People vs. Castillo

Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, and proof of force or intimidation is not necessary because a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What must be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.

AAA was an 18-year-old woman suffering from epileptic seizures since age nine, which caused her to stop schooling at Grade I level. She had difficulty understanding lessons, could not write well, and had poor memory. The appellant was a neighbor who had bought rice cake from AAA's mother, BBB. The case was prosecuted under Article 266-A, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, which defines rape as carnal knowledge of a woman when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.

AAA was 18 years old when she was raped by the appellant. She was the eldest of four children of BBB and CCC, her deceased father. She began schooling at age eight but could not finish Grade I because of epileptic seizures that started when she was nine years old, occurring at least once a month. During attacks, AAA would tremble and become stiff. She had difficulty understanding lessons, could not write well, had poor memory, and had difficulty following instructions compared to her younger siblings.

Sometime in March 2000, AAA approached the appellant to collect his debt for rice cake he had bought from her mother. Instead of settling his account, the appellant cuddled AAA until they reached the house of a certain Atok in Barangay Agay-ayan, Gingoog City. Once inside, the appellant made her lie down on the bed, removed her short pants and panty, and removed his own pants and underwear. When both were naked, the appellant mounted AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her pain. Afterward, he instructed her to go home.

Days later, the experience was repeated when AAA was on her way to visit her aunt's house. The appellant, standing by a mango grove, approached her, walked with her, and led her to a nearby chapel in Agay-ayan. Outside the chapel, the appellant undressed AAA and himself, and in a standing position, inserted his penis into her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her. Thereafter, AAA told her mother what the appellant had done.

On 11 May 2000, BBB accompanied AAA to Gingoog District Hospital where Dr. Thessa Marie Antillon-Malimas examined her. The doctor found a 7x6 cm. contusion hematoma on the lateral aspect of the right buttocks, which could have been caused by blunt force or violence applied two days prior. The doctor's findings on AAA's genitalia revealed healed lacerations at 3 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions on the hymen, which could have been caused by a blunt object, violence, or sexual intercourse. The vaginal canal yielded negative results for spermatozoa, but another contusion was found therein. AAA subsequently executed a sworn statement before SPO4 Myrna Z. Palad.

AAA was subjected to psychological tests administered by Myrna Delos Reyes-Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist at the Northern Mindanao Medical Center. The Draw-A-Person Test and Bender Visual Motor Test showed that AAA had poor visual motor coordination and low level mental functioning not within her chronological age of 21 years at the time of examination. The psychologist concluded that AAA suffered from mild to moderate mental retardation with a mental age of 8 to 12 years old, could be educated up to Grade VI level, lacked personal hygiene, had a vague concept of big numbers and time, and could easily be deceived or persuaded by a man to engage in sexual intercourse due to her low level mental functioning.

The defense presented Rolando Castillo, appellant's father, and the appellant himself, whose testimony consisted mainly of bare denial and alibi. The appellant denied raping AAA, claiming that in March 2000 he was harvesting coconuts from the land of Elizabeth Camus from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. daily. He also claimed that the house of Atok was demolished as early as 1998. On 9 May 2000, he went to his uncle's house in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, and stayed there until receiving a letter from his father in June 2000 informing him of the rape case. On 15 August 2000, the appellant, his father, and Eddie Camus went to AAA's place to ask her mother to settle the case. The appellant claimed he surrendered voluntarily to the Barangay Captain. He also claimed that BBB got angry at him when he told her to get married since she was a widow, which he believed was the reason for the charge.

Rolando categorically admitted that AAA is mentally retarded. He disclosed that he accompanied the appellant to AAA's place to ask forgiveness in case the charge was true. On rebuttal, BBB disclosed that even prior to the filing of the case, the appellant already admitted that he molested AAA. She also clarified that the house of Atok was not demolished in 1998 but only in 2000, as she was present gathering firewood during the demolition.

• Mental Retardation Not Proven: Appellant contended that the records are bereft of evidence conclusively showing that AAA was suffering from mental retardation, and that BBB's declaration that AAA is a slow thinker does not sufficiently establish mental retardation.
• Expert Witness Qualification: Appellant argued that the prosecution's supposed expert witness was highly questionable because she had not acquired any doctorate degree in the field of psychology or psychiatry, and the psychological tests she administered were inadequate to establish AAA's mental capacity.
• Guilt Not Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Appellant anchored his argument for acquittal on the alleged failure of the prosecution to establish AAA's mental retardation, concluding that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the prosecution's arguments on appeal beyond the presentation of its evidence at trial.

• Mental Retardation: Whether the prosecution sufficiently established that AAA was suffering from mental retardation to support a conviction for rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite his defenses of denial and alibi.

• Mental Retardation: Yes. Mental retardation was sufficiently established through the testimonies of AAA's mother and the Guidance Psychologist, the trial court's own observation of AAA's demeanor while testifying, and the categorical admission of appellant's own father that AAA is mentally retarded.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes. The conviction was affirmed, the prosecution having proven both the fact of sexual congress and AAA's mental retardation through AAA's categorical and straightforward testimony, corroborated by medical findings of healed hymenal lacerations.

• Mental Retardation: The Court held that the term "woman deprived of reason" includes one suffering from mental retardation. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(b), and proof of force or intimidation is not necessary because a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter. Mental retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical or clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court. Under Section 50, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, an ordinary witness may give an opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. The mother of an offended party in a rape case, though not a psychiatrist, is competent to testify on the matter if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party. Even if the Guidance Psychologist may not qualify as an expert witness, her observations regarding AAA's appearance, manner, habits, and behavior are admissible as an ordinary witness' testimony. The Court noted that the deprivation of reason contemplated by law need not be complete; mental abnormality or deficiency is sufficient. The trial court's own observation that AAA "seemed to be a retardate" and found it hard to answer simple questions was entitled to great weight and respect. Most tellingly, appellant's own father, Rolando, categorically admitted that AAA is mentally retarded and feeble-minded, putting beyond doubt her mental state.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The Court held that AAA's testimony was categorical and straightforward, and she positively identified the appellant as the person who raped her. The fact of sexual congress was supported by medical findings of healed hymenal lacerations at 3 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions, which could have resulted from sexual intercourse. When the victim's testimony is corroborated by the physician's finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge. The records failed to show that AAA was prompted by ill motive in imputing the offense. The appellant's claim that his remark about BBB's widowhood could have triggered the case was highly implausible, as no mother in her right mind would subject her daughter to the hardships and shame of a rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt feelings. The appellant's act of going to AAA's house to have the case settled and ask for forgiveness was undeniably indicative of guilt. Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the victim. The appellant failed to show the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime, as he left Agay-ayan only in May 2000, while the rape incidents happened in March 2000. Although the complaint alleged that the appellant knew of AAA's mental retardation, which would qualify the crime and make it punishable by death under Article 266-B, par. 10, the prosecution did not adduce evidence to prove the same. The Court therefore affirmed the conviction for simple rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(b), punishable by reclusion perpetua.

• Rape of a mental retardate — Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary because a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What must be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter.
• Proof of mental retardation — Mental retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical or clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court. A mental retardate exhibits a slow rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity. The mental retardation of persons and the degrees thereof may be manifested by their overt acts, appearance, attitude and behavior, including dentition, manner of walking, ability to feed oneself or attend to personal hygiene, dependency on others for protection and care, and inability to achieve intelligible speech. All these may be testified on by ordinary witnesses who come in contact with an alleged mental retardate.
• Ordinary witness opinion on mental condition — Under Section 50, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is competent for an ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. The mother of an offended party in a rape case, though not a psychiatrist, is competent to testify on the matter if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party.
• Deprivation of reason need not be complete — The deprivation of reason contemplated by law need not be complete; mental abnormality or deficiency is sufficient.
• Trial court observation of mental capacity — For purposes of determining the mental capacity of a person, the personal observation of the trial judge suffices even in the absence of an expert opinion, and such findings are entitled to great weight and respect.
• Credibility of mentally deficient rape victims — The competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant's accusations, it lends greater credence to her testimony that someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime.
• Asking for forgiveness as indicative of guilt — An act of asking for forgiveness is undeniably indicative of guilt.
• Denial and alibi — Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the victim. For alibi to prosper, the accused must show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the commission of the crime at the time of its commission.

• "Clearly, carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the elements required for conviction of rape of a mental retardate under Article 266-A, par. 1(b).
• "It bears stressing that the deprivation of reason contemplated by law need not be complete; mental abnormality or deficiency is sufficient." — This defines the scope of "deprived of reason" under the rape statute, establishing that partial mental deficiency suffices.
• "Such testimony puts beyond doubt that AAA is truly a mental retardate. Her condition was so apparent to people who have had an opportunity to interact and deal with her that even appellant's own father, who happens to be AAA's neighbor, could not deny her mental state." — This highlights the significance of the defense's own admission in confirming the victim's mental retardation.
• "It bears emphasis that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant's accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused." — This articulates the doctrine on the credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses.

• People vs. Dalandas, 442 Phil. 688 (2002) — Controlling precedent holding that mental retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical or clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and the observation by the trial court; also cited for the manifestations of mental retardation observable by ordinary witnesses.
• People vs. Dumanon, 401 Phil. 658 (2000) — Cited in Dalandas for the proposition that mental retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical or clinical evidence.
• People vs. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 177294, 19 February 2008, 546 SCRA 363 — Cited for the elements of rape under Article 266-A and the rule that what needs to be proven in rape of a mental retardate are the facts of sexual congress and the mental retardation of the victim.
• People vs. Bacaling, 447 Phil. 197 (2003) — Cited for the proposition that the term "woman deprived of reason" includes one suffering from mental retardation, and that the personal observation of the trial judge suffices to determine mental capacity even without expert opinion.
• People vs. Duranan, 402 Phil. 205 (2001) — Cited for the rule on ordinary witness opinion regarding mental condition under Section 50, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
• People vs. Atuel, G.R. No. 106962, 3 September 1996, 261 SCRA 339 — Cited for the proposition that the deprivation of reason contemplated by law need not be complete; mental abnormality or deficiency is sufficient.
• People vs. Ybañez, 404 Phil. 423 (2001) — Cited for the principle that the gravamen of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent.
• People vs. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — Cited as the basis for transferring the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
• People vs. Agunos, 375 Phil. 315 (1999) — Cited for the rule that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped, and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility.
• People vs. Macapal, Jr., G.R. No. 155335, 14 July 2005, 463 SCRA 387 — Cited for the proposition that the straightforward narration of the victim accompanied by categorical identification of the accused seals the case for the prosecution.
• People vs. Malones, 469 Phil. 301 (2004) — Cited for the rule that laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.
• People vs. Garin, 476 Phil. 455 (2004) — Cited for the rule that the absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of prosecution witnesses strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists.
• People vs. Jose, 367 Phil. 68 (1999) — Cited for the proposition that it is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice in a rape prosecution.
• People vs. Erardo, G.R. No. 119368, 18 August 1997, 277 SCRA 643 — Cited for the rule that an act of asking for forgiveness is undeniably indicative of guilt.
• People vs. Agravante, 392 Phil. 543 (2000) — Cited for the rule that denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses that cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the victim.
• People vs. Kimura, 471 Phil. 895 (2004) — Cited for the requisites of alibi: the accused must show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
• People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 177756, 3 March 2008, 547 SCRA 511 — Cited for the proposition that the victim's straightforward testimony, corroborated by medical findings, is sufficient to convict.
• People vs. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566, 3 March 2006, 484 SCRA 76 — Cited for the rule that civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape, and moral damages is awarded without need of further proof.
• People vs. Gragasin, G.R. No. 186496, 25 August 2009, 597 SCRA 214 — Cited for the rule that exemplary damages are awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance.
• People vs. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419 — Cited as the basis for withholding the real name of the victim-survivor and using fictitious initials.

• Article 266-A, par. 1(b), Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353 — Defines rape as carnal knowledge of a woman when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. The Court applied this provision to hold that carnal knowledge of a mental retardate constitutes rape without need to prove force or intimidation.
• Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code — Provides that rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, and that the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime is committed with aggravating or qualifying circumstances, including when the offender knew of the mental disability of the offended party. The Court applied this provision to affirm the penalty of reclusion perpetua for simple rape, as the prosecution failed to prove appellant's knowledge of AAA's mental retardation.
• Section 50, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence — Allows the opinion of an ordinary witness regarding the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. The Court applied this provision to admit the testimonies of BBB and the Guidance Psychologist regarding AAA's mental condition.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal offenses when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The Court applied this provision to deny exemplary damages because no aggravating circumstance was proven.

• Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice (Chairperson)
• Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice
• Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justice (designated as additional member per Special Order No. 876)
• Mariano C. Del Castillo, Associate Justice

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the provided text.