People vs. Ching

An information for rape need not state the precise date of commission, as the date is not a material ingredient of the offense; it is sufficient that the information alleges the approximate date—such as the year or month—of the crime's commission, provided all essential elements of rape are stated.

William Ching and BBB were married on 29 February 1980 and had eight children, including AAA, born on 12 August 1983. The family resided in Quezon City. At the relevant times, Ching had periods of detention for drug-related offenses, and BBB was likewise detained for drug pushing from June 1998 until December 1999. AAA worked as a house helper during portions of the period in question. The applicable law for the first rape, committed in 1996, was Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; for the two rapes committed in May 1998, the applicable law was Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997). Republic Act No. 9346, prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, later became effective and governed the reduction of the penalty.

William Ching and BBB were married on 29 February 1980 and had eight children, of whom AAA was the third. AAA was born on 12 August 1983, though her birth was never registered with the appropriate government agencies; BBB had relied on a comadrona for the delivery, and a neighbor who volunteered to register the birth apparently lost the relevant papers. A baptismal certificate issued by the Sacred Heart Parish in Kamuning, Quezon City, recorded AAA's date of birth.

Sometime in the year 1996, at around 5:00 in the afternoon, AAA was cooking rice at the family home while BBB was at the market. Ching sent the younger siblings outside and instructed AAA to go inside the bedroom. He ordered her to lie on the cemented floor, removed her shorts and panty, and pressed his feet against hers to prevent resistance. AAA screamed for help, but Ching held both her hands above her head, removed his own shorts and brief, and inserted his penis into her vagina. He threatened to kill her if she made noise. Afterward, AAA went to the house of BBB's kumare, Aling Leony, but did not report the incident to BBB out of fear.

For the second time, one evening in May 1998, while AAA and her younger siblings were sleeping on the cemented floor inside the bedroom, Ching entered, lay down beside her, pulled her left arm, and positioned himself on top of her. He removed her shorts and panty and again inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA did not shout because of Ching's repeated threats to kill her. For the third time, also in the evening of May 1998, under similar circumstances—AAA and her siblings sleeping inside the bedroom—Ching lay beside her, pulled her arm, placed himself on top of her, removed her clothing, and had carnal knowledge of her. Again, she did not shout out of fear.

From June 1998 to February 1999, Ching was detained for drug pushing. After his release, he would go to AAA's employer's house to demand money, creating a commotion when she refused. Fed up, AAA went to the nearby barangay hall to report not only the commotion but also the prior rapes. Ching was arrested by PO3 Deduque and PO3 Baldeswis. BBB, who had herself been detained for drug pushing and was released only on 5 December 1999, immediately supported AAA upon learning of the incidents.

A medico-legal examination conducted by Dr. James Belgira of the PNP Crime Laboratory found shallow healed lacerations at the 5 and 9 o'clock positions of AAA's hymen and concluded that she was in a "non-virgin state physically," with no external signs of recent physical trauma. Due to Dr. Belgira's unavailability, Dr. Angel Cordero appeared in court to produce and interpret the medical records. Ching testified in his own behalf and denied all accusations, admitting that AAA was his daughter but claiming that AAA's employer and BBB had coached her into filing the rape charges because he had been demanding money from her. The RTC found the prosecution's evidence sufficient and convicted Ching of three counts of qualified rape, imposing reclusion perpetua for the 1996 rape and the death penalty for the two May 1998 rapes. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification, reducing the death penalty to reclusion perpetua per Republic Act No. 9346.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Appellant maintained that the approximate time of the commission of the offense must be stated in the complaint or information, and that the informations in the instant case failed to do so, rendering them fatally defective.
• Right to Be Informed: Appellant argued that the date and time of the alleged rapes were so indefinite that he was deprived of the opportunity to prepare for his defense, violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether the informations charging the accused with rape were fatally defective for failure to state with particularity the approximate date of the commission of the alleged rapes, thereby violating the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

• Sufficiency of the Information: No. The informations were sufficient, the date of commission not being a material ingredient of rape, whose gravamen is carnal knowledge through force and intimidation; allegations of "the year 1996" and "the month of May 1998" sufficiently apprised the accused of the charges.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that it is not necessary to state the precise date of the offense except when it is a material ingredient, and that the offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date. In rape cases, the date or time of commission is not a material ingredient because the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation; the precise time has no substantial bearing on the commission. Accordingly, the date need not be stated with absolute accuracy. Consistent precedent—People vs. Purazo and People vs. Magbanua—upheld informations that alleged only the year or the month and year of commission. All essential elements of rape were stated in the informations, which alleged that the three incidents occurred in "the year 1996" and in "May 1998." These allegations substantially apprised appellant of the crime charged and did not deprive him of the right to prepare his defense. The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were likewise specifically alleged in the informations and proven during trial through AAA's baptismal certificate (showing her birth date as 12 August 1983), the marriage contract of Ching and BBB, and Ching's own admission that AAA was his daughter. The penalty of death was proper for each count under both Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (for the 1996 rape) and Republic Act No. 8353 (for the May 1998 rapes), but was reduced to reclusion perpetua per Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9346, with appellant ineligible for parole under Section 3 of the same law. The awards of P75,000.00 civil indemnity, P75,000.00 moral damages, and P25,000.00 exemplary damages for each count were sustained as proper under prevailing jurisprudence.

• Date is not a material ingredient of rape — The gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation; the precise date or time of commission has no substantial bearing on the offense. It is sufficient that the information alleges the approximate date of commission, such as the year or the month and year. The Court applied this doctrine to sustain informations alleging "the year 1996" and "the month of May 1998" as sufficient to apprise the accused of the charges.
• Qualifying circumstances must be alleged and proven — The qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and relationship with the offender must be specifically alleged in the complaint or information and proved during trial to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. The Court found both circumstances duly alleged in the informations and established through AAA's baptismal certificate, the marriage contract, and appellant's judicial admission.
• Baptismal certificate as proof of age — While the best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth, in its absence, similar authentic documents such as a baptismal certificate showing the date of birth suffice. The Court admitted AAA's baptismal certificate because her birth was never registered, and the certificate stated her birth date as 12 August 1983.

• "The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. The precise time when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its commission." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on why the informations were sufficient despite the absence of precise dates.
• "We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated." — Quoted from People vs. Purazo, this formulation is the canonical statement frequently cited in subsequent rape jurisprudence regarding the immateriality of the date of commission.
• "An information can withstand the test of judicial scrutiny as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof." — Quoted from People vs. Magbanua, this passage defines the standard for testing the sufficiency of an information in rape prosecutions.

• People vs. Purazo, 450 Phil. 651 (2003) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that the date is not an essential element of rape and that the time or place of commission need not be accurately stated.
• People vs. Magbanua, 377 Phil. 750 (1999) — Followed. Cited for sustaining the validity of an information for rape that merely alleged the year of commission, and for the principle that an information is sufficient as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts constitutive thereof.
• People vs. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — Cited as authority for the RTC's direct elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals for review in light of the death penalty imposed.
• People vs. Cayabyab, G.R. No. 167147, 3 August 2005, 465 SCRA 681 — Followed. Cited for the rule that in the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as a baptismal certificate suffice to prove the age of the offended party.
• People vs. Pruna, 439 Phil. 440 (2002) — Cited through Cayabyab as the originating source of the rule on proving the age of the victim for purposes of qualifying circumstances.

• Section 11, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that it is not necessary to state the precise date of the offense except when it is a material ingredient, and that the offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date. Applied to hold that the informations alleging "the year 1996" and "May 1998" were sufficient.
• Section 6, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Enumerates the requisites of a valid and sufficient information, including the approximate date of the commission of the offense. Applied in conjunction with Section 11.
• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — The law applicable to the first rape committed in 1996; provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the rape victim is a minor and the offender is a parent.
• Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) — The law applicable to the two rapes committed in May 1998; likewise provides for the death penalty when the victim is a minor and the offender is a parent.
• Section 2, Republic Act No. 9346 — Provides that in lieu of the death penalty, reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated uses the nomenclature of penalties under the Revised Penal Code. Applied to reduce the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
• Section 3, Republic Act No. 9346 — Provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences are reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the Act, shall not be eligible for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Applied to deny appellant eligibility for parole.

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concurred.