People vs. Cariquez

Circumstantial evidence, combined with a child victim's spontaneous statements identifying her abusers as part of the res gestae, is sufficient to convict beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and homicide, and where the homicide victim is under twelve years of age, the penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Section 10, Article VI of R.A. No. 7610.

Ava Ma. Victoria Cariquez and her live-in partner Leezel Franco resided at No. 116 Royal Townhomes, San Rafael, Mandaluyong City, with Ava's two-and-a-half-year-old daughter, Mariel "Ethel" Cariquez. Franco was not the child's father. The household was marked by near-daily quarrels between Ava and Franco, both of whom were using drugs. Ethel was originally the subject of an Information dated May 30, 1996 charging both accused with serious physical injuries under Section 10, Article VI of R.A. No. 7610; after the child's death on May 31, 1996, the Information was amended on August 30, 1996 to charge both with parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 5 of R.A. No. 7659.

Ava Ma. Victoria Cariquez and her two-and-a-half-year-old daughter, Mariel "Ethel" Cariquez, moved into No. 116 Royal Townhomes, San Rafael, Mandaluyong City, sometime in January 1996. Ava's sister, Lilia Gojul, moved in with them and slept with the child in one of the two bedrooms. Ava had a housemaid named Elizabeth Patao, who also watched over Ethel. At the time, Ava had a live-in partner, Leezel Franco, who was not the child's father. The household was not peaceful: Ava and Franco quarreled almost daily, and both were using drugs. Neighbors found the child cute and friendly but regarded Ava and Franco as aloof and snobbish.

In mid-March 1996, Lilia Gojul left the household and returned to her home in Novaliches, Quezon City. When she visited on April 14, 1996, she was shocked by Ethel's appearance: her hair had been shaven, her face was full of contusions, her neck bore faded cigarette burns, her arms and legs showed traces of pinching and maltreatment, both eyes had "black-eye" marks, and her knees were contused from prolonged kneeling. When Lilia asked the child to identify who inflicted the injuries, Ethel tearfully pointed to Ava and Franco. Lilia confronted Ava about the abuse. Neighbors corroborated these observations: Michelle Torrente, occupying the adjacent unit, heard the child crying daily, even at one or two o'clock in the morning, and on one occasion saw Ethel with a shaven head, bruises, wounds, and cigarette burns. When asked what happened, the child replied "pinaso po ako" and identified "Papa ko po," referring to Franco. Theresa Castillo, another neighbor, also noticed the shaven head and bruises; when she asked the child's yaya why this was done, the yaya answered "parusa."

On May 12, 1996, Lilia visited again and found Ethel even sicker and more bruised than before. Out of pity, she persuaded Ava to let her take custody of the child, and Ava wrote a note passing guardianship to Lilia. However, on May 14, 1996, Lilia had to leave without bringing Ethel, who cried silently as she departed. Nothing was heard from the household thereafter.

On May 27, 1996, around three or four o'clock in the afternoon, Ethel was transferred by ambulance from the Mandaluyong Medical Center to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital at Greenhills, San Juan. She was unconscious, unable to breathe on her own, assisted by an ambu bag, and bore prominent bruises on the forehead and right cheek. Dr. Jose Joey Bienvenida attended to her and interviewed Ava for the medical history. Ava first said that her brother had mauled the child, then changed her story, claiming the child had fallen from the stairs. A CT-scan revealed a combination of chronic and acute subdural hematoma, massive edema, a fracture on the left frontal bone, and blood clot in almost the entire cerebral hemisphere. Dr. Bienvenida noted the head injury was a "confluent injury" sustained on different dates—one portion being a resolving hematoma at least two days old, while the more acute injury was sustained within twenty-four hours of examination. Ethel was confined in the Intensive Care Unit, classified as brain-dead, and her condition deteriorated until she died on May 31, 1996 at about 10:20 in the morning. The cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to multiple organ system failure, severe massive cranio-cerebral trauma." NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Antonio Vertido conducted an autopsy and concluded the cause of death was "Traumatic Head Injury, Severe," noting a linear fracture in the right middle cranial fossa, abrasions and contusions on various parts of the body, and hematomas on the forehead and scalp.

Ava testified in court that on the morning of May 27, 1996, she had left the house to make a telephone call while Ethel was eating and Franco was playing the guitar. Upon returning, she found the child playing with her food and, after repeated refusals to eat, struck her with a plastic belt on the buttocks. She claimed that when she held Ethel by the shoulder, the child struggled, slipped, lost balance, and fell, hitting the sofa and then the edge of the cemented stairs with her head. However, in her affidavit dated June 1, 1996 and her reply-affidavit, Ava pointed to Franco as the one responsible, stating that upon returning home she found Franco hitting Ethel with the buckle of a belt at the back and front of her head, that she tried to stop him but was pushed, and that this was not the first time he had hit the child—he would do so whenever he was high on drugs and Ethel was noisy. Ava attempted to diminish these admissions by testifying that she did not read the affidavits before signing and that she signed under a state of shock. Franco, for his part, offered two versions: in his counter-affidavit dated June 11, 1996, he declared that Ava had pushed Ethel, causing the fatal fall; but in his court testimony, he claimed that this account was merely narrated to him by Ava and that he never witnessed the incident, insisting he had nothing to do with the child's injuries and had no idea what happened.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Accused-appellants argued that the lower court gravely erred in convicting both accused without sufficient evidence, maintaining that the prosecution's principal witness Lilia Gojul and the other witnesses never saw how Ethel sustained her injuries, and that the prosecution's evidence was purely hearsay, conjectural, and failed to show any conspiracy to maltreat or cause the child's death.
• Accident: Accused-appellants contended that the child's death was purely accidental and that there was no evil motive on their part to kill her.
• Hearsay Objection: Accused-appellants characterized Ethel's statements to Lilia Gojul regarding her shaven head and injuries as hearsay, arguing that they could not be considered an exception to the hearsay rule because they were not made on an impending death or with the thought of an impending death and were related to Lilia many days before the fatal incident.
• No Case Against Franco: Franco further asserted that only Ava was formally charged, hence there was no case against him.

• Circumstantial Evidence: The Office of the Solicitor General enumerated seven circumstances establishing the accused's culpability, including the observations of Lilia Gojul, Michelle Torrente, and Theresa Castillo regarding the child's injuries and her identification of her abusers, the medical testimony of Dr. Bienvenida regarding confluent injuries sustained on different dates and Ava's conflicting accounts, and Dr. Vertido's autopsy finding of traumatic head injury as the cause of death.
• Res Gestae: The prosecution maintained that the child's spontaneous statements identifying her abusers were admissible as part of the res gestae under Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction of both accused-appellants for the death of the victim.
• Admissibility of Child's Statements: Whether the victim's statements identifying her abusers were admissible as part of the res gestae or were inadmissible hearsay.
• Defense of Accident: Whether accused-appellant Ava's defense of accident was sufficient to exempt her from criminal liability.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy between Ava and Franco was sufficiently established.
• Proper Conviction of Franco: Whether Franco could be convicted of homicide when the amended Information charged him with parricide.
• Proper Penalty for Franco: Whether the penalty imposed on Franco should be modified in light of R.A. No. 7610, given that the victim was under twelve years of age.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. The combination of circumstances—observed injuries, the child's spontaneous identifications, medical findings of injuries sustained on different dates, and the accused's conflicting accounts—constituted an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Admissibility of Child's Statements: Yes. The victim's spontaneous statements identifying her abusers were admissible as part of the res gestae under Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as they were made in connection with a startling occurrence and before the declarant had time to contrive or devise.
• Defense of Accident: No. The requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code were not proven; the totality of Ava's own story demonstrated that the child was maltreated and pushed, causing the fatal head injuries.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was inferred from the totality of facts and circumstances showing that Ava and Franco aimed by their acts toward the same unlawful object of maltreating and torturing the child, each doing a part so that their acts were connected and indicated a concurrence of sentiment.
• Proper Conviction of Franco: Yes. Franco was charged in the amended Information, albeit for parricide, and could legally be convicted of homicide, which is necessarily included in the charge of parricide.
• Proper Penalty for Franco: Yes. The penalty was modified to reclusion perpetua pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 10, Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, which mandates reclusion perpetua for homicide when the victim is under twelve years of age.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict provided three requisites are present: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken chain of events leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the guilt of the accused. Here, the seven circumstances enumerated by the prosecution—Lilia's observations of the child's injuries and the child's identification of her abusers on April 14 and May 12, 1996; Michelle Torrente's testimony regarding the child's crying and her identification of "Papa Leezel"; Theresa Castillo's testimony regarding the "parusa" explanation; Dr. Bienvenida's finding of confluent injuries sustained on different dates; Ava's conflicting accounts to the doctor; and Dr. Vertido's autopsy conclusion of traumatic head injury—together with Ava's extrajudicial admissions and her judicial admission that the child slipped from her hold and hit the cemented stairs, formed an unbroken chain establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Admissibility of Child's Statements: The declarations of Lilia, Michelle, and Theresa as to what they personally observed on the child were not hearsay, as they saw the child and personally noticed the injuries and telltale marks of torture. While the child's answers as to who inflicted the injuries may have been hearsay because the child could not be confronted, they were part of the res gestae and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 42 of Rule 130. The three requisites were satisfied: (1) the principal act—the tortures inflicted on the child—was a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. While there has been no uniformity as to the interval of time separating the startling event from the declaration, what is necessary is that the injuries sustained by the child prior to May 27, 1996 were inflicted by Ava and Franco.

• Defense of Accident: Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, accident exempts an accused from criminal liability only when it is shown that the accused was performing a lawful act with due care, the resulting injury was caused by mere accident, and there was no fault or intent to cause the injury. The defense of accident shifted the burden of evidence to the accused. Ava's story was internally inconsistent: she offered one version in open court (accident) and another in her affidavit and reply-affidavit (Franco as the culprit). Her explanation that she did not read the affidavits before signing and signed under a state of shock was deemed flimsy and incredible, as the affidavits were prepared at her instance long before trial and given voluntarily. The totality of her story proved beyond reasonable doubt that the child was maltreated and pushed hard, driving her head into the cemented stairs and causing the injuries that were the proximate cause of death.

• Conspiracy: Proof of conspiracy need not be direct but may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances. If two or more persons aim by their acts toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, are in fact connected, indicating a closeness of formal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred even without proof of an actual meeting to concert means. The facts and circumstances proven unerringly led to the conclusion that Ava and Franco conspired to maltreat, injure, inflict pain, and torture the child, united in that purpose and intention. The totality of their evil deeds demonstrated beyond doubt their resolve to pursue their common objective, which eventually resulted in the child's death. Medical evidence confirmed that the child's injuries were sustained not only on the date of the fatal incident but on dates before it.

• Proper Conviction of Franco: Franco's claim that he was not charged in the amended Information was found absolutely wanting in basis. He was charged, although for parricide, but he could legally be convicted of homicide, which is necessarily included in that charge.

• Proper Penalty for Franco: Ava committed parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. With no modifying circumstances proven, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed. Franco was correctly held liable for homicide only, as he was a stranger to the victim. Prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 7610, the penalty for homicide under Article 249 was reclusion temporal. As amended by R.A. No. 7610, the penalty for homicide when the victim is under twelve years of age is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 10, Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. Accordingly, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed upon Franco.

• Res Gestae (Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court) — Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequently thereto, with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. The three requisites are: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, must be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. There has been no uniformity as to the interval of time separating the startling event from the declaration. The Court applied this doctrine to admit a two-and-a-half-year-old child's spontaneous statements identifying her abusers, notwithstanding the passage of time between the infliction of injuries and the disclosure.

• Circumstantial Evidence (Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court) — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict when: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken chain of events leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the guilt of the accused. The Court found the seven circumstances enumerated by the prosecution, together with the accused's extrajudicial and judicial admissions, sufficient to sustain conviction.

• Conspiracy — In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, and each conspirator is liable for the crimes committed by the other conspirators. Proof of conspiracy need not be direct but may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances. If two or more persons aim by their acts toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, are in fact connected, indicating a closeness of formal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. The Court inferred conspiracy from the systematic pattern of abuse by both accused against the child.

• Accident as an Exempting Circumstance (Article 12, Revised Penal Code) — For accident to exempt an accused from criminal liability, it must be shown that: (1) the accused was performing a lawful act with due care; (2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and (3) there was no fault or intent to cause the injury on the part of the accused. The defense of accident shifts the burden of evidence to the accused. The Court found that Ava failed to satisfy these requisites, the totality of her story proving that the child was maltreated and pushed.

• Homicide Under R.A. No. 7610 (Section 10, Article VI) — When the victim of homicide is under twelve years of age, the penalty is reclusion perpetua pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 10, Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, which provides that the penalty for acts punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262 paragraph 2, and 263 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve years of age. The Court applied this provision to elevate Franco's penalty from the indeterminate sentence imposed by the trial court to reclusion perpetua.

• "Where ETHEL dwelt was not a home; it was not even a house. It was hell. AVA and LEEZEL considered ETHEL not as a child with human dignity and an object of love as children should be, but an unwanted object against whom they could vent everything from frustrations to anger and hate." — This passage encapsulates the Court's characterization of the systematic abuse suffered by the child victim and the moral basis for the conviction.

• "The issue then that must be resolved is who was or were responsible for the act on 27 May 1996, which caused or resulted in the death of ETHEL? on this the prosecution failed to offer any direct evidence. the circumstantial evidence the trial court appreciated related to acts or events which happened before 27 May 1996. Yet, these prior acts are inseparable from that which happened on 27 May 1996. the latter was the coup de grace." — This passage articulates the Court's reasoning connecting the pattern of prior abuse to the fatal incident through circumstantial evidence, framing the May 27 event as the culmination of a continuous course of conduct.

• "That she told the truth in her affidavit and reply-affidavit cannot escape the verdict of rational minds." — This passage establishes the Court's rejection of Ava's attempt to disown her extrajudicial admissions, finding her explanation that she signed without reading and under a state of shock to be flimsy and incredible.

• People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 (1991) — Cited for the proposition that circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken chain of events leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the guilt of the accused.
• People vs. Alvero, 224 SCRA 16 (1993) — Cited alongside People vs. Tiozon for the same proposition regarding the unbroken chain requirement in circumstantial evidence.
• People vs. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70 (1992) — Cited for the three requisites for the admission of evidence as constituting part of the res gestae under Section 42 of Rule 130.
• People vs. Taneo, 218 SCRA 494 (1993) — Cited alongside People vs. Sanchez for the res gestae requisites.
• Anciro vs. People, 228 SCRA 629 (1993) — Cited alongside the above cases for the res gestae requisites.
• People vs. Veronas, 179 SCRA 423 (1989) — Cited for the rule that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
• People vs. Enriquez, 281 SCRA 103 (1997) — Cited alongside People vs. Veronas for the conspiracy principle.
• People vs. Hermosa, 177 SCRA 574 (1989) — Cited for the proposition that proof of conspiracy need not be direct but may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances.
• People vs. Apongan, 270 SCRA 713 (1997) — Cited alongside People vs. Hermosa for the same proposition on inferred conspiracy.

• Article 246, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 5 of R.A. No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes parricide. Applied to convict Ava, who as the mother of the victim was criminally responsible for the child's death, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed in the absence of modifying circumstances.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide. Applied to convict Franco, who as a stranger to the victim was liable for homicide rather than parricide.
• Article 12, Revised Penal Code — Provides accident as an exempting circumstance. Applied to reject Ava's defense of accident, the requisites not having been proven.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the imposition of the lesser penalty when no modifying circumstances are present. Applied to justify the imposition of reclusion perpetua rather than death for parricide.
• Section 10, Article VI, R.A. No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) — Mandates the penalty of reclusion perpetua for homicide when the victim is under twelve years of age. Applied to modify Franco's penalty from the indeterminate sentence imposed by the trial court to reclusion perpetua.
• Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides for the admissibility of statements as part of the res gestae. Applied to admit the child victim's spontaneous statements identifying her abusers as an exception to the hearsay rule.
• Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Sets forth the requisites for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to convict. Applied to uphold the conviction based on the combination of circumstances established by the prosecution.

Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Santiago, JJ., concurred.