People vs. Damaso

Hearsay evidence, even if admitted without objection, carries no probative value and cannot support a conviction. A warrantless search of a dwelling is invalid absent a recognized exception (search incident to arrest, search of a moving vehicle, or plain view), and the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is personal and cannot be waived by third parties unless expressly authorized. In a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms, variance between the firearm's serial number alleged in the information and that of the firearm presented at trial is a substantive defect that fails to establish the corpus delicti.

On June 18, 1988, Philippine Constabulary officers led by Lt. Candido Quijardo were dispatched to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. The operation led to a series of arrests, interrogations, and searches extending to Urdaneta and Bonuan, Dagupan City. Acting on information obtained from individuals apprehended during the initial operation, the officers eventually entered a house allegedly rented by the accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, and seized an M-14 rifle, ammunition, and various subversive materials. The accused was charged solely with illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of subversion under the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, after the information was amended to exclude all other originally named accused.

• Initial Operation and Raids: On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo of the 152nd PC Company and his companions apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa, and Deogracias Mayaoa in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. The apprehended persons disclosed the existence of an underground safehouse at Gracia Village, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Urdaneta Station Commander, the group proceeded there and found subversive documents, a radio, a .45 caliber firearm, and other items.

• Surveillance and Entry into Accused's Dwelling: The group then went to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and placed under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba (sister of the apprehended Berlina Aritumba). There they interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor, who stated she worked with "Bernie Mendoza" (the accused-appellant). Morados guided the group to the house rented by appellant but it had been vacated. After securing the Barangay Captain's assistance to locate the new house rented by appellant, the group, accompanied by Morados, proceeded there. Upon arrival, they saw Luz Tanciangco outside and informed her they knew she was an NPA member. After initially denying it, Tanciangco saw Morados and then invited the group inside.

• The Warrantless Search: Inside the house, the group, together with the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, "Ang Bayan" pamphlets, xerox copiers, a computer machine, and several persons (Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco, and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested permission to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one room, the officers saw subversive orientation books, an M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunition, a Kenwood radio, an artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro, and Laguna, and other items. They confiscated these articles and brought the persons found in the house to their headquarters for investigation.

• Identification of the Accused: The accused-appellant was not present during the search. The persons found in the house allegedly revealed that appellant was the lessee and owned the confiscated items. At trial, Lt. Quijardo testified that Luz Tanciangco identified "Bernie Mendoza" as the lessee and owner of the items. M/Sgt. Artemio Gomez testified that the occupants revealed "a certain Ka Bernie" as the occupant. Lt. Quijardo admitted he was "not the proper (person) to tell the real identity of Bernie de Guzman" and could only refer to intelligence officers.

• Firearm Serial Number Discrepancy: The amended information charged appellant with possession of an "M14 Rifle bearing Serial No. 1249935." However, the firearm presented and identified at trial bore serial number 1249985.

• Trial Court Ruling: The trial court convicted the accused, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating P.D. No. 1866 in furtherance of subversion, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with forfeiture of the seized items.

Note: In this appeal, the accused-appellant is the petitioner in substance; the arguments are framed from the assignment of errors.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Appellant argued that the prosecution's evidence was woefully inadequate to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly with respect to establishing his identity as the owner or possessor of the firearm and ammunition.

• Failure to Prove Qualifying Circumstance: Appellant maintained that even if illegal possession were proven, the qualifying circumstance of subversion was not established by the prosecution.

• Admissibility of Evidence: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in admitting the firearms, documents, and items listed in Exhibit E because they had been declared inadmissible with finality by another branch of the same court and constituted fruits of an illegal warrantless search.

• Absorption Doctrine: Appellant argued that the separate charge for subversion filed against him should absorb the charge for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of subversion, and that the trial court should have granted his motions to quash on this ground.

• Consensual Entry and Waiver: The Solicitor General argued that the officers entered the house upon the invitation of Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados (appellant's alleged helper); that Tanciangco voluntarily opened the room revealing the items; and that technically no search occurred because the articles were voluntarily shown. The consent of Tanciangco and Morados constituted a valid waiver of the warrant requirement.

• Plain View Doctrine: The Solicitor General maintained that the evidence was in plain view of the authorities and could therefore be seized without a warrant.

• Hearsay Admitted Without Objection: The Solicitor General conceded that the identification testimony was hearsay but argued it became admissible because defense counsel failed to object to its presentation.

• Serial Number as Typographical Error: The Solicitor General dismissed the discrepancy between the serial number in the information and that on the firearm presented at trial as merely a typographical error of no legal consequence.

• Hearsay and Identification: Whether the prosecution's evidence identifying the accused-appellant as the lessee of the house and owner of the confiscated items was competent to support a conviction.

• Validity of the Warrantless Search: Whether the warrantless search of the accused-appellant's dwelling and the seizure of evidence therein were constitutionally permissible.

• Corpus Delicti and Firearm Identification: Whether the variance between the serial number of the firearm alleged in the information and that of the firearm presented at trial was fatal to the prosecution's case.

• Absorption of Illegal Possession by Subversion: Whether the separate charge of subversion against the accused-appellant absorbed the charge of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of subversion, warranting dismissal of the latter.

• Hearsay and Identification: The testimonies of Lt. Quijardo and M/Sgt. Gomez regarding the accused-appellant's identity as lessee and owner were hearsay because the witnesses testified to matters not within their personal knowledge — they merely repeated what Luz Tanciangco and other occupants had told them. While the failure to object rendered the evidence admissible, admissibility is not equivalent to probative value. Citing People v. Valero (112 SCRA 675), hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value. The prosecution's failure to present as witnesses the persons who actually knew the accused as lessee and owner prevented the accused from exercising his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine those witnesses.

• Validity of the Warrantless Search: The warrantless search was unconstitutional. None of the three recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement — search incidental to arrest, search of a moving vehicle, and seizure of evidence in plain view — applied. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures is personal and cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one expressly authorized to do so on that person's behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The prosecution failed to establish that Luz Tanciangco or Luz Morados had authority to consent to the search. The accused was not present, and no evidence showed that Morados was indeed his helper or had authority to open the house in his absence. The raid was not urgent; the officers could have secured a search warrant.

• Corpus Delicti and Firearm Identification: The variance between the serial number alleged (1249935) and the number on the firearm presented (1249985) was a substantive defect, not a mere typographical error. In illegal possession cases, the prosecution must prove the existence of the firearm and the accused's unlicensed possession of it. The discrepancy meant the corpus delicti was not fully established.

• Absorption of Illegal Possession by Subversion: The crime of subversion does not absorb illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866. Subversion and rebellion are distinct crimes. Subversion punishes mere membership in a subversive organization, while rebellion requires a public uprising and taking up arms. The legislature validly created two separate offenses: illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866) and subversion qualified by taking up arms (R.A. 1700). The doctrine in Hernandez regarding absorption of common crimes in rebellion does not apply.

• Hearsay Probative Value Rule — Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, carries no probative value. Admissibility of evidence must not be equated with its weight. The failure of counsel to object to incompetent evidence may make it admissible, but it does not confer upon it any evidentiary weight. (People v. Valero, 112 SCRA 675, applied.)

• Personal Nature of Right Against Unreasonable Searches — The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures is personal to the individual whose rights are invaded. It cannot be waived by anyone except that person or one expressly authorized to waive it on his or her behalf. Consent given by a third party who lacks authority to do so is ineffective to validate a warrantless search. (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, applied.)

• Exceptions to Warrant Requirement — A warrantless search and seizure is valid only in three instances: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267, cited.)

• Corpus Delicti in Illegal Possession of Firearms — In prosecutions for illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution must prove both the existence of the firearm and that the accused possessed it without the corresponding license. A substantive variance between the firearm described in the information and the firearm presented at trial fails to establish the corpus delicti.

• Subversion Distinguished from Rebellion; Non-Absorption of Illegal Possession — Subversion (R.A. 1700) punishes membership in a subversive organization and is a crime against national security; rebellion (Article 134, Revised Penal Code) requires a public uprising and taking up arms and is a crime against public order. The legislature created two distinct offenses under P.D. 1866 and R.A. 1700, and the charge of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of subversion is not absorbed by a separate charge of subversion. (People v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992; People v. Liwanag, 73 SCRA 473, applied.)

• "The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value." — This passage, quoting People v. Valero, articulates the core evidentiary rule that decided the case. It distinguishes admissibility from probative weight and forecloses reliance on unobjected-to hearsay as the basis for conviction.

• "The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf." — This statement, drawn from De Garcia v. Locsin, is the doctrinal basis for invalidating the search based on third-party consent.

• "While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government." — This passage, quoting Rodriguez v. Evangelista, reinforces the supremacy of constitutional rights over law enforcement objectives.

• People v. Valero, 112 SCRA 675 (1982) — Applied as controlling authority on the rule that hearsay evidence, even if admitted without objection, has no probative value.

• De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 — Applied for the doctrine that the right against unreasonable searches is personal and cannot be waived by unauthorized third parties.

• Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 (1986) — Cited as authority enumerating the three exceptions to the warrant requirement.

• Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 (1987) — Cited for the proposition that lack of urgency precludes a warrantless search; officers who have time to secure a warrant must do so.

• Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230 — Cited for the principle that law enforcement must operate within constitutional limits.

• People v. Liwanag, 73 SCRA 473 (1976) — Applied for the distinction between subversion (membership-based, crime against national security) and rebellion (public uprising, crime against public order).

• People v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992 — Applied for the holding that subversion does not absorb illegal possession of firearms under P.D. 1866; the legislature validly created two distinct offenses.

• Buscayno v. Military Commission, 109 SCRA 289 (1981) — Cited for the proposition that subversion is a crime against national security, distinct from rebellion which is against public order.

• Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — The right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Applied to invalidate the warrantless search of the accused's dwelling; the Court emphasized that this right is personal and cannot be waived by unauthorized third parties.

• Third Paragraph, Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866 — Defines and penalizes illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. The provision established the offense charged; the Court found the prosecution failed to prove its elements beyond reasonable doubt.

• Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), as amended by Executive Order No. 276 — The Court distinguished this offense from rebellion, holding that subversion punishes mere membership in a subversive organization and is a separate crime not absorbed by illegal possession charges.

Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concurred. Cruz, J., concurred, subject to his reservations in Baylosis v. Chavez, 202 SCRA 405.

None.