People vs. Corpuz and Serquina

Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by credible eyewitnesses, particularly where it is physically possible for the accused to be at the crime scene, and the killing of a victim struck from behind without warning is qualified by treachery rather than evident premeditation where no evidence shows when the plan to kill was formed or how much time elapsed before its execution.

Olimpio Corpuz and Julian Serquiña were tenants in a hacienda where the deceased Juan Tobias also worked as a tenant. A proposal by the hacienda manager that Serquiña and Tobias exchange lots fell through due to Tobias's objections, providing a possible — though not indispensable — motive for the killing. The accused resided approximately one to one and a half kilometers from Tobias's house in barrio San Leon, Balungao, Pangasinan.

On the night of May 12, 1953, at around nine o'clock in barrio San Leon, Balungao, Pangasinan, the occupants of the house of Juan Tobias were roused by the barking of dogs. Peeping from the side of the house, Francisco Bartolome, a nine-year-old boy, and Pedro Quibolen, who helped Tobias work his lands, saw and recognized Julian Serquiña, and a little farther off, Olimpio Corpuz, revealed by the light of a petroleum lamp hung outside the door. Tobias invited the two men to come up, but instead Serquiña told him to come down and asked him to lead them to Esmeralda, "even up to the stream only." When Tobias refused, Serquiña ordered him to go ahead. Once Tobias was on the ground with his back turned to the accused, both men struck him several times with a shovel and the handle of a plow, felling him. As Quibolen and Bartolome ran away, they could still hear the deceased being struck repeatedly.

The two witnesses ran to the house of Francisco Tobias, brother of the deceased, to call for help. Francisco, seized with fear, would not go to the scene but instead reported the killing first to the Philippine Constabulary barracks nearby and, in the early morning of May 13, 1953, to the municipal authorities. An investigation was conducted at the scene, and both accused were arrested and brought to the Municipal Building at about eleven o'clock that morning. The deceased suffered multiple wounds as described in the medical certificate prepared by Dr. Triumfo Magpali, the Municipal Health Officer.

The defendants claimed they never left their respective houses on the night of May 12, 1953, having gone to sleep at about seven o'clock that evening. Olimpio Corpuz's alibi was corroborated by the testimonies of his son Juan Corpus and his son-in-law Teofilo Ancheta, while Julian Serquiña's was corroborated by his sister Felipa Serquiña. The accused also pointed out that no sufficient motive had been established to induce them to commit the crime, although the record showed that a proposed exchange of tenant lots between Serquiña and Tobias had fallen through due to Tobias's objections.

The trial court found the murder qualified by evident premeditation and convicted both accused, sentencing each to reclusion perpetua and ordering them to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of ₱4,000.00 and to pay proportionally the costs.

• Alibi vs. Positive Identification: Whether the defense of alibi can prevail over the positive identification of the accused by prosecution eyewitnesses.
• Qualifying Circumstance — Evident Premeditation: Whether the killing was properly qualified by evident premeditation as found by the trial court.
• Qualifying Circumstance — Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing.
• Proof of Motive: Whether proof of motive is indispensable for conviction where the identity of the accused is otherwise established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Other Circumstances: Whether nighttime, uninhabited place, or dwelling should be appreciated as aggravating circumstances.

• Alibi vs. Positive Identification: No. The alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by credible eyewitnesses, the alibi being corroborated only by close relatives and the accused having resided within physical proximity of the crime scene.
• Qualifying Circumstance — Evident Premeditation: No. Evident premeditation was not established because the record did not show when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time elapsed before it was carried out.
• Qualifying Circumstance — Treachery: Yes. The killing was qualified by treachery, the attack being sudden and unexpected, with the victim struck from behind while his back was turned, rendering him totally unprepared to defend himself.
• Proof of Motive: No. Proof of motive is not indispensable where the identity of the accused is otherwise established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Other Circumstances: Nighttime is absorbed by treachery; uninhabited place was not proven because it was not shown that there were no houses nearby; dwelling was not appreciated because the victim was not attacked or killed inside his house or its dependencies.

• Alibi vs. Positive Identification: The defense of alibi requires that it be clearly established with no room for doubting its accuracy, plausibility, and verity. The alibi offered by both accused failed this test because the only persons corroborating their claim were very close relatives who would naturally testify in their favor. Moreover, Corpuz admitted his house was only about one kilometer from Tobias's house, and Serquiña estimated his residence at about one and a half kilometers from barrio San Leon. Given this proximity, it was not physically impossible for the accused to go to Tobias's house and return later that evening. The positive identification by Pedro Quibolen, who had known Corpuz for years and was familiar with his features, was substantially clear and satisfactory. While Francisco Bartolome testified only that Serquiña's companion was "very similar to" Corpuz, Quibolen's testimony definitively identifying Corpuz was sufficient. The absence of any motive on the part of the witnesses to testify falsely further strengthened their credibility, as both accused admitted there was no reason for the witnesses to make a false imputation. The prompt arrest of the accused on the morning of May 13, 1953, following the early revelation of the killers' identity, bespeaks a spontaneity of reaction not dictated by ulterior considerations.

• Qualifying Circumstance — Evident Premeditation: The trial court's finding of evident premeditation was not borne out by the evidence. It was not shown when the plan to kill Tobias was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out. Without a basis for determining whether the accused had sufficient time between the inception of the plan and its fulfillment to dispassionately consider and accept its consequences, premeditation cannot be appreciated, as such time is essential to the circumstance.

• Qualifying Circumstance — Treachery: The record established that the attack was sudden and unexpected. The deceased had his back turned when he was first struck on the back of the head at the inception of the aggression, catching him totally unprepared to defend himself. Under such circumstances, the accused employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to themselves. Treachery thus properly qualified the killing as murder.

• Proof of Motive: Although the record disclosed a possible motive — the failed lot exchange proposal objected to by Tobias — proof of motive is not indispensable where the identity of the accused is otherwise shown beyond reasonable doubt. The absence of a proven motive does not negate guilt where positive identification and sufficient evidence establish the accused's participation.

• Other Circumstances: Although the crime was committed at nighttime, nocturnity is absorbed by treachery and cannot be separately appreciated. The uninhabited place circumstance was not proven because it was not shown that there were no houses nearby, which is required for its appreciation. The dwelling circumstance was not appreciated because it did not appear that the victim was attacked or killed in any part of his house or its dependencies.

• Alibi — For alibi to prosper, it must be clearly established and must not leave any room for doubting its accuracy, plausibility, and verity. It must clearly appear that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the place of the crime at the time it occurred. Alibi cannot prevail over a positive identification of the accused that is substantially clear and satisfactory. Corroboration by close relatives alone is insufficient, and proximity of the accused's residence to the crime scene negates physical impossibility.

• Proof of Motive — Proof of motive is not indispensable where the identity of the accused is otherwise established beyond reasonable doubt. Motive need not be proven when guilt is sufficiently established by other evidence.

• Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation requires proof of (a) the time when the plan to kill was hatched and (b) sufficient time between the inception of the plan and its fulfillment for the accused to dispassionately consider and accept the consequences. Absent evidence of when the plan was formed and how much time elapsed, premeditation cannot be appreciated.

• Treachery — Treachery qualifies a killing when the accused employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to themselves. A sudden and unexpected attack on a victim whose back is turned, rendering him totally unprepared to defend himself, constitutes treachery. Nighttime is absorbed by treachery and cannot be separately appreciated.

• Uninhabited Place — For the uninhabited place circumstance to be appreciated, it must be proven that there were no houses nearby.

• "An alibi cannot prevail over an identification of the accused which is substantially clear and satisfactory." — This passage states the controlling rule on the relative weight of alibi versus positive identification, a principle frequently invoked in subsequent criminal jurisprudence.

• "proof of motive is not indispensable where guilt is otherwise established by sufficient evidence. ln other words, motive need not be established if the identity of the accused is otherwise shown beyond reasonable doubt." — This formulation articulates the doctrine on the non-essentiality of motive when identity is proven, a standard proposition in Philippine criminal law.

• "the attack was sudden and unexpected, the deceased Juan Tobias had his back turned when he was first struck on the back of the head at the inception of the aggression, catching him totally unprepared to make a defense of his person." — This passage illustrates the application of treachery to a sudden attack from behind, demonstrating the factual basis for the qualifying circumstance.

• People vs. Masilungan, 104 Phil. 621 — Cited for the proposition that alibi must be clearly established and corroborated by credible witnesses, not merely close relatives.
• People vs. Saladino, L-11893 — Cited for the requirement that for alibi to be given credence, it must be physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene.
• People vs. Aguipo, L-12123-34 — Cited for the rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification.
• People vs. Garciola, 90 Phil. 285 — Cited for the principle that the absence of a motive to testify falsely on the part of prosecution witnesses strengthens their credibility.
• People vs. Sespene, 102 Phil. 199 — Cited for the doctrine that proof of motive is not indispensable where guilt is otherwise established.
• People vs. Custodio, 97 Phil. 698 — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation, particularly the need to show when the plan was hatched and sufficient elapsed time.
• People vs. Felipe, L-4619 — Cited for the definition and application of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
• People vs. Jimenez, 99 Phil. 285 — Cited for the rule that nighttime is absorbed by treachery.
• People vs. Piring, 35 Off. Gaz. (13) 2272 — Cited for the requirement that the uninhabited place circumstance must be proven by showing there were no houses nearby.

• Revised Penal Code, Article 248 (Murder) — Applied through the qualifying circumstance of treachery under Article 14, paragraph 16, which defines treachery as the employment of means, methods, or forms tending directly and specially to insure the execution of the crime without risk to the offender. The penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, consistent with the penalty for murder as then provided.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 14, paragraph 13 (Evident Premeditation) — Discussed and rejected as a qualifying circumstance for lack of evidence on when the plan was conceived and whether sufficient time elapsed for reflection.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concurred.