People vs. Casido

A conditional pardon granted to a convicted accused during the pendency of his appeal from the conviction is void for being prohibited by the constitutional requirement that executive clemency may only be exercised after final judgment.

Accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin were convicted of murder by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. They appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending, the President of the Philippines granted them conditional pardons, leading to their release from prison. The Supreme Court subsequently took cognizance of the matter upon being informed of the pardons.

• Nature of the Case: The case originated from a criminal conviction for murder. The accused-appellants, William Casido and Franklin Alcorin, were found guilty by the trial court and appealed to the Supreme Court.
• The Conditional Pardons: During the pendency of the appeal, the President of the Philippines granted separate conditional pardons to both accused-appellants. The pardons were signed on 19 January 1996, and the appellants were released from the New Bilibid Prisons on 25 January 1996 based on these documents.
• Motion to Withdraw Appeal: Following their release, the accused-appellants filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal before the Supreme Court. Their counsel later filed a comment offering no objection to the motion.
• Court's Inquiry: The Supreme Court, upon being apprised of the pardons, required the Bureau of Corrections to submit certified true copies of the pardons and discharge orders. The Court noted that the pardons were issued "by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the recommendation of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release and Pardon."

• Propriety of Pardon: The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the plaintiff-appellee (People of the Philippines), had previously argued in its brief that the appealed decision should be affirmed in toto. The specific arguments regarding the validity of the pardon are not detailed in the resolution, as the issue arose post-briefing.

• Motion to Withdraw: The accused-appellants, through their Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal, implicitly sought to abandon their appeal, presumably in light of their release via executive clemency. Their counsel offered no objection to the withdrawal.

• Constitutional Limitation on Pardon: Whether a conditional pardon granted by the President to a convicted accused during the pendency of his appeal from the conviction is valid under the 1987 Constitution.
• Effect of Pardon on Appeal: Whether the acceptance of a pardon during the pendency of an appeal operates as an abandonment or waiver of that appeal.

• Constitutional Limitation on Pardon: The conditional pardons are void. Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. The constitutional requirement of "conviction by final judgment" is a limitation on the exercise of executive clemency.
• Effect of Pardon on Appeal: The acceptance of the pardon does not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal. The release of an accused by virtue of a pardon before the withdrawal of an appeal renders those responsible administratively liable. The proper procedure requires that an accused must first withdraw his appeal before a pardon can be validly granted.

• Final Judgment Requirement for Executive Clemency — Under the 1987 Constitution, the power of the President to grant pardons may only be exercised after conviction by final judgment. This prohibition extends to all forms of executive clemency, including conditional pardons, commutations, and parole, during the pendency of an appeal. The ruling in People vs. Salle (G.R. No. 103567, 4 December 1995) was applied, which explicitly declared this rule to curb the practice of processing pardon applications despite pending appeals.

• "We now declare that the 'conviction by final judgment' limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court." — This excerpt from People vs. Salle, adopted in this resolution, articulates the controlling constitutional doctrine.
• "The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable." — This passage clarifies the procedural and administrative consequences of violating the final judgment rule.

• People vs. Salle, G.R. No. 103567, 4 December 1995 — Controlling precedent. The Court explicitly adopted and applied the ruling in Salle, which categorically prohibited the grant of pardon during the pendency of an appeal and declared such pardons void.
• People vs. Hinlo, G.R. No. 110035, 31 January 1995 — Cited as an earlier resolution that condemned the "practice of processing applications for pardon or parole despite pending appeals" as "in clear violation of law."
• People vs. Sepada, G.R. No. L-47514, 21 March 1991 — Cited for the principle signifying "the necessity of a final judgment before parole or pardon could be extended."
• Monsato vs. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190 (1989) and People vs. Crisola, 128 SCRA 1 (1984) — Mentioned as cases whose obiter dictum or rulings (under the 1973 Constitution) may have been erroneously applied to justify the pardons in this case.

• Section 19, Article VII, 1987 Constitution — The provision conferring upon the President the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. The Court interpreted the "after conviction by final judgment" phrase as a strict temporal limitation prohibiting clemency while an appeal is pending.

• Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
• Justice Jose A.R. Melo
• Justice Justo P. Francisco, Jr.
• Justice Artemio V. Panganiban