People vs. Chupeco

Identity of the property—that the property removed or repledged is the same or identical property previously mortgaged or pledged—is an essential element common to both acts punished under Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, and the prosecution's failure to prove such identity warrants acquittal. Jurisdiction, once vested in a court by virtue of an essential ingredient of the offense having occurred within its territorial jurisdiction, is not tolled by subsequent amendment or stipulation.

Jose L. Chupeco was the owner of certain sawmill machinery, equipment, and transportation units located in Sitio Saguing, Dinalupihan, Bataan. On July 24, 1946, he executed a chattel mortgage over these properties in the City of Manila in favor of the Agricultural and Industrial Bank to secure a loan of ₱20,000. The bank's capital, assets, accounts, contracts, and choses in action were subsequently transferred to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, an institution created and operating under Republic Act No. 85, with its principal office in Manila. The accused was later charged with repledging the same mortgaged properties to one Mateo B. Pinili without the mortgagee's consent and with removing the properties from Bataan to Zambales, also without consent.

On July 24, 1946, Jose L. Chupeco executed a chattel mortgage (Exhibit "D") in the City of Manila over certain properties located in Sitio Saguing, Dinalupihan, Bataan, in favor of the Agricultural and Industrial Bank to secure a loan of ₱20,000. The mortgaged properties included an open shed under construction for sawmill use, various sawmill machinery and equipment (including a Wheland circular sawmill with carriage and 60" inserted circular saw, a Gray Marine Full Diesel Engine 225 H.P., an RD-14 Tractor with Bulldozer, a D-6 Caterpillar tractor, a Clitract International Caterpillar, an air compressor, a complete set of welding instruments, a lathe machine, a planer for iron and steel, and a tracing machine with vise), and transportation units (a Chevrolet truck Model 1941, an International Baby truck Model 1938, a GMC Army truck 6 x 6, and a Willys jeep). The bank's capital, assets, accounts, contracts, and choses in action were subsequently transferred to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, created under Republic Act No. 85.

On November 28, 1947, in the City of Manila, Chupeco allegedly pledged or encumbered certain properties to Mateo B. Pinili, and thereafter transferred or removed properties to Subic, Zambales, without the written consent of the mortgagee bank. The information charged that these acts were committed with intent to defraud the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, causing damage in the amount of ₱15,935.80 representing the unpaid balance of the mortgage. The properties later pledged (Exhibit "E") consisted of a sawmill with gray marine engine 125 H.P. with circular saw and appurtenances, building and improvements assessed at ₱8,000.00, a bulldozer H.D.-14 (Allis-Chalmers, Engine No. 3251541), and two cargo trucks 6 x 6 (Engine Nos. 220314218 and 220359225, Registration Nos. 17094 and 17093).

The accused moved to quash the information on the grounds that more than one offense was charged and that the court lacked jurisdiction. The motion was denied, and after arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. During the partially tried case, defense counsel and the fiscal entered into an agreement to amend the information so that the charge would be only for removal of mortgaged property, eliminating the portion on repledging already pledged property. The information, however, remained unamended. The accused then filed a motion to dismiss based on the agreement, but the court denied it and ordered that the case be tried on the original charge of repledging property already encumbered. After trial, the CFI of Manila found the accused guilty and imposed a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, because the jurisdiction of an inferior court was in issue. The accused argued that since both the location of the chattels and the site to which they were moved were outside Manila, the Manila courts acquired no jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found no merit in this argument, holding that the execution of the first mortgage was alleged to have taken place in Manila—an essential ingredient of the offense—vesting jurisdiction in the CFI of Manila under Rule 110, Section 9 of the Rules of Court. However, the Court found a fatal defect in the prosecution's evidence: the properties listed in the chattel mortgage (Exhibit "D") and in the information were materially different from those listed in the subsequent pledge (Exhibit "E"), and nothing in the evidence established that they were the same properties. The Office of the Solicitor General itself recommended acquittal on this ground.

• Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that since both the place where the chattels were located and the site to which they were moved are outside Manila, the courts of Manila acquired no jurisdiction to try the case because the offense was not committed within Manila territory.
• Effect of Agreement to Amend: Petitioner maintained that the agreement with the fiscal to discard the charge of repledging left only the accusation of transferring encumbered property from Bataan to Zambales without consent, which occurred entirely outside Manila and thus outside the trial court's jurisdiction.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the appellee, recommended acquittal, conceding that the evidence failed to establish that the properties mortgaged to the bank (Exhibit "D") were the same ones subsequently encumbered to Mateo Pinili (Exhibit "E").

• Jurisdiction: Whether the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction over the case when the mortgaged properties were located in Bataan and allegedly moved to Zambales, both outside Manila.
• Sufficiency of Evidence — Identity of Property: Whether the prosecution established that the properties later pledged to Mateo Pinili were the same or identical properties previously mortgaged to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, as required under Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Jurisdiction: Yes. The CFI of Manila had jurisdiction because an essential ingredient of the offense—the execution of the first chattel mortgage—was alleged to have taken place in Manila, vesting jurisdiction under Rule 110, Section 9 of the Rules of Court. Once vested, jurisdiction is not tolled by subsequent amendment or stipulation.
• Sufficiency of Evidence — Identity of Property: No. The evidence failed to establish that the properties listed in the chattel mortgage (Exhibit "D") were the same properties later pledged (Exhibit "E"). The descriptions were materially different, and identity of property is an essential element under Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Jurisdiction: The original information charged the crime of repledging already encumbered property without the creditor's consent. One of the essential ingredients of this offense—the execution of the first mortgage—was alleged to have taken place in Manila. Under Rule 110, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, the CFI of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the offense (citing People vs. Mission, 48 O.G., 1331). It is well-established that once jurisdiction is vested, it is not tolled by subsequent amendment or stipulation (citing McClain vs. Kansas City Bridge Co., 83 SW 2d 132; Shankle vs. Ingram, 45 S.E. 578; Walton vs. Mardeville Dowling & Co., 5 NW 776). The agreement with the fiscal to discard the repledging charge amounted to no more than an avowal by the prosecution that it could not establish the other elements of the offense. Furthermore, the trial court actually rejected the defense motion to dismiss and directed trial on the original charge; the accused obeyed this directive, thereby renouncing the claim that the information had been amended to discard that averment.

• Sufficiency of Evidence — Identity of Property: An essential element common to both acts punished under Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code—whether selling or pledging personal property already pledged or mortgaged, or removing mortgaged personal property to another location—is that the property removed or repledged must be the same or identical property that was previously mortgaged or pledged. The chattel mortgage (Exhibit "D") listed a Wheland circular sawmill, a Gray Marine Full Diesel Engine 225 H.P., an RD-14 Tractor with Bulldozer, a D-6 Caterpillar tractor, a Clitract International Caterpillar, an air compressor, welding instruments, a lathe machine, a planer, a tracing machine, a Chevrolet truck, an International Baby truck, a GMC Army truck, and a Willys jeep. The subsequent pledge (Exhibit "E") listed a sawmill with gray marine engine 125 H.P., a bulldozer H.D.-14 (Allis-Chalmers), and two cargo trucks 6 x 6. The descriptions were materially different, and nothing in the evidence established that these were the same properties. The Office of the Solicitor General itself recommended acquittal on this ground. Without proof of identity of the properties, the essential element of the offense was not established, and the accused could not be convicted on the evidence on record.

• Vesting of Jurisdiction — Once jurisdiction over a case has vested in a court by virtue of an essential ingredient of the offense having occurred within its territorial jurisdiction, it is not lost or tolled by subsequent amendment of the information or stipulation between the parties. The Court applied this principle to hold that the CFI of Manila retained jurisdiction despite the agreement to amend the charge, because the original information alleged that the first mortgage was executed in Manila, an essential ingredient of the offense of repledging already encumbered property.

• Essential Element of Identity of Property under Article 319, Revised Penal Code — An essential element common to both acts punished under Article 319—selling or pledging personal property already pledged or mortgaged without the mortgagee's consent, and removing mortgaged personal property to another province or city without written consent—is that the property removed or repledged must be the same or identical property that was previously mortgaged or pledged. Failure to prove this identity warrants acquittal, as the Court found in this case where the descriptions in the chattel mortgage and the subsequent pledge were materially different.

• "An assential element common to the two acts punished under Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed or repledged, as the case may should be the same or identical property that was mortgaged or pledged before such removal or repledging." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: it defines the essential element of identity of property required for conviction under Article 319, and its absence in the evidence led to acquittal. (Note: the original text contains the typographical errors "assential" and the missing "be" after "may.")

• "It is well-established that once vested, the jurisdiction is not tolled by subsequent amendment or stipulation" — This states the jurisdictional doctrine applied: jurisdiction once acquired is not lost by subsequent procedural developments such as amendment or stipulation between the parties.

• "the fatal error in the decision appealed from is its disregard of the fact that the evidence fails to show that the properties mortgaged to the bank are the same one encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinili" — This identifies the decisive ground for reversal: the trial court convicted without proof of the essential element of identity of property.

• People vs. Mission, 48 O.G., 1331 — Cited as authority for the proposition that where an essential ingredient of the offense is alleged to have occurred in a particular venue, the court of that venue acquires jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 110, Section 9 of the Rules of Court.
• McClain vs. Kansas City Bridge Co., 83 SW 2d 132; Shankle vs. Ingram, 45 S.E. 578; Walton vs. Mardeville Dowling & Co., 5 NW 776 — Foreign cases cited as authority for the doctrine that jurisdiction once vested is not tolled by subsequent amendment or stipulation.

• Article 319, Revised Penal Code — Punishes two acts: (1) selling or pledging personal property already pledged or mortgaged without the consent of the mortgagee, and (2) removing mortgaged personal property to another province or city without the mortgagee's written consent. The Court held that identity of the property is an essential element common to both acts, and the prosecution's failure to prove it warranted acquittal.
• Rule 110, Section 9, Rules of Court — Governs venue of criminal actions; the Court applied it to hold that jurisdiction vested in the CFI of Manila because an essential ingredient of the offense (execution of the first mortgage) was alleged to have occurred in Manila.
• Section 17, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended — Authorized the Court of Appeals to certify cases to the Supreme Court where the jurisdiction of an inferior court is in issue.
• Republic Act No. 85 — Created the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, the complainant institution to which the Agricultural and Industrial Bank's capital, assets, accounts, contracts, and choses in action were transferred.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Parades, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

None.