People vs. Cajurao

Self-defense cannot be invoked when the victim's unlawful aggression has already ceased, and the accused pursues and kills the retreating victim; and treachery cannot be appreciated where there is no evidence that the accused deliberately and consciously adopted a method of attack to insure the victim's death without risk to himself.

The appellant Joseph Cajurao and the victim Santiago Betita were both residents who attended a community dance and carnival at the Poblacion, Surallah, South Cotabato on the evening of November 29, 1993. The Sangguniang Kabataan had sponsored a disco at the Civic Cultural Center gymnasium, and vendors such as Pacita Pordios and Nanette Evangelista set up stalls along the periphery. Civilian volunteers, including Domingo Tecson, were assigned to maintain peace and order in the area.

On the evening of November 29, 1993, the residents of Poblacion, Surallah, South Cotabato were celebrating at a carnival in the municipal plaza, with a disco sponsored by the Sangguniang Kabataan at the Civic Cultural Center gymnasium. Pacita Pordios had set up a stall in front of the gymnasium to sell candies, soft drinks, and other items, illuminating her wares with a makeshift kerosene lamp made from a flat Tanduay bottle fitted with a wick. The appellant Joseph Cajurao and his friend Allan Dañosos went to the dance hall but, having no tickets, were denied entry by Felix Teruel and Nena Carmelo, who were manning the gate and ticket booth. The two lingered in the vicinity and repeatedly tried to enter without tickets, to no avail.

At about 10:30 p.m., Pordios was surprised when Santiago Betita suddenly arrived at her stall and took the makeshift lamp. She confronted him, but Betita ignored her and held on to the lamp in a defensive stance, appearing perturbed. Shortly thereafter, someone threw a stone, causing people to scatter. Still holding the lamp, Betita moved over to the stall beside Pordios's. Suddenly, the appellant sped towards Betita and stabbed him on the right nipple. Betita fell to the ground, and the appellant threw his knife away and fled. Domingo Tecson, a civilian volunteer on patrol, saw the appellant running past him, looked in the direction from which the appellant had come, and saw Betita slumped on the ground. Tecson shouted for help, instructed fellow volunteers to chase the appellant, and after a brief chase the appellant was caught in the carnival ground and turned over to the police. Tecson returned to the crime scene and, with light from a nearby fire truck, found the knife and its scabbard, which he turned over to the authorities. Pordios and Tecson gave their statements to PO3 Lino D. Antonino the following day. Dr. Rolando P. Arrojo, the Municipal Health Officer, certified that Betita died due to severe internal hemorrhage resulting in shock and cardiac arrest, caused by a stab wound on the right chest. The victim's mother, Valentina Betita, spent ₱20,000 for the wake and burial.

The appellant admitted stabbing and killing Betita but claimed he acted in self-defense. He testified that at about 9:00 a.m. on November 29, 1993, he and Dañosos went to the dance, where Betita shouted at him, accused him of being a braggart and a liar, and challenged him. At about 10:00 p.m., the appellant went outside and sat on a concrete bench near a mango tree. Betita followed, shouted at him again, and slapped him on the face. Betita then fled to Pordios's stall and grabbed the makeshift lamp. According to the appellant, as Betita was about to throw the lighted lamp at him from about four meters away, the appellant walked towards Betita, pushed aside the hand holding the lamp, drew a knife from his waist, and stabbed Betita on the right nipple. He then threw the knife in a grassy area and fled. Nanette Evangelista, a defense witness, corroborated much of the appellant's account, testifying that she saw Betita approach the appellant, point at him, slap him, and then flee to Pordios's stall where he grabbed the Tanduay lamp and was about to throw it before the appellant, armed with a knife, ran towards him and stabbed him on the chest.

The trial court rejected the appellant's defense, gave full credence to the prosecution witnesses' testimony that the appellant stabbed a defenseless victim, and appreciated the presence of treachery, qualifying the killing to murder. On cross-examination, however, Pordios demonstrated that at the moment of the stabbing, Betita was merely holding the bottle in his right hand at the level of his right shoulder, with his elbow by his side and his body erect — a defensive, not a throwing, posture.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The appellant contended that the trial court erred in giving credence and full probative weight to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Tecson and Pordios, while ignoring his own testimony and that of Evangelista.
• Self-Defense: The appellant maintained that he stabbed Betita because the latter took hold of the lighted Tanduay lamp and was about to throw it at him, constituting unlawful aggression. He argued that there was no provocation on his part and that the means he employed to repel the aggression were reasonable.

• Self-Defense: Whether the appellant established by clear and convincing evidence the elements of self-defense, particularly unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated to convict the appellant of murder.

• Self-Defense: No. The appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving the elements of self-defense, the victim's unlawful aggression having ceased when he retreated and assumed a defensive posture, rendering the appellant's pursuit and stabbing retaliatory.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not proven because there was no evidence that the appellant deliberately and consciously adopted a method of attack to insure the victim's death without risk to himself, the victim being armed with a lighted lamp he could have used to fend off the assault.

• Self-Defense: By interposing self-defense, the appellant admitted killing the victim, thereby shifting the burden of proof to him to establish with clear and convincing evidence the confluence of the essential requisites: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The appellant failed to discharge this burden. Unlawful aggression — the indispensable element of self-defense — presupposes an actual or imminent danger to life or limb and cannot consist in oral threats or a merely threatening stance. Assuming Betita did slap the appellant, Betita's aggression ceased when he ran away to Pordios's stall and took hold of the lamp in a defensive posture. Pordios's testimony and physical demonstration on cross-examination showed that Betita was merely holding the bottle at the level of his right shoulder with his elbow by his side — not in a throwing position. When the appellant pursued and stabbed Betita, he did so in retaliation, not in self-defense. The settled rule is that once unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor. The appellant's flight, his discarding of the weapon, his failure to report the incident or surrender, and the failure of both the appellant and Evangelista to give statements to the police all belied the claim of self-defense. The trial court's factual findings on witness credibility were accorded high respect, the Court finding no reason to deviate from them after a meticulous review of the records.

• Treachery: Treachery under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) employment of means, methods, or manner of execution that would insure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act of the offended party, leaving the latter no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of such means, methods, or manner of execution. There was no evidence that the appellant deliberately and consciously adopted a method of attack to insure the victim's death. Pordios did not see how the incident commenced and developed before Betita appeared at her stall. Treachery must be present at the inception of the attack; where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot be merely supposed. Moreover, the attack could not be said to have been without risk to the appellant, because Betita was holding a lighted wick lamp which he could have used to fend off the assault. A sudden attack, to be treacherous, must be proven to have been a mode deliberately adopted to deprive the victim of a chance to fight or retreat. Absent such proof, the killing was homicide, not murder.

• Burden of Proof in Self-Defense — When the accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, the burden of proof shifts to the accused to prove with clear and convincing evidence the confluence of three requisites: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence. In this case, the appellant failed to discharge this burden, particularly on the element of unlawful aggression.

• Unlawful Aggression — Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual or imminent danger to life or limb; it cannot consist in oral threats, a threatening stance, or an intimidating attitude. A belief that one is about to be attacked is not sufficient. The aggression must be real or at least imminent, not merely imaginary. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that Betita's act of slapping the appellant, even if credited, had ceased when Betita retreated and assumed a defensive posture, so that the appellant's subsequent pursuit and stabbing constituted retaliation, not self-defense.

• Cessation of Unlawful Aggression — When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance. Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray. The Court held that once Betita fled and took a defensive position, the necessity for the appellant to attack ceased, and his persistence in attacking negated self-defense.

• Elements of Treachery — Treachery requires: (1) employment of means, methods, or manner of execution that would insure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act of the offended party, who thus has no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of such means, methods, or manner of execution. Treachery must be present at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, treachery cannot be merely supposed. The Court found no evidence of deliberate adoption of a treacherous mode of attack, and noted the victim was holding a lighted lamp that could have been used for defense.

• "There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless there is clear and convincing proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The unlawful aggression, a constitutive element of self-defense, must be real or at least imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be attacked is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual or imminent danger on the life or limb of a person." — This passage defines the indispensable element of self-defense and explains why the appellant's claim failed.

• "The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance." — This articulates the doctrine that cessation of unlawful aggression extinguishes the right to invoke self-defense, central to the Court's rejection of the appellant's defense.

• "Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot be merely supposed." — This states the rule that treachery must be proven from the inception of the attack and cannot be presumed, which led to the reduction of the conviction from murder to homicide.

• People vs. Albao, 327 SCRA 123 (2000) — Cited for the proposition that treachery cannot be appreciated where the accused made no preparation to kill the deceased in a manner insuring commission of the crime or making it impossible or hard for the attacked person to defend himself or retaliate. The Court applied this reasoning to the present case.
• People vs. Mahinay, 304 SCRA 767 (1999) — Cited for the definition of treachery and its two concurrence conditions. Followed as the controlling formulation of the elements of treachery.
• People vs. Galit, 230 SCRA 486 (1994) — Cited for the definition of unlawful aggression as requiring actual or imminent danger, not merely imaginary or threatening attitude. Followed in rejecting the appellant's claim of self-defense.
• People vs. Agapinay, 186 SCRA 812 (1990) — Cited for the doctrine that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or wound the former aggressor, and that retaliation is not a justifying circumstance. Followed as controlling.
• People vs. Camacho, 359 SCRA 200 (2001) — Cited for the rule that when the accused interposes self-defense, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Followed.

• Article 11, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Defines self-defense as a justifying circumstance, requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. Applied to evaluate and reject the appellant's claim of self-defense.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery (alevosia) as a qualifying circumstance. Applied to determine whether the killing qualified as murder; the Court found the provision inapplicable for failure to prove deliberate adoption of a treacherous mode of attack.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes homicide with reclusion temporal. Applied as the proper basis for conviction after treachery was not appreciated, resulting in the modification from murder to homicide.

Puno (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concurred.