People vs. Carandang

Conspiracy may be established through circumstantial evidence of concerted action before, during, and after the commission of the crime, and once established, the act of one conspirator is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each. Unlike evident premeditation, conspiracy requires no lapse of time for meditation and reflection; it arises the moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony.

Accused Restituto Carandang, Henry Milan, and Jackman Chua were charged with the murder of two police officers—PO2 Dionisio Alonzo and SPO2 Wilfredo Red—and the frustrated murder of SPO1 Wilfredo Montecalvo, all arising from a single incident on April 5, 2001 at Milan's residence on Calavite Street, Brgy. Salvacion, Quezon City. The police team had been dispatched from the La Loma Police Station 1 in response to a request for assistance from Milan's sister regarding an alleged drug deal at her house. The appeals of all three accused were initially filed with the Supreme Court but transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to People vs. Mateo, which intermediate-appellate review for these cases.

In the afternoon of April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of the La Loma Police Station 1 received a request for assistance from the sister of accused Henry Milan regarding a drug deal that would allegedly take place at her house on Calavite Street, Brgy. Salvacion, Quezon City. The station commander instructed SPO2 Wilfredo Red to speak with Milan's sister, who had come to their office. SPO2 Red, accompanied by PO2 Dionisio Alonzo, SPO1 Rodolfo Estores, and SPO1 Wilfredo Montecalvo, talked to her and thereafter formed a team with himself as leader. After receiving further instructions from the station commander, the team proceeded to Calavite Street aboard a mobile patrol car and an unmarked car.

Upon reaching the place at around 4:00 p.m., the officers alighted and surrounded Milan's house. SPO1 Montecalvo's group went to the left side while SPO2 Red's group proceeded to the right, the two groups eventually meeting near Milan's room at the back of the house. The door to the room was open, allowing the officers to see Restituto Carandang, Milan, and Jackman Chua inside. SPO2 Red told the group that the persons inside would not put up a fight. However, when the officers identified themselves as police, Milan immediately shut the door. PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall and propelling them inside. PO2 Alonzo shouted "Walang gagalaw!" Suddenly, gunshots rang out, hitting PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red, who dropped to the floor one after the other. Due to the suddenness of the attack, neither was able to return fire and both were killed. SPO1 Montecalvo, who was behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm when Carandang shot and hit him. SPO1 Estores heard Chua say to Milan, "Sugurin mo na!" Milan lunged toward SPO1 Montecalvo, but the latter was able to fire and hit him. SPO1 Estores then went inside and pulled SPO1 Montecalvo out.

Reinforcements arrived at around 4:30 p.m. SPO1 Montecalvo was brought to the Chinese General Hospital, where a bullet was removed from the right portion of his nape, incurring hospitalization expenses of ₱14,324.48. Milan also stepped out and was brought to a hospital. Carandang and Chua remained holed up inside the house for several hours, negotiating for surrender and requesting the presence of a Colonel Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo. They surrendered between 11:00 p.m. and midnight. SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were found dead inside the house with broken legs and gunshot and grenade shrapnel wounds. Dr. Winston Tan, PNP medico-legal officer, determined that gunshot wounds caused the deaths of both officers.

The defense presented a different version. Carandang claimed he had no firearm and that the police fired all shots; he was at Milan's house to ask Milan to help convert his SIM card, found Milan and Chua playing cards, and took cover under a bed when gunfire erupted after the door was destroyed. Milan testified that he was at home playing cards with Chua when someone pounded on the door, which was then destroyed, and two unidentified men barged in firing; he was hit and ran out for safety. Chua testified that he arrived at noontime to play cards, heard loud banging, and was hit on his left big toe when gunshots erupted; he ducked near the bed and lost consciousness, regaining it only at the hospital. A paraffin test on Chua yielded negative for gunpowner nitrates, while Carandang's test was positive; Milan refused examination.

The trial court found all three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder, acting in conspiracy with each other, qualified by treachery. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications, adding indemnity for loss of earning capacity and adjusting the penalty for frustrated murder. Only Milan and Chua appealed further to the Supreme Court; Carandang informed the Court he was no longer interested in pursuing his appeal.

• No Conspiracy: Milan and Chua argued that there was no conspiracy among the three accused, the assault being the impulsive act of Carandang alone rather than the result of any agreement or concerted action.
• Fear, Not Concerted Action: They maintained that their acts of closing the door and not peaceably talking to the police were caused by fear of the officers, who were allegedly in full battle gear.
• Rapid Events Negate Conspiracy: They asserted that the fortuitous and unexpected character of the encounter and the rapid turn of events should have ruled out conspiracy, as the incident happened so fast that they had no opportunity to stop Carandang.
• No Attack by Milan: They contested the factual finding that Chua directed Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo, alleging that both were unarmed and that Milan ran out of the room for safety, not to attack—particularly since Milan was already injured in the stomach.
• Utterance After the Fact: Assuming arguendo that Chua uttered "Sugurin mo na!", they argued that no crime was committed thereby because all victims had already been shot; the words were uttered without reflection and did not inherently carry inducement or temptation.
• Treachery Not Proven: Assuming conspiracy exists, they contended that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not duly proven, so the conviction should have been for homicide and frustrated homicide only.

• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy existed among Carandang, Milan, and Chua in the commission of the crimes charged.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Whether treachery was duly proven to qualify the crimes as murder and frustrated murder rather than homicide and frustrated homicide.

• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established through circumstantial evidence of concerted action before and after the shooting—Milan's closing of the door to facilitate ambush and Chua's directive to Milan to attack a fallen officer—demonstrating unity of purpose among all three accused.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Yes. Treachery was present because the execution of the attack, particularly the sudden barrage of gunfire when the door was pushed open, made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or retaliate.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of an actual agreement among the accused. Proof of concerted action before, during, and after the crime demonstrating unity of design and objective is sufficient, and once established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation. Milan's closing of the door when the police identified themselves allowed Carandang to take strategic positions and wait in ambush; the brief delay while officers tried to open the door gave the appellants a vantage point. After the shooting, Chua's directive "Sugurin mo na!" to Milan and Milan's compliance by lunging toward SPO1 Montecalvo further demonstrated unity of purpose. These facts constitute convincing circumstantial evidence rather than proof that Chua was a principal by inducement or that Milan's attack alone made him a principal by direct participation; all three are principals by direct participation as co-conspirators. SPO1 Estores's positive testimony on Chua's utterance prevails over the plain denials of Milan and Chua, he having no reason to fabricate. The rapid turn of events does not negate conspiracy, because unlike evident premeditation, conspiracy requires no sufficient period for meditation and reflection; it arises the moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony. Factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals and supported by evidence, are conclusive on the Supreme Court.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Treachery is present when the execution of the attack makes it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or retaliate. The sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed the door open illustrate the appellants' intention to prevent any chance for the officers to defend themselves. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death; applying Article 63, since there was no other modifying circumstance besides the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed. For frustrated murder, under Article 50 in connection with Article 61(2), the penalty is one degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal. Its medium period—14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months—serves as the maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, with the minimum within the range of prision mayor. The Court of Appeals correctly modified the indeterminate penalty to six years and one day of prision mayor, minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, maximum.

• Conspiracy Doctrine — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive; proof of concerted action before, during, and after the crime, demonstrating unity of design and objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each. Applied in this case: Milan's closing of the door and Chua's directive to Milan were circumstantial evidence of unity of purpose, rendering all three principals by direct participation.

• Conspiracy and Time Element — Unlike evident premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that a sufficient period of time elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection. Conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony. Applied: the rapid turn of events did not negate conspiracy.

• Treachery — Treachery is present when the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or retaliate. What is decisive is the manner of execution, not the mere fact of suddenness. Applied: the sudden barrage of gunfire when the door was pushed open, without opportunity for the officers to return fire, established treachery.

• Conclusiveness of Factual Findings — Factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the Supreme Court when supported by the evidence on record, subject to recognized exceptions including conclusions grounded on speculation, manifestly mistaken inferences, grave abuse of discretion, misapprehension of facts, conflicting findings, lack of citation of specific evidence, contradiction by evidence on record, or findings contrary to admissions of both parties.

• "Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on conspiracy as applied to the facts, articulating the ratio decidendi that circumstantial evidence of concerted action suffices to establish conspiracy.

• "Unlike evident premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period of time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony." — This passage distinguishes conspiracy from evident premeditation on the element of time, directly rejecting appellants' argument that the rapid turn of events negated conspiracy.

• "Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate." — This passage defines the controlling test for treachery and applies it to the facts, establishing the qualifying circumstance that elevated the crimes to murder and frustrated murder.

• People vs. Sumalpong, 348 Phil. 501 (1998) — Followed for the doctrine that conspiracy may be proven by concerted action before, during, and after the crime, and that the act of one conspirator is the act of all.

• People vs. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — Procedural basis for transferring appeals involving death penalties from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.

• People vs. Baldimo and Derilo, 338 Phil. 350 (1997) — Followed for the rule that conspiracy requires no period of meditation and reflection, unlike evident premeditation.

• People vs. Garin, 476 Phil. 455 (2004) — Followed for the definition of treachery: what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or retaliate.

• People vs. Orias and Elarcosa, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 417 — Followed for the current amounts of civil indemnity (₱75,000.00) and moral damages (₱50,000.00) in murder and homicide cases, awarded automatically without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.

• People vs. Regalario, G.R. No. 174483, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 738 — Followed for the award of exemplary damages (₱30,000.00) when the crime was committed with an aggravating circumstance, whether generic or qualifying.

• Pelonia vs. People, G.R. No. 168997, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 207 — Followed for the enumeration of exceptions to the conclusiveness of trial court factual findings affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder with reclusion perpetua to death when committed with any of the enumerated attendant circumstances, including treachery. Applied to qualify the killings of SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo as murder.

• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides rules for the application of penalties composed of two indivisible penalties: when neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present (other than the qualifying circumstance), the lesser penalty shall be applied. Applied to impose reclusion perpetua for each count of murder.

• Article 50, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. Applied to determine the penalty for frustrated murder as one degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death.

• Article 61, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Provides rules for graduating penalties when the prescribed penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties: the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed. Applied to determine that reclusion temporal is the penalty for frustrated murder.

• Section 1, Indeterminate Sentence Law — Requires courts to impose an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of which is determined by the attending circumstances under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed. Applied to fix the indeterminate penalty for frustrated murder at six years and one day of prision mayor, minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, maximum.

Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Jose Catral Mendoza.