People vs. Carmen

Where the accused, acting without intent to kill but with inexcusable lack of precaution, cause the death of a person through a reckless act, they are liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, not murder—even if charged with murder—because reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is necessarily included in the offense of murder under the rule on variance between allegation and proof.

Eutiquia Carmen, also known as "Mother Perpetuala," led a religious group called the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which was engaged in faith healing. The other accused-appellants—Celedonia Fabie, Delia Sibonga, Alexander Sibonga, and Reynario Nuñez—were members or associates of the same group. None of them was a licensed medical practitioner. The victim, Randy Luntayao, was a 13-year-old boy who had suffered a "nervous breakdown" in November 1996, manifesting symptoms such as talking to himself and laughing inexplicably, which his father attributed to the boy having to skip meals during farm work.

Randy Luntayao, the 13-year-old eldest son of Eddie and Perlita Luntayao, suffered a "nervous breakdown" on November 20, 1996, characterized by talking to himself and laughing inexplicably. On January 26, 1997, upon the suggestion of Reynario Nuñez, Eddie Luntayao took his wife and three children, including Randy, from their home in Negros Occidental to Cebu, arriving in the afternoon and spending the night at Nuñez's house in Tangke, Talisay.

The following day, January 27, 1997, the family proceeded to the house of Eutiquia Carmen in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, where all the accused-appellants were present. Eddie spoke with Carmen about his son's condition and was told that the boy was possessed by a "bad spirit" that she could exorcise. Carmen warned that the spirit might transfer to Eddie, so the healing prayer should be conducted without him. The accused-appellants then led Randy out of the house while Eddie, his wife, and their two daughters were locked inside a room. Eddie soon heard his son shout "Ma, tabang!" twice but could not leave the locked room.

Meanwhile, 10-year-old Honey Fe Abella, who had been playing nearby with her friend Frances Claire Rivera, heard a child cry "Tabang ma!" and ran toward Carmen's house. From a few meters away, with an unobstructed view of the kitchen, Honey Fe witnessed the accused-appellants subjecting Randy to a brutal ritual: Alexander Sibonga held the boy's waist while Reynario Nuñez held his hands as the boy was immersed head-first in a drum of water, with Carmen, Delia Sibonga, and Celedonia Fabie pushing his head down. Nuñez then tied the boy to a bench with a green rope, after which Carmen poured water from a plastic container into the boy's mouth. Each time the boy struggled, Alexander Sibonga banged his head against the bench. Carmen and Fabie took turns pounding the boy's chest with their fists, and Fabie dropped her weight buttocks-first onto the boy's body. Carmen then ordered Delia Sibonga to fetch a knife, which Carmen slowly plunged into the left side of the boy's body, catching the dripping blood with a cut plastic container. The accused-appellants later carried the boy inside the house.

At around 5:00 p.m., the accused-appellants carried Randy into the prayer room and placed him on the altar. Eddie saw that his son's face was bluish and contused, his tongue protruding, and it was clear the boy was dead. Carmen prevented Eddie from approaching, saying the boy would be resurrected at 7:00 that evening. After 7:00 p.m., Carmen arranged for a coffin and had the body transferred to Nuñez's house. The next day, January 28, 1997, Nuñez took Eddie to the Talisay Municipal Health Office to report the death, instructing him to keep quiet. A death certificate was issued by Dr. Milagros Carloto, who indicated pneumonia as the cause of death based solely on what Eddie was told to say, without ever examining the body. Randy was buried that afternoon in Tangke, Talisay, after Carmen told the family they could not bring the body home to Negros because she and the others might be arrested.

After returning to Negros Occidental, Eddie sought assistance from Bombo Radyo in Bacolod City, which referred him to the NBI. On February 3, 1997, Eddie filed a complaint for murder and requested exhumation and autopsy. The NBI exhumed the body on February 20, 1997, and Dr. Ronaldo Mendez conducted the autopsy, finding a contusion on the chest, a fracture of the third left rib, and a linear fracture of the occipital bone extending to the base of the skull—findings consistent with Honey Fe's eyewitness account. Dr. Mendez opined that the skull fracture could have been caused by forcible contact with a blunt object such as a wooden bench, and that the cause of death was the internal effects of a traumatic head injury and/or traumatic chest injury. No stab wound was found, which Dr. Mendez attributed to the advanced decomposition of the body.

The defense presented Ritsel Blase, a 21-year-old member of Carmen's group, who testified that the boy was merely given a bath and prayed over, that his parents witnessed the entire procedure, and that Randy was still alive when taken inside the house. She denied that any violence was inflicted. Three former "patients" testified that Carmen had cured them through prayer without physical violence. Dr. Carloto testified on the death certificate she issued, and Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador Solima was presented to identify a resolution recommending dismissal of the charges, though his recommendation had been disapproved by the City Prosecutor. Eddie Luntayao was recalled to rebut the defense witnesses, denying that he witnessed the ritual and reiterating that he and his family were locked in a room.

• Absence of Criminal Intent: Accused-appellants argued that they were members of a religious group performing a faith-healing ritual consented to by the victim's parents, and that they had no intent to kill the boy; their liability, if any, arose from reckless imprudence because they ought to have known their actions would not bring about a cure.
• Impropriety of Treachery: Accused-appellants contended that treachery could not be appreciated because, in the absence of intent to kill, there can be no treachery, as the acts complained of were efforts to restrain the victim in order to effect the cure.
• Credibility of Prosecution Eyewitness: Accused-appellants challenged the credibility of Honey Fe Abella's testimony and pointed to the prosecution's failure to present the testimony of Frances Claire Rivera and the knife allegedly used in stabbing the victim.
• Change of Judge: Accused-appellants argued that the decision was rendered by Judge Galicano Arriesgado, who took over the case after Judge Renato Dacudao had presided over the trial, impairing the decision's reliability.

• Criminal Intent and Proper Offense: Whether the accused-appellants, who lacked intent to kill but caused the victim's death through a reckless faith-healing ritual, should be convicted of murder or of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
• Treachery: Whether treachery may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in the absence of intent to kill.
• Conviction for a Lesser Offense: Whether the accused-appellants may be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide when the information charged them with murder.
• Credibility of Eyewitness: Whether the testimony of the 10-year-old prosecution eyewitness, Honey Fe Abella, is credible and sufficient to sustain conviction.
• Change of Judge: Whether the decision rendered by a judge who did not personally hear the witnesses is valid.

• Criminal Intent and Proper Offense: Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, not murder. The accused-appellants acted without malice or intent to kill; their liability stemmed from inexcusable lack of precaution in performing an unauthorized "treatment" without medical training.
• Treachery: No. Treachery cannot be appreciated absent intent to kill, as the acts viewed as treacherous were in fact efforts to restrain the victim for the purported cure.
• Conviction for a Lesser Offense: Yes. Under Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5, reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is necessarily included in murder, permitting conviction for the lesser offense despite the information charging only murder.
• Credibility of Eyewitness: Yes. Honey Fe Abella's testimony was clear, straightforward, and corroborated by the autopsy findings of Dr. Mendez.
• Change of Judge: Yes, valid. A judge who did not personally hear the witnesses may render a valid decision based on the records and transcript of stenographic notes.

• Criminal Intent and Proper Offense: The presumption that criminal intent arises from the commission of an unlawful act holds only in the absence of proof to the contrary. Here, the facts indubitably showed the absence of intent to kill: the accused-appellants were members of a faith-healing group, the ritual was conducted with the parents' consent, and the purpose was to cure the boy of an alleged spirit possession. The elements of reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code were present—voluntarily doing acts without malice, from which material damage resulted by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution. None of the accused-appellants was a medical practitioner, and their lack of medical skill in treating the victim resulted in his death. United States vs. Divino and People vs. Vda. de Golez were cited as analogous: in both, non-medical practitioners who attempted to cure victims and caused injury or death were held liable for reckless imprudence rather than intentional felonies.

• Treachery: Treachery requires the deliberate employment of means, methods, or manner of execution to ensure the offender's safety from the victim's defensive or retaliatory acts. Without intent to kill, there can be no treachery. The acts the trial court viewed as manifestations of treachery—immersion in water, banging the head against the bench, pounding the chest—were in fact efforts by the accused-appellants to restrain Randy so they could effect the cure. The trial court's reliance on People vs. Cagoco for the proposition that killing with treachery is murder even without intent to kill was untenable, as the presumption of criminal intent was rebutted by the evidence.

• Conviction for a Lesser Offense: Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure permit conviction of an offense proved that is included in the offense charged, when the essential ingredients of the former form part of those constituting the latter. In Samson vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that a conviction for a negligent act can be had under an information exclusively charging a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. In People vs. Fernando, the Court similarly modified a murder conviction to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide after finding no criminal intent. The fact that the information did not allege imprudence was immaterial, as the deficiency was supplied by the evidence, and the result was beneficial to the accused-appellants.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: Honey Fe Abella's testimony was clear, straightforward, and far from coached or contrived. She was only a few meters from the kitchen, which had no roof or walls but only a pantry, giving her a good vantage point. Her account was corroborated by Dr. Mendez's autopsy findings—fractures on the third left rib and the base of the skull—consistent with her description of the banging and pounding. The absence of a stab wound was explained by the advanced decomposition of the body, exhumed 24 days after burial without embalming. The failure to present Frances Claire Rivera's testimony and the knife used was not fatal, as the presentation of the knife was not indispensable.

• Change of Judge: A judge who did not personally hear the testimonies is not rendered incompetent to decide the case, as the ruling is based on the records and the transcript of stenographic notes. This principle was upheld in People vs. Ulzoron.

• Presumption of Criminal Intent — Criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act, but this presumption holds only in the absence of proof to the contrary. Where the evidence shows that the accused acted without malice or intent to kill—as where they performed a faith-healing ritual with the parents' consent—the presumption is rebutted, and liability for an intentional felony cannot attach.

• Reckless Imprudence (Article 365, Revised Penal Code) — Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. What takes the place of malice or intention is the offender's failure to take precautions due to lack of skill, taking into account his employment, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

• Variance Between Allegation and Proof (Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5) — When there is a variance between the offense charged and that proved, and the offense as charged includes or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged. A conviction for a negligent act may be had under an information charging a willful offense, on the theory that the greater includes the lesser.

• Treachery Requires Intent to Kill — Treachery cannot be appreciated in the absence of intent to kill, as it presupposes the deliberate employment of means to ensure the offender's safety from the victim's defensive or retaliatory acts. Acts intended to restrain a victim for a purported cure do not constitute treachery.

• "The trial court's reliance on the rule that criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act is untenable because such presumption only holds in the absence of proof to the contrary." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for negating murder: the presumption of criminal intent was rebutted by evidence showing the accused-appellants' lack of intent to kill.

• "While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime . . . but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense." — Quoted from Samson vs. Court of Appeals, this passage is the canonical formulation of the doctrine permitting conviction for reckless imprudence under an information charging an intentional felony.

• "In the absence of intent to kill, there is no treachery or the deliberate employment of means, methods, and manner of execution to ensure the safety of the accused from the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the victim." — This defines the relationship between intent to kill and treachery, a point frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on qualifying circumstances.

• United States vs. Divino, 12 Phil. 175 (1908) — Followed. The accused, not a licensed physician, attempted to cure the victim's foot ulcers by wrapping petroleum-soaked cloth around her feet and lighting it, causing injuries. Held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries, as the accused had no intention to cause evil but rather to remedy the ailment. Applied by analogy to the accused-appellants' unauthorized faith-healing treatment.

• People vs. Vda. de Golez, 108 Phil. 855 (1960) — Followed. A non-medical practitioner who treated a victim without the necessary technical knowledge and caused death was properly charged with homicide through reckless imprudence. Applied to support the conclusion that the accused-appellants' liability was for reckless imprudence.

• Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 103 Phil. 277 (1958) — Followed. Established that a conviction for a negligent act may be had under an information exclusively charging a willful offense, on the theory that the greater includes the lesser. Applied to justify convicting the accused-appellants of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide despite the information charging only murder.

• People vs. Fernando, 49 Phil. 75 (1926) — Followed. The accused was charged with and convicted of murder by the trial court; the Supreme Court modified the judgment to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide after finding no criminal intent. Applied as direct precedent for the modification.

• People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 (1929) — Cited. The presumption of criminal intent from the commission of an unlawful act holds only in the absence of proof to the contrary.

• People vs. Ulzoron, 286 SCRA 741 (1998) — Followed. A judge who did not personally hear the witnesses may render a valid decision based on the records and transcript of stenographic notes.

• Article 4, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides that a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences of his felonious act, even if the consequences are not intended. The trial court relied on this provision, but the Supreme Court found it inapplicable because the accused-appellants did not commit an intentional felony.

• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Defines reckless imprudence as voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution. Applied to hold the accused-appellants liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, as they lacked medical skill and acted without malice in attempting to cure the victim.

• Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Govern variance between allegation and proof, permitting conviction of an offense proved that is included in or necessarily includes the offense charged. Applied to sustain the conviction for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under an information charging murder.

• Articles 2206(3) and 2219(1), Civil Code — Basis for the award of civil indemnity and moral damages to the heirs of the deceased.

• Articles 2229 and 2231, Civil Code — Basis for the award of exemplary damages by reason of the accused-appellants' gross negligence in attempting to cure the victim without a license to practice medicine.

Bellosillo, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred. Quisumbing, J., was on leave.