People vs. Casabuena and Formaran

In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony is committed whenever homicide results by reason or on occasion of the robbery, regardless of whether the person killed is one of the robbers and regardless of whether the killing was perpetrated by the robbers themselves or by a third party.

Accused-appellants Ronilee Casabuena y Francisco and Kevin Formaran y Gilera, together with Jimmy Arizala, were charged with the complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code for an incident that occurred on October 11, 2012, inside a passenger jeepney in Marikina City. The case tests the scope of Article 294, paragraph 1, specifically whether the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is committed when the person killed is one of the robbers, shot not by his co-robbers but by a responding police officer.

On October 11, 2012, around 6:00 a.m., Ciara Kristle V. Abella was riding a jeepney headed to Montalban with other passengers. She fell asleep on the front row beside the conductor and was suddenly awakened when three passengers boarded and declared a hold-up. One hold-upper positioned himself at the entrance of the jeepney, another stood near the driver holding a knife, and the third took Abella's cellular phone, wallet, and ATM card worth approximately P5,000, placing them inside his backpack. The other passengers likewise surrendered their belongings. After taking the items, the hold-uppers alighted from the jeepney. A passenger saw a policeman nearby and sought assistance.

Around 6:20 a.m., PO2 Ramilo P. De Pedro and PO2 Michael Albania were patrolling J. Molina corner E. Santos Streets when they noticed a commotion inside the jeepney. PO2 De Pedro saw three male passengers alight and heard a passenger shout "Holdaper yan, tatlo yan, may baril sila!" Upon seeing the two officers, one hold-upper fled toward Bayan-bayanan Street and was chased by PO2 Albania, while PO2 De Pedro approached the other two. PO2 De Pedro identified himself as a police officer and frisked one of them. Suddenly, the other hold-upper drew a pistol from his backpack, prompting PO2 De Pedro to drop his M16 rifle and wrestle for the pistol. PO2 De Pedro gained possession and fired twice; the second shot hit the hold-upper in the chest, killing him. The other hold-upper discarded his knife and was handcuffed. PO2 Albania returned with the third hold-upper and recovered the stolen items. The passengers were brought to the precinct for interrogation. The two surviving hold-uppers were identified as appellants Casabuena and Formaran; the deceased was Jimmy Arizala.

Appellants denied the charges, testifying that they boarded a jeepney in Marikina heading to Montalban to visit Casabuena's sister. They alighted at Concepcion when a police mobile stopped them, frisked them, and brought them to the station. They claimed they were identified by six persons as the hold-uppers at the Hall of Justice. The trial court found the prosecution's eyewitness, Abella, credible — her testimony was simple, clear, consistent, and replete with details — and convicted appellants of robbery with homicide. The trial court found that conspiracy was clearly manifested in the concerted efforts of appellants and Arizala, and that even if Arizala was the one killed, appellants should equally be held accountable. The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling.

• No Direct Relation Between Robbery and Killing: Appellants contended that the trial court gravely erred in ruling them liable for the complex crime of robbery with homicide because there was no direct relation and intimate connection between the robbery and the killing of Arizala, since it was PO2 De Pedro who fired the shot.
• Conspiracy Not Proven: Appellants averred that conspiracy between them and Arizala was not duly established by the prosecution.

• All Elements Present: The OSG maintained that the trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as all elements of robbery with homicide were present.
• Conspiracy Established: The OSG argued that conspiracy was sufficiently proven because the evidence showed unity of purpose and unity in action between appellants and Arizala during the perpetration of the crime.

• Elements of Robbery with Homicide: Whether appellants committed the complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code when the person killed was one of the robbers, shot by a responding police officer rather than by the robbers themselves.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy between appellants and Arizala was duly established.

• Elements of Robbery with Homicide: Yes. All elements of the complex crime of robbery with homicide are present; it is immaterial that the victim of the homicide was one of the robbers or that the killing was committed by a third party, the word "any" in Article 294, paragraph 1 being all-inclusive.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established through the concerted acts of appellants and Arizala in boarding the jeepney, declaring a hold-up, positioning themselves strategically, and taking the passengers' belongings, demonstrating joint purpose and community of interest.

• Elements of Robbery with Homicide: The prosecution must prove four elements: (1) taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is with intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) by reason or on occasion of the robbery, homicide is committed. All elements were satisfied: appellants used a gun and knives to take the passengers' belongings; the properties did not belong to appellants; intent to gain was presumed from the unlawful taking; and Arizala died on the occasion of the robbery. The Court emphasized that Article 294, paragraph 1 requires only that "the crime of homicide shall have been committed" by reason or on occasion of the robbery, without qualification as to who committed the homicide or who the victim was. The word "any" in "any person guilty of robbery" is all-inclusive, covering even the robbers themselves. The Court distinguished Article 294, paragraph 1 from Article 297 (attempted/frustrated robbery with homicide), which uses the phrase "person guilty of such offenses," and from other paragraphs of Article 294 that use "accompanied by" or "the offender shall have inflicted," which suggest the accessory crime must be committed by the robber. Applying the principle ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus, the Court refused to read into paragraph 1 a limitation the legislature did not impose. Relying on People vs. Ebet and People vs. De Jesus, the Court held that once homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the felony is robbery with homicide, regardless of who was killed or who perpetrated the killing.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence but may be inferred from the parties' conduct indicating a common understanding. Under Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements are: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement; (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony; and (3) the execution of a felony was decided upon. Abella's testimony showed that appellants and Arizala boarded the jeepney together, declared a hold-up, positioned one at the entrance, another near the driver with a knife, and the third taking the passengers' belongings — acts demonstrating joint purpose, concerted action, and community of interest. When homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of robbery, all who took part as principals in the robbery are liable as principals of robbery with homicide even if they did not participate in the killing, unless they endeavored to prevent it. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

• Robbery with Homicide as Special Complex Crime — Under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is committed when homicide results by reason or on occasion of the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during, or after the robbery. It is immaterial whether the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, whether the death supervenes by accident, or whether the victim is one of the robbers themselves. Once homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the felony is robbery with homicide. Applied to hold appellants liable despite the fact that their co-robber Arizala was the one killed, and the killing was perpetrated by the responding police officer.

• Conspiracy in Robbery with Homicide — When homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of robbery, all who took part as principals in the robbery are liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, even if they did not actually participate in the killing, unless they endeavored to prevent the homicide. Conspiracy may be inferred from the mode or manner in which the crime was perpetrated, from acts evincing joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. The act of one conspirator is the act of all.

• Ubi Lex Non Distinguit, Nec Nos Distinguere Debemus — Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Applied to Article 294, paragraph 1, which does not qualify who committed the homicide or who the victim must be, unlike other paragraphs of the same article that use limiting phrases such as "accompanied by" or "the offender shall have inflicted." The difference in phraseology within the same article is crucial and evinces legislative intent to treat the accessory crimes differently.

• "it is irrelevant if the victim of homicide is one of the robbers. In such scenario, the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Verily, once a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide." — This passage articulates the core ratio decidendi: the identity of the homicide victim is immaterial so long as the killing occurred by reason or on occasion of the robbery.

• "Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed" — The Court's emphasis on the word "any" as all-inclusive, including the robbers themselves, is the textual basis for the holding.

• "where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus." — Quoted from Justice Lopez's concurrence during deliberation, this principle of statutory construction underpins the Court's refusal to limit Article 294, paragraph 1 based on who committed the homicide.

• People vs. Buenamer, 794 Phil. 214 (2016) — Cited for the enumeration of the four elements of robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1.
• People vs. Dela Cruz, 595 Phil. 998 (2008) — Cited for the rule that the intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, and that the killing may occur before, during, or after the robbery.
• People vs. Ebet, 649 Phil. 181 (2010) — Controlling precedent applied; held that it is irrelevant if the victim of homicide is one of the robbers, and that once homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the felony is robbery with homicide.
• People vs. De Jesus, 473 Phil. 405 (2004) — Applied alongside Ebet for the same proposition regarding the irrelevance of the identity of the homicide victim.
• People vs. Labagala, G.R. No. 221427, July 30, 2018 — Cited for the requirement that there be a direct relation and intimate connection between the robbery and the killing.
• People vs. Lago, 411 Phil. 52 (2001); People vs. Fegidero, 392 Phil. 36 (2000); People vs. Francisco, 388 Phil. 94 (2000) — Cited for the elements of conspiracy under Article 8, paragraph 2 and the rule that conspiracy may be inferred from the parties' conduct.

• Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, imposing reclusion perpetua to death when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, homicide is committed. Applied as the basis for conviction, with the Court emphasizing the all-inclusive term "any person" and the unqualified phrase "the crime of homicide shall have been committed."
• Article 297, Revised Penal Code — Distinguished from Article 294, paragraph 1; covers attempted and frustrated robbery with homicide, using the phrase "person guilty of such offenses," which suggests the same person must commit both the robbery and the killing.
• Article 8, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy and its elements: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement; (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony; and (3) the execution of a felony was decided upon. Applied to establish conspiracy among appellants and Arizala.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., and Lopez, JJ., concur.

• Justice Caguioa — Dissented, arguing that Article 294, paragraph 1 requires that the "crime of homicide" be committed by the person guilty of robbery. When PO2 De Pedro shot and killed Arizala, the police officer did not commit a "crime of homicide" — he acted in the performance of duty in self-defense. Since the accused-appellants also did not kill their co-accused, no "crime of homicide" was committed by any of the robbers. The dissent relied on People vs. Manalili, where the Court held that attempted robbery with homicide was not committed because the dead robber was killed by a passenger, not by his cohorts, and the law requires that the robbery and the killing be perpetrated by the same person. The dissent invoked the principle of strict construction of penal statutes and in dubio pro reo, arguing that appellants should be convicted only of robbery, not the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The dissent further argued that the phrases "by reason or on occasion of" and "accompanied by" in Article 294 are descriptive only of the timing of the accessory crimes, not of the person who committed them, and that in both instances the accessory crimes should have been committed by the person or persons guilty of robbery.