, treachery was not appreciated for Abelardo's killing because he was already aware of the danger when he came to his brothers' aid, but it was appreciated for the attacks on Eric and Mark Ryan because the sudden and unexpected nature of the assault rendered the unarmed victims defenseless.

• Abuse of Superior Strength — Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. Where multiple armed persons attack an unarmed victim, the fact of numerical superiority constitutes abuse of superior strength. In this case, four armed assailants attacked the unarmed Abelardo, and the Court appreciated abuse of superior strength as the qualifying circumstance in lieu of treachery.

• Credibility of Related Witnesses — Relationship per se does not equate to bias or ulterior motive nor automatically tarnish the testimony of a witness. A witness who is related to the victim is naturally interested in securing the conviction of the guilty and definitely not the innocent or just any "fall guy." In this case, the Court upheld the credibility of prosecution witnesses who were relatives of the victims, finding their positive and categorical testimonies prevailed over appellant's unsubstantiated denial.

• Behavior During Startling Occurrences — There is no hard and fast standard by which to measure a person's behavior or reaction when confronted with a startling or horrifying occurrence. Different persons react differently — some may shout for help, some may be hysterical, some fight back, and others may simply freeze and take the blows mutely. In this case, the Court rejected appellant's argument that the Evangelista brothers' failure to seek help from relatives was contrary to human experience.

• Distinction Between Frustrated and Attempted Felonies — A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In this case, Eric's non-fatal wound resulted in attempted murder because not all acts of execution were performed (the wound was not fatal), while Mark Ryan's fatal wound that did not cause death only due to timely medical attention resulted in frustrated murder.

• Temperate Damages in Lieu of Actual Damages — When actual damages proven by receipts during trial amount to less than P25,000, the award of temperate damages for P25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount, to avoid the situation where those who presented no receipts at all would receive more than those who tried but succeeded in proving only a lesser amount. However, when the victim's full claim itself does not exceed the temperate damages threshold, only the amount actually claimed and proven by receipts is awarded, as it would be unjust to compel the accused to pay more than what the victim actually claimed to have spent.

• "It exists when two (2) or more persons are shown by their acts to have aimed toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, are in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiments." — This passage defines implied conspiracy, the doctrine underpinning appellant's liability for all acts committed by his co-accused despite the absence of proof of an express agreement.

• "Here, when Abelardo came out of their house and approached his brothers, he already knew that appellant and his companions had violently attacked his brothers. Thus, Abelardo was already aware of the danger appellant posed in his person. It cannot be said, therefore, that attack made against him was 'unexpected.' In sum, Aberlardo was not an 'unsuspecting victim.' Consequently, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in Abelardo's killing." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for the reclassification of the qualifying circumstance from treachery to abuse of superior strength in Abelardo's murder, drawing a critical distinction between awareness of a person's reputation and awareness of actual impending danger.

• "What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate." — This passage states the controlling test for treachery even when the victim was forewarned, as applied to the attacks on Eric and Mark Ryan, and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on treachery.

• "It is, therefore, incorrect for the Court to award more than the amount Eric Evangelista actually incurred for his treatment, let alone, beyond what Eric Evangelista himself claimed to have actually spent." — This passage clarifies the limits of the temperate damages doctrine, establishing that temperate damages should not exceed the amount actually claimed by the victim when the full claim itself is below the temperate damages threshold.

• People vs. Evasco, G.R. No. 213415, September 26, 2018 — Controlling authority on implied conspiracy. The Court followed its formulation of the two forms of conspiracy (express and implied) and its holding that direct proof of agreement is not always required to establish conspiracy.

• People vs. Pulgo, 813 Phil. 205 (2017) — Controlling authority on treachery despite forewarning. The Court followed its pronouncement that treachery may be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned, provided the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate.

• People vs. Casillar, 141 Phil. 43 (1969) — Followed on abuse of superior strength. The Court applied its holding that when four armed assailants attack an unarmed victim, abuse of superior strength is appreciated.

• People vs. Garcia, 182 Phil. 398 (1979) — Followed on abuse of superior strength. The Court applied its holding that where four persons attacked an unarmed victim but treachery was not proven, the fact of four assailants constitutes abuse of superiority.

• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Controlling authority on civil liability awards. The Court applied its schedule of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages for consummated, frustrated, and attempted crimes involving death, as well as its rule on temperate damages when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented.

• People vs. Villanueva, 456 Phil. 14 (2003) — Followed on temperate damages. The Court applied its rule that when actual damages proven by receipts amount to less than P25,000, temperate damages of P25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages, but clarified the limitation where the victim's full claim does not exceed that threshold.

• People vs. Albrazado, 445 Phil. 109 (2003) — Followed on temperate damages. The Court cited its holding that it would be unfair for the victim's heirs to get nothing despite the death of their kin for the reason alone that they cannot produce any receipts.

• Rivera vs. People, 515 Phil. 824 (2006) — Followed on attempted murder. The Court applied its holding that non-fatal wounds do not negate criminal liability for attempted murder when intent to kill is established.

• People vs. Collamat, G.R. No. 218200, August 15, 2018 — Followed on credibility of witnesses. The Court applied the rule that appellate courts accord the highest respect to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility, absent any showing of overlooked or misappreciated facts.

• People vs. Golem Sota, G.R. No. 203121, November 29, 2017 — Followed on behavior during startling occurrences. The Court applied the rule that there is no hard and fast standard for measuring human behavior when confronted with a horrifying event.

• People vs. Lababo, G.R. No. 234651, June 6, 2018 — Followed on frustrated murder. The Court applied its holding that the act of killing becomes frustrated when the offender performs all acts of execution which could produce the crime but did not produce it for reasons independent of the perpetrator's will, such as timely medical attention.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder. Applied to classify Abelardo's killing as murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, punishable by reclusion perpetua, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties prescribed, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.

• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Applied to classify Eric's injury as attempted murder (the offender commenced the felony directly by overt acts but did not perform all acts of execution, as the wound was not fatal) and Mark Ryan's injury as frustrated murder (the offender performed all acts of execution which would have produced the felony but did not produce it by reason of timely medical attention, a cause independent of the perpetrator's will).

• Article 50, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for principals of frustrated crimes, one degree lower than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Applied to impose the indeterminate penalty of eight years of prision mayor (minimum) to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal (maximum) for frustrated murder.

• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for principals of attempted crimes, two degrees lower than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Applied to impose the indeterminate penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional (minimum) to eight years and one day of prision mayor (maximum) for attempted murder.

• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. Applied to impose reclusion perpetua for murder, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties prescribed under Article 248, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.

Caguioa, J., Reyes, Jr., J., and Zalameda, J., concurred. Carpio, J. (Chairperson), was on official leave.