People vs. Crisostomo and Ragsac

Extrajudicial confessions executed before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973 are not subject to the requirement of counsel assistance during custodial interrogation, and remain admissible if shown to have been freely and voluntarily given without threat, duress, or violence. Where conspiracy is established by concerted acts and treachery is shown by a sudden attack from behind, both accused are liable as principals for murder; however, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated where insufficient time elapsed for reflection, and self-defense fails where unlawful aggression is not proven.

Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac were both sentenced prisoners confined at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, at the time of the incident. The victim, Antonio Waje, was likewise a sentenced prisoner in the same institution. Crisostomo had a longstanding grievance against Waje: Waje had killed prison guards Anselmo Villablanca and Fortunato Villareal at the Davao Penal Colony in 1958, who had been Crisostomo's supervisors and friends. Ragsac belonged to the Genuine Ilocano Gang, whose rival faction, the Commando Gang, counted Waje among its members. Both accused carried extensive criminal records, including prior convictions for theft, robbery, murder, illegal possession of firearms, and evasion of service of sentence.

Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac were inmates at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, as was the victim, Antonio Waje. Four days before May 27, 1972, Crisostomo gave Waje P62.00 to buy cigarettes and sugar at the prison Post Exchange. When Crisostomo later asked Waje about the items, Waje replied that the money was lost. Crisostomo asked Waje to repeat what he said, and Waje responded with "Maulit ka" and dared Crisostomo to fight. This incident, compounded by Crisostomo's knowledge that Waje had killed two prison guards at the Davao Penal Colony in 1958 who had been Crisostomo's supervisors and friends, led Crisostomo and Ragsac to plan to kill Waje.

At about 7:00 in the morning of May 27, 1972, the two accused left their dormitory to carry out their plan. Crisostomo followed a group of prisoners assigned to collect garbage, while Ragsac proceeded to the general kitchen. Crisostomo then went to the kitchen where he met Ragsac, and there they waited. When they saw Waje walking toward the Reception and Diagnostic Center, they followed him. Crisostomo approached Waje from behind, turned him about, and stabbed him. The first thrust did not prove fatal, so Ragsac stabbed Waje as well, and the two took turns stabbing the victim. Prison guard Servideo Camarillo, who witnessed the stabbing, fired shots into the air, causing the two accused to run toward the kitchen and lie face down. Camarillo recovered the weapons from them at that location. Waje was brought to the prison hospital but died on arrival; the post-mortem examination disclosed seven stab wounds, with the cause of death determined to be hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds.

That same morning, both accused were treated at the prison hospital for injuries consisting of abrasions, contusions, ecchymosis, and lacerated wounds. Thereafter, prison guard Tolentino Avelina, assigned as investigator for Waje's death, conducted separate interrogations in Tagalog. Crisostomo was interrogated between 11:00 a.m. and 12:40 p.m. and executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "F") in which he admitted plotting with Ragsac to kill Waje, citing Waje's killing of the prison guards and the loss of the P62.00 as his motives. Ragsac was interrogated from 1:00 p.m. to 2:40 p.m. and executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "G") admitting that he stabbed Waje several times, explaining that he did so because Crisostomo asked him and he could not refuse a friend, and that Waje belonged to the rival Commando Gang. Both accused identified the weapons recovered by Camarillo as those they had used.

At trial, the accused presented a materially different version. Crisostomo claimed he alone stabbed Waje in self-defense, alleging that Waje struck him with a "chaco" — a weapon made of two sharp-edged pieces of wood connected by a string — when he asked about the P62.00, and that he saw Waje pulling something from his body, prompting him to draw his own weapon, a "matalas," and stab Waje. Ragsac denied any participation, claiming he was with a brigade of prisoners collecting garbage. The "chaco" was never presented to the prison investigator and was never mentioned in either sworn statement, surfacing for the first time at trial. The trial court found the prosecution witnesses more credible than the defense witnesses and convicted both accused of murder. During the pendency of the automatic review, Ragsac escaped from prison.

• Conspiracy, Premeditation, and Treachery: The accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in finding that they conspired to kill Waje and that the killing was attended by evident premeditation and treachery.
• Ragsac's Participation: The accused-appellants maintained that the trial court erred in holding that Ragsac participated in the killing of Waje, Ragsac denying involvement and claiming he was with a garbage-collection brigade at the time.
• Self-Defense: The accused-appellants contended that the trial court erred in ruling that Crisostomo did not act in self-defense, asserting that Waje had attacked him with a "chaco" and that he stabbed Waje only to repel the aggression.
• Admissibility of Confessions: Counsel for the accused argued that the admission of their sworn statements was unconstitutional under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution because they were not assisted by counsel during custodial interrogation, and that the injuries they sustained proved they were maltreated into confessing.

• Voluntariness of Confessions: The Solicitor General countered that the injuries sustained by the accused did not necessarily prove maltreatment, as they were consistent with suddenly dropping prone to the ground while running at full speed when shots were fired, and that Crisostomo's head wound, if his testimony were credited, was caused by the alleged "chaco" blow from Waje rather than by torture.
• Timing of Alleged Torture: The appellee argued that even assuming torture occurred, it was inflicted when guards and soldiers were apprehending the accused following the assault on Waje — around 9:00 to 9:30 a.m. — and not during the investigation conducted by Avelina more than two hours later, during which the accused themselves admitted that Avelina was good to them and did not threaten or maltreat them.
• Constitutional Safeguard Inapplicable: The appellee maintained that the constitutional proscription against uncounseled confessions during custodial interrogation applied only to confessions made after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973, and that the sworn statements here were executed before that date.

• Admissibility of Confessions: Whether the sworn statements of the accused were admissible in evidence, notwithstanding claims of torture and lack of counsel assistance.
• Conspiracy: Whether the accused conspired to kill Waje.
• Treachery and Evident Premeditation: Whether the killing was committed with treachery and evident premeditation.
• Ragsac's Participation: Whether Ragsac participated in the killing of Waje.
• Self-Defense: Whether Crisostomo acted in self-defense when he killed Waje.

• Admissibility of Confessions: Yes. The sworn statements were admissible, having been freely and voluntarily given without coercion, and the constitutional requirement of counsel during custodial interrogation did not apply because the statements were executed before January 17, 1973.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established by the accused's agreement to kill Waje two hours before the act and their concerted acts of leaving the dormitory together, meeting at the kitchen, waiting for Waje, and simultaneously stabbing him.
• Treachery and Evident Premeditation: Treachery, yes — the attack from behind was consciously adopted to facilitate the killing without risk. Evident premeditation, no — only two hours elapsed between the plan and the killing, insufficient time for reflection.
• Ragsac's Participation: Yes. Ragsac's participation was established by his sworn admission and the concerted acts showing conspiracy; his flight during the pendency of review further evidenced consciousness of guilt.
• Self-Defense: No. Crisostomo failed to prove unlawful aggression, the first and indispensable element of self-defense, as no credible evidence showed that Waje was armed or had attacked him.

• Admissibility of Confessions: For a confession to be admissible, it must have been made without hope of benefit, without fear or duress, and without threat, torture, violence, artifice, or deception. The injuries sustained by the accused — bruises, abrasions, and ecchymosis — were consistent with suddenly dropping prone while running at full speed when shots were fired, and did not necessarily prove maltreatment. Even assuming torture occurred, it was inflicted during apprehension around 9:00 to 9:30 a.m., not during the investigation by Avelina, which took place from 11:00 a.m. to 12:40 p.m. for Crisostomo and from 1:00 p.m. to 2:40 p.m. for Ragsac. The accused themselves admitted at trial that Avelina was good to them and did not threaten or maltreat them. The lapse of more than two hours between the alleged maltreatment and the taking of their statements gave them sufficient time to retract any coerced admissions. As to the constitutional argument, the proscription against uncounseled confessions during custodial interrogation applied only to confessions made after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973; the sworn statements here were executed before that date.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy was shown by the admitted fact that the accused agreed to kill Waje two hours before the killing, and by their concerted acts: leaving their dormitory at 7:00 a.m., meeting at the prison kitchen, waiting for Waje to appear, approaching him, and simultaneously stabbing him. Because conspiracy was established, the acts of one accused were considered the acts of the other, making both liable as principals.

• Treachery and Evident Premeditation: Treachery was demonstrated by Crisostomo's admission that he approached Waje from behind, turned him about, and then stabbed him. The suddenness of the attack was consciously adopted to facilitate the perpetration of the crime without risk to the accused. Evident premeditation, however, could not be appreciated. The accused allegedly planned to kill Waje at 7:00 a.m. and the killing took place at 9:00 a.m. — a span of only two hours, which was insufficient time for the accused to reflect upon the consequences of their act.

• Ragsac's Participation: Ragsac's participation was established by his sworn statement (Exhibit "G") in which he admitted stabbing Waje several times, and by the concerted acts demonstrating conspiracy. His flight from prison while his case was pending review, as a death convict, was further evidence of his consciousness of guilt.

• Self-Defense: By invoking self-defense, Crisostomo admitted that he killed Waje, thereby shifting the burden of proof to him to establish the justifying circumstance by sufficient and convincing evidence. The elements of self-defense are unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression requires actual physical force or the actual use of a weapon. Crisostomo's claim that Waje attacked him with a "chaco" was not credible, as it was contrary to common experience and human nature for one to take violent offense at an inquiry about lost money. The "chaco" was never presented to the prison investigator and was never mentioned in the sworn statements, appearing for the first time at trial. There was no sufficient showing that Waje was armed at the time he was killed. Given that the victim was unarmed, it was not reasonable for two armed accused to attack him and inflict seven stab wounds.

• Admissibility of Confessions — A confession is admissible if made without hope of benefit, without fear or duress, and without the use of threat, torture, violence, artifice, or deception. Written statements made freely and voluntarily, admitting participation in the act complained of and sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence, are a sufficient basis for conviction. The Court applied this by finding that the sworn statements of both accused were voluntary, given the absence of credible evidence of coercion during the investigation and the accused's own admission that the investigator treated them well.

• Prospective Application of the 1973 Constitutional Safeguard on Confessions — The proscription against the admissibility of confessions obtained during custodial interrogation in violation of procedural safeguards applies only to confessions made after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973. The Court applied this rule to uphold the admissibility of the accused's sworn statements, which were executed before that date.

• Conspiracy by Concerted Acts — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and execute it through concerted acts demonstrating a common design. Where conspiracy is established, the acts of one conspirator are considered the acts of all, and all are liable as principals. The Court found conspiracy in the accused's prior agreement to kill Waje and their coordinated actions leading to the stabbing.

• Treachery — Treachery is present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to ensure its accomplishment without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. The Court found treachery in Crisostomo's approach from behind and sudden stabbing of Waje, a mode of attack consciously adopted to ensure the killing without risk.

• Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation requires sufficient time for the offender to reflect upon the consequences of the act. The Court declined to appreciate this circumstance where only two hours elapsed between the plan and the execution, holding that the interval was insufficient for reflection.

• Self-Defense — Burden of Proof and Elements — One who invokes self-defense thereby admits the killing and assumes the burden of proving the justifying circumstance. The elements are: (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind, requiring actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. The Court found that Crisostomo failed to establish unlawful aggression, as no credible evidence showed Waje was armed or had attacked him.

• Flight as Evidence of Consciousness of Guilt — The flight of a death convict from prison while his case is pending review is evidence of consciousness of guilt. The Court applied this to Ragsac, who escaped during the pendency of the automatic review.

• "For a confession to be admissible in evidence, it is a general rule that it must have been made without hope of benefit, without fear or duress, and without the use of threat, torture, violence, artifice or deception." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the voluntariness requirement for confessions, which the Court applied to uphold the admissibility of the accused's sworn statements.

• "it is settled that proscription against the admissibility of confessions obtained from the accused during the period of custodial interrogation in violation of the procedural safeguards, applies to confessions after the effectivity of the new charter on January 17, 1973." — This passage establishes the prospective application of the 1973 Constitution's custodial interrogation safeguards, a critical temporal demarcation for confessions obtained before the charter's effectivity.

• "By invoking self-defense, the accused Crisostomo admitted that he killed Antonio Waje. With his admission, the burden is upon him to prove by sufficient and convincing evidence that he was defending himself when he killed Waje." — This passage articulates the doctrinal shift in burden of proof when an accused pleads self-defense, a principle frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "Unlawful aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind. There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one's life, limb or right is either actual or imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon." — This passage defines unlawful aggression, the indispensable first element of self-defense, in terms commonly reproduced in later decisions.

• U.S. vs. Agatea, 40 Phil. 596 — Cited for the general rule on the voluntariness requirement for admissible confessions, providing the foundational formulation that confessions must be made without hope of benefit, fear, duress, threat, torture, violence, artifice, or deception.

• People vs. Tolentino, 82 Phil. 808 — Cited for the proposition that freely and voluntarily executed written statements admitting participation in the act charged, when sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence, are a sufficient basis for conviction.

• Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that the constitutional proscription against uncounseled confessions during custodial interrogation applies only to confessions made after January 17, 1973.

• People vs. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 488 — Cited for the principle that where conspiracy is established, the acts of one conspirator are considered the acts of the other, rendering all conspirators liable as principals.

• People vs. Lim, 71 SCRA 249 — Cited for the doctrine that treachery is present when the suddenness of the attack is consciously adopted to facilitate the crime without risk to the offender.

• People vs. Padiernos, 69 SCRA 484 — Cited for the rule that one who invokes self-defense admits the killing and assumes the burden of proving the justifying circumstance.

• People vs. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366 — Cited for the definition of unlawful aggression as equivalent to assault or threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind, requiring actual physical force or actual use of a weapon.

• People vs. Cornelio, 39 SCRA 435 — Cited for the principle that the flight of a death convict from prison while his case is pending review is evidence of consciousness of guilt.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder. The Court applied this provision to convict both accused, finding the killing qualified by treachery, with the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. The penalty of death was initially imposed but reduced to reclusion perpetua for lack of the necessary votes.

• Section 20, Article IV, 1973 Constitution — Provides procedural safeguards during custodial interrogation, including the right to counsel. The Court held that this provision applies only prospectively to confessions made after the Constitution's effectivity on January 17, 1973, and therefore did not bar admission of the accused's sworn statements, which were executed before that date.

Fernando, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concurred. Teehankee, J., concurred in the result.