People vs. Cortezano

A minor over nine but under fifteen years of age who commits rape with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability and is entitled only to a discretionary penalty lowered by two degrees from that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68(1) of the Revised Penal Code, provided the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that the minor acted with discernment.

The appellants Bernardo Cortezano and Joel Cortezano were the sons of [the grandparents] residing in Barangay [xxx], Sipocot, Camarines Sur. The victim AAA was their seven-year-old niece, daughter of [parents] who periodically left their children in the grandparents' care during school vacations. At the time of the offenses in May and June 1990, Bernardo was twelve years and four months old and Joel was thirteen years and six months old. The applicable law was Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as it stood prior to Republic Act No. 7659, which prescribed reclusion perpetua to death for rape committed by two or more persons.

Sometime in March 1990, [the mother] decided to take a leave from her part-time job in Cubao, Quezon City, and spend her vacation with her three children — eight-year-old AAA, three-year-old [sibling], and [another sibling] who was barely a year old — at the house of her parents-in-law in Barangay [xxx], Sipocot, Camarines Sur. The Cortezano residence was located on an isolated patch of land. The grandparents' household included their children: Bernardo ("Butchoy"), then twelve years old; Joel, then thirteen; Tinggang, six years old; and their nephew Boyet Orcine, also six. By mid-April 1990, [the mother] returned to Caloocan City, leaving her children in the grandparents' care.

According to the prosecution, early in the afternoon of May 6, 1990, Joel and Bernardo ordered AAA to sleep in their grandparents' room. When AAA protested that the room was hot, Joel threatened to whip her with a broom. AAA complied and fell asleep, but awoke sensing pressure on her arms and legs. She saw her uncles holding her hands and feet as she was being undressed. AAA struggled but was overpowered. Joel and Bernardo wet her vagina with saliva; Joel then mounted and penetrated her while Bernardo stood at the window as lookout. After Joel dismounted, Bernardo took his turn, with Joel serving as lookout. AAA felt something slippery inside her vagina each time. Boyet Orcine then arrived and asked what they were doing; Joel and Bernardo ordered Boyet to rape AAA, threatening to box him if he refused, and laughed as Boyet complied. They then called AAA's younger siblings to look at their naked sister. Joel and Bernardo threatened to kill AAA and her family if she told anyone. Thereafter, Joel and Bernardo subjected AAA to sexual abuse on a daily basis until June 10, 1990, when [the mother] arrived to bring the children back to Caloocan City. AAA did not reveal the abuse because of the threats. She suffered pain in her lower abdomen and numbness on the left side of her body.

The abuse remained undisclosed until May 27, 1994, when Boyet Orcine told [the mother] that AAA had been sexually abused by Joel and Bernardo in 1990. [The mother] contacted a DSWD social worker, who advised her to ask AAA directly. On June 1, 1994, [the mother] asked AAA about her experiences in Sipocot; AAA disclosed the rapes. [The mother] brought AAA to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, where Dr. Ma. Cristina B. Freyra examined her and found deep healed lacerations at 3, 7, and 9 o'clock on the hymen, consistent with sexual penetration. Sworn statements were given on June 16, 1994.

For their part, the appellants interposed alibi. Bernardo testified that on March 28, 1990, he had gone to Barangay Bagadiong, Libmanan, to help his cousin plow and plant rice, and did not return to Sipocot until April 5, 1993. He admitted, however, that passenger jeepneys and buses plied the route between Bagadiong and Sipocot four times daily, making it possible for him to return. Joel testified that on May 6, 1990, he and his mother traveled to Manila so he could receive treatment for leukemia at the Philippine General Hospital, where he claimed to have been confined for about a week. He failed to produce any medical certificate, claiming it was lost in a typhoon. The prosecution rebutted this with certifications from the PGH Medical Records Division showing that Joel had consulted only as an outpatient on August 16, 1989, November 2, 1989, and April 6, 1990, and was never confined at the PGH in 1990. Joel's mother and father corroborated the claim that Joel was in Manila during the relevant period, while the grandparents' brother Sancho testified that he saw AAA in Caloocan City on May 10, 1990. Boyet Orcine denied having sexual intercourse with AAA and testified that he was in the hills of Barangay Tulay with his mother on May 6, 1990, returning only in 1993.

The trial court gave full credence to AAA's testimony, finding it consistent, spontaneous, and corroborated by the medico-legal findings. It convicted the appellants of four counts of rape — two in each Information — and sentenced each to reclusion perpetua for each count, with moral and exemplary damages.

• Credibility of Victim's Testimony: Appellants argued that AAA's testimony was incredible and barren of probative weight, citing the discrepancy between her sworn statement claiming thirty-six rapes and her trial testimony identifying only May 6 and June 10, 1990, as the dates of the charged offenses.
• Corroboration by Siblings: Appellants asserted that if AAA's claim that her siblings saw her naked were true, the siblings would have immediately reported the matter to their parents, and their failure to do so raised serious doubts about AAA's veracity.
• Boyet Orcine's Denial: Appellants pointed to Boyet's denial that he had sexual intercourse with AAA as belying the latter's testimony.
• Alibi: Appellants maintained that although alibi is inherently weak, the prosecution's evidence was so tattered that the defense of alibi assumed decisive importance, and the prosecution bore the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Ill Motive of Complainant's Mother: Appellants claimed the charges were instigated by [the mother] to retaliate against her husband and his family.

• Credibility of Victim: Whether the testimony of the seven-year-old victim was credible and sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape, notwithstanding alleged inconsistencies and the defense of alibi.
• Discernment of Minors: Whether the appellants, who were over nine but under fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, acted with discernment and were thus not exempt from criminal liability.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the appellants were entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and what the proper indeterminate penalty should be.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the aggravating circumstances of relationship and ignominy could be appreciated to increase the penalty, given that they were not alleged in the Informations.
• Civil Liabilities: Whether the trial court's award of damages was proper, and whether civil indemnity should additionally be awarded.

• Credibility of Victim: Yes. The victim's testimony was categorical, spontaneous, and consistent, and was corroborated by medico-legal findings of healed hymenal lacerations; minor inconsistencies did not affect credibility, and the defense of alibi could not prevail over positive identification.
• Discernment of Minors: Yes. The appellants acted with discernment, as shown by their coordinated conduct — wetting the victim's vagina, taking turns as lookout, threatening to kill the victim, forcing Boyet to rape the victim, and ordering the victim's siblings to see her naked.
• Proper Penalty: The penalty was reduced from reclusion perpetua to an indeterminate sentence of nine years and one day of prision mayor (medium period) as maximum to four years and two months of prision correccional (medium period) as minimum, pursuant to Article 68(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Aggravating Circumstances: No. The aggravating circumstances of relationship and ignominy, though present, could not aggravate the penalty because they were not alleged in the Informations, as mandated by Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, applied retroactively as favorable to the appellants.
• Civil Liabilities: The trial court's award was modified. Civil indemnity of P50,000 per count was additionally awarded, moral damages of P50,000 per count were maintained, and exemplary damages were adjusted to P25,000 per count.

• Credibility of Victim: The assessment of witness credibility lies within the province of the trial court, which is in the best position to observe the demeanor, conduct, and attitude of witnesses. Appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's credence findings absent a clear showing that it overlooked or disregarded significant facts. The trial court found AAA's testimony consistent, firm, and undisturbed even under lengthy cross-examination. Minor inconsistencies related to trivial matters and were to be expected when a person recounts painful and humiliating experiences. The medico-legal findings of deep healed lacerations at 3, 7, and 9 o'clock corroborated the testimony of sexual penetration, even though no fresh lacerations were found, the examination having occurred three years after the abuse. The victim's crying during testimony bolstered credibility, as human nature and experience confirm. No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, submit to examination of her private parts, and endure a public trial unless motivated by a desire to have the culprit punished. The discrepancy between AAA's sworn statement (thirty-six rapes) and the number of counts charged (four) did not render her testimony implausible; the prosecutor may have opted to file fewer counts for reasons unrelated to credibility, and the municipal trial court conducting the preliminary investigation had itself found probable cause for thirty-six counts. The siblings' failure to report was explained by their tender ages — one was barely three and the other only one year old. The appellants' claim that the charges were fabricated by the mother for revenge was rejected as implausible, no mother subjecting a young child to the rigors of a rape trial merely to exact revenge. The defense of alibi was the weakest of all defenses; for it to prosper, the defense must establish by clear and convincing evidence both presence in another place and physical impossibility of being at the scene. Bernardo failed to prove physical impossibility, admitting that transportation between Bagadiong and Sipocot was readily available. Joel failed to substantiate his claim of confinement at the PGH, which was directly contradicted by hospital certifications showing only outpatient consultations. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive, straightforward, and spontaneous testimony of the victim identifying the appellants as the perpetrators.

• Discernment of Minors: Under Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, a person over nine and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted with discernment. The burden is on the prosecution to prove discernment. Discernment is the minor's mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, determined from all facts and circumstances, including the minor's appearance, attitude, comportment, and behavior before, during, and after the commission of the act, and even during trial. The evidence showed beyond cavil that the appellants acted with discernment: (a) they wetted the victim's vagina before raping her; (b) one acted as lookout while the other raped the victim; (c) they threatened to kill the victim if she divulged the abuse; (d) they forced Boyet to rape the victim; (e) they laughed as Boyet was raping the victim; and (f) they ordered the victim's siblings to look at their naked sister after the rapes.

• Proper Penalty: The imposable penalty for rape committed by two or more persons under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (prior to RA 7659) was reclusion perpetua to death. Because the appellants were both minors at the time of the offenses, they were entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68(1), which mandates a discretionary penalty always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law. Two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to death is prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years). The maximum of the indeterminate penalty was taken from the medium period of prision mayor, and the minimum from the medium period of prision correccional (6 months and 1 day to 6 years), yielding an indeterminate sentence of nine years and one day of prision mayor as maximum to four years and two months of prision correccional as minimum.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The crimes were aggravated by relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, the appellants being the uncles of the victim. The crime in Criminal Case No. L-1679 was also aggravated by ignominy, as the appellants forced Boyet to rape the victim, laughed during the act, and ordered the victim's siblings to see her naked. However, these aggravating circumstances could not be appreciated to increase the penalty because they were not alleged in the Informations, as mandated by Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crimes were committed before the effectivity of that Rule, it was applied retroactively because it was favorable to the appellants.

• Civil Liabilities: The trial court awarded P50,000 as moral damages and P50,000 as exemplary damages per case but did not award civil indemnity. The Supreme Court modified the award: AAA was entitled to civil indemnity of P50,000 and moral damages of P50,000 for every count of rape, and exemplary damages of P25,000 per count. The trial court had convicted the appellants of two counts of rape in each Information, for a total of four counts, so each appellant was ordered to pay a total of P100,000 as civil indemnity, P100,000 as moral damages, and P50,000 as exemplary damages in each criminal case.

• Discernment of minors over nine but under fifteen — A minor over nine but under fifteen years of age is exempt from criminal liability only when he acted without discernment. Discernment is the minor's mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, determined by taking into consideration all facts and circumstances, including the minor's appearance, attitude, comportment, and behavior before, during, and after the commission of the act, and even during trial. The burden of proving discernment rests on the prosecution. In this case, discernment was established by the appellants' coordinated and deliberate conduct during the commission of the rapes.

• Privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68(1) — When the offender is under fifteen but over nine years of age and is not exempt from liability because the court declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime committed. Applied here, two degrees lower from reclusion perpetua to death yielded prision mayor, from which the indeterminate sentence was computed.

• Credibility of child victims in rape cases — Testimonies of young victims of rape deserve full credence and should not be easily dismissed as fabrication. No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her private parts, and submit to a public trial unless motivated by the desire to have the culprit punished. When a woman, more so a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Minor inconsistencies in testimony relate to trivial matters and do not affect credibility, as minor lapses are expected when a person recounts details of a humiliating and painful experience.

• Alibi as a defense — Alibi is the weakest of all defenses. For alibi to prosper, the defense must establish by clear and convincing evidence: (a) the presence of the appellant in another place at the time of the commission of the offense, and (b) the physical impossibility for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive, straightforward, and spontaneous testimony of the victim identifying the accused as the perpetrators.

• Allegation of aggravating circumstances in the Information — Aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, must be alleged in the Information to be appreciated, pursuant to Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This rule is applied retroactively when favorable to the accused, even if the crimes were committed before its effectivity.

• "The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial." — This passage, quoting Valentin vs. Duqueña, defines the controlling standard for discernment under Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code and is the foundational test applied to determine whether minors over nine but under fifteen are criminally liable.

• "No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial, unless she is motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished." — This passage, quoting People vs. Quezada, articulates the doctrinal basis for according full credence to the testimony of child victims in rape cases and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "[A]libi is the weakest of all defenses. It is a settled rule that for an alibi to prevail, the defense must establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely the accused was somewhere else." — This passage states the canonical two-pronged test for the defense of alibi and establishes why alibi fails against positive identification by the victim.

• People vs. Batis, 216 SCRA 673 (1992) — Cited for the three settled principles governing rape prosecutions: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; (2) the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with caution; and (3) the prosecution's evidence must stand or fall on its own merits.
• People vs. Guanson, 372 SCRA 222 (2001) — Cited for the doctrine that assessment of witness credibility lies within the province and competence of trial courts, and appellate courts will not disturb such assessment absent clear error.
• People vs. Quezada, 375 SCRA 248 (2002) — Cited for the principle that no woman of tender age would fabricate a rape charge and submit to public trial unless motivated by a desire for justice.
• People vs. De Guzman, 372 SCRA 95 (2001) — Cited for the rule that testimonies of rape victims, especially child victims, are given full weight and credit, and that it is most improbable for an innocent girl to impute so serious a crime as rape to any man if it were not true.
• Valentin vs. Duqueña, 68 Phil. 580 (1939) — Cited for the definition and standard of discernment for minors over nine but under fifteen, which is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong.
• People vs. Fuertes, 326 SCRA 382 (2000) — Cited for the definition of ignominy as an aggravating circumstance that adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime.
• People vs. Delima, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003 — Cited for the retroactive application of Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring aggravating circumstances to be alleged in the Information, as favorable to the accused.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code (as amended) — Defined and punished rape committed by two or more persons with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Applied as the law in force at the time of the commission of the offenses in May and June 1990, prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659.
• Article 12, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — Exempts from criminal liability a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless he acted with discernment. Applied to determine whether the appellants, who were twelve and thirteen years old at the time, were exempt from liability; the Court found they acted with discernment.
• Article 68(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides that upon a person under fifteen but over nine who is not exempted from liability by reason of having acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law. Applied to reduce the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death to prision mayor, from which the indeterminate sentence was computed.
• Article 15, Revised Penal Code (as amended) — Defines the alternative circumstance of relationship, taken into consideration when the offended party is a relative by affinity in the same degree as the offender. Applied to recognize relationship as an aggravating circumstance, the appellants being the uncles of the victim, though it could not increase the penalty due to non-allegation in the Informations.
• Article 14, Revised Penal Code — Lists aggravating circumstances, including the employment of means or circumstances which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. Applied to find ignominy attendant when the appellants forced Boyet to rape the victim and ordered the victim's siblings to see her naked, though it could not aggravate the penalty.
• Section 9, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires that aggravating circumstances be alleged in the Information. Applied retroactively as favorable to the appellants, precluding appreciation of relationship and ignominy as aggravating circumstances because they were not alleged in the Informations.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concurred.