People vs. Casido

A conditional pardon granted during the pendency of an appeal is void ab initio for violating the constitutional requirement that pardon may only be extended after conviction by final judgment; however, amnesty—being a public act that requires congressional concurrence and which looks backward to obliterate the offense itself—may be validly granted even before final judgment and serves as a legal basis for release independent of a void pardon.

The case arose from the conviction of William O. Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin for the killing of Victoriano Mapa, allegedly committed in their capacity as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army/National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NDF) in pursuit of political beliefs. While their appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, they sought executive clemency through parallel applications: first, for conditional pardon before the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon, and second, for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission created under Proclamation No. 347. The simultaneous processing of these applications raised fundamental questions regarding the distinction between pardon and amnesty under Philippine constitutional and statutory law.

• Accused-appellants William O. Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin were convicted for the killing of Victoriano Mapa, allegedly committed as members of the CPP/NPA/NDF in pursuit of their political beliefs.
• While their appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, they filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal received by the Court on January 11, 1996.
• The Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP) recommended conditional pardon for the accused-appellants, which the President approved and signed on January 19, 1996.
• The Bureau of Corrections released the accused-appellants on January 25, 1996, pursuant to the conditional pardon.
• The National Amnesty Commission (NAC), created under Proclamation No. 347, favorably acted on the accused-appellants' applications for amnesty on February 22, 1996, finding that they were confirmed members of the CPP/NPA/NDF and that the killing was committed in pursuit of political beliefs.
• The PCGBRP Secretariat claimed they relied on verbal undertakings from non-government organization (NGO) lawyers (Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, Free Legal Assistance Group, KAPATID, PAHRA) that motions to withdraw appeals would be filed.
• The Committee members claimed they were unaware of Supreme Court rulings in People v. Hinlo and People v. Salle requiring final judgment before pardon, and that they acted in good faith as part of government confidence-building measures for peace and national reconciliation.

• The Office of the Solicitor General contended that the grant of amnesty to accused-appellants under Proclamation No. 347 rendered moot and academic the question of the premature pardon granted to them.
• The OSG argued that unlike pardon, amnesty may be granted before or after the institution of criminal prosecution and sometimes even after conviction, citing Barrioquinto v. Fernandez.
• The OSG maintained that amnesty extinguishes criminal liability and restores civil and political rights, making the release of the accused-appellants valid regardless of the invalidity of the conditional pardons.

• The accused-appellants filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal to facilitate the grant of conditional pardon, indicating their desire to avail of executive clemency.
• Through their representatives from various NGOs, they undertook to file the necessary withdrawals of appeal simultaneous with the processing of their pardon applications.
• The accused-appellants voluntarily applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 347, asserting that their crimes were committed in pursuit of political beliefs as members of the CPP/NPA/NDF.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the conditional pardons granted to the accused-appellants during the pendency of their appeal are void for violation of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution.
  • Whether the members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon should be held in contempt for recommending and processing the pardons while appeals were pending.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the grant of amnesty under Proclamation No. 347 validated the release of the accused-appellants despite the void conditional pardons.
  • Whether amnesty may be validly granted before conviction by final judgment and its legal effects distinct from pardon.

• Procedural:
  • The conditional pardons granted on January 19, 1996, are declared void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal, in violation of the constitutional requirement that pardon may only be granted after conviction by final judgment.
  • The members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon and its Secretariat are not held in contempt but are admonished for failure to exercise due care and diligence in verifying the status of the appeals before recommending pardon, which caused the President serious embarrassment.
• Substantive:
  • The grant of amnesty under Proclamation No. 347, which was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No. 12 on June 2, 1994, is valid and legally distinct from the void pardon.
  • Amnesty may be granted before final judgment and extinguishes criminal liability completely, putting the offense into oblivion such that the grantee stands before the law as though he had committed no offense.
  • The release of accused-appellants is valid solely on the ground of amnesty, not the conditional pardon.
  • The case is dismissed with costs de oficio.

• Distinction Between Pardon and Amnesty — Pardon is a private act of the Chief Executive granted after conviction that looks forward to relieve the offender from the consequences of the offense; amnesty is a public act requiring Congressional concurrence that looks backward to abolish and put into oblivion the offense itself, which may be granted before or after institution of criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
• Final Judgment Requirement for Executive Pardon — Under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the President may grant pardon only after conviction by final judgment; any pardon granted during the pendency of an appeal is void ab initio.
• Judicial Notice of Amnesty — Amnesty is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice, unlike pardon which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned.

• "Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice." — Citing Barrioquinto v. Fernandez
• "Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted... While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense."

• Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642 (1949) — Established the fundamental distinction between pardon and amnesty; held that amnesty may be granted before or after institution of criminal prosecution and is a public act of which courts take judicial notice.
• People v. Hinlo, G.R. No. 110035, January 31, 1995 — Cited as precedent establishing that pardon may only be granted after conviction by final judgment, which the Committee members claimed they were unaware of.
• People v. Salle, G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995 (250 SCRA 582) — Cited as precedent reinforcing the requirement of final judgment before pardon, which the Committee members allegedly disregarded.
• People v. Sepada, G.R. No. L-47514, March 21, 1991 — Cited for the principle that final judgment is a condition sine qua non for the grant of parole or pardon.

• Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution — Limits the President's power to grant pardon, reprieves, commutations, and remission of fines and forfeitures to cases where the conviction is by final judgment; violation of this provision renders the pardon void.
• Article 36, Revised Penal Code — Cited in the context of Barrioquinto regarding the effects of pardon, specifically that it does not restore public offices or rights unless expressly provided, and does not exempt from civil indemnity.
• Proclamation No. 347 — Granted amnesty to rebels, insurgents, and persons who committed crimes against public order or in furtherance of political ends; created the National Amnesty Commission to process applications.
• Concurrent Resolution No. 12 — Congressional concurrence to Proclamation No. 347 adopted on June 2, 1994, satisfying the constitutional requirement for amnesty.