People vs. Casiano

A subsequent information for illegal possession and use of a false bank note did not require another preliminary investigation where the amended complaint’s allegations already charged the same acts under Article 168, and the accused’s failure to invoke double jeopardy in her appellee’s brief waived that personal privilege.

On October 19, 1955, Ricardo Macapagal filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Rosales, Pangasinan a complaint, amended on or about December 6, 1955, charging Rosalina Casiano with estafa. After conducting the first stage of the preliminary investigation and finding probable cause, the justice of the peace court issued a warrant of arrest, and Casiano posted a bail bond for her temporary release. When the case was called for preliminary investigation, Casiano waived her right thereto, and the record was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

Subsequently, the provincial fiscal filed in the CFI an information for illegal possession and use of a false treasury or bank note, alleging that on or about April 16, 1955, in Rosales, Pangasinan, Casiano, with full knowledge that check No. 728681 was spurious and false and supposedly issued by the American Bankers Association of New York City, U.S.A., willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously used and had in her possession the false check, which she sold and cashed to Ricardo Macapagal for P580 although its face value was $300, to Macapagal’s damage in that amount, contrary to Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code.

At arraignment on November 16, 1956, Casiano pleaded not guilty. The prosecution began presenting evidence through Pedro Punsalan, cashier of the Tarlac Branch of the Philippine National Bank, who was cross-examined by defense counsel. The case was set for continuation of the hearing on December 12 and 13, 1956, but owing to several postponements secured by Casiano, the hearing was not resumed until October 15, 1958, when Casiano appeared with new counsel, Atty. Lorenzo Suyat, who prayed for and obtained another postponement.

On November 10, 1958, the new counsel was granted permission to submit a motion to dismiss, which was filed on November 24, 1958, on the ground that there had been no preliminary investigation of the charge of illegal possession and use of a false bank note and that the absence of such preliminary investigation affected the jurisdiction of the court. The CFI granted the motion, and after reconsideration was denied, the prosecution appealed. In the amended complaint, Macapagal had alleged that Casiano, through false manifestations and fraudulent representations that check No. 728681, valued at $300 and drawn by the American Bankers Association against the Guaranty Trust Company of New York in favor of Domingo Flores as payee, was good and genuine, sold the check to Macapagal for P580; that Casiano knew the representations were false and fraudulent and made them to induce Macapagal to buy the check; that Macapagal paid P580; that Casiano converted the amount to her own use; and that the check was dishonored upon presentation for collection on the ground that it was fraudulent.

• Scope of Preliminary Investigation: Respondent maintained that her waiver in the justice of the peace court did not deprive her of the right to a preliminary investigation of the crime of illegal possession and use of a false bank note, because that offense does not include, and is not included in, estafa; estafa is covered by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code under Title Ten (Crimes Against Property), while illegal possession and use of a false bank note is under Article 168 under Title Four (Crimes Against Public Interest).
• Double Jeopardy: Respondent objected to the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy.

• Scope of Preliminary Investigation: Whether the crime of illegal possession and use of a false bank note as charged in the information was included in the allegations of the amended complaint filed with the justice of the peace court, regardless of the term used to designate the offense, such that respondent was not entitled to another preliminary investigation.
• Waiver of Preliminary Investigation: Whether respondent waived her right to another preliminary investigation by failing to invoke it prior to or at the time of the entry of her plea in the CFI.
• Effect of Absence of Preliminary Investigation: Whether the absence of a preliminary investigation for the crime charged in the information impaired the validity of the information or affected the jurisdiction of the CFI.
• Appeal by the Prosecution: Whether the SC may entertain the prosecution’s appeal under Rule 118, section 2 of the Rules of Court, considering the constitutional immunity from double jeopardy.
• Waiver of Double Jeopardy: Whether respondent waived her constitutional right not to be twice placed in jeopardy by filing a brief on the merits without invoking that right.
• Estoppel and Double Jeopardy: Whether respondent may still invoke double jeopardy after successfully securing dismissal on the ground that the CFI lacked jurisdiction.

• Scope of Preliminary Investigation: No. The crime charged in the information was included in the amended complaint’s allegations, which charged knowing possession and use of a false bank note under Article 168 in relation to Article 166; the label “estafa” did not control.
• Waiver of Preliminary Investigation: Yes. Even if another preliminary investigation were required, respondent waived it by failing to invoke it before or at the time of her plea in the CFI.
• Effect of Absence of Preliminary Investigation: No. The absence of a preliminary investigation did not impair the information’s validity or affect the CFI’s jurisdiction; the proper remedy was to conduct it or remand, not dismiss.
• Appeal by the Prosecution: Yes. The SC may entertain the appeal because Rule 118, section 2 cannot limit its constitutional appellate jurisdiction over pure questions of law; double jeopardy is a waivable personal privilege.
• Waiver of Double Jeopardy: Yes. Respondent waived double jeopardy by filing a brief on the merits without invoking it, thereby conceding the prosecution’s right to appeal.
• Estoppel and Double Jeopardy: No. Respondent is estopped from claiming the CFI had jurisdiction after successfully securing dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

• Scope of Preliminary Investigation: The SC framed the issue not as an abstract question whether estafa includes illegal possession and use of a false bank note, but whether the crime charged in the information was actually included in the amended complaint’s allegations, regardless of the term used. The amended complaint alleged that Casiano knowingly had in her possession, with intent to use, and actually used, a false or falsified bank note or other obligation payable to bearer—the crime defined and punished in Article 168, in relation to Article 166—and the information charged the same substance. The CFI therefore erred in holding that the information’s allegations were not included in the amended complaint and that Casiano was entitled to another preliminary investigation.
• Waiver of Preliminary Investigation: The SC held that even if Casiano had a right to another preliminary investigation, she waived it by failing to invoke it prior to or at least at the time of entering her plea in the CFI. It cited People vs. Solon, People vs. Magpale, and People vs. Lambino. Her plea of not guilty without raising the issue operated as a waiver.
• Effect of Absence of Preliminary Investigation: Independently, the absence of the preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information or render it defective, and did not affect the CFI’s jurisdiction. If Casiano were entitled to another preliminary investigation, the CFI should have conducted it, ordered the provincial fiscal to conduct it under section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 732, or remanded the record to the justice of the peace court, instead of dismissing the case.
• Appeal by the Prosecution: The SC considered Rule 118, section 2, which says the People cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed in double jeopardy. It held the rule could not deny the SC authority to entertain the appeal. The Constitution vests Congress with power to define jurisdiction under Article VIII, section 2, and authorizes the SC to promulgate rules that shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights under Article VIII, section 13. Construing Rule 118, section 2 to limit the SC’s appellate jurisdiction over pure questions of law would exceed the rule-making power. Marquez vs. Prodigalidad and Calano vs. Cruz upheld SC jurisdiction over pure questions of law despite statutory appeal limitations. The rule is procedural, enforcing the waivable personal privilege against double jeopardy. Kepner vs. U.S. held that the prosecution cannot appeal over the defendant’s objection after jeopardy, but it is not authority where the defendant does not object or consents.
• Waiver of Double Jeopardy: The SC held double jeopardy is a personal privilege that may be waived expressly or impliedly, and must be specially pleaded at the earliest opportunity. Casiano filed a brief limited to the merits and did not question the prosecution’s right to appeal, effectively conceding it. Unlike the defendants in People vs. Hernandez, People vs. Ferrer, People vs. Bao, and People vs. Golez, who did not file briefs, Casiano performed an affirmative act from which waiver could be implied. She had objected to the motion for reconsideration on double jeopardy, so she knew of the defense when she filed her brief, yet did not invoke it. Thus, she waived it.
• Estoppel and Double Jeopardy: The SC held Casiano could not invoke double jeopardy because it would require asserting that the CFI had jurisdiction, contrary to her successful motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Under People vs. Acierto, a party cannot take inconsistent positions; one who secures dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is estopped from later claiming jurisdiction to plead double jeopardy. The rule applies with greater force because the appeal is a continuation of the same proceedings under the same sovereignty. The SC also noted Rule 113, section 10 gives the court discretion to entertain a late double jeopardy motion, and under the circumstances it would not do so.

• Preliminary Investigation Measured by Allegations, Not Label — The right to a preliminary investigation for the crime charged in the information depends on whether that crime was actually included in the allegations of the complaint filed with the justice of the peace court, regardless of the term used to designate the offense. The SC applied this by looking at the amended complaint’s allegation of knowing possession and use of a false bank note under Article 168, in relation to Article 166, which matched the information, so no new preliminary investigation was needed.
• Waiver of the Right to Preliminary Investigation — The right to a preliminary investigation may be waived if not invoked prior to or at the time of the entry of plea in the CFI. The SC applied this by holding that even if Casiano had a right to another preliminary investigation, her failure to raise it before or at her plea waived it.
• Absence of Preliminary Investigation Does Not Affect Jurisdiction or Information’s Validity — The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information, render it defective, or affect the CFI’s jurisdiction. The proper remedy is for the CFI to conduct the investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it under section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 732, or remand the record to the justice of the peace court, not dismiss the case.
• Double Jeopardy as a Waivable Personal Privilege — The constitutional immunity from second jeopardy is a personal privilege that the accused may waive expressly or impliedly. It must be specially pleaded at the earliest opportunity; failure to invoke it in an appellee’s brief on the merits waives it. The SC applied this by holding Casiano’s brief on the merits without raising double jeopardy waived the immunity.
• Estoppel Against Inconsistent Positions on Jurisdiction — A party who successfully secures a dismissal on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction is estopped from later asserting that the court had jurisdiction in order to plead double jeopardy. The SC applied this against Casiano, who had induced the CFI to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction but would need to assert jurisdiction to claim double jeopardy.
• SC Appellate Jurisdiction over Pure Questions of Law Cannot Be Diminished by Rules — The SC’s appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and decrees involving only errors or questions of law is constitutional and statutory and cannot be curtailed by a procedural rule. Rule 118, section 2 is a procedural measure enforcing the waivable double jeopardy immunity, not a limitation on the SC’s jurisdiction. The SC applied this to entertain the prosecution’s appeal involving pure questions of law.

• "The issue before us is whether defendant is entitled to a preliminary investigation of the crime of illegal possession and use of a false bank note as charged in the information herein. The answer to this question depends upon whether or not such crime was included actually in the allegations of the amended complaint filed with the justice of the peace court, regardless of the term used in said pleading to designate the offense charged therein." — This passage states the controlling test for whether another preliminary investigation was required.
• "It erred, also, in dismissing the case for, even if defendant had a right to such other preliminary investigation, the same was deemed waived upon her failure to invoke it prior to or, at least, at the time of the entry of her plea in the court of first instance" — This passage holds that any right to another preliminary investigation was waived by the plea.
• "Indeed, it is well settled that "the immunity from second jeopardy granted by the Constitution is a personal privilege which accused may waive"." — This passage states the rule that double jeopardy is a waivable personal privilege, which the SC applied against Casiano.
• "A party will not be followed to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent Positions which if allowed would result in brazen deception." — The SC adopted this estoppel principle to bar Casiano from asserting jurisdiction after securing dismissal for lack of it.

• People vs. Solon, 47 Phil. 443, 448 — Cited for the rule that the right to a preliminary investigation is waived if not invoked prior to or at the time of plea.
• People vs. Magpale, 70 Phil. 176 — Cited with Solon for waiver of the right to preliminary investigation by failure to invoke it before plea.
• People vs. Lambino, 55 Off. Gaz., 1565 — Cited with Solon and Magpale for the same waiver rule.
• Marquez vs. Prodigalidad, 83 Phil. 813 — Controlling precedent holding that statutory limits on appeals do not bar SC review of pure questions of law, applied to uphold jurisdiction over the prosecution’s appeal.
• Calano vs. Cruz, 50 Off. Gaz., 610 — Reiterated Marquez vs. Prodigalidad and upheld SC jurisdiction over an appeal involving purely legal questions.
• Kepner vs. U.S., 11 Phil. 669 — Distinguished; it bars prosecution appeal over the defendant’s objection after jeopardy, but not where the accused does not object or consents.
• People vs. Acierto, L-2708 & L-3355-60 — Controlling precedent on estoppel against inconsistent positions; applied to bar Casiano from pleading double jeopardy after securing dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
• Atkins Kroll & Co., Inc. vs. B. Cua Hian Tek, L-9871 — Cited for the rule that a party who adopts a theory in the lower court cannot change it on appeal.

• Article 168, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes; the information charged this offense, and the SC held its substance was already alleged in the amended complaint.
• Article 166, Revised Penal Code — Referred to in relation to Article 168; the SC described the amended complaint as alleging the crime defined and punished in Article 168, in relation to Article 166.
• Article 315, Revised Penal Code — Estafa; the original complaint’s label. The SC held the label did not control whether the later Article 168 charge was included in the amended complaint’s allegations.
• Article VIII, section 2, Constitution of the Philippines — Vests Congress with power to define, prescribe, and apportion jurisdiction of courts; the SC used it to reject a construction of Rule 118, section 2 that would encroach on its appellate jurisdiction.
• Article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines — SC rule-making power; rules shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The SC construed Rule 118, section 2 as procedural to avoid unconstitutionality.
• Rule 118, section 2, Rules of Court — The People cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed in double jeopardy; the SC held it did not bar the appeal because double jeopardy was waived and the appeal involved pure questions of law.
• Section 1687, Revised Administrative Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 732) — Governs preliminary investigation; the SC said the CFI should have conducted the investigation, ordered the fiscal to do so, or remanded, instead of dismissing.
• Rule 113, sections 1 and 2, paragraph (h), and section 10, Rules of Court — Motion to quash on double jeopardy; waiver if not raised before plea; court discretion to entertain a late motion. The SC used these to support waiver and discretion not to entertain the plea.
• Article III, Bill of Rights (double jeopardy guarantee) — The SC treated the immunity from second jeopardy as a constitutional personal privilege that the accused may waive.

• Paras, C.J. (Dissenting) — He dissented because Rule 118, section 2 and the Constitution bar the prosecution’s appeal when the accused would be placed in double jeopardy; the CFI had dismissed the case after a prosecution witness testified, and defense counsel had already invoked double jeopardy when the fiscal sought reconsideration. He viewed the majority’s waiver theory as inapplicable because waiver of double jeopardy operates only when a new prosecution follows an acquittal or conviction, not where the appeal itself is prohibited. He also found People vs. Acierto irrelevant because it involved military and civil jurisdiction, and he noted that preliminary investigation can be waived.