People vs. Cudal

Statements made by a victim immediately after a startling occurrence, while still under the stimulus of nervous excitement and before any opportunity to contrive, are admissible as part of the res gestae and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, provided the utterance was spontaneous, concerned the circumstances of the occurrence, and was made during or immediately subsequent to the startling event.

On the early morning of January 1, 1998, appellant Pablo Cudal returned to his home in Barangay Bonlalacao, Mangatarem, Pangasinan after celebrating New Year's Eve with cousins and nephews. He roused his 79-year-old father, Crispin Cudal, from sleep and demanded money to pay for the liquor consumed during the drinking session. Crispin refused, telling appellant he had no money and that appellant was already drunk.

• The Incident: At approximately 2:00 a.m. on January 1, 1998, appellant Pablo Cudal arrived home in Barangay Bonlalacao, Mangatarem, Pangasinan from a drinking spree with his cousins and nephews. He roused his 79-year-old father, Crispin Cudal, from sleep and demanded money so he could return to the drinking session and pay for the liquor consumed. The victim replied that he had no money and told appellant he was already drunk. A quarrel ensued between father and son.

• The Victim's Statements to Camilo Cudal: Camilo Cudal, appellant's first cousin, was approximately 50 meters away at the house of his mother-in-law when he heard the commotion. He immediately rushed to the victim's house and found Crispin sitting on his bed, wiping blood oozing from his forehead. When Camilo asked what happened, the victim replied that he had quarreled with appellant and that appellant hit him with a stone. When Camilo confronted appellant, the latter reasoned that he was asking money from his father but the latter refused.

• The Victim's Statements to Segundino Cudal: Camilo brought the wounded victim to the house of Segundino Cudal, the victim's brother. Segundino testified that when the victim arrived, he was still "strong" although his face was bloodied and his clothes stained with blood. When Segundino asked what happened, the victim stated, "I was struck with stone by my son," and identified the son as Pablo Cudal.

• The Victim's Death and Medical Findings: Camilo fetched the victim's daughter Leoncia from Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, who brought the victim to a nearby hospital. The victim expired the following day, January 2, 1998, at about 4:00 p.m. The postmortem examination conducted by Dr. Cleofe Orence, Rural Health Physician of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, revealed: (1) a lacerated wound, approximately 4 cm, on the midfrontal area; (2) hematoma on the dorsal aspect of the right hand; and (3) contusion measuring 2x3 cm on the right upper quadrant of the abdomen. The probable cause of death was determined as "INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE secondary to Craniocerebral Injury secondary to Trauma T/C Ruptured Viscus, abdomen."

• Appellant's Injuries: Appellant was arrested on January 3, 1998 and brought for treatment at the Mangatarem District Hospital. Medical findings showed: negative alcoholic breath; stab wound of 2 cm on the left side of the face; stab wound of 1.5 cm on the left zygomatic area; periorbital hematoma, left, superimposed with a punctured wound of .5 cm on the left lower eyelid; punctured wound on the left eyebrow; and contusion hematoma of 1x1 cm on the occipital area.

• The Charge: An Information was filed charging appellant with parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, alleging that appellant, with evident premeditation and treachery, attacked and hit his father with a stone, causing mortal wounds that directly resulted in his death.

• Appellant's Defense: Appellant denied striking the victim. He claimed that it was the victim who assaulted him with a bolo, and that while going after him, the victim accidentally fell and hit the bedpost, wounding himself on the forehead. As to the abdominal injury, appellant explained that the victim subsequently fell on the floor, hitting his abdomen with the handle of the bolo he was holding.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Appellant assailed the trial court for accepting the prosecution's account as gospel truth despite the fact that its witnesses were not direct eyewitnesses to the crime charged. The prosecution's case, appellant contended, rested on testimony that did not directly establish the act of killing.

• Admissibility of the Victim's Statements: The prosecution relied on the testimonies of Camilo Cudal and Segundino Cudal, who recounted the victim's statements identifying appellant as the assailant. These statements, made immediately after the incident, were offered as part of the res gestae under the Rules of Court.

• Admissibility of Evidence: Whether the testimonies of Camilo Cudal and Segundino Cudal, narrating the victim's statements identifying appellant as the assailant, were admissible as part of the res gestae despite the absence of direct eyewitness testimony.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on the victim's spontaneous statements and the corroborating medical evidence.

• Appreciation of Intoxication: Whether appellant's intoxication at the time of the incident was properly appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.

• Admissibility of Evidence: The victim's statements to Camilo and Segundino were properly admitted as part of the res gestae, an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The three requisites for res gestae were satisfied: (1) the principal act—the assault with a stone—was a startling occurrence; (2) the victim's statements were spontaneous, made before he had time to contrive or devise a false statement, and were uttered immediately after the incident; and (3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The spontaneity of the utterance and its logical connection with the principal event, coupled with the fact that the utterance was made while the declarant was still "strong" and under the stimulus of nervous excitement, precluded contrivance, deliberation, design, or fabrication, giving the utterance an inherent guaranty of trustworthiness. No motive existed for the victim to falsely point to his own son as the culprit.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The victim's categorical, spontaneous, and instinctive statements to Camilo and Segundino constituted positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator. The postmortem report corroborated the victim's account, showing injuries consistent with being struck by a stone, as the defense's own medical witness, Dr. Orence, admitted on cross-examination that the contusion could have been caused by the force of a stone and the hematoma on the dorsal right hand could have resulted from the victim attempting to parry a stone thrown at him. The trial court's assessment of witness credibility was accorded respect absent any showing of arbitrariness or oversight of material facts.

• Appreciation of Intoxication: Intoxication, being an alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, is mitigating if not habitual or intentional, and aggravating if habitual or intentional. No evidence was presented to establish that appellant was a habitual drunkard. Applying the rule that doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, intoxication was correctly appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. Absent any aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2(3) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Res Gestae — Under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. Three requisites must concur: (1) the principal act or res gestae must be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a false statement, and was made during the occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The admissibility of such exclamations rests on the experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective faculties, so that the utterance becomes a spontaneous and sincere response to actual sensations and perceptions. Since the utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear, it may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed. In this case, the victim's statements to Camilo and Segundino, made immediately after the assault while still bleeding and in a state of nervous excitement, satisfied all three requisites.

• Credibility of Trial Court Findings — Appellate courts will normally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses unless the latter has reached conclusions clearly unsupported by evidence, or unless some facts or circumstances of weight or influence were overlooked which, if considered, would affect the result. The rationale is that trial courts have superior advantages in ascertaining truth and detecting falsehood, having the opportunity to observe at close range the manner and demeanor of witnesses while testifying.

• Alternative Circumstance of Intoxication — Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, intoxication is an alternative circumstance: it is aggravating if habitual or intentional; it is mitigating if otherwise. In case of doubt, the doubt shall be resolved in favor of the accused. Absent evidence of habitual drunkenness, intoxication shall be appreciated as mitigating.

• "The spontaneity of the utterance and its logical connection with the principal event, coupled with the fact that the utterance was made while the declarant was still 'strong' and subject to the stimulus of the nervous excitement of the principal event, are deemed to preclude contrivance, deliberation, design or fabrication, and to give to the utterance an inherent guaranty of trustworthiness." — This passage articulates the rationale for admitting res gestae statements, emphasizing that the declarant's state of nervous excitement provides a substitute guaranty of reliability ordinarily supplied by cross-examination.

• "The admissibility of such exclamation is based on experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock." — This excerpt, drawn from People v. Sanchez, explains the psychological foundation of the res gestae doctrine.

• "It cannot be concluded that in a very short span of time, taking into consideration the ripe age of the victim, his relationship to appellant, and the cruelty and suffering which immediately preceded the confession, the victim had the opportunity to concoct the facts surrounding the incident and its authorship." — The Court emphasized that the victim's age, his relationship to the accused, and the circumstances of the assault negated any suggestion of fabrication.

• People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — Invoked as the basis for transferring the direct appeal from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or death.

• People v. Ignas, G.R. Nos. 140514-15, September 30, 2003, 412 SCRA 311 — Cited for the three requisites of the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.

• People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 74740, August 28, 1992, 213 SCRA 70 — Relied upon for the rationale underlying the res gestae doctrine, specifically the psychological basis for admitting spontaneous utterances made under nervous excitement.

• People v. Dalag, G.R. No. 129895, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 254 — Cited for the principle that appellate courts accord respect to trial court findings on credibility of witnesses.

• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Parricide. Applied to appellant's killing of his father. The provision imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for any person who kills his father, mother, or child (legitimate or illegitimate), or any ascendant, descendant, or spouse.

• Article 15, Revised Penal Code — Alternative circumstances. Intoxication was appreciated as a mitigating circumstance under this provision, absent proof that appellant's drunkenness was habitual or intentional.

• Article 63, paragraph 2(3), Revised Penal Code — Rules for application of indivisible penalties. Where the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The provision justified the imposition of reclusion perpetua instead of death.

• Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Part of the res gestae. Applied to admit the victim's statements to Camilo and Segundino as an exception to the hearsay rule.

Justice Quisumbing (Chairperson), Justice Carpio, and Justice Velasco, Jr., concurred. Justice Tinga was on leave.

N/A. The decision was unanimous among the participating justices.