People vs. Cusi Jr.

A witness's testimony regarding a statement made by another person is not hearsay when offered merely to prove the fact that the statement was made or its tenor, rather than to establish the truth of the facts asserted therein.

Six accused — Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano — were charged with robbery in band with homicide before the Court of First Instance of Davao. During the trial, Sgt. Lucio Bano of the Digos, Davao police force testified as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made by accused Puesca. The legal question arose within the context of the hearsay rule as applied to statements made by one accused implicating others.

In Criminal Case No. 6813 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty. During the trial, Sgt. Lucio Bano of the Police Force of Digos, Davao testified as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by accused Arcadio Puesca. Bano testified that Puesca, aside from admitting his own participation in the offense, revealed that other persons conspired with him and mentioned each of their names.

Following up on this testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the witness to state in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for accused Macalinao, Gustilo, and Dairo objected, contending that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as their clients were concerned. The respondent judge resolved the objection by directing the witness to answer the question but without mentioning the names of the accused who had interposed the objection. Thus, the witness was permitted to name Puesca's co-conspirators except those who had raised the objection. The prosecuting officer's motion for reconsideration of this ruling was denied, prompting the present petition for certiorari praying that the ruling be declared erroneous and that the respondent judge be directed to allow witness Bano to answer the question in full.

• Admissibility of Testimony: Petitioner argued that the testimony of Sgt. Bano regarding the names mentioned by Puesca was not hearsay, because the purpose was merely to establish the fact that Puesca had made the statement naming his co-conspirators, not to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein.
• Relevance: Petitioner maintained that the fact to be established was relevant to explain why the police force subsequently questioned and investigated the persons allegedly named by Puesca.

• Hearsay Rule: Whether the testimony of a witness regarding the names of co-conspirators mentioned by an accused in an extrajudicial confession is hearsay and inadmissible when timely objected to by the persons named.

• Hearsay Rule: No. The testimony is not hearsay when offered merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or its tenor, rather than to prove the truth of the facts asserted. The witness should have been allowed to answer in full, with the understanding that the answer is not competent evidence of the actual conspiracy.

• Hearsay Rule: The hearsay rule excludes out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein. However, when a witness testifies to a statement made by another person solely to prove that the statement was made or to show its tenor, the testimony is not hearsay. The prosecuting officer expressly limited the purpose of the question to establishing that Puesca had mentioned the names of his co-conspirators to Sgt. Bano, without claiming that the statement or the answer would be competent evidence that the persons named actually conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, the question was proper and the witness should have been allowed to answer in full. Furthermore, the fact sought to be established was relevant to explain why the police subsequently questioned and investigated the persons allegedly named by Puesca. The respondent judge's ruling, which excluded only the names of the objecting accused, was therefore erroneous.

• Hearsay Rule — Limited Admissibility Doctrine — A statement made by a person to a witness is hearsay only if offered to prove the truth of the facts asserted in the statement. If the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement, the testimony is admissible and is not hearsay. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine by allowing Sgt. Bano to testify to the names mentioned by Puesca, provided the testimony was understood as proving only that Puesca made the statement — not that the persons named actually conspired with him.

• "But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi, distinguishing hearsay offered for truth from testimony offered to prove the making of a statement.

• "For this limited purpose, we believe that the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense." — This passage defines the scope of admissibility and the limitation on the probative use of the testimony.

• People vs. Lew Yon, 97 Cal. 224 — Cited as supporting authority for the proposition that testimony regarding a statement made by another person is not hearsay when offered merely to prove that the statement was made or its tenor, rather than the truth of the facts asserted.

• VI Wigmore on Evidence, §§177–178 — Cited as authoritative support for the distinction between hearsay offered for the truth of the matter asserted and testimony offered merely to prove the making of a statement or its tenor.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concurred.