People vs. Cortes

When no generic aggravating circumstance is proven and mitigating circumstances are present, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua, not death, pursuant to Article 63 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

The accused, George Cortes y Ortega, was charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law), for the fatal stabbing of sixteen-year-old Edlyn S. Gamboa. The case reached the Supreme Court on automatic review because the trial court imposed the death penalty, which at the time required mandatory review by the Court en banc.

On June 24, 1998, at about eleven o'clock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo was seated on a bench outside her house at P. Lindo Street, Saint Paul District, Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Edlyn Gamboa, a sixteen-year-old girl, approached Junilla asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibuña. Junilla noticed that accused George Cortes y Ortega was following Edlyn. Junilla instructed Edlyn to go upstairs, but as Edlyn complied, the accused followed and successively stabbed her several times. Junilla attempted to help but was overpowered by the accused. Edlyn managed to run despite her wounds but collapsed five meters away. Junilla shouted for help, and the accused fled. Edlyn briefly stood up, took about five steps, and collapsed again. She was taken to the Babano Medical Clinic, where she expired.

The accused admitted to the stabbing but claimed he mistook Edlyn for her male companion, against whom he had an earlier altercation. He attributed the mistake to his intoxication and the darkness of the place. He only learned the following morning, through a radio vigilantes program, that he had stabbed the wrong person.

On August 12, 1998, a provincial prosecutor filed an Information for murder against Cortes, alleging treachery and evident premeditation, armed with a knife, with intent to kill. At his arraignment on August 28, 1998, the accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty. The trial court conducted an inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea, and the accused reiterated his guilty plea and his extrajudicial confession executed before the police. The prosecution then presented evidence to prove aggravating circumstances, while the defense presented evidence on mitigating circumstances.

The prosecution alleged the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty, nighttime, abuse of superior strength, disregard of sex, and intoxication. The defense raised the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, mistaken identity, and the alternative mitigating circumstance of intoxication. On September 2, 1998, the trial court found the aggravating circumstances present and appreciated only the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, which it offset against one aggravating circumstance. The trial court convicted the accused of murder and sentenced him to death, ordering him to indemnify the victim's family ₱60,000.00 and to pay ₱200,000.00 in damages plus costs.

• Failure to Prove Aggravating Circumstances: The accused argued that the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and the other circumstances alleged to have attended the commission of the crime.
• Impropriety of Death Penalty: The accused maintained that in the absence of any aggravating circumstances and considering the presence of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the penalty imposable is not death but reclusion perpetua.

• Agreement on Absence of Aggravating Circumstances: The Solicitor General agreed with the accused that the only aggravating circumstance present was treachery, which qualified the killing to murder, and that there were two mitigating circumstances—plea of guilty and intoxication, which was not habitual.
• Proper Penalty: The Solicitor General argued that the penalty should be reclusion perpetua, not death, in accordance with Article 63 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

• Evident Premeditation: Whether the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was proven by the prosecution.
• Cruelty: Whether the aggravating circumstance of cruelty attended the commission of the crime.
• Nighttime: Whether nighttime was properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether abuse of superior strength may be appreciated separately from treachery.
• Disregard of Sex: Whether the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex was present.
• Intoxication: Whether intoxication should be considered a mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the death penalty was properly imposed instead of reclusion perpetua.

• Evident Premeditation: No. The prosecution failed to establish the three elements of evident premeditation: the time the accused determined to commit the crime, an act manifestly indicating he clung to that determination, and a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow reflection.
• Cruelty: No. Although the accused stabbed the victim several times, there was no showing that the wounds were intended to prolong the victim's suffering; mere infliction of successive wounds without proof of intent to prolong suffering does not constitute cruelty.
• Nighttime: No. Nighttime is aggravating only when specially sought by the offender, taken advantage of, or facilitates the crime by ensuring immunity from identification or capture; no evidence showed the accused purposely sought the cover of darkness.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: No. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery and cannot be appreciated separately as another aggravating circumstance; here, treachery qualified the offense to murder.
• Disregard of Sex: No. It was not shown that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed manifest disrespect for her womanhood; in fact, the accused mistook the victim for a man.
• Intoxication: Mitigating. Intoxication is mitigating when it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the crime; the accused's intoxication, which contributed to his mistaken identity, was not shown to be habitual or intentional.
• Proper Penalty: No. The death penalty was improper; the correct penalty is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as no generic aggravating circumstance was proven while two mitigating circumstances were present.

• Evident Premeditation: The elements of evident premeditation are: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to that determination, and (c) a lapse of time between the determination and the execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act. The prosecution failed to establish any of these elements. There was no evidence of when the accused formed the intent to kill, no overt act showing he persisted in that determination, and no sufficient interval for reflection. Accordingly, evident premeditation could not be appreciated.
• Cruelty: For cruelty to be appreciated, it must be shown that the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully by inflicting unnecessary physical and moral pain, denoting sadism and a marked degree of malice. The mere fact of inflicting successive wounds to cause death, with no appreciable time intervening between wounds to show intent to prolong suffering, is not sufficient. Although the accused stabbed the victim several times, nothing in the record indicated a deliberate intent to prolong her agony.
• Nighttime: Nighttime becomes aggravating only when it is specially sought by the offender, the offender takes advantage of it, or it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring immunity from identification or capture. No evidence suggested that the accused purposely sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime or to conceal his identity. The incident occurred at around eleven o'clock in the evening, but nothing showed the accused deliberately chose that time for concealment.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery and cannot be appreciated separately as an additional aggravating circumstance. Here, treachery was the qualifying circumstance that elevated the killing to murder. Appreciating abuse of superior strength separately would constitute improper double appreciation of circumstances arising from the same facts.
• Disregard of Sex: Disregard of sex requires a showing that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed manifest disrespect for her womanhood. The accused mistook the victim for a man, negating any intent to show disrespect for her sex. The circumstance therefore could not be appreciated.
• Intoxication: Intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating depending on the circumstances. It is mitigating when it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; it is aggravating when habitual or intentional. A person pleading intoxication as a mitigating circumstance must prove having taken a sufficient quantity of alcoholic beverage to obfuscate reason, and must show that he is not a habitual drinker and did not take the drink to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime. The accused's intoxication contributed to his mistaken identity, and there was no showing it was habitual or intentional; thus, it was appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
• Proper Penalty: Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the penalty is divisible and no aggravating circumstance is present but mitigating circumstances are, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Murder under Article 248, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Since no generic aggravating circumstance was proven and two mitigating circumstances—plea of guilty and non-habitual intoxication—were present, the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua. The Court also awarded ₱50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by the victim's heirs.

• Elements of Evident Premeditation — The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation requires proof of three elements: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to that determination, and (c) a lapse of time between the determination and the execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act. All three must be established; failure to prove any one precludes appreciation of the circumstance.

• Cruelty as an Aggravating Circumstance — Cruelty requires proof that the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully by inflicting unnecessary physical and moral pain, denoting sadism and a marked degree of malice or perversity. The mere infliction of successive wounds to cause death, without proof of intent to prolong suffering, is insufficient.

• Nighttime as an Aggravating Circumstance — Nighttime is aggravating only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender, (2) the offender takes advantage of it, or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from identification or capture. Absent proof of any of these conditions, nighttime is not appreciated.

• Absorption of Abuse of Superior Strength in Treachery — Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery and cannot be separately appreciated as an additional aggravating circumstance when treachery already qualifies the offense.

• Intoxication as a Mitigating Circumstance — Intoxication is mitigating when it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. The accused must prove (a) having taken a sufficient quantity of alcoholic beverage to obfuscate reason, and (b) that he is not a habitual drinker and did not take the drink to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime. Intoxication is aggravating only when habitual or intentional.

• Application of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code — When the penalty prescribed by law is divisible and the crime is attended by mitigating circumstances with no aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. For murder, which carries reclusion perpetua to death, the absence of aggravating circumstances and the presence of mitigating circumstances mandate the imposition of reclusion perpetua.

• "The prosecution failed to establish the following elements of this aggravating circumstance: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to that determination, and (c) a lapse of time between the determination and the execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act." — This passage states the controlling three-element test for evident premeditation and explains why the circumstance was not appreciated.

• "For cruelty to be appreciated against the accused, it must be shown that the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully as he inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain." — This defines the canonical formulation of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance and distinguishes it from mere multiple wounding.

• "Night-time becomes an aggravating circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2) the offender takes advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from identification or capture." — This enumerates the three conditions under which nighttime may be appreciated as aggravating, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, so that it can not be appreciated separately as another aggravating circumstance." — This states the rule of absorption that prevents double appreciation of abuse of superior strength when treachery is already the qualifying circumstance.

• People vs. Torres, G.R. No. 138046, December 8, 2000 — Cited for the three-element test of evident premeditation; followed as controlling formulation.
• People vs. Magayac, 330 SCRA 767 (2000) — Cited for the definition of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance, itself citing People vs. Dayug, 49 Phil. 423 (1926) and People vs. Estorco, G.R. No. 111941, April 27, 2000; followed.
• People vs. Gallego, G.R. No. 130603, August 15, 2000, and People vs. Bohol, G.R. No. 130587, July 12, 2000 — Cited for the conditions under which nighttime is aggravating; followed.
• People vs. Casturia, G.R. No. 128819, November 20, 2000 — Cited for the rule that abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, itself citing People vs. Carillo, G.R. No. 129528, June 8, 2000; followed.
• Mari vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127694, May 31, 2000 — Cited for the rule on disregard of sex; followed.
• People vs. Pinca, 318 SCRA 270 (1999), and People vs. Tambis, 311 SCRA 430 (1999) — Cited for the doctrine on intoxication as a mitigating or aggravating circumstance; followed.
• People vs. de la Cruz, G.R. No. 128362, January 16, 2001, and People vs. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689 (1997) — Cited for the award of moral damages; followed.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder, prescribing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Treachery was the qualifying circumstance that elevated the killing to murder. The provision was applied to determine the range of penalties available.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of divisible penalties when aggravating and mitigating circumstances are present. Applied to mandate the imposition of the lesser penalty (reclusion perpetua) because no aggravating circumstance was proven while mitigating circumstances were present.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concurred. Panganiban, J., was abroad on official leave. Quisumbing, J., was on official leave. Gonzaga-Reyes, J., was on leave.