People vs. Chaves

An interlocutory order denying the presentation of an accused as an ordinary prosecution witness is not appealable but may be assailed by certiorari within a reasonable period. Rule 119 does not limit the evidence at a state-witness discharge hearing to the sworn statement, and a co-accused may testify for the prosecution without prior discharge as a state witness if he voluntarily consents, subject to the trial court’s determination of voluntariness.

Respondent Judge Nazar U. Chaves presided over Criminal Case No. 86-39 in the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, in which private respondent Miguel P. Paderanga was an accused. The legal framework includes Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court (later Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure) on discharge of an accused as state witness, and Rule 130, Section 30 on admissions by a conspirator.

In October 1986, Informations for Multiple Murder for the killing of members of the Bucag family in Gingoog City were filed against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City. Venue was moved to Cagayan de Oro City by Administrative Order No. 87-2-244, and Criminal Case No. 86-39 was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, presided by respondent Judge Nazar U. Chaves. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted; the other accused remained at large.

Two years later, in October 1988, Felizardo Roxas, also known as “Ely Roxas,” “Fely Roxas,” and “Lolong Roxas,” was identified as another member of the group responsible for the slaying of the Bucag family. An amended information was filed on October 6, 1988 to implead Roxas as a co-accused, and he engaged the services of private respondent Miguel Paderanga as his counsel. A preliminary investigation was conducted to give Roxas the opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his defense. In his counter-affidavit, Roxas implicated Atty. Paderanga as the mastermind of the killings. The amended information was again amended to include Paderanga as one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39.

Trial ensued. At the hearing on May 18, 1993, the prosecution called Felizardo Roxas as its first witness. Private respondent objected to the presentation of Roxas’ testimony, and the trial court took the matter under advisement. The following day, May 19, 1993, the trial court sustained private respondent’s objection on the ground that the presentation of Roxas’ testimony would violate his right against self-incrimination. The trial court further ruled that before Roxas could be presented as a witness for the prosecution, he must first be discharged as a state witness, and that the prosecution could not present Roxas as a hostile witness.

The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, to discharge Roxas as a state witness. It also manifested its intention to present Julito Ampo as another state witness or ordinary prosecution witness. On June 3, 1993, the trial court denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration but set the motion for the discharge of Roxas as state witness for hearing. On June 29, 1993, the trial court issued an Order allowing the presentation of Roxas’ testimony for purposes of proving the conditions of Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court on the discharge of a state witness; private respondent objected, and the trial court overruled the objection. The next day, June 30, 1993, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the presentation of Roxas’ testimony would be tantamount to allowing him to testify as a state witness before his discharge; that the qualification of a proposed state witness must be proved by evidence other than his own testimony; and that at the hearing for the discharge of a proposed state witness, only his sworn statement could be presented, not his oral testimony.

On July 15, 1993, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order granting private respondent’s motion for reconsideration. The trial court ruled that only the sworn statement of the proposed state witness may be admitted and considered and that the “evidence” contemplated in Rule 119, Section 9 is any evidence other than his testimony; it set aside the June 29, 1993 Order without prejudice to the prosecution’s presenting any other evidence in support of the discharge. The ruling was also applied to accused Julito Ampo upon the prosecution’s manifestation that it adopted the same stand with respect to his proposed discharge. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on August 9, 1993, which the trial court denied on September 23, 1993 for lack of merit. The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the CA on November 17, 1993, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32616, assailing the June 3, July 15, and September 23, 1993 Orders. The CA dismissed the petition on November 7, 1997 for lack of merit, prompting this petition for review.

• Finality of the June 3, 1993 Order: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in ruling that the June 3, 1993 Order denying the presentation of Felizardo “Ely” Roxas as an ordinary witness had already become final because no appeal was perfected within the reglementary period, and in citing Amarante vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 104.
• Voluntary Testimony Without Prior Discharge: Petitioner argued that Ely Roxas and Julito Ampo voluntarily expressed their consent to testify as prosecution witnesses, so there was no need to first discharge them as state witnesses before they could be presented; an accused may testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do so with full knowledge of his right and the consequences of his acts.
• Evidence at the Discharge Hearing: Petitioner maintained that it could validly present the testimony of Ely Roxas and Julito Ampo at the hearing for their discharge as state witnesses because Rule 119, Section 9 requires the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness, without distinguishing as to the kind of evidence; the proposed witness’s own testimony is the most competent evidence to prove the conditions for discharge.

• Premature Testimony as State Witness: Private respondent argued that the presentation of Roxas’ testimony would be tantamount to allowing him to testify as a state witness before his discharge; that the qualification of a proposed state witness must be proved by evidence other than his own testimony; and that at the hearing for the discharge of a proposed state witness, only his sworn statement can be presented and not his oral testimony.
• Admission by Conspirator: Private respondent countered that Roxas and Ampo cannot be allowed to testify because their testimony would effectively constitute an admission by a conspirator which, under Rule 130, Section 30 of the Rules of Court, is inadmissible as evidence against a co-conspirator until the conspiracy is established by evidence other than said declaration.

• Finality of Interlocutory Order: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the June 3, 1993 Order denying the presentation of Felizardo Roxas as an ordinary witness had already become final for failure to appeal within the reglementary period, by citing Amarante vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 104.
• Evidence at State Witness Discharge Hearing: Whether the CA erred in limiting the evidence that the prosecution may present in its motion to discharge proposed state witnesses to their respective sworn statements and in upholding the trial court’s denial of the presentation of other evidence, including their oral testimony.
• Voluntariness of Co-Accused’s Testimony: Whether an accused may testify for the prosecution without first being discharged as a state witness where he voluntarily consents, and what the trial court must determine before allowing such testimony.

• Finality of Interlocutory Order: Yes. The CA erred in ruling that the June 3, 1993 Order had become final; the order was interlocutory, did not dispose of the case on the merits, and could be assailed by certiorari within a reasonable period.
• Evidence at State Witness Discharge Hearing: Yes. The CA erred in limiting the evidence to the sworn statements; Rule 119, Section 17 (formerly Section 9) requires evidence and the sworn statement and does not exclude the proposed witness’s oral testimony.
• Voluntariness of Co-Accused’s Testimony: Yes, if voluntary. An accused cannot be compelled to testify as a hostile witness, but may testify against a co-defendant with full knowledge of his rights and the consequences; no prior discharge is required, but the trial court must determine voluntariness.

• Finality of Interlocutory Order: The CA ruled that the June 3, 1993 Order disallowing Roxas’ testimony as a hostile witness had become final because the prosecution did not appeal. The SC held this was error because the order was interlocutory; it did not finally dispose of the case on its merits. As an interlocutory order, it could not be the proper subject of appeal; it could be assailed in a special civil action for certiorari. Under the Rules of Court then governing, certiorari may be filed within a reasonable period, as supported by Santiago, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 121908, January 26, 1998. Although the record did not show that the prosecution moved for reconsideration of the June 3, 1993 Order, it did file a motion for reconsideration of the July 15, 1993 Omnibus Order, raising the matter of presenting Roxas as an ordinary witness as distinguished from a state witness. That motion was denied on September 23, 1993, and the prosecution filed its petition on November 17, 1993, well within a reasonable period and even within the 60-day reglementary period under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA therefore erred in treating the order as final.

• Evidence at State Witness Discharge Hearing: Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (formerly Rule 119, Section 9) provides that the trial court may direct one or more accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state “after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge.” The provision does not distinguish as to the kind of evidence the prosecution may present; it requires the sworn statement and such evidence as are necessary to determine if the conditions for discharge exist. The purpose is to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary exclusion from the complaint of persons guilty of the crime charged. No exemption from the term “evidence” excludes the testimony of the accused. There is no other evidence more competent than the proposed witness’s own testimony to prove the conditions: absolute necessity for his testimony, no other direct evidence available, corroboration in material points, not appearing to be the most guilty, and no conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. The trial judge also needs the testimony to clarify matters in the sworn statements. Paderanga’s objection under Rule 130, Section 30 that the testimony would be an admission by a conspirator was premature; he could interpose the proper objection during direct examination when the prosecution asks questions touching on conspiracy.

• Voluntariness of Co-Accused’s Testimony: An accused cannot be made a hostile witness for the prosecution because that would compel him to be a witness against himself. However, he may testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do so, with full knowledge of his right and the consequences of his acts; it is not necessary that the court first discharge him as a state witness. There is a difference between testifying as a state witness and testifying as a co-accused: a state witness must qualify, is discharged as an accused, and is exempted from prosecution, while a co-accused who testifies remains an accused and can be held liable if found guilty. The SC could not merely rely on the prosecution’s representation that Roxas and Ampo had volunteered to testify; the trial court must determine with certainty whether they voluntarily consented, lest their right against self-incrimination be violated. The dispositive order therefore directed the trial court to determine voluntariness and then allow the prosecution to present them, or in the alternative to allow them to testify at the hearing on their discharge as state witnesses.

• Interlocutory Order; Certiorari — An order that does not finally dispose of the case on its merits is interlocutory and not appealable; it may be challenged by certiorari within a reasonable period. The SC applied this to the June 3, 1993 Order disallowing Roxas as a hostile witness and held the CA erred in ruling it final.
• Discharge of Accused as State Witness; Evidence at Hearing — Under Rule 119, Section 17 (formerly Section 9), the court may discharge an accused as state witness with consent after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing. The SC held the prosecution is not limited to the sworn statement; the proposed witness may testify. The conditions are (a) absolute necessity for the testimony, (b) no other direct evidence available for proper prosecution except the testimony, (c) testimony can be substantially corroborated in material points, (d) proposed witness does not appear to be the most guilty, and (e) no prior conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
• Testimony of a Co-Accused; Right Against Self-Incrimination — An accused cannot be compelled to testify as a hostile witness for the prosecution, but may voluntarily testify against a co-defendant with full knowledge of his rights and the consequences; prior discharge as a state witness is not required, but the trial court must determine voluntariness. The SC applied this to Roxas and Ampo.
• Admission by Conspirator — Under Rule 130, Section 30, the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against a co-conspirator only after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The SC held Paderanga’s objection was premature because it could be raised during direct examination when conspiracy is touched.
• When the Law Does Not Distinguish — The SC applied the rule that when the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish. Rule 119 does not distinguish as to the kind of evidence at the discharge hearing, so oral testimony is not excluded.

• "Clearly, the Order dated June 3, 1993 was interlocutory; it did not finally dispose of the case on its merits. As such, the Order cannot be the proper subject of appeal. It may, however, be assailed in a special civil action for certiorari." — This passage states the SC’s ground for rejecting the CA’s finality ruling and allowing certiorari.
• "The provision does not make any distinction as to the kind of evidence the prosecution may present. What it simply requires, in addition to the presentation of the sworn statement of the accused concerned, is the presentation of such evidence as are necessary to determine if the conditions exist for the discharge, so as to meet the object of the law, which is to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary exclusion from the complaint of persons guilty of the crime charged." — This passage rejects the trial court’s limitation of the discharge hearing to the sworn statement.
• "There is no other evidence more competent than the testimony of the proposed witness himself to prove the conditions that his testimony is absolutely necessary in the case; that there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense; that his testimony can be corroborated in its material points; that he does not appear to be the most guilty; and that he has not been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude." — This passage explains why the proposed witness’s oral testimony is competent to prove the Rule 119 conditions.
• "It is true that an accused cannot be made a hostile witness for the prosecution, for to do so would compel him to be a witness against himself. However, he may testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do so, with full knowledge of his right and the consequences of his acts." — This passage distinguishes compelled hostile-witness testimony from voluntary testimony against a co-accused.

• Santiago, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 121908, January 26, 1998 — Cited to support the rule that a petition for certiorari may be filed within a reasonable period; the SC used it to find the prosecution’s petition timely.
• People vs. Trazo and Escartin, 58 Phils. 258, 260 (1933) — Cited for the rule that an accused may testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do so with full knowledge of his right and the consequences; followed.
• Deloso vs. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545, 550 (1990) — Cited for the maxim that when the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish; followed.
• Amarante vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 104 — Invoked by the CA for its finality ruling; the SC rejected its application because the June 3, 1993 Order was interlocutory.

• Rule 119, Section 9, Rules of Court (now Rule 119, Section 17, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure) — Governs discharge of an accused as state witness and requires the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement at a hearing. The SC applied it to allow the proposed witnesses’ oral testimony at the discharge hearing and to identify the conditions for discharge.
• Rule 119, Section 18, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that discharge operates as acquittal and bars future prosecution unless the accused fails or refuses to testify. The SC cited it to distinguish a discharged state witness from a co-accused who testifies and remains liable.
• Rule 130, Section 30, Rules of Court — Admission by conspirator; the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against a co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The SC held Paderanga’s objection was premature and could be raised during direct examination.
• 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — The SC noted the prosecution’s petition was filed within the 60-day reglementary period prescribed in the 1997 Rules, even as it applied the reasonable-period rule for certiorari under the rules then governing.