People vs. Cawaling

A murder charge against public officers, including a town mayor, belongs to the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan when the Information does not allege that the crime was committed in relation to their office; and an accused who admits the killing but invokes self-defense or lawful performance of duty bears the burden of proving the justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.

Cawaling was the mayor of San Jose, Romblon, while Tumbagahan, De los Santos, and Cajilo were members of the local police force. Ronie Ilisan was the brother of Nelson, Vicente, and Imelda Ilisan, the principal prosecution witnesses. Before the murder charge was filed, Nelson Ilisan filed an administrative case before the National Police Commission against Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo, and Andres Fontamillas for Ronie's killing; Adjudication Board No. 14 found them guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal.

On December 4, 1982, at around 8:00 or 8:30 in the evening, Vicente Ilisan and his elder brother Ronie Ilisan were drinking tuba at the C & J-4 Kitchenette of co-accused Andres Fontamillas in Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon. When they stood up to go home, Luz Venus told them not to go out because the accused were watching them outside about three meters from the restaurant. Diosdado Venus accompanied them upon their request, and they walked toward home. About a hundred meters from the restaurant, the six accused — Mayor Cawaling, Policemen Cajilo, Fontamillas, Tumbagahan, and De los Santos, and civilian Alex Batuigas — flashlighted them, and Diosdado ran back. The two brothers also ran toward the house of their elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon, but Fontamillas and Cajilo blocked them at the gate of the fence. Ronie ran toward the ricefield, and the accused chased them.

Vicente ran toward the bushes and lay on the ground behind a coconut tree. He saw Ronie fall on the ricefield, then rise by kneeling and raising his two hands. All six accused approached Ronie with their flashlights and shot him. Cawaling said, "you left him, he is already dead." Cawaling was armed with a .45 caliber, Fontamillas and Cajilo with armalites, and Tumbagahan, De los Santos, and Batuigas with .38 caliber firearms. The group left toward Cawaling's house. Vicente ran to the house of his older brother Nelson Ilisan and told him Ronie was dead; Imelda later arrived crying and said, "Manong, patay ron si Ronie." Nelson warned them not to be noisy because the group might return. Nelson and Vicente later went to barangay captain Adolfo Tumbagahon, then to the townhall and the chief of police, and eventually to the place where Ronie was shot. Vicente found an empty .45 caliber shell about three arm's length from the body and surrendered it to the Napolcom. Dr. Blandino C. Flores described multiple gunshot wounds, and the death certificate stated that Ronie died of "severe hemorrhage and gun shot wo[unds]."

The defense gave a different account. Cawaling arrived from Manila at around 7:00 in the evening, went home, then proceeded to the municipal hall and police station. He joined Tumbagahan and Cajilo near the flagpole and learned they were assigned for patrol that night. Cawaling told them he had received information that certain persons were plotting to kill him and a member of the police force. They conducted patrol and passed by the C & J-4 Kitchenette, where they heard Ronie Ilisan say in a loud voice that he would kill a person that night. Gil Palacio and Luz Venus allegedly saw Ronie, very drunk, brandishing a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver. Later, Ronie passed by the municipal hall and shouted the challenge, "gawas ang maisog." A few moments later, Cawaling and the policemen heard a gunshot and hysterical female voices shouting, "pulis, tabang." They ran toward the house of Nelson Ilisan and saw Ronie holding a .38 caliber revolver. Cawaling told Ronie to surrender his gun, but Ronie pointed the gun at Cawaling and pulled the trigger. Cawaling shouted "dapa" and was not hit. Ronie ran toward the church, and the policemen chased him. Ronie allegedly fired at Cajilo, but the gun misfired; at the ricefield, Cajilo fired warning shots, and Ronie fired at Tumbagahan. Cajilo and Tumbagahan then fired and hit Ronie. Tumbagahan picked up the gun still in Ronie's hand and gave it to Cajilo, and the group reported the incident at the police station.

The RTC found the prosecution witnesses credible and rejected the defense witnesses. It noted contradictions among the spot report prepared by Station Commander Oscar M. Montero, the testimonies of Cajilo and Tumbagahan, and the medical findings of Dr. Flores on the caliber of the gun, the wounds inflicted, and Cawaling's whereabouts during the shooting. It found that Cawaling and his men, armed with guns, could have immediately disarmed the victim at the initial encounter. It ruled that the positive identification by prosecution witnesses prevailed over the alibi of De los Santos and Fontamillas, which was not corroborated. It found that the .38 caliber revolver allegedly owned by the victim was in fact owned and used by Alex Batuigas. It also found the defense photo and sketch misleading because the window from which Imelda allegedly saw the incident was at the eastern side of her house and afforded a clear view, while the window referred to by the defense was at the southern portion. The RTC further found no ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses and noted a motive: Nelson Ilisan testified that Ronie had witnessed Bonifacio Buenaventura, a former chief commander of the San Jose Police Force, kill a certain Ruben Ventura, and that Cawaling, Buenaventura's first cousin, wanted Ronie dead because Ronie had not followed his instruction to leave town.

• Conspiracy: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecution's conspiracy theory, contending that policemen on actual duty normally operate in groups but not necessarily in conspiracy, and that Cawaling was not a co-conspirator.
• Cawaling's Participation: Cawaling argued that he had nothing to do with the shooting except to shout to arrest the victim, which prompted the policemen to chase and shoot the victim when he resisted after firing at Cawaling.
• Presumption of Regularity: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in not giving weight to the policemen's testimonies, which carry the presumption of regularity.
• Equipoise Rule: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in not acquitting them by applying the equipoise rule, which would create reasonable doubt.
• Self-Defense and Lawful Duty: Tumbagahan and Cajilo argued that they merely performed a lawful duty and that the shooting resulted from a hot pursuit and shoot-out in self-defense.
• Qualifying Circumstances and Penalty: Tumbagahan and Cajilo argued that treachery and abuse of superior strength were not proven, that the crime should be homicide only, and that voluntary surrender should mitigate the penalty.
• Double Jeopardy: Tumbagahan and Cajilo argued that the trial court erred in not considering double jeopardy.
• Jurisdiction: Tumbagahan and Cajilo argued that the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction, insisting that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction.
• Due Process: Cawaling argued that there was a blatant absence of due process in the proceedings tantamount to mistrial.
• Alibi: De los Santos raised alibi and denial.

• Double Jeopardy: The People, through the Solicitor General, countered that appellants were never arraigned, never pleaded before the Judge Advocate General's Office, there was no trial, and no judgment on the merits had been rendered.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the RTC or the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a murder charge against public officers where the Information does not allege commission in relation to office.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the filing and alleged dismissal of a case before the Judge Advocate General's Office barred the criminal prosecution.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in relying on the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies.
• Self-Defense: Whether appellants acted in self-defense.
• Lawful Performance of Duty: Whether appellants acted in lawful performance of duty.
• Alibi: Whether De los Santos's alibi and denial should be credited.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was established.
• Equipoise Rule: Whether the equipoise rule required acquittal.
• Qualifying Circumstances: Whether treachery and abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder, and whether evident premeditation was proven.
• Damages: Whether the awards of actual damages and lost earnings were proper.
• Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances: Whether voluntary surrender should be credited and what penalty should be imposed.

• Jurisdiction: No. The RTC had jurisdiction because the Information charged murder without alleging that the offense was committed in relation to public office; Sandiganbayan jurisdiction requires such an allegation and the prescribed penalty threshold.
• Double Jeopardy: No. First jeopardy did not attach because there was no sufficient evidence of a valid indictment, arraignment, plea, trial, or acquittal or dismissal before a military commission or the Judge Advocate General's Office.
• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The SC found no reason to alter the RTC's credibility findings; the prosecution witnesses positively identified appellants and no ill motive was shown.
• Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression did not start with the victim; even under the defense version, aggression had ceased when the victim fled, and the means employed were excessive.
• Lawful Performance of Duty: No. The requisites were not met; the victim was not committing an offense, and the killing was not a necessary consequence of the lawful performance of duty.
• Alibi: No. Positive identification prevailed, and De los Santos failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was inferred from the concerted acts of chasing, blocking the victim's routes, beaming flashlights on him, and shooting him together; the act of one is the act of all.
• Equipoise Rule: No. The inculpatory facts pointed to only one conclusion — guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Qualifying Circumstances: Yes as to treachery; abuse of superior strength was absorbed in treachery, and evident premeditation was not proven.
• Damages: Partly. The actual damages were deleted for lack of receipts; lost earning capacity was increased to P928,000; the P50,000 civil indemnity was affirmed.
• Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances: No voluntary surrender. The warrant was served and appellants were detained; the requisites of voluntary surrender were not met, and reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed.

• Jurisdiction: The SC held that jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the institution of the action and by the allegations in the Information. Under Section 4(a)(2) of PD 1606, as amended, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office where the penalty is higher than prision correccional or a P6,000 fine. But Sanchez vs. Demetriou teaches that public office is not a constitutive element of murder; the relation to office must be direct, such that the offense cannot exist without the office. The Information charged murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and did not allege that appellants committed it in relation to their office. Following Aguinaldo vs. Domagas, the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, had jurisdiction. The SC also considered PD 1952, which placed uniformed members of the Integrated National Police under court-martial jurisdiction, but held that the RTC's jurisdiction was determined by the allegations of the Information, which did not allege relation to office. BP 129, Section 20 also gives trial courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body, except those falling under the Sandiganbayan.
• Double Jeopardy: The SC held that double jeopardy requires a first jeopardy attached, validly terminated, and a second jeopardy for the same offense. First jeopardy attaches only after a valid indictment, before a competent court, after arraignment, after a valid plea, and when the accused is acquitted or convicted or the case is dismissed without his express consent. Under PD 39 and its implementing rules, military commission proceedings require a summary preliminary investigation, formal charges, arraignment, and trial. Appellants presented only disposition forms and a letter recommending that the case be dropped; they did not present a charge sheet, record of arraignment, or record of trial. The Solicitor General pointed out that they were never arraigned, never pleaded before the JAGO, there was no trial, and no judgment on the merits. No first jeopardy attached.
• Credibility of Witnesses: The SC acknowledged the general rule that trial courts' factual findings on credibility deserve respect, with an exception when the judge who penned the decision did not hear the witnesses. Even after reviewing the records, the SC found no reason to alter the RTC's credibility findings. Vicente Ilisan narrated the chase and shooting in detail; Imelda Tumbagahon and Nelson Ilisan corroborated him and positively identified appellants. The defense failed to prove ill motive, and family relationship does not necessarily bias witnesses; it can impel them to seek justice. The SC rejected Cawaling's claim that washing the cadaver was suspicious: Bebelinia Sacapaño merely cleaned the body, appellants could have requested another autopsy, and conviction rested on strong testimonial evidence. The claim that Vicente was too drunk was unsupported; the evidence showed Ronie, not Vicente, was the drunk person referred to by Luz Venus. The testimonies of Dr. Flores, Nelson Ilisan, and Prosecutor Victoriano were not formally offered, but no objection was made and they were cross-examined; under People vs. Java, the objection was waived. The SC also held that the prosecutor's alleged partiality did not invalidate the proceedings, as prosecutors may prosecute with earnestness and vigor but must not strike foul blows.
• Self-Defense: The SC held that unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for self-defense. The RTC found that unlawful aggression did not start with the victim; appellants waited for Ronie outside the restaurant, chased him, and shot him without giving him an opportunity to defend himself. Even under the defense's version, Ronie was running away when chased and shot, so any unlawful aggression had ceased; when aggression ceases, the defender has no right to kill or wound the former aggressor. The means employed were also excessive: appellants were armed and could have ordered surrender; one shot at the shoulder would have immobilized him, yet they fired successive shots while he was kneeling with raised hands. Since appellants admitted killing but invoked self-defense, the burden shifted to them to prove the justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence; they failed.
• Lawful Performance of Duty: The SC held that the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty requires (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty, and (2) the injury or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of that duty. Appellants, except Cawaling, were policemen on duty, but the victim was not committing any offense at the time. Killing him under the circumstances was not a valid performance of duty. Quoting People vs. De la Cruz, the SC ruled that "Performance of duties does not include murder" and that "Murder is never justified, regardless of the victim." The fact that Ronie was a troublemaker was not an excuse.
• Alibi: The SC held that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent, and untainted by ill motive. De los Santos was positively identified by prosecution witnesses as part of the group that chased and shot Ronie. He failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene; his evidence showed only that he was sleeping in his house near the locus criminis. Alibi is inherently weak, easily fabricated, and must be received with caution.
• Conspiracy: The SC held that conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is rarely available, but conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission or inferred from acts showing a joint purpose, concerted action, and community of intent. The SC agreed with the RTC: all accused chased the victim and his brother; four blocked their routes to the houses of Nelson and Imelda; all six armed accused continued the pursuit; when Ronie fell and rose kneeling with raised hands, all beamed their flashlights on him and shot him in a united and concerted manner; Cawaling was heard saying "you left him, he is already dead." It did not matter who inflicted the mortal wound; the act of one is the act of all.
• Equipoise Rule: The SC rejected the equipoise rule. Under People vs. Lagnas, the rule applies if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt; then the evidence does not satisfy moral certainty. Here, the inculpatory facts pointed to only one conclusion: appellants were guilty. The SC agreed with the RTC that guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Qualifying Circumstances: The SC held that treachery exists when the malefactors employ means and methods that tend directly and especially to insure the execution of the offense without risk to themselves arising from the defense the victim might make; its essence is a sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation. Even though Ronie was warned and was able to run, treachery still attended the killing. Under People vs. Landicho, treachery may be appreciated even when the victim was warned, because what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate. Appellants waited for Ronie, chased him, prevented him from seeking refuge, carried firearms and flashlights, and fired at him while he was kneeling with arms raised. The SC did not appreciate abuse of superior strength because it is absorbed in treachery. It also did not appreciate evident premeditation because the prosecution failed to show the time the offender determined to commit the crime, an act manifesting that determination, and a lapse of time sufficient for reflection.
• Damages: The SC affirmed the P50,000 civil indemnity. It deleted the P6,000 actual damages because no receipts were presented to substantiate the expenses; pecuniary loss must be established by credible evidence. It recomputed loss of earning capacity using the formula 2/3 x [80 - age of victim at death] x [reasonable portion of annual net income received as support by heirs]. Nelson Ilisan testified that the deceased earned an average of P100 daily or P3,000 monthly; deducting P1,000 for living and necessary expenses left P24,000 annual net income. The victim was 22 years old. The computation is 2/3 x [80 - 22] x P24,000 = P928,000. The RTC's award of P116,666.66 was therefore increased to P928,000.
• Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances: The SC held that voluntary surrender was not proven. The warrant for arrest was issued on August 18, 1987, while the Urgent Motion for Bail was filed only on September 2, 1987. The requisites of voluntary surrender are: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. Records show that the warrant was served on Tumbagahan and Cajilo on September 2, 1987 and they were detained. With no other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the RTC correctly imposed reclusion perpetua. The SC noted that before the amendment of Section 248 of the Revised Penal Code by Section 6 of RA 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.

• Jurisdiction determined by allegations in the Information — The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over public officers requires that the offense be committed in relation to their office and that the prescribed penalty threshold be met; absent such allegation, the RTC has jurisdiction. The SC applied this to a murder charge against a mayor and policemen where the Information did not allege relation to office.
• Burden of proof when the accused admits killing — Once an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense or lawful performance of duty, the burden shifts to him to prove the justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. The SC applied this because appellants admitted the killing but failed to prove self-defense or lawful duty.
• Unlawful aggression in self-defense — Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for self-defense; when it ceases, the defender has no right to kill or wound the former aggressor. The SC applied this because the victim was running away when chased and shot.
• Requisites of lawful performance of duty — The accused must prove that he acted in the performance of a duty and that the injury or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of that duty. The SC applied this and held that killing the victim was not a valid performance of duty.
• Conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it; it may be inferred from the mode and manner of the commission or from acts showing a joint purpose, concerted action, and community of intent. The SC applied this to the coordinated chase, blocking, and shooting of the victim.
• Treachery — Treachery exists when the malefactors employ means and methods that tend directly and especially to insure the execution of the offense without risk to themselves arising from the defense the victim might make; its essence is a sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation. The SC applied this even though the victim was warned, because the execution of the attack made it impossible for him to defend himself.
• Abuse of superior strength absorbed in treachery — Abuse of superior strength is deemed absorbed in treachery and cannot be separately appreciated. The SC applied this in qualifying the killing to murder.
• Equipoise rule — If the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not satisfy moral certainty and cannot support conviction. The SC did not apply it because the evidence pointed only to guilt.
• Alibi — Alibi must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime; it is inherently weak and easily fabricated. The SC rejected De los Santos's alibi because he failed to prove physical impossibility.
• Voluntary surrender requisites — Voluntary surrender requires that the offender has not been actually arrested, that he surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent, and that the surrender is voluntary. The SC applied this and rejected the claim because the warrant had been served and appellants were detained.
• Lost earning capacity formula — Loss of earning capacity is computed as 2/3 x [80 - age of victim at death] x [reasonable portion of the annual net income which would have been received as support by heirs]. The SC applied this and increased the award to P928,000.

• "It is axiomatic that once an accused-appellant admits killing the victim, he bears the burden of establishing the presence of any circumstance like self-defense, performance of a lawful duty or, for that matter, double jeopardy, which may relieve him of responsibility, or which may mitigate his criminal liability." — The SC used this as the framework for rejecting self-defense and lawful performance of duty after the accused admitted the killing.
• "Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased." — The SC quoted this from Sanchez vs. Demetriou to explain why the Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction over the murder charge.
• "Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots." — The SC used this to explain why conspiracy may be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused.
• "Performance of duties does not include murder." — The SC quoted this from People vs. De la Cruz to reject the policemen's claim that they were acting in the lawful performance of duty.

• Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 (1993) — Controlling precedent on jurisdiction; clarified that public office is not a constitutive element of murder.
• Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al., G.R. No. 98452 (1991) — Followed; absent an allegation that the offense was committed in relation to public office, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.
• People vs. Java, 227 SCRA 668 (1993) — Followed; testimony not formally offered in evidence may still be admitted if the other party did not object.
• People vs. Lagnas, 222 SCRA 745 (1993) — Cited for the equipoise rule; distinguished because the evidence against appellants was overwhelming.
• People vs. Landicho, 258 SCRA 1 (1996) — Followed; treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was warned of danger.
• People vs. De la Cruz, 227 SCRA 278 (1993) — Followed; performance of duties does not include murder, and murder is never justified regardless of the victim.
• People vs. Sion and Bisu, G.R. No. 109617 (1997) — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender; applied to reject the claim of voluntary surrender.
• People vs. Villamor, G.R. No. 111313-14 (1998) — Cited for the formula on loss of earning capacity; applied in recomputing the award to P928,000.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder; the Information charged murder under this article, and the SC affirmed the conviction qualified by treachery.
• Article 11, Revised Penal Code — Lists the justifying circumstances of self-defense and fulfillment of duty; the SC applied its requisites and found them unproven.
• Section 4(a)(2), Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended — Grants the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office where the penalty is higher than prision correccional or a P6,000 fine; the SC held it did not apply absent an allegation of relation to office.
• Section 20, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Gives trial courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body, except those falling under the Sandiganbayan; the SC used it to affirm RTC jurisdiction.
• Presidential Decree No. 1952, amending Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1850 — Places uniformed members of the Integrated National Police under court-martial jurisdiction; the SC discussed it but held that the RTC's jurisdiction was determined by the allegations of the Information.
• Presidential Decree No. 39 and its implementing rules — Prescribe military commission procedure, including preliminary investigation, formal charges, arraignment, and trial; the SC used it to reject double jeopardy because no charge sheet, arraignment, or trial record was shown.
• Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of Court — Provides the burden of proof; the SC applied it in holding that an accused who admits killing but invokes self-defense must prove the justifying circumstance.
• Section 36, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Requires an objection to evidence at the time of oral examination; the SC applied it through People vs. Java to admit testimonies not formally offered because no objection was made.
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 7659 — Amended Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code effective December 31, 1993; the SC noted that before the amendment, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
• Section 95, Presidential Decree No. 856 — Governs autopsy and dissection of remains; the SC cited it to note that appellants could have requested another autopsy.