People vs. Compendio, Jr.

Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification, and treachery cannot qualify a killing as murder where the victim was forewarned or the attack was frontal; recidivism must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and is not supplied by the accused’s failure to object.

In the early morning of 18 August 1989, Cirilo Vitualla, a deaf-mute, was on board a pedicab (potpot) cruising along Magsaysay Avenue, Baybay, Leyte, near the Petron Gasoline Station. The pedicab was driven by accused-appellant Eleuterio C. Compendio, Jr., alias “Loloy.” Trinidad C. Sabando was walking on foot ahead of the pedicab. According to Sabando, the pedicab overtook her at about five armslengths, stopped, and its driver alighted and forced Vitualla to get out. Once Vitualla was outside, the driver stabbed him once on the left side of the breast with a knife. Vitualla fell to the ground, and the driver sped away in the pedicab. Sabando recognized both Vitualla and Compendio by the light of the electric bulb from the Petron Gasoline Station, and she knew the weapon used was a knife while the victim was unarmed. She heard no argument between them because Vitualla was mute. The trial court’s summary also stated that Vitualla was with his companion Nenita Jose, who reported the incident to the police, although the SC later noted that this finding was erroneous.

After the incident was reported to the police, a team headed by SPO1 Anselmo C. Tan, Jr. went to Barangay Kilim, Baybay, Leyte, to investigate. There, they found the accused already on board a passenger jeepney bound for Ormoc City, carrying two bags of clothes. The police inquiry showed that the accused admitted to the killing, but the statement was not reduced to writing. The trial court considered the accused’s presence on the jeepney with his bags of clothes a few hours after the incident as proof of flight.

The accused-appellant interposed alibi. He testified that on the night of 18 August 1989 he was in his house on M.L. Quezon Street, Baybay, Leyte, with his live-in partner Nene Nuñez; he went to sleep at around 8:00 p.m. and woke up only at about 6:00 a.m. the next day. On questions from the trial court, he admitted that the Sangi bridge on M.L. Quezon Street was only two corners away from his house and that he could reach the bridge by walking from his house in fifteen minutes.

The defense also presented Romeo L. Aguinaldo, who was supposed to affirm a previous affidavit allegedly refuting Sabando’s testimony; on the witness stand, however, Aguinaldo denied knowledge of the affidavit’s contents. Perfecto Inso then attested that Aguinaldo’s affidavit was read twice to Aguinaldo by Atty. Alfredo T. Bensi in the latter’s office. Thelma Gofredo, Aguinaldo’s common-law wife, asserted that Vitualla was at her house drinking tuba with Aguinaldo from 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on 18 August 1989 and left only at 10:00 p.m.; the following day at 6:00 a.m. she learned that Vitualla had died because his corpse was carried to his house nearby. Luz Alvero testified that at around 4:00 a.m. of 19 August 1989, she, together with Isyang (the victim’s mother) and Romeo Aguinaldo, retrieved the victim’s corpse from the Sangi bridge near the house of Dr. Bernardo; her testimony was meant to discredit Sabando by providing details about the victim’s death allegedly inconsistent with Sabando’s narration.

The trial court found the accused-appellant’s alibi flawed in light of Sabando’s positive identification, as the possibility of his being at the crime scene at the time of the killing could not be discounted, considering his meeting with his live-in partner on the night of 18 August 1989 and his excuse that he was asleep from 8:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. It found no evidence of evident premeditation but appreciated treachery because at the time the victim was attacked he was unarmed and had no time to defend himself as he was just forced to get out and once out was stabbed right away. It also considered recidivism against the accused-appellant despite the absence of proof, reasoning that the prosecution failed to attach certified true copies of the judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. B-1554 (frustrated homicide, October 6, 1989) but the accused failed to object to such lack of presentation. The case commenced with a complaint filed with the MTC of Baybay, Leyte, on 27 January 1992, while the information was filed with the RTC on 23 October 1992 and later amended, with leave of court, to insert recidivism.

• Credibility of Trinidad Sabando: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in stating that Sabando’s testimony was very categorical and straightforward and complete with its details.
• Testimony of SPO1 Anselmo Tan: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of SPO1 Anselmo Tan and assailed the admissibility of his alleged uncounselled oral admission when he was apprehended and investigated by SPO1 Tan.
• Nenita Jose’s Presence: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in stating that on 18 August 1989, at about 3:00 o’clock in the early morning, the victim Cirilo Vitualla was with his live-in partner Nenita Jose on board the pedicab allegedly driven by the accused-appellant.
• Nenita Jose’s Report: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in stating that it was the live-in partner of the victim who reported the stabbing incident to the PNP Baybay, Leyte.

• Credibility of Eyewitness Identification: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to Trinidad Sabando’s testimony and in finding accused-appellant positively identified as the killer.
• Alibi: Whether accused-appellant’s alibi can prevail over the prosecution’s positive identification.
• Uncounselled Oral Admission: Whether the alleged uncounselled oral admission before SPO1 Tan was admissible and material to the conviction.
• Nenita Jose Findings: Whether the trial court’s erroneous findings that Nenita Jose was with the victim and reported the incident affect the conviction.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation was proven to qualify the killing as murder.
• Treachery: Whether treachery was proven to qualify the killing as murder.
• Recidivism: Whether recidivism was proven as an aggravating circumstance.
• Penalty: Whether the trial court imposed the correct penalty and whether the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies.

• Credibility of Eyewitness Identification: No. The SC found Sabando trustworthy and her positive identification sufficient; the change of judge allowed the SC to assess the transcripts, and the trial court’s factual findings were supported.
• Alibi: No. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification; accused failed to show physical impossibility because he was only 15 minutes by walking from the crime scene.
• Uncounselled Oral Admission: No. The trial court did not rely on the alleged admission; it relied on Sabando’s testimony and the accused’s flight.
• Nenita Jose Findings: No. Even if the trial court erroneously found Nenita Jose was with the victim and reported the incident, the error did not affect the finding that Sabando positively identified the accused as the killer.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The requisites were not established.
• Treachery: No. The two conditions were not proven; the victim was forewarned and the attack was frontal.
• Recidivism: No. It was not proven beyond reasonable doubt; failure to object did not cure the lack of certified proof.
• Penalty: No. The crime was homicide, not murder; the penalty is reclusion temporal medium, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies.

• Credibility of Eyewitness Identification: The general rule is that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court because it heard the witnesses and observed their deportment. This case falls under the exception where one judge heard the testimony and another penned the decision; the SC was not precluded from assessing the transcripts. After poring over Sabando’s testimony, the SC found her trustworthy: she narrated events in a direct, unaffected, and convincing manner, stuck to her story on cross-examination and on questions from the trial court, and showed no indication of prevarication. The SC cited People vs. Sulit for the exception.
• Alibi: The SC held that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else; he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the crime. The accused admitted that the Sangi bridge was two corners away and could be reached by walking in 15 minutes, so he was not elsewhere so as to preclude his presence at the scene. The SC cited People vs. Lee and People vs. Penillos.
• Uncounselled Oral Admission: The argument was incomprehensible; what the SC gathered was that the accused assailed the admissibility of his alleged uncounselled oral admission. The trial court did not take the admission into account and relied on Sabando’s testimony. SPO1 Tan’s material testimony was that the accused was collared at Barangay Kilim on a passenger jeepney bound for Ormoc with bags of clothes a few hours after the incident, which the trial court considered proof of flight. Thus, there was no reversible error.
• Nenita Jose Findings: The third and fourth assigned errors were irrelevant and inconsequential. Even if the trial court erroneously found that Nenita Jose was with the victim during the killing and reported the incident to the Baybay PNP, the error did not alter, affect, or negate the finding that Sabando saw and positively identified the accused as the killer.
• Evident Premeditation: The prosecution alleged evident premeditation, but the SC agreed with the trial court that its requisites were not established: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The SC cited People vs. Narit.
• Treachery: Under Article 14(6) of the Revised Penal Code, treachery exists when the offender commits any crime against persons employing means, methods, or forms in execution that tend directly and specially to insure execution without risk to himself from the defense the offended party might make. Two conditions must concur: (1) the means of execution give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means were deliberately or consciously adopted. Sabando’s testimony showed that the pedicab stopped, the driver forced the victim to alight, and after the victim disembarked, the accused, facing him six feet from the pedicab, stabbed him once on the left breast; the victim fell and the accused sped away. The SC held this did not establish treachery: there was no hint that the accused deliberately adopted a mode of attack to deprive Vitualla of the chance to retaliate or defend; forcing the victim to alight exposed the accused to a possible anticipatory strike; the victim would have been more helpless if seated inside the pedicab; there was no indication of the time interval between acts to determine that the victim had no time to defend; and the victim was sufficiently forewarned when forced to alight, so the attack was not sudden and unexpected. Qualifying circumstances must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself, and treachery cannot be appreciated when the victim was forewarned or the attack was frontal or not sudden. The SC cited People vs. de la Cruz, People vs. Hubilla, and People vs. Genobia.
• Recidivism: Recidivism is a generic aggravating circumstance under Article 14(9) of the Revised Penal Code, with effects governed by Article 64; it is an affirmative allegation when alleged in the information. Since the accused pleaded not guilty, there was a joinder of issues on guilt and modifying circumstances; the prosecution was burdened to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the existence of modifying circumstances. The trial court gravely erred in appreciating recidivism simply because the accused failed to object to the prosecution’s failure to present certified true copies of the judgment of conviction. Thus, recidivism cannot be appreciated.
• Penalty: With no mitigating or generic aggravating circumstances proven, Article 64(1) required the penalty prescribed for the offense proved to be imposed in its medium period. Homicide under Article 249 is punishable by reclusion temporal, whose medium period is 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum must be within the penalty next lower to that prescribed in Article 249. The SC imposed 10 years of prision mayor medium as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. The SC also pointed out that for murder the trial court imposed life imprisonment instead of reclusion perpetua; the two penalties are not synonymous, and it enjoined the trial court to apply the appropriate penalty in the future. The SC cited People vs. Penillos and People vs. Lascuna.

• Alibi — Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the crime. The accused failed because he was only 15 minutes by walking from the crime scene.
• Treachery — Under Article 14(6) of the Revised Penal Code, treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in execution that tend directly and specially to insure execution without risk to himself from the defense the offended party might make. Two conditions: (1) the means give the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; (2) the means were deliberately or consciously adopted. Not proven here because the victim was forewarned when forced to alight, the attack was frontal, and there was no showing of a deliberate mode to deprive him of defense.
• Evident Premeditation — Requisites: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; (3) sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow reflection. Not established in this case.
• Recidivism — A generic aggravating circumstance under Article 14(9) of the Revised Penal Code; it must be alleged in the information and proven beyond reasonable doubt. The accused’s failure to object to the prosecution’s failure to present certified true copies of the prior conviction did not cure the lack of proof.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — When no mitigating or aggravating circumstances are proven, the penalty prescribed for the offense is imposed in its medium period under Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and the accused is entitled to an indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the penalty next lower to that prescribed. Applied to homicide under Article 249.
• Life Imprisonment vs. Reclusion Perpetua — The two penalties are not synonymous; the trial court erred in imposing life imprisonment for murder instead of reclusion perpetua. The SC reminded courts to apply the appropriate penalty.
• Credibility and Change of Judge — Appellate courts generally defer to the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility, but where one judge heard the testimony and another penned the decision, the SC may assess the transcripts. The SC reviewed Sabando’s testimony and found her trustworthy.
• Lawyer’s Duty After Extension — Under Rule 12.03, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda, or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation. Atty. Bensi was admonished for failing to file the appellant’s brief despite extensions.

• “For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the locus criminis at the time the crime was committed.” — The SC used this rule to reject the accused-appellant’s alibi because he was only 15 minutes by walking from the crime scene.
• “Under substantive law, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons (e.g., homicide or murder) employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.” — The SC applied this definition and found treachery not proven.
• “The rule is that circumstances which would qualify the killing as murder must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself.” — The SC used this to require strict proof of treachery before raising the killing from homicide to murder.
• “Recidivism is an aggravating circumstance under Article 14(9) of the Revised Penal Code those effects are governed by Article 64 thereof, and is, therefore, an affirmative allegation whenever alleged in the information.” — The SC held that the trial court erred in appreciating recidivism without proof, despite the accused’s failure to object.

• People vs. Sulit, 233 SCRA 117, 124 [1994] — Cited for the exception to the rule of deference to trial court findings where one judge heard the testimony and another penned the decision.
• People vs. Lee, 204 SCRA 900, 910 [1991] — Cited for the rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification.
• People vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546, 560 [1992] — Cited for the rule that alibi requires proof of physical impossibility to be at the locus criminis; also cited on the distinction between life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua.
• People vs. Narit, 197 SCRA 334, 349 [1991] — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation.
• People vs. de la Cruz, 207 SCRA 632, 650 [1992] — Cited for the conditions of treachery.
• People vs. Hubilla, G.R. No. 114904, 29 January 1996 — Cited for the rule that treachery cannot be appreciated when the victim was forewarned or the attack was frontal.
• People vs. Genobia, 234 SCRA 699, 709 [1994] — Cited for the rule that qualifying circumstances must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself.
• People vs. Lascuna, 225 SCRA 386, 404-405 [1993] — Cited for the rule that life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are not synonymous.

• Article 14(6), Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as a qualifying circumstance; the SC applied it and found treachery not proven.
• Article 14(9), Revised Penal Code — Defines recidivism as a generic aggravating circumstance; the SC held it must be alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt and cannot be appreciated absent proof.
• Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when no mitigating or aggravating circumstances are proven, the penalty prescribed for the offense is imposed in its medium period; the SC applied it to homicide.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes reclusion temporal for homicide; the SC used it to fix the indeterminate penalty.
• Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended — Applied in favor of accused-appellant to fix the minimum and maximum of the indeterminate penalty.
• Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Code of Professional Responsibility — Requires a lawyer not to let the period lapse after obtaining extensions without submitting the pleading or explaining the failure; Atty. Bensi was admonished.