People vs. Dagatan

Alibi is unavailing where the accused failed to establish physical impossibility, and the killing is murder punishable by reclusion perpetua when nighttime, superior strength, and treachery are proven; the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion or obfuscation cannot be separately appreciated where they arose from the same remote event and the victim was not the offender.

Sergio and Saturnino Dagatan were brothers, and their sister Lucila Dagatan had eloped with Eleuterio Yara, who later abandoned her and returned to Leyte. Victorio Ceniza was a good friend of Yara and Yara's first cousin, and it was claimed that Ceniza assisted Yara in the elopement. On June 11, 1937, at about eleven o'clock in the evening, after Victorio Ceniza and Leodegario Into had made their purchases in the market of Moacboac, municipality of Carmen, Cebu, the two young men walked side by side along the national highway toward their home at Carmen. As they approached the Dawis bridge in Carmen, Into noticed two men sitting on the railing whom he recognized as Sergio Dagatan and Saturnino Dagatan.

Suddenly Sergio attacked Victorio with a wooden cane about 4½ feet long and 1¼ inches in diameter, hitting him on the shoulder, and Saturnino helped his brother in beating up Victorio with a handy leather-covered rod containing a hard metal at its end, locally known as "caborrata." The victim fell right then and there, unconscious. The Dagatan brothers placed the limp body of Victorio in the middle of the road to make it appear that it was hit by an automobile, but Sergio, on second thought, said, "Let us throw him out to the sea in order that they would believe he died by drowning," so Sergio threw the body into the water. When Leodegario Into saw that his companion was being beaten up by the two brothers, he started to run, but he was held by Julio Dagatan, now deceased, father of Sergio and Saturnino, who appeared at the scene. Sergio wanted to kill Into, but the father dissuaded his son saying, "Don't kill him because he is my relative and he has no fault at all."

Having seen what had happened, Into was taken to the house of the Dagatans and was seen walking together with them by Enrique Puno, now deceased. On the way, Julio told Into that they had to kill Victorio Ceniza because the latter had smirched the reputation of the Dagatan family for having been instrumental in the elopement of his daughter Lucila Dagatan with Eleuterio Yara, Ceniza's first cousin, who later abandoned her and returned to Leyte. Once in the house of the Dagatans, Sergio again wanted to kill Into, but Julio said, "Let us not kill him; we will just caution him on pain of life that if this happening would come to the knowledge of the Government authorities, we are going to kill him." Into passed the night in the house of the Dagatans, and on the following morning he was allowed to go home after giving him some fresh fish to take to his father so that he would not be scolded. Before Into boarded the truck towards Carmen, he was again given a parting warning not to tell the authorities about the incident. The truck had to stop at the Dawis bridge as there were many people curiously looking at the floating body in the creek near the bridge, but Into did not say a word but merely looked on, remembering the warning of the Dagatans. Neither did he say anything to his parents about the incident when he reached home.

On the same morning, June 12th, Domingo F. Buot, then chief of police of Carmen, was notified by one Florentina Laping, now deceased, that there was a body floating in the creek. He hurried to the place and saw the body of Victorio Ceniza, whom he knew personally. There was already a crowd of people viewing the floating corpse, among whom was Isabelo Neis who took pictures thereof (Exhs. D and E). The chief of police then notified the justice of the peace and the president of the sanitary division, Dr. Mercado, and the body was removed to the house of the mother of the deceased. Autopsy was made by Dr. Mercado, between 9:00 and 10:00 that morning, who found that (a) the immediate cause of death was drowning — the lungs and stomach had plenty of water; (b) contusions of different parts of the body caused before the body was thrown into the water; (c) the humerous bone of the left arm was broken, caused by a hard and blunt instrument like a cane or "caborrata"; and (d) the victim was still alive, although unconscious, when thrown into the water. Police investigation revealed that the last person with whom the deceased was seen before his death was Leodegario Into. When taken in for questioning, Into told everything he knew about the crime, which led to the prosecution of herein appellants. In the course of his investigation, the chief of police found the "caborrata," the middle portion of which was broken, hanging on a post in the house of the Dagatans.

The defense was alibi. Sergio Dagatan testified that he had been a driver of the A & B Taxicab of Cebu City since 1924; that on June 11, 1937, he did not go to Carmen because from about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of June 10th up to about the same hour of the following morning, a 24-hour stretch, he was on duty driving the A & B taxi within Cebu City; that the company assigned two drivers to a car who took turns driving it for 24 straight hours; that his partner was Roberto Remolisan; that at about past 8:00 o'clock in the morning of June 11th, after turning over his receipts to Genaro Cabahug, he took breakfast and slept in the upper part of the garage; that he did not return to his home at Pag-utlan, Danao, about 33 or 34 kilometers from Cebu City, because he had to wait for his wife and his brother Epifanio Dagatan who was taking a boat that evening from Cebu to Manila; that he and his wife conducted his brother to the wharf; and that he slept in the company garage with his wife and small child. He also stated that he did not know the deceased Victorio Ceniza nor witness Leodegario Into, but knew their names only when the case was first heard before Judge De la Rama. On cross-examination, he admitted that he had a house in Pag-utlan, Danao, where he lived with his family; that Danao is about 34 kilometers from Cebu and about 7 kilometers from Carmen; that he was off-duty on June 11th and, although free to go home, preferred to stay and sleep in the company garage because he would again be on duty for 24 hours the following morning; and that he used to go home to Danao when off-duty unless he had an important engagement in Cebu.

Saturnino Dagatan testified that he was also a driver of the A & B Taxi in Cebu; that on June 11, 1937, he was driving a taxi within Cebu and did not go outside the city; that he had not gone to Carmen on the evening of June 11th; that every time he drove his taxi he was given a ration of 10 liters of gasoline which, if he went out of the city, had to be replaced and permission had to be sought from the company; that from Cebu to Carmen the car would consume about 10 liters of gasoline; and that he could not have been to the place of the crime because he was in Cebu from six to twelve o'clock that evening. On cross-examination, he admitted that there were many buses, trucks, and jeepneys plying between Cebu and Carmen; that if he were to drive himself, it would take him only forty minutes to go to Carmen from Cebu; that Exhibits 2 and 2-A are samples of the company form wherein the trips and taxi fares are recorded; that Exhibit 2 is kept by the company while Exhibit 2-A is retained by the driver; and that the records of the company were presented in court at the first hearing and were seen by Judge De la Rama. To corroborate them, Genaro Cabahug, the person in charge of the company at the time, testified that as a general practice drivers were only allowed to drive within Cebu City; that if they had to go beyond the city limits they had to notify the office; that if they needed more gasoline they had to ask for additional ration; that the company had a place in the upper part of the garage wherein drivers who did not live in the city rested and waited for their turns; that on June 11, 1937, he remembered Sergio Dagatan was in the resting place in the garage and Saturnino was on duty until relieved the following morning; and that Sergio was not driving that evening because it was Saturnino who was on duty, and these two drove the same car, so that if one was driving the other was off-duty. On cross-examination, he told the court that the company had 36 drivers for 18 cars; that he could not recall the exact whereabouts of each and every one of the 36 drivers on that particular day, but remembered particularly those of Sergio and Saturnino because of the incident that happened, which was of importance to his family, the deceased being a distant relative of his; that he could not remember even the names of the 16 other drivers on duty on the day in question except herein appellants; that he could not remember the companions of Sergio while the latter was resting in the garage, but only presumed he had companions because the practice was that drivers living outside the city took their rest in that place and waited for their turns; that Sergio was from Danao and had his family there; that he did not know where Saturnino was at 6:00 o'clock that evening and did not remember where he was at 10:00 o'clock on the same night, although he maintained that Saturnino was within Cebu City because anytime a driver goes beyond the city limits he has to notify the office for advice, and if their gasoline is not enough for the trip he has to ask for additional gasoline; that he did not remember where Saturnino was at 12:00 o'clock that midnight, but presumed he was within the city in accordance with the company record which had been presented at the former trial, although it was possible that even if it is recorded in the company books that Saturnino was driving within the city, he could have left the taxi in some corner under the pretext that he is within the city and could have taken a bus out of the city.

• Alibi: Accused-appellants argued that on the night in question they were not at Dawis bridge in Carmen but in Cebu City, about 40 kilometers from the scene, and presented testimony about their taxi duties, company practice, and corroboration by Genaro Cabahug.
• Double Jeopardy: Accused-appellants invoked double jeopardy after the case had been dismissed on that ground following the filing of the new information.

• Mitigating Circumstances: The People, through the Solicitor General, argued that the two mitigating circumstances cannot be counted separately and independently, citing People vs. Yaon, and that the circumstance of vindication cannot be counted separately from passion or obfuscation.

• Alibi: Whether the accused-appellants' defense of alibi should be credited given the prosecution's positive identification and the failure to show physical impossibility.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the defense of double jeopardy bars the prosecution.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the lower court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion or obfuscation.
• Penalty and Qualifying Circumstances: Whether the crime is murder and whether the penalty should be reclusion perpetua.

• Alibi: No. Alibi did not merit serious consideration because appellants failed to show physical impossibility, and the distance could be covered in 40 minutes to an hour by available transportation; positive testimony and corroborating evidence identified them.
• Double Jeopardy: No. The SC had already ruled in G.R. No. L-4396 that jeopardy had not set because the failure to decide after submission did not terminate the case by dismissal or conviction.
• Mitigating Circumstances: No. The mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion or obfuscation cannot be appreciated because the elopement and abandonment occurred long before the crime, the deceased was not the seducer, and the two circumstances cannot be counted separately.
• Penalty and Qualifying Circumstances: Yes. The crime was murder, and the penalty is reclusion perpetua; nighttime, superior strength, and treachery were duly proven, while the mitigating circumstances were not.

• Alibi: The SC held that alibi is easily and conveniently manufactured and must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Appellants claimed they were in Cebu City, about 40 kilometers from Carmen, but they themselves showed that Carmen was only about 40 kilometers from Cebu City, with abundant transportation such as buses, jeepneys, and trucks plying between the two places, which would take at most an hour, and Saturnino himself said it would take him only 40 minutes if he drove. Sergio's claim that he slept at the company garage with his wife and child was uncorroborated, and he admitted that when off-duty he used to go home to Danao, about 7 kilometers from the scene, unless he had an important engagement in Cebu. Saturnino's testimony that he was on duty in Cebu actually bolstered the prosecution, because he could have driven to Carmen in 40 minutes and returned without Cabahug knowing his whereabouts, since there was no way of tracing the movement of each driver. On the other hand, Leodegario Into's positive testimony that he saw the Dagatan brothers beat the deceased with the cane and caborrata and throw him into the water was corroborated by the pictures Exhibit D and E and by the unrefuted testimony of the chief of police who found the broken caborrata hanging on a post in the Dagatans' house. There was no room for doubt that appellants committed the crime.
• Double Jeopardy: The SC held that the defense of double jeopardy had already been passed upon in G.R. No. L-4396, October 30, 1951, where it ruled that jeopardy had not set because Judge De la Rama's failure to decide the case after its submission for decision did not terminate the case either by dismissal or by conviction.
• Mitigating Circumstances: The lower court considered in appellants' favor the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense under Article 13, No. 5, and passion or obfuscation under Article 13, No. 6, of the Revised Penal Code. The SC held that these two circumstances cannot be considered because the elopement of Lucila Dagatan with Eleuterio Yara and her abandonment by the latter took place long before the commission of the crime, and because the deceased was not the one who eloped with and abandoned her. The Solicitor General correctly pointed out that these two mitigating circumstances cannot be counted separately and independently, citing People vs. Yaon. The SC also noted that the motive took place quite a long time before the commission of the crime and entertained serious doubts as to its compatibility with the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
• Penalty and Qualifying Circumstances: The SC found duly proven the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, superior strength, and treachery which qualify the crime as murder. Following Article 248, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty that should be imposed upon appellants is reclusion perpetua. The lower court's indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal was therefore modified.

• Alibi — The defense must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission; it is easily and conveniently manufactured. The SC applied this rule by rejecting appellants' claim that they were in Cebu City because the distance to Carmen could be covered in 40 minutes to an hour by available transportation, and the prosecution's positive identification and corroborating evidence prevailed.
• Mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion or obfuscation — These circumstances cannot be appreciated when the grave offense occurred long before the crime, the victim was not the offender, and the two circumstances cannot be counted separately and independently. The SC applied this rule because Lucila Dagatan's elopement and abandonment happened long before the killing, Victorio Ceniza was not the seducer, and People vs. Yaon barred counting the two circumstances separately.
• Double jeopardy — Jeopardy is not set where the failure of the judge to decide the case after submission for decision did not terminate the case either by dismissal or by conviction. The SC applied this rule through its prior ruling in G.R. No. L-4396, October 30, 1951.
• Murder qualified by nighttime, superior strength, and treachery — When these circumstances are duly proven, the killing is qualified as murder, and the penalty under Article 248 in relation to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua. The SC applied this rule and modified the lower court's penalty accordingly.

• "Time and again we have held that in order that this kind of defense, which is easily and conveniently manufactured, could prosper, it must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accuse could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission." — The SC stated the standard for alibi and used it to reject the Dagatan brothers' claim that they were in Cebu City.
• "But these two circumstances cannot be considered not only because the elopement of Lucila Dagatan with Eleuterio Yara and her abandonment by the latter took place long before the commission of the crime, but also because the deceased was not the one who eloped with and abandoned her." — The SC rejected the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion or obfuscation.
• "With respect to the defense of double jeopardy invoked by appellants, suffice it to say that the same has already been passed upon by us when this case was first brought before this Court on this point (G. R. L-4396, October 30, 1951), wherein we held that jeopardy had not set by reason of the fact that the failure of Judge De la Rama to decide the case after its submission for decision, did not terminate the case either by dismissal or by conviction." — The SC disposed of the double jeopardy defense by relying on its prior ruling in the same case.
• "On the other hand, we find duly proven the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, superior strength and treachery which qualify the crime as murder, and following Art. 248, in relation to Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty that should be imposed upon appellants is reclusion perpetua." — The SC qualified the killing as murder and imposed reclusion perpetua.

• People vs. Yaon, 43 Off. Gaz., 4142 — Cited for the rule that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion or obfuscation cannot be counted separately and independently.
• G.R. No. L-4396, October 30, 1951 — Prior SC ruling in the same case, relied on to reject double jeopardy; held that jeopardy had not set because the failure to decide after submission did not terminate the case by dismissal or conviction.

• Article 13, No. 5, Revised Penal Code — Vindication of a grave offense; invoked by the lower court but rejected because the elopement and abandonment were remote and the deceased was not the offender.
• Article 13, No. 6, Revised Penal Code — Passion or obfuscation; invoked by the lower court but rejected and not counted separately from vindication.
• Article 14, No. 5, Revised Penal Code — Taking advantage of superior strength; found proven as an aggravating circumstance.
• Article 4, No. 6, Revised Penal Code — Nighttime, as cited in the text; found proven as an aggravating circumstance.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Murder; the penalty for the crime as qualified.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Rules for applying penalties; used with Article 248 to impose reclusion perpetua.