People vs. Dagman

A felony is frustrated, not attempted, when the offender performs all acts of execution believed necessary to produce the crime as a consequence, and the crime does not result solely by reason of causes independent of the offender's will — such as the victim's feigning of death — even where the assailants themselves desist upon believing the victim is already dead.

Elias Magbual was an employee of the hacienda "La Esperanza." The persons who attacked him had previously been dispossessed of portions of the hacienda's land by judicial order, and this dispossession furnished the motive for the assault. Seven defendants — Luis Pacunla, Andres Rebollido, Isabelo Rebollido, Juan Olanan, Anastasio Dagman, Valentin Tabladillo, and Luciano Pacunla — were charged in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija with the crime of frustrated murder.

On May 2, 1924, Elias Magbual, an employee of the hacienda "La Esperanza," was treacherously attacked by a crowd of approximately forty persons while in the performance of his duties. The motive for the crime was that the attackers, who harbored enmity against Magbual, had previously been dispossessed of portions of the land by judicial order. The assault began with the crowd shouting "Avance," whereupon Magbual attempted to escape. A stone thrown by Anastasio Dagman struck Magbual in the breast and knocked him down. In that position, Luis Pacunla attacked him with a lance, wounding him.

Magbual made a further attempt to flee but fell again, whereupon the accused inflicted additional wounds with bolos and clubs. The assailants declared their purpose to kill, crying "Vamos a matarle," and at one point fingered Magbual's nose to determine whether respiration continued. Magbual ultimately escaped death by feigning death, leading his tormentors to believe he had expired. The offenders then desisted of their own will, believing they had accomplished their purpose.

Seven persons — Luis Pacunla, Andres Rebollido, Isabelo Rebollido, Juan Olanan, Anastasio Dagman, Valentin Tabladillo, and Luciano Pacunla — were charged in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija with the crime of frustrated murder. After trial, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David found each accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide and sentenced them accordingly. The trial judge found the murderous intent of the accused and their joint purpose clearly demonstrated, conclusions amply supported by the record. All defendants appealed, assigning two errors: that the trial judge erred in finding intent to kill, and in finding an agreement to kill such that all accused were sentenced to the same penalty without regard to individual participation.

• Intent to Kill: Defendants-appellants argued that the trial judge erred in finding that the accused possessed the intention to kill Elias Magbual, the offended party.
• Conspiracy and Individual Participation: Defendants-appellants maintained that the trial judge erred in finding an agreement to kill Magbual and in sentencing all accused to the same penalty without taking into account the participation of each individual in the commission of the crime.

• Reclassification of Crime: The Attorney-General, representing the plaintiff-appellee, recommended that the crime be classified as frustrated murder rather than frustrated homicide, in view of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
• Aggravating Circumstance: The Attorney-General further recommended that the penalty be placed at the maximum of that provided by law due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance that prohibited arms were used by the assailants.

• Intent to Kill: Whether the trial judge erred in finding that the accused had the intention to kill Elias Magbual.
• Conspiracy: Whether the trial judge erred in finding an agreement to kill and in sentencing all accused to the same penalty without regard to individual participation.
• Classification of the Felony: Whether the crime should be classified as frustrated murder rather than frustrated homicide, and whether it is frustrated rather than attempted.

• Intent to Kill: No. The intent to kill was clearly demonstrated by the nature of the wounds, the assailants' cry of "Vamos a matarle," and their act of fingering Magbual's nose to check for respiration.
• Conspiracy: No. The murderous intent and joint purpose of the accused were clearly demonstrated by the coordinated attack, and each was proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime included in the information.
• Classification of the Felony: Yes. The crime is frustrated murder, not frustrated homicide or attempted murder, because the offenders performed all acts of execution and believed they had killed the victim, with death averted only by causes independent of their will, and treachery qualified the killing.

• Intent to Kill: Intent to kill may be gathered from the circumstances surrounding the attack. Here, deadly weapons were used, blows were directed at vital parts of the body, the aggressors expressly stated their purpose to kill, and they believed they had in fact killed the victim. The nature of the wounds, the cry "Vamos a matarle," and the act of fingering Magbual's nose to check for respiration all conclusively established murderous intent. The Court relied on a line of precedents including U.S. vs. Mendoza, U.S. vs. Sanchez, U.S. vs. Domingo and Dolor, U.S. vs. Marasigan, U.S. vs. Reyes, U.S. vs. Sabio, and U.S. vs. Taguibao for the proposition that intent to kill is inferred from surrounding circumstances.

• Conspiracy: The trial judge found each accused proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and ample proof substantiated this finding. The murderous intent and joint purpose of the accused were clearly demonstrated by the coordinated nature of the attack — the crowd acting in concert, shouting "Avance," and sequentially attacking the victim with stones, lances, bolos, and clubs. No basis existed to disturb the finding of a common design.

• Classification of the Felony: The murder was frustrated because the offenders performed all acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, yet the felony was not produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrators — namely, Magbual's feigning of death. Pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Penal Code, this constitutes a frustrated felony. The subjective phase of the crime was entirely passed, and subjectively speaking, the crime was complete. The distinction between frustrated and attempted murder, as articulated in U.S. vs. Lim San, is that in frustrated murder the accused performs all acts believed necessary to consummate the crime and death fails to follow for causes apart from his will, whereas in attempted murder the accused begins the commission by overt acts but is prevented by some outside cause from completing the acts necessary to consummate the crime. Here, the assailants believed they had performed all acts necessary to cause death and desisted of their own will, firmly stamping the crime as frustrated. Treachery (alevosia) qualified the killing as murder, as the attack was carried out in a manner that insured the safety of the assailants while depriving the victim of any opportunity for defense.

• Frustrated vs. Attempted Felony — A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, but the felony is not produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. A felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution, being prevented by some cause outside his own will. The critical distinction lies in whether the offender believed he had performed all acts necessary to consummate the crime: if so, and death does not result for reasons apart from his will, the crime is frustrated; if the offender is prevented from completing the acts by an outside force, it is attempted. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that the assailants believed they had killed Magbual and desisted of their own will, making the crime frustrated rather than attempted.

• Inference of Intent to Kill — Intent to kill may be gathered from the circumstances surrounding the attack, including the nature of the weapons used, the parts of the body struck, the violence of the assault, and any declarations of purpose made by the aggressors. The Court found intent established through the use of deadly weapons, blows to vital parts, the cry "Vamos a matarle," and the assailants' checking for respiration.

• Treachery (alevosia) as a Qualifying Circumstance — The accomplishment of a killing with alevosia, in such manner as to insure the safety of the assailants while depriving the victim of the opportunity to make defense, qualifies the crime as murder. The Court found treachery present in the coordinated ambush of Magbual by approximately forty persons.

• "The murder should be regarded as frustrated because the offenders performed all of the acts of execution which should precede the felony as consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrators; in this instance, the playing possum by Magbual." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for classifying the crime as frustrated, applying Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Penal Code to the specific fact of the victim feigning death.

• "In frustrated murder the accused performs all of the acts which he believes necessary to consummate the crime. Death, fails to follow for causes entirely apart from his will. In attempted murder the accused begins the commission of the crime by over acts, but involuntarily desists from performing the other acts necessary to consummate the crime, he being prevented from so doing by some cause outside of his own will." — This quotation from U.S. vs. Lim San, as adopted by the Court, provides the canonical formulation of the distinction between frustrated and attempted felonies, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "The subjective phase of the crime was entirely passed, and subjectively speaking, the crime was complete." — This passage articulates the subjective-phase test for determining whether a felony is frustrated, emphasizing that the offender's own belief that all necessary acts have been performed is the controlling factor.

• U.S. vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273 (1910) — Controlling authority for the distinction between frustrated and attempted murder, quoted at length by the Court. Justice Moreland's formulation was adopted as the governing test.
• U.S. vs. Sanchez, 20 Phil. 427 (1911) — Cited for the proposition that the use of deadly weapons, blows to vital parts, and the employment of alevosia classify a crime as frustrated murder; also cited for decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain on the same point.
• U.S. vs. Mendoza, 38 Phil. 691 (1918) — Cited among the line of cases supporting the inference of intent to kill from surrounding circumstances.
• U.S. vs. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209 (1917) — Cited for the proposition that the subjective phase of the crime having been entirely passed, the crime was complete.
• U.S. vs. Agoncillo and Admana, 33 Phil. 242 (1916) — Cited for the principle that the victim's failure to die was owing to a chance or accident or reason independent of the criminal act performed.

• Article 3, Paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code (Penal Code) — Defines a frustrated felony as one where the offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence but which nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Applied to classify the crime as frustrated murder, since the assailants performed all acts of execution and death was averted only because Magbual feigned death.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ., concurred. Villamor and Villa-Real, JJ., took no part.

• Street, J. — Dissented on the ground that the offense should be qualified as an attempt to commit homicide, not as frustrated murder, disagreeing with the majority's classification of the felony.