People vs. Carpo

A conviction may rest on the positive and credible testimony of a single eyewitness, and inconsistencies between a witness's affidavit and court testimony do not impair credibility where the latter merely supplies details omitted in the former; counsel cannot compromise a client's civil liability without a special power of attorney expressly authorizing such compromise.

The accused — Jaime Carpo, barangay captain of Brgy. Libsong, and Warlito Ibao together with his sons Oscar and Roche — were residents of adjoining barangays in Pangasinan, living near the Dulay family in Brgy. Baligayan. The attack on the Dulay household was allegedly motivated by a pending murder case against Roche Ibao for the killing of Delfin Meriales, brother of the eyewitness Ruben Meriales, in which the victim Florentino Dulay was about to testify against Roche. Republic Act No. 7659 had reintroduced the death penalty for qualified murder, and the case reached the Supreme Court by automatic review.

On 25 August 1996, at about 8:00 in the evening, Ruben Meriales was watching television with his family in Brgy. Baligayan, Pangasinan, when his dogs barked. His mother, apprehensive that their cow might be stolen, prodded him to investigate. He took his flashlight and walked toward the cow tied to a mango tree. The noise grew louder, arousing his suspicion. After transferring the cow nearer his house, he went inside the kitchen, stood atop the concrete washbasin, hid behind bamboo slats, and peeped outside. Two bulbs positioned about three meters away filtered light through the slats, illuminating the surroundings; there was also moonlight. From this concealed vantage point, he saw barangay captain Jaime Carpo and Warlito Ibao stooping suspiciously near his barn, with Warlito's son Roche standing by the mango tree. All three were looking toward Florentino Dulay's house, about a meter to the south. Ruben then saw Oscar Ibao stride toward the Dulay hut, lift the sawali mat near the wall, and hurl something inside. Oscar scurried toward the nearby creek with Roche following. Seconds later, a loud explosion shook the neighborhood, and Teresita Dulay's screams broke into the night.

Ruben rushed outside toward Florentino's hut but was deterred by darkness. He returned for his flashlight and raced back. Inside, he found a bloodied Florentino cradled in the arms of his weeping widow, Norwela and Nissan lying side by side on a cot drenched in blood, and a motionless Noemi whose head was oozing. He left to borrow the jeepney of Brgy. Kagawad Edgardo Marquez. The neighbors milling about had given up hope on Florentino, so only Norwela, Nissan, and Noemi were loaded and rushed to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital. Norwela, who had chest and lower appendage injuries, died en route. Nissan, five years old, died later from shock due to shrapnel wounds in her left shoulder, abdomen, and lower extremities. Noemi survived; her attending physician, Dr. Emiliano Subido, found her semi-conscious and vomiting though ambulatory, but due to the seriousness of her wounds and the hospital's lack of facilities, she was transferred to a hospital in Dagupan City.

Police Officer Guillermo Osio and colleagues responded to the scene, gathering grenade shrapnel and a grenade shifting lever. Teresita Dulay told him she suspected the accused. Ruben likewise named the same suspects but, fearful that the culprits would return, refused to give a formal statement, promising to do so after the burial. On 4 September 1996, Ruben kept his promise and gave his sworn statement to Police Officer Osio, naming Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao, and Roche Ibao as the perpetrators. He stated that Florentino was killed because he was about to testify against Roche for the murder of Ruben's brother, Delfin Meriales. A criminal complaint was filed on 3 October 1996. Jaime was arrested on 25 October 1996. Roche eluded arrest until 9 December 1996, when he was apprehended in La Union; Oscar and Warlito then surrendered to the NBI in La Union.

At trial, the accused interposed alibi. Jaime and his wife Veronica testified that on the evening of the incident, Jaime was at home in Brgy. Libsong, 150 meters from the Dulay house in Brgy. Baligayan. When he heard the explosion, he sent tanods to check; upon learning it occurred in the adjoining barangay, he went to sleep. He claimed Ruben implicated him because Ruben was angry that Jaime had sided with the Ibaos in the murder case against Roche. Jaime further alleged that on 10 December 1996, while incarcerated, Ruben visited him asking forgiveness for falsely naming him. Warlito, Oscar, and Roche testified that their family was having a farewell party for Maribel Ibao, who was leaving for Hong Kong, and that they heard the blast but did not investigate. They denied hearing police officers call for them an hour after the explosion. Roche asserted he did not have a house in Brgy. Baligayan and had slept at his parents' house that night. The trial court, however, gave full credit to Ruben's testimony, finding no "twitch of falsehood on his lips," and convicted all four accused of the complex crime of multiple murder with attempted murder, imposing the death penalty and ordering P600,000.00 in damages based on a compromise agreement between counsel.

• Inconsistency between testimony and affidavit: Accused-appellants argued that Ruben Meriales's testimony in court was different from and contradictory to his affidavit of 4 October 1996, thereby undermining his credibility.
• Bias and ill motive: Accused-appellants maintained that Ruben was not a disinterested witness because he harbored a grudge against the Ibaos for the murder of his brother Delfin Meriales, and that he fabricated his story to retaliate against them.
• Lie detector test results: Accused-appellants urged that the favorable results of their lie detector tests with the NBI, which revealed no specific reactions indicative of deception, be admitted into the records.
• Alibi: Accused-appellants claimed they were elsewhere when the grenade was hurled into the Dulay hut — Jaime at home in Brgy. Libsong, and the Ibaos at a farewell party at their residence.

• Credibility of Single Witness: Whether the testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for multiple murder complexed with attempted murder.
• Consistency of Testimony with Affidavit: Whether alleged inconsistencies between Ruben's affidavit and his court testimony discredit him as a witness.
• Bias of Witness: Whether Ruben's admitted resentment against the Ibaos renders his testimony unworthy of credence.
• Sufficiency of Alibi: Whether the alibi proffered by the accused-appellants constitutes a valid defense against positive identification.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was properly established among the accused-appellants.
• Classification of the Crime: Whether the crime is properly denominated as multiple murder complexed with attempted murder, and whether the crime against Noemi is attempted rather than frustrated murder.
• Validity of Compromise Agreement on Damages: Whether the trial court's award of damages based on a compromise agreement entered into by counsel without a special power of attorney is valid.

• Credibility of Single Witness: Yes. The testimony of a single credible witness is sufficient for conviction, the trial court's assessment of credibility being accorded great deference on appeal absent any overlooked or disregarded fact.
• Consistency of Testimony with Affidavit: No, the alleged inconsistency does not discredit the witness. Court testimony commands greater respect than an affidavit, and the former merely supplied details the latter failed to disclose.
• Bias of Witness: No, Ruben's admitted resentment does not discredit him. His frankness in admitting his grudge should be considered in his favor, and the mere existence of ill motive does not confirm fabrication.
• Sufficiency of Alibi: No. Alibi is futile where the accused were within proximity of the crime scene, and their flight and unnatural post-incident conduct demonstrated guilt.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established through the coordinated presence and actions of the accused, with Jaime, Warlito, and Roche providing encouragement and security to Oscar.
• Classification of the Crime: Yes. The crime is properly denominated as multiple murder complexed with attempted murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, a single act producing three deaths and one injury; the crime against Noemi is attempted murder because none of her wounds was fatal.
• Validity of Compromise Agreement on Damages: No. The compromise agreement is void for lack of a special power of attorney authorizing counsel to compromise their clients' civil liability, and the accused-appellants were never consulted regarding the settlement.

• Credibility of Single Witness: The trial court is best equipped to assess witness credibility, and its factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal unless it has overlooked, misunderstood, or disregarded important facts — which was not the case here. The trial court observed no "twitch of falsehood" in Ruben's testimony and found that it was the accused, not Meriales, who lied. Deference to the trial court's assessment was therefore warranted.

• Consistency of Testimony with Affidavit: A scrutiny of the records reveals that Ruben's testimony is not inconsistent with his affidavit; the former merely supplied details the latter failed to disclose. Even assuming inconsistency, it is settled that whenever an affidavit contradicts testimony given in court, the latter commands greater respect. Such inconsistency is unimportant and would not even discredit a fallible witness, affidavits being often incomplete and prepared by investigating officers rather than the witness himself.

• Bias of Witness: The mere fact that Ruben admitted harboring resentment against the Ibaos for the murder of his brother Delfin does not confirm that he fabricated his story. His frankness in admitting his resentment should even be considered in his favor. His concealment behind the kitchen wall rather than warning the Dulays was a natural reaction governed by fear rather than reason; persons react differently to impending danger, and this alone should not cast doubt on his credibility. Jaime's claim that Ruben had admitted lying while in jail was found farcical, nothing having been offered in support thereof, and the lone corroborative testimony of Roche was unworthy of belief given the noise of construction three meters away.

• Sufficiency of Alibi: By Jaime's own admission, he was only 150 meters from the crime scene, reachable in 30 minutes at most. The Ibaos acknowledged having a party a stone's throw away. Their failure to investigate the blast or join neighbors who had instantaneously milled outside was unnatural and betrayed them. Their immediate flight to La Union and tarriance there until Roche's arrest demonstrated guilt and a desire to evade prosecution. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by a credible witness.

• Conspiracy: From Ruben's detailed account, Jaime and Warlito positioned themselves near the hay barn while Roche stood by the mango tree, all looking toward the Dulay house. Their presence inescapably gave encouragement and a sense of security to Oscar, the group's perpetrator, who was emboldened knowing his co-conspirators were not far behind. Conspiracy was thus inferred from their coordinated acts.

• Classification of the Crime: Under People vs. Tayo, the crime could be denominated as murder qualified by explosion rather than treachery. However, since treachery was alleged in the Information and appreciated by the trial court, the explosion resulting in three deaths and one wounding constitutes multiple murder complexed with attempted murder. The victims were sleeping when the grenade was hurled, giving them no chance to defend themselves, satisfying treachery. The crime against Noemi is attempted murder because none of her injuries was fatal; her attending physician ruled out intercerebral hemorrhage, and she would suffer physical incapacity for only ten to fourteen days. Since the accused did not perform all acts of execution that would have caused her death, the crime is only attempted. Because the three murders and the attempted murder were produced by a single act, Article 48 applies, prescribing the penalty for the more serious crime — reclusion perpetua to death — in its maximum period, which is death.

• Validity of Compromise Agreement on Damages: Under Article 1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary to compromise a client's litigation. Section 23 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that attorneys cannot, without special authority, compromise their clients' litigation. Counsel for both parties had no special power of attorney from their clients. While Teresita Dulay ratified the agreement by signing as instructed by the court, the accused-appellants were never consulted. In the absence of a special power of attorney, counsel could neither bind nor compromise the accused's civil liability. The trial court's approval, without precautionary measures to protect the accused's right not to be deprived of property without due process of law, could not legalize the settlement. The compromise was therefore void, and a new damages award was entered: P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each of the three deaths (P300,000.00 aggregate), plus P30,000.00 as indemnity for Noemi's attempted murder, totaling P330,000.00.

• Single-witness rule — The testimony of a single credible witness, if positive and convincing, is sufficient to sustain a conviction, even against multiple accused. The Court applied this by affirming the conviction based solely on Ruben Meriales's eyewitness testimony, the trial court having found no indication of falsehood.

• Affidavit versus court testimony — Whenever an affidavit contradicts testimony given in court, the latter commands greater respect. Affidavits are often incomplete, being taken by investigating officers rather than the witness, so inconsistencies between affidavit and testimony are unimportant and do not discredit a witness. The Court found that Ruben's testimony merely supplied details omitted in his affidavit.

• Alibi as weakest defense — Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, especially when the accused was within proximity of the crime scene. It cannot prevail over the positive identification by a credible witness. The Court rejected all four alibis because the accused were near the crime scene and their post-incident conduct — failure to investigate the blast, failure to join neighbors, and flight to La Union — betrayed guilt.

• Conspiracy inferred from coordinated acts — Conspiracy may be inferred from the coordinated actions of the accused, even without direct proof of a prior agreement. The presence of co-conspirators giving encouragement and a sense of security to the principal perpetrator establishes conspiracy.

• Complex crimes under Article 48 — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. The hurling of a single grenade producing three murders and one attempted murder constitutes a complex crime, warranting the death penalty.

• Authority of counsel to compromise — Under Article 1878 of the Civil Code and Section 23 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, counsel cannot compromise a client's litigation without a special power of attorney expressly authorizing such compromise. Ratification by one party does not cure the absence of authority as to the other party who was never consulted.

• "A scrutiny of the records reveals that his testimony is not inconsistent with his affidavit of 4 October 1996 inasmuch as the former merely supplied the details of the event which the latter failed to disclose. But assuming that there was any inconsistency, it is settled that whenever an affidavit contradicts a testimony given in court the latter commands greater respect." — This passage articulates the canonical doctrine on the relative evidentiary weight of affidavits versus in-court testimony, a principle frequently cited in Philippine evidence jurisprudence.

• "The mere fact that Ruben admitted harboring resentment against the Ibaos for the murder of his brother Delfin does not confirm that he fabricated his story. His frankness in admitting his resentment against the Ibaos should even be considered in his favor." — This defines the principle that a witness's candid admission of bias may enhance rather than diminish credibility, and that ill motive alone does not establish fabrication.

• "In the absence of a special power of attorney given by accused-appellants to their counsel, the latter can neither bind nor compromise his clients' civil liability." — This states the ratio decidendi on the limits of counsel's authority to compromise a client's claims without express mandate, grounded in Article 1878 of the Civil Code and Section 23 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

• People vs. Tayo, G.R. No. 52798, 19 February 1986, 141 SCRA 393 — Cited for the doctrine that murder by means of explosion may be qualified by explosion rather than treachery; followed in principle but distinguished because treachery, not explosion, was alleged in the Information and appreciated by the trial court.

• People vs. Reanzares, G.R. No. 130656, 29 June 2000; People vs. Adoviso, G.R. Nos. 116196-97, 23 June 1999, 309 SCRA 1 — Cited for the proposition that lie detector tests have not been accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception, supporting the Court's refusal to admit the accused's polygraph results.

• People vs. Geguira, G.R. No. 130769, 13 March 2000; People vs. Antonio, G.R. No. 128900, 14 July 2000 — Cited for the doctrine that court testimony commands greater respect than affidavits when they conflict, supporting the Court's rejection of the inconsistency argument.

• People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 110600, 7 August 1996, 260 SCRA 402 — Cited for the principle that a witness's frank admission of resentment should be considered in his favor, supporting the Court's finding that Ruben's candor enhanced his credibility.

• People vs. Reducan, G.R. Nos. 126094-95, 21 January 1999, 301 SCRA 516 — Cited for the distinction between frustrated and attempted murder based on whether the injuries are fatal, supporting the Court's classification of the crime against Noemi as attempted murder.

• Lim Pin vs. Liao Tan, 200 Phil. 685 (1982) — Cited for the requirement of a special power of attorney for counsel to compromise a client's litigation, supporting the invalidation of the compromise agreement on damages.

• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. Applied because the hurling of one grenade produced three murders and one attempted murder, constituting a complex crime warranting the death penalty.

• Section 6, Republic Act No. 7659 — Imposes the death penalty for qualified murder. Applied in imposing the supreme penalty upon all four accused.

• Article 1878, Civil Code — Requires a special power of attorney to compromise, submit questions to arbitration, renounce the right to appeal, waive objections to venue, or abandon prescription already acquired. Applied to invalidate the compromise agreement on damages for lack of express authority from the accused-appellants.

• Section 23, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Provides that attorneys have authority to bind clients in matters of ordinary judicial procedure but cannot, without special authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of clients' claims but the full amount in cash. Applied to hold that counsel lacked authority to compromise the accused's civil liability.

• Article 83, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Section 25, RA 7659) — Requires that upon finality of a decision imposing the death penalty, the records be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency or pardoning power. Applied in the dispositive portion directing transmittal of records.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ. Four members maintained their personal position that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional, but submitted to the majority ruling that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should be imposed.