People vs. Court of Appeals

The requirement of a hearing in support of the discharge of an accused as state witness under Sec. 9, Rule 119 is satisfied in substance where the prosecution's evidence and the sworn statement of the proposed witness are already before the court and the defense has been given the opportunity to oppose the motion, even if no actual oral hearing was conducted.

Nonilo Arile and Jose Pring were among the persons jointly charged with kidnapping for ransom in Criminal Case No. 94159, and the prosecution sought to discharge Arile from the information so that he could testify for the State, particularly at the hearing on Pring's petition for bail. The governing provision, Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, had replaced the earlier version of the same rule by expressly requiring the court to require the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge before the court could be satisfied of the conditions for discharge. The amendment was a response to Flores vs. Sandiganbayan, where the SC set aside a discharge order because the Sandiganbayan had merely relied on the information furnished by the fiscal.

On August 21, 1992, an information was filed with the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 67, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94159 and entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Nonilo Arile, Jaime Serrano, Edmund Divinagracia, Jose Pring, Timoteo Zarcal, Reynaldo Fernandez, Danilo Fernandez, Eddie Chang, Jose Sy and John Does," charging Jose Pring and his co-accused with violation of Article 267 (Kidnapping for Ransom) of the Revised Penal Code. After the information was filed, Pring submitted a petition for bail, with its hearing scheduled on August 31, 1992 and September 2, 1992 at 2:00 P.M.

On August 28, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to discharge accused Nonilo Arile so that he could be a state witness, with notice of hearing on September 4, 1992 at 8:30 A.M. Three days later, on August 31, 1992, Pring filed through counsel another motion for the issuance of bail, likewise with notice of hearing on September 4, 1992 at 8:30 A.M. At the scheduled hearing on the petition for bail on August 31, 1992, Pring failed to appear although his lawyers did, and upon joint motion by the prosecution and the defense the arraignment, pre-trial conference, and hearing on the petition for bail were reset to 2:00 P.M. of September 4, 1992.

On September 1, 1992, the prosecution filed an opposition to the petition for bail and asked that the hearing thereon be deferred until the trial court resolved the motion to discharge Arile, whose testimony was allegedly necessary to establish that the evidence of guilt against Pring was strong. On September 4, 1992, Pring's counsel filed an opposition to the motion to discharge Arile. At 2:00 P.M. of that day Criminal Case No. 94159 was called for arraignment, pre-trial, and the petition for bail, but only Arile appeared. The trial court thereupon issued an order resetting the arraignment and pre-trial conference to September 10, 11, 17, 18, 24, and 25, 1992, all at 2:00 P.M., and considering the motion to discharge Arile submitted for resolution.

On September 8, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the motion. After a careful examination of Arile's sworn statement and the other evidence of the prosecution, including the sworn statements of Jaime Serrano and Edmund Divinagracia and those of Rogelino A. Morales, the driver of the kidnapped victim, and Chin Yi Tsou, the victim's father, the court was satisfied that the averments of the government in its motion were borne out and fully supported by the facts and the relevant evidence, and it found that the conditions for discharge under Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure had been satisfied.

Pring assailed the order by filing a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 28933. At the hearing conducted by the appellate court on September 22, 1992, his counsel emphatically stressed the trial court's failure to comply with the required hearing in support of the discharge as mandated by Sec. 9, Rule 119. On October 23, 1992, the CA rendered its decision holding that before effecting the discharge the court should require the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of the proposed witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, and, finding that the lower court had resolved the motion without any hearing thereon, it annulled and set aside the September 8, 1992 Order of discharge.

The prosecution then filed the present petition, and Pring's comment was filed on February 1, 1993. Before that comment, the trial court issued an Order on January 21, 1993 considering Pring's petition for bail submitted for resolution with or without the opposition of the prosecution, prompting the prosecution to file an urgent motion for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order and for resolution of the petition; on March 30, 1993, the SC En Banc issued the TRO, ordering Judge Apolinario Santos to cease and desist from resolving or granting Pring's motion for bail in Criminal Case No. 94159 until the petition was resolved.

• Substantial Compliance with the Hearing Requirement: The Solicitor General argued that the prosecution's evidence — consisting of (a) the sworn statement of proposed witness Nonilo Arile, (b) the resolution of the investigating prosecutors, (c) the affidavits of Rogelio Morales, driver of the kidnapped Chinese children, and (d) the affidavits of accused Jaime Serrano and Edmund Divinagracia — had all been submitted to form part of the records of the case and were thus available for the scrutiny of Pring, who controverted Arile's statements in detail both in his Opposition to the Motion to Discharge and in his Petition for Bail. On this theory, the submission of the evidence to prove that the conditions for discharge exist amounted to its presentation in court, and the opportunity to rebut afforded Pring satisfied the due process requirement contemplated by the law in mandating a hearing; the requirement of holding an actual hearing in support of the discharge was substantially complied with.

• Strict Compliance with Sec. 9, Rule 119: Pring maintained that Arile's exclusion from the information was invalid because it rested on an Order of Discharge whose issuance was fatally flawed for the trial court's failure to conduct a hearing in support of the discharge, and he advocated strict adherence to the letter of the law.
• Impropriety of Certiorari under Rule 65: Pring contended that the State's filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was improper because, upon analysis of the single issue raised, the petition presented only a question of law, and under the rules on procedure a CA decision involving a pure question of law may be elevated to the SC only by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not under Rule 65.

• Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari: Whether the People may elevate the CA decision to the SC through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, where the CA decision involved a pure question of law.
• Hearing in Support of the Discharge: Whether the trial court may resolve the prosecution's motion to discharge an accused as state witness without conducting a hearing under Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, where the accused's sworn statement and the prosecution's other evidence were already in the possession of the court and had been challenged by the defense in its opposition and petition for bail.

• Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari: Yes. Certiorari under Rule 65 was available because an appeal would have been slow, inadequate, and insufficient to promptly relieve the prosecution of the injurious effects of the CA judgment, and the remedy was resorted to not as a substitute for appeal but as the proper remedy for the prosecution's predicament.
• Hearing in Support of the Discharge: Yes. The absence of an actual hearing was not fatal where the prosecution's evidence and Arile's sworn statement were already before the court and the defense had been given the opportunity to oppose the motion, satisfying the spirit and intent of Sec. 9, Rule 119 and the requirements of due process.

• Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari: The SC applied the settled rule that certiorari may be availed of where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment complained of, or in order to avoid further litigation. Citing Jaca vs. Lumber Company, as cited in Lansang, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, the SC noted that the availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy, and sufficient, and that it is the inadequacy — not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ — that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. Here, the CA decision setting aside the Order of Discharge effectively crippled the prosecution's bid to oppose Pring's application for bail, since the prosecution intended to utilize Arile's testimony to show that the evidence of guilt against Pring was strong. Because the trial court had warned that it would soon decide the bail petition with or without the prosecution's intended opposition, the prosecution was left without choice and was compelled under justified circumstances to file the special civil action, which it resorted to not as a substitute for appeal but as the proper remedy that could with dispatch address its predicament. There was thus no procedural impediment barring the SC from entertaining the petition.

• Hearing in Support of the Discharge: The SC compared the old and the amended Sec. 9, Rule 119. Under the old rule, the competent court could, at any time before the accused entered upon his defense, direct one or more of them to be discharged upon the five conditions, without any express requirement of a hearing. The 1985 Rules, as amended, now require that the court act "after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge," and only then may it be satisfied of the same five conditions: (a) absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. The amendment was intended to avoid a repetition of Flores vs. Sandiganbayan, where the SC set aside the Sandiganbayan's Order of Discharge because that court merely relied on the information furnished by the fiscal in forming its conclusion on whether the conditions for discharge had been met. The SC explained that the term "hearing in support of the discharge" refers to a proceeding separate from the trial itself where the prosecution presents its evidence proving the existence of the conditions for discharge and the sworn statement of the proposed witness; it does not foreclose but rather affords the defense an opportunity to enter its opposition against the motion, all to aid the court in fulfilling its mandated duty of determining the propriety of the sought-after discharge. The essential objective of the law is for the court to receive or possess evidence for or against the discharge which will serve as a tangible and concrete basis, independent of the fiscal's persuasions, in granting or denying the motion. Applying this, the SC found that the prosecution had submitted Arile's sworn statement and its evidence showing that the conditions for discharge had been met, and that the defense was able to oppose the motion. With both litigants able to present their side, the lack of an actual hearing was not fatal enough to undermine the court's ability to determine whether the conditions prescribed under Sec. 9, Rule 119 were satisfied, and the court thereby avoided a repetition of Flores. On the due process objection, the SC held that "to be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court, and that where a party was given the opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there can be denial of procedural due process; "due process is not semper et ubique judicial process." Pring had filed his opposition to the motion to discharge Arile and had even discussed the material points of Arile's testimony in his petition for bail, so his assertion of a denial of due process for failure to conduct a hearing in support of the discharge was unfounded and not substantiated after a perusal of the records.

• Hearing in support of the discharge under Sec. 9, Rule 119 — The term refers to a proceeding, separate from the trial itself, where the prosecution presents its evidence proving the existence of the conditions for discharge and the sworn statement of the proposed witness, and where the defense is afforded an opportunity to enter its opposition. Its essential objective is for the court to receive or possess evidence for or against the discharge which will serve as a tangible and concrete basis, independent of the fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions, in granting or denying the motion. In this case, the SC held that this objective was met even without an actual oral hearing because the prosecution's evidence and the defense's opposition were already before the court.
• Substantial compliance with the hearing requirement — The absence of an actual hearing is not fatal enough to undermine the court's ability to determine whether the conditions for discharge were satisfied where both litigants were able to present their sides and the court had before it the evidence for and against the discharge.
• Due process — opportunity to be heard — "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; where a party was given the opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there can be denial of procedural due process. "Due process is not semper et ubique judicial process." Pring's filing of an opposition to the motion to discharge and his discussion of the material points of Arile's testimony in his petition for bail negated his claim of denial of due process.
• Certiorari under Rule 65 as a remedy despite the availability of appeal — Certiorari may be availed of where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment complained of, or in order to avoid further litigation. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy where the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy, and sufficient; it is the inadequacy of the appeal, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies, that determines the propriety of certiorari.
• Conditions for discharge of an accused as state witness — Under Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the State, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that: (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Evidence adduced in support of the discharge automatically forms part of the trial, and if the motion is denied, the accused's sworn statement is inadmissible in evidence.

• "Thus, the term 'hearing in support of the discharge' as contemplated by said law refers to a proceeding, separate from the trial itself, where the prosecution presents its evidence proving the existence of the conditions for discharge and the sworn statement of the proposed witness." — Defines the nature of the hearing required under Sec. 9, Rule 119 and distinguishes it from the trial proper.
• "In requiring therefore, a 'hearing in support of the discharge,' the essential objective of the law is for the court to receive or possess evidence for or against the discharge which will serve as tangible and concrete basis, independent of the fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions, in granting or denying the motion for discharge." — States the purpose behind the hearing requirement, which the SC used to test whether the procedure followed substantially complied.
• "With both litigants able to present their side, the lack of actual hearing was not fatal enough to undermine the court's ability to determine whether the conditions prescribed under Section 9, Rule 119 were satisfied." — The core application: the absence of an oral hearing did not invalidate the discharge where the evidence for and against was already before the court.
• "To be heard' does not only mean verbal arguments in court. Where a party was given the opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there can be denial of procedural due process. 'Due process is not semper et ubique judicial process.'" — The due process formulation the SC used to reject Pring's claim that the lack of a hearing denied him procedural due process.

• Flores vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-63677, August 12, 1983, 124 SCRA 109 — The case the 1985 amendment to Sec. 9, Rule 119 sought to avoid repeating; the SC had set aside a Sandiganbayan discharge order because that court merely relied on the information furnished by the fiscal. Distinguished and avoided in this case.
• Jaca vs. Lumber Company, No. L-25771, March 29, 1982, 113 SCRA 107, 129 — Cited, through Lansang, for the rule that the availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not prevent recourse to certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate, speedy, and sufficient remedy.
• Lansang, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76028, April 6, 1990, 184 SCRA 230, 235 — Cited as the case through which the Jaca rule was applied in support of the availability of certiorari under Rule 65.
• Juanita Yap Say and William Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-73451, March 28, 1988, 159 SCRA 325 — Cited for the due process rule that "to be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court and that due process is not semper et ubique judicial process.
• Presco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82215, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 232 — Cited for the rule that certiorari may be availed of where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, or to avoid further litigation.

• Sec. 9, Rule 119, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended — Governs the discharge of an accused to be a state witness and requires the court, before granting the discharge, to require the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge. Applied: the SC held that the hearing requirement was substantially complied with where the prosecution's evidence and the defense's opposition were already before the court.
• Sec. 9, Rule 119, old Rules of Criminal Procedure (pre-1985) — Quoted by the SC to show that the old rule allowed discharge without an express hearing requirement, and that the amendment added the requirement of a hearing in support of the discharge.
• Art. 267, Revised Penal Code — Kidnapping for ransom, the offense charged against Pring and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 94159.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Certiorari. Held available to the prosecution despite the availability of an appeal, because an appeal would have been slow, inadequate, and insufficient to relieve it from the injurious effects of the CA judgment.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Petition for review on certiorari. Pring argued that this was the only proper mode of elevating a CA decision involving a pure question of law; the SC rejected the objection and entertained the Rule 65 petition.