People vs. Court of Appeals

A search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the place actually searched must be the place described in the warrant; the executing officers' personal knowledge or the evidence they adduced in support of the application cannot amplify or modify the description, which may be particularized only by the judge and only in the warrant itself. A search of a place different from that stated in the warrant is void, and evidence seized therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose.

The case involves a search warrant issued by Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City and a criminal case for illegal possession of explosives subsequently filed in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court at Malolos, Bulacan. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant issue only upon probable cause personally determined by the judge and that it particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, while Article III, Section 3 renders evidence obtained in violation thereof inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Rules of Court, Rule 126, Sections 7 and 11, further require that a search be made in the presence of the lawful occupant or two witnesses and that the officer forthwith deliver the seized property to the issuing judge with a verified inventory.

On December 14, 1995, Senior Inspector PNP James Brillantes applied for a search warrant before Branch 261 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who allegedly had firearms and explosives in his possession at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. The following day, December 15, 1995, Judge Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch 216, RTC Quezon City, issued Search Warrant No. 1068 (95), which described the premises to be searched as "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207" and admonished that the search be "limited only to the premises herein described." The application and the affidavit appended thereto contained the same description, which the judge reproduced verbatim in the warrant.

The search was actually executed not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apartment No. 1, immediately adjacent to the store, resulting in the arrest of four Pakistani nationals and the seizure of their personal belongings, papers, and effects — wallets, wrist watches, shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses, and travelling bags — including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00, aside from US$5,175.00 (receipted), none of which were mentioned in the warrant. Also seized were one dynamite stick, two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type, and one fragmentation grenade, but not the items described in the warrant: three Ingram machine pistols, four 9mm pistols, blasting caps, fuse, assorted chemical ingredients for explosives, and assorted magazines and ammunition. The US$5,175.00 was later returned to the respondents upon order of the court on their motion or request. On December 19, 1995, three days after service, a return was made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers, effects, or cash, and there was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.

On January 22, 1996, the private respondents pleaded not guilty to the charge of illegal possession of explosives and, on the same date, submitted their "Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible)." On January 29, 1996, Judge Casanova conducted an ocular inspection of the premises searched, which established that the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1, adjacent to Abigail's Variety Store; that there is no such number as "1207" in the building, which is correspondingly called only "Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4"; that Apartment No. 1 is separate from the store; that there are no connecting doors between the store and the apartment; and that each has its own respective door for ingress and egress. The People did not object to these findings.

The police officers claimed that they had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched — the first of four separate apartments behind the store — and that they had submitted a sketch to Judge Bacalla depicting the premises. The Court of Appeals, however, noted that the sketch was not dated, not signed by its maker, and not mentioned in the search warrant, and the People admitted during the hearing that the sketch was "not attached to the application for search warrant (but) merely attached to the motion for reconsideration." Judge Casanova also pointed out inconsistencies between Judge Bacalla's Order of December 15, 1995, which mentioned only P/Sr. Insp. Brillantes as the witness examined, and the warrant itself, which adverted also to SPO4 Cesar Santiago and SPO1 Prisco Bello, putting in doubt the sufficiency of the determination of probable cause. On February 9, 1996, Judge Casanova granted the motion to quash, declared the seized items inadmissible, and ordered the turnover of US$5,750.00 to the court; the motion for reconsideration was denied on May 28, 1996. The Solicitor General then commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition on September 11, 1996, on the grounds that the place searched was different from that described in the warrant, the search was not witnessed by lawful occupants, the return was tardy, and the respondent judge properly took cognizance of the motion to quash under the doctrine in Nolasco vs. Paño.

• Disregard of Issuing Court's Determination: The Solicitor General argued that the Court of Appeals erred in sanctioning the lower court's precipitate act of disregarding the proceedings before the issuing court and overturning the latter's determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be searched.
• Attachment of the Sketch: The Solicitor General argued that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the sketch was not attached to the application for the warrant despite clear evidence to the contrary.
• Tardiness of the Return: The Solicitor General argued that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could not be diminished by the tardiness by which the return was made.
• Certiorari as Remedy: The Solicitor General argued that the Court of Appeals hastily applied the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a substitute for appeal, although the circumstances fell within the exceptions to that rule.
• Opportunity to Present Evidence: The Solicitor General argued that the People was deprived of the opportunity to present evidence to prove the validity of the warrant when the petition was abruptly resolved without informing the petitioner thereof.
• Burgos Doctrine: The Solicitor General invoked Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, arguing that the executing officer's prior knowledge of the place intended in the warrant is relevant and that, in case of ambiguity, the officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file.

• Place Searched Different from Warrant: Private respondents moved to quash the search warrant and to declare the evidence obtained inadmissible, principally on the ground that the place actually searched — Apartment No. 1 — was different and distinct from the place described in the warrant, Abigail's Variety Store, as established by the ocular inspection.
• Search Not in Presence of Occupants: Private respondents asserted that the search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of the place or any member of the family, the occupants having been handcuffed and immobilized in the living room at the time.
• Tardy Return: Private respondents pointed out that the articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the warrant itself, the return having been made after three days or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: Whether the search warrant particularly described the place to be searched when the warrant specified "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207" but the officers searched Apartment No. 1, a separate and adjacent residential unit.
• Jurisdiction to Quash: Whether the motion to quash the search warrant was properly filed in the court where the criminal case was pending rather than in the court that issued the warrant.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: No. The search warrant failed the constitutional requirement of particularly describing the place to be searched, because the place actually searched — Apartment No. 1 — was different from the place stated in the warrant, "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207." The search was therefore void, and the evidence seized was inadmissible for any purpose under Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution.
• Jurisdiction to Quash: Yes. Under policy guideline No. 3 in Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, where no motion to quash was filed in the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression of the evidence; the remedy is alternative, not cumulative, and the Bulacan RTC acted within its competence.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: The Court held that the whole case hinged on whether the search warrant validly described the apartment in which the private respondents were actually residing. Although the police officers may have had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and may have intended to search the first of four separate apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store, the warrant itself described only "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207," and the judge's admonition limited the search "only to the premises herein described." The officers' faulty depiction of the premises in their application and affidavit — which the judge reproduced verbatim — caused the discrepancy, and the officers neither asked the judge to correct the description nor pointed out to him that the intended premises were "katabi," "kadikit," or "next to" the store. The Court distinguished Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, which concerned an obvious typographical error immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants; here, there was no ambiguity in the warrant itself, the ambiguity lying outside the instrument in the absence of a meeting of minds between the applicants and the issuing judge. The Court ruled that what is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts or had represented in their supporting proofs, and that the place to be searched cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge or the evidence they adduced. The particularization of the description may properly be done only by the judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search, for to allow otherwise would concede to them the power of choosing the place to be searched and open wide the door to abuse of the search process. Because the warrant was valid only as to Abigail's Variety Store and there was none for Apartment No. 1, the search and seizure proceedings were void, and the infringement of Article III, Section 2 necessarily brought into operation Article III, Section 3, rendering the evidence inadmissible for any purpose. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the other assigned errors — the attachment of the sketch, the presence of occupants during the search, the tardiness of the return, the refusal to receive evidence, and the propriety of certiorari — since these would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that the search was void.
• Jurisdiction to Quash: The Court rejected the Solicitor General's contention that a motion to quash a search warrant issued by a court other than the one trying the criminal case may be filed only with the issuing court. The Court clarified that the second policy guideline in Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals applies where the issuing court resolves the motion, while the third guideline applies where no motion to quash was filed in or resolved by the issuing court and the criminal case is pending in another court. In the latter situation, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression of the evidence, and a motion to quash and a motion to suppress are alternative, not cumulative, remedies, governed by the omnibus motion rule and the rule against forum-shopping. In this case, no motion to quash was ever filed in the Quezon City RTC; the motion was submitted only to the Bulacan RTC after the criminal action had been commenced there. The case thus fell within guideline No. 3, and the Bulacan RTC was deemed to have acted within its competence.

• Particularity of Description of the Place to Be Searched — Under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, it does not suffice for a search warrant to be valid that it be based on probable cause personally determined by the judge; it is essential that it particularly describe the place to be searched, the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so described. The place stated in the warrant itself controls, not the applicants' intent or the evidence they submitted to the issuing court, and the particularization may be done only by the judge and only in the warrant itself. Applied here: the warrant described "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207," but the officers searched Apartment No. 1, a separate adjacent unit, rendering the search void and the evidence inadmissible.
• Alternative Remedies for Quashing a Search Warrant (Malaloan Guidelines) — Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is commenced in another court, a motion to quash the warrant or to suppress the evidence may be filed for the first time in either the issuing court or the court where the criminal case is pending, but the remedy is alternative, not cumulative; the court first taking cognizance does so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. Guideline No. 3 applies where no motion to quash was filed in the issuing court: the interested party may move in the criminal case court for suppression of the evidence.
• Obvious Typographical Error Exception (Burgos Doctrine) — Distinguished. Where the warrant's description contains an obvious typographical error immediately perceptible on the face of the warrant, the executing officer may consult the application and the official court file to clarify the intended place. The doctrine does not apply where the warrant is unambiguous but the officers searched a different place based on their own understanding, for the place to be searched cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' personal knowledge.

• "What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant." — This is the ratio decidendi: the warrant's own description controls, and the officers' subjective intent or supporting evidence cannot cure a defective description.
• "The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search." — This states the canonical rule that the judge alone, in the warrant, may particularize the place to be searched, and that officers executing the warrant have no discretion to choose a different place.
• "It does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched, the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so described." — This articulates the two-fold constitutional requirement for a valid search warrant and the purpose of the particularity requirement.
• "Such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative." — This clarifies the Malaloan guidelines on the proper forum for quashing a search warrant issued by a court other than the one trying the criminal case.

• Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 133 SCRA 800 (1984) — Distinguished. That case concerned two search warrants with an obvious typographical error immediately perceptible on their face, where the executing officer could consult the court records to clarify the intended address; inapplicable where the warrant is unambiguous but a different place was searched.
• Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249 (1994) — Controlling. The Court applied policy guideline No. 3 of this case to hold that the Bulacan RTC properly took cognizance of the motion to quash where no motion had been filed in the issuing court and the criminal case was pending in another court.
• Nolasco vs. Paño, 139 SCRA 152 — Cited for the doctrine that a search warrant is deemed consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure, and the presiding judge in the criminal case has the right to rule on the warrant and exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
• Templo vs. de la Cruz, 60 SCRA 295 — Noted as the previous ruling overhauled by Nolasco vs. Paño.
• Quantero vs. NBI — Cited for the requirement under Section 7, Rule 126 that a search be made in the presence of the lawful occupant or, in his absence, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

• Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Requires that no search warrant issue except upon probable cause personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and that the warrant particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Violated here because the place actually searched differed from the place described in the warrant.
• Article III, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — Provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the search-and-seizure provision shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Applied to exclude the items seized under the void warrant.
• Section 7, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Requires that no search of a house, room, or other premise be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant or any member of his family, or in their absence, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. The occupants were handcuffed and immobilized at the time of the search.
• Section 11, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Requires the officer to forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath. The return was made after three days or 77 hours from service.

Romero, Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concurred.