People vs. Cloribel

A dismissal of a criminal case upon the accused's motion because the prosecution failed to appear at trial, after arraignment and upon a valid information, operates as an acquittal and bars reinstatement under double jeopardy; the trial court's label of "provisional" cannot alter that legal effect. A trial court does not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing a criminal case for failure to prosecute under Sec. 3, Rule 30 where the delay is not solely attributable to the accused and the prosecution's absence is unsatisfactorily explained.

The prosecution of Bienvenido Y. Aguilar, Dionisio M. Labad, Senen S. Burgos, Zosimo U. Angeles, and Manuel Akol was handled by government prosecutors from the Department of Justice, with the Office of the Solicitor General appearing for petitioner. The case was governed by the former Rules of Court, particularly Sec. 3, Rule 30 (now Sec. 3, Rule 17) on failure to prosecute and Sec. 9, Rule 113 (now Rule 117, Sec. 9) on double jeopardy.

On September 27, 1958, a criminal information for falsification of public, official and/or commercial documents was filed against Bienvenido Aguilar, Dionisio M. Labad, Senen S. Burgos, Zosimo U. Angeles, and Manuel Akol, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 45717 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was set for arraignment on October 17, 1958, but because of a number of preliminary motions, the arraignment did not take place as scheduled and was held on March 23, 1959. The case was then set for trial on the merits on May 26 and 27, 1959, but various incidents prevented the trial from proceeding as originally scheduled, and it was eventually transferred to September 16, 1959.

From September 16, 1959 to August 30, 1960, the scheduled hearings were postponed at least six times. The September 16, 1959 hearing was cancelled and postponed to November 23, 25 and 27, 1959, which were in turn transferred successively to January 25, 26 and 27, 1960; March 20, 21 and 22, 1960; April 20, 21 and 22, 1960; June 14, 15 and 16, 1960; July 11, 13 and 18, 1960; and August 24, 25 and 26, 1960. Of these six postponements, four were jointly sought or agreed upon by counsels for both parties, one was prayed for by the respondent, and one was represented by the petitioner. On August 23, 1960, the lower court postponed the August 24, 25 and 26 hearing "until further assignment." The transfer of the hearing to March 16, 17 and 20, 1961 resulted from petitioner's own motion for consolidation of the criminal and civil cases.

On January 23, 1962, Special Prosecutor E. Pañganiban was designated Acting Commissioner of Immigration, while Special Prosecutor Pedro D. Cenzon, some weeks before May 17, 1962, was made to collaborate in the prosecution of the Stonehill cases. Because of these additional assignments, they moved for the cancellation of the trial set for May 17, 1962; the motion was granted and Criminal Case No. 45717 was transferred for trial to August 15 and 16, 1962. Sometime in June 1962, Pañganiban returned to the Prosecution Division of the Department of Justice. On July 7, 1962, he was assigned to investigate Central Bank cases and held office at the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank. During the same period, Cenzon was extended an ad interim appointment to the Judiciary, and by July 3, 1962, he officially withdrew his appearance from the case.

On July 17, 1962, the Records Bureau of the Department of Justice received the Notice of Hearing for the August 15 trial. On August 15, 1962, when the case was called for trial at 8:30, the special prosecutor failed to appear despite due notice; it was called again at 9:35 and still no prosecutor appeared. Upon motion of counsel for the defense, respondent Judge entered an order provisionally dismissing the case with costs de oficio and cancellation of bail bonds. A state witness present in the courtroom notified Prosecutor Pañganiban, who, with Solicitor Emerito M. Salva and Atty. Filoteo Evangelista of the Central Bank, went to see the respondent Judge, but the morning session had already adjourned. They explained their failure to appear, and the Judge advised them to file a motion for reconsideration.

In their motion for reconsideration, the government prosecutors explained that the notice of hearing never reached Pañganiban because he had been Associate Commissioner of Immigration and was reassigned to the Central Bank on July 6, 1962; that the notice addressed to Fiscal Cenzon probably did not reach him because on July 3, 1962 he had filed a petition to withdraw his appearance in view of his appointment as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental and was busy with Stonehill investigations; that Pañganiban was unaware of the hearing and was under the impression that the criminal case was consolidated for trial with the civil case; that a motion to consolidate Civil Case No. 38824 and Criminal Case No. 45717 had been filed by the Solicitor General's office and granted without objection; that the cases were set for joint trial by then Judge Gustavo Victorino; and that because of the illness of one of the accused, the hearing was postponed, leaving Pañganiban with the impression that the joint trial was set for September 17, 1962. The respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration. The records showed that the notice was served on the Records Division of the Department of Justice on July 17, 1962; that Pañganiban had returned to the Prosecution Division by June 1962 and, although handling Central Bank cases, was still officially with that division; and that a prosecution witness reported for trial on August 15, 1962. The case had been pending for three years and eleven months from its filing on September 27, 1958 to the trial date on August 15, 1962.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner argued that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the August 15, 1962 dismissal order; it contended that the long delay was primarily attributable to respondents' numerous requests for postponement and initiation of incidents, so the lower court should not have acted favorably on their claim that their right to speedy trial was impaired.
• Unsatisfactory Explanation for Non-Appearance: Petitioner maintained that its failure to appear was satisfactorily explained because the notice of hearing never reached Prosecutor Pañganiban, who had been Associate Commissioner of Immigration and was reassigned to the Central Bank, and because he was under the impression that the joint trial of the criminal and civil cases was set for September 17, 1962.
• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner argued that respondents could not invoke double jeopardy because they themselves moved for the dismissal and because the dismissal was expressly decreed to be "provisional."

• Dismissal as Acquittal: Respondents contended that the dismissal was an acquittal within the meaning of Sec. 9, Rule 113 of the former Rules of Court (now Rule 117, Sec. 9) because it was ordered subsequent to arraignment by a competent court and upon a valid information.
• Invalid "Provisional" Label: Respondents urged that the qualification of the dismissal as "provisional" was of no legal consequence since it was beyond the respondent Judge's power to make.
• Speedy Trial: Respondents invoked their constitutional right to speedy trial in seeking dismissal of the case.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the August 15, 1962 order dismissing Criminal Case No. 45717 for failure of the prosecution to appear.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the dismissal amounted to an acquittal that bars reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 45717 under the rule against double jeopardy.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. Under Sec. 3, Rule 30 (now Sec. 3, Rule 17), the trial court had authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute, and the record did not show that its action was arbitrary or despotic; the delay was not solely attributable to respondents and the prosecution's absence was unsatisfactorily explained.
• Double Jeopardy: Yes. The dismissal was in legal effect an acquittal, entered after arraignment and upon a valid information because the prosecution failed to appear and the accused insisted on their right to speedy trial; the "provisional" label was a mere surplusage and did not prevent double jeopardy from attaching.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The SC started from the authority of the court to dismiss for failure of the prosecution to appear under Sec. 3, Rule 30 of the former Rules of Court (now Sec. 3, Rule 17), which allows dismissal upon defendant's motion or the court's own motion and provides that the dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits unless otherwise provided. The rule reposed discretion in the trial court; dismissal will not be reversed absent abuse, and the burden of showing abuse is on appellant. The SC found no grave abuse. From filing on September 27, 1958 to the trial date on August 15, 1962, three years and eleven months had elapsed. The delays were not solely attributable to respondents: of the six postponements from September 16, 1959 to August 26, 1960, four were jointly sought or agreed upon, one was by respondent, and one by petitioner; the transfer to March 16, 17 and 20, 1961 resulted from petitioner's own motion for consolidation; and the May 17, 1962 trial was moved to August 15, 1962 on petitioner's motion. The Judge also waited an hour after the first call, did not dismiss motu proprio, acted only on the defense motion, and advised the prosecutors to file a motion for reconsideration. Grave abuse means arbitrary or despotic exercise of power by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law; the record did not show this. Petitioner also failed to satisfactorily explain its absence: the notice was served on the Records Division of the Department of Justice on July 17, 1962, which was due service; Pañganiban had returned to the Prosecution Division by June 1962 and, although assigned to Central Bank cases, was still officially with the Department; Cenzon had withdrawn; the prosecutors were uncoordinated; and a prosecution witness reported for trial.
• Double Jeopardy: The SC rejected petitioner's reliance on People vs. Salico, which held that a dismissal upon defendant's motion is a waiver of the right against double jeopardy. That ruling had been abandoned and expressly repudiated in People vs. Robles, citing People vs. Bangalao, People vs. Diaz, People vs. Albano, and People vs. Ferrer. The rule that a dismissal upon defendant's motion is not a bar has no application where the dismissal is predicated on the defendant's right to speedy trial (People vs. Tacneng). The qualification "provisional" cannot be the legal basis for avoiding double jeopardy; the issue was whether the dismissal was in fact definite or without prejudice. People vs. Diaz ruled that dismissal upon defense motion for failure of the fiscal to be present on the day of trial bars subsequent prosecution. People vs. Labatete held that even where the fiscal fails to prosecute and the judge dismisses the case, the termination is not a real dismissal but an acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove the case when the time came. Thus the dismissal was not truly a dismissal but an acquittal, entered upon defendants' insistence on their constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear. Under Gandicela vs. Lutero, courts have no discretion to determine or characterize the legal effects of their orders unless expressly authorized; words like "without prejudice," "provisionally," or "definitely" are mere surplusage if the legal effect under the law is otherwise. The "provisional" label therefore did not prevent the dismissal from operating as an acquittal, and reinstatement would violate double jeopardy.

• Dismissal for failure to prosecute — Under Sec. 3, Rule 30 (now Sec. 3, Rule 17), when the plaintiff fails to appear at trial, or to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with the rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion; the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits unless otherwise provided by the court. The SC applied this to a criminal case where the government prosecutors failed to appear, holding that the trial court had authority to dismiss and did not gravely abuse its discretion.
• Grave abuse of discretion — The SC defined it as the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The SC found none because the Judge waited for the prosecutors, acted only on the defense motion, advised a motion for reconsideration, and the delay was not solely attributable to the accused.
• Dismissal as acquittal; double jeopardy — A dismissal of a criminal case upon the accused's motion because the prosecution failed to appear at trial, after arraignment and upon a valid information, amounts to an acquittal and bars reinstatement; the trial court's label of "provisional" cannot alter that legal effect. The SC applied this because the dismissal was entered upon the accused's insistence on their right to speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear.
• Courts cannot characterize the legal effects of their orders — Courts have no discretion to determine or characterize the legal effects of their orders or decisions unless expressly authorized; adding words like "without prejudice," "provisionally," or "definitely" is a mere surplusage if the legal effect under the law is otherwise. The SC applied this to disregard the "provisional" label on the dismissal.

• "the dismissal of an action pursuant to this rule rests upon the sound discretion of the court and will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of abuse. The burden of showing abuse of Judicial discretion is upon appellant since every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the court's action." — The SC cited this to explain that a dismissal under the failure-to-prosecute rule is discretionary and that the burden of showing abuse lies on the appellant.
• "Even where the fiscal, fails to prosecute and the judge dismisses the case, the termination is not real dismissal but acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove the case when the time therefor came." — The SC quoted this from People vs. Labatete to hold that the dismissal in this case was in legal effect an acquittal.
• "Courts have no discretion to determine or characterize the legal effects of their orders or decisions, unless expressly authorized to do so as provided for in Rule 30 of the Rules of Court. The addition of such words "without prejudice", "provisionally" or "definitely" to their order or decision could be mere surplusage if the legal effect under the law is otherwise, because courts cannot amend the law." — The SC used this from Gandicela vs. Lutero to reject the "provisional" label as controlling.
• "IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We hold that a reinstatement of this case would operate to violate the respondents-defendants' right against double jeopardy." — This is the SC's final holding that barred reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 45717.

• People vs. Salico, 84 Phil. 722 — Old ruling that dismissal upon defendant's motion waives double jeopardy; expressly abandoned and repudiated by the SC.
• People vs. Robles, G.R. No. L-12761, June 29, 1959 — Controlling precedent cited for abandoning Salico and sustaining double jeopardy despite dismissal secured on accused's motion.
• People vs. Tacneng, G.R. No. L-12082, April 30, 1959 — Held that the rule that dismissal on defendant's motion is not a bar has no application where the dismissal is predicated on the right to speedy trial.
• People vs. Diaz, G.R. No. L-6518 — Ruled that dismissal upon defense motion for failure of the fiscal to be present on the day of trial bars subsequent prosecution for the same offense; also cited for treating such dismissal as an acquittal.
• People vs. Labatete, G.R. No. L-12917, April 7, 1960 — Held that even where the fiscal fails to prosecute and the judge dismisses the case, the termination is not a real dismissal but an acquittal.
• Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299 — Held that courts cannot characterize the legal effects of their orders; "provisionally" or "without prejudice" is surplusage if the law's legal effect is otherwise.
• Tavera-Luna Inc. vs. Nable, 67 Phil. 340 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion as arbitrary or despotic exercise of power by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
• Alafriz vs. Nable, 72 Phil. 278 — Also cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion.

• Sec. 3, Rule 30, former Rules of Court (now Sec. 3, Rule 17) — Failure to prosecute; when the plaintiff fails to appear at trial or prosecute for an unreasonable length of time or comply with the rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon defendant's motion or the court's own motion, and the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits unless otherwise provided. Applied: authorized the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 45717 for the prosecution's failure to appear; no grave abuse.
• Sec. 9, Rule 113, former Rules of Court (now Rule 117, Sec. 9) — Double jeopardy; respondents invoked it, and the SC held that the dismissal after arraignment upon a valid information operated as an acquittal and barred reinstatement.