People vs. Caimbre

A person cannot be held liable as a principal by inducement unless the inducement was the determining cause of the crime and was made with the direct intention of procuring its commission. Where the principal actor had already commenced the attack and was pursuing the victim of his own volition, a contemporaneous exhortation cannot be considered the determining cause of the killing, absent proof of the inducer's motive or moral influence over the actor.

Demetrio Caimbre and Vicente Caimbre were brothers. The victim, Angel Olimpo, and a companion, Fausto Broa, arrived at the house of Esteban Caimbre at Sitio Cabaluran, Dagami, Leyte, on the evening of May 4, 1956. The appellant Edilberto Justimbaste was present at the scene, though his precise relationship to the Caimbre brothers or to the victim is not disclosed in the decision. The case was tried under the Revised Penal Code's provisions on principals by inducement.

On the evening of May 4, 1956, at about ten o'clock, Angel Olimpo and Fausto Broa arrived at the house of Esteban Caimbre at Sitio Cabaluran, Dagami, Leyte, and sat on a mortar. Shortly thereafter, Demetrio Caimbre arrived, sat on the same mortar, and then, without any provocation, slashed Angel Olimpo with a bolo. Olimpo ran toward a nearby palay seed bed, pursued by Demetrio up to the border of the ricefield, where he was overtaken and slashed again several times. During the pursuit, appellant Edilberto Justimbaste told Demetrio: "You had better killed him."

Upon the suggestion of Fausto Broa, the wounded victim was removed from the ricefield and taken to higher ground. When Vicente Caimbre noticed that Olimpo was still alive, he told his brother Demetrio: "Finish him, finish him." Obeying this urging, Demetrio cut Olimpo's neck, saying: "He would be lucky if he could still survive."

The three accused — Edilberto Justimbaste, Demetrio Caimbre, and Vicente Caimbre — were charged with murder in the Court of First Instance of Leyte. Demetrio pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide and was sentenced accordingly. After trial on a plea of not guilty, Justimbaste and Vicente Caimbre were convicted as co-principals by inducement of murder, each sentenced to life imprisonment and ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased in the amount of ₱6,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay proportionate costs. Only Justimbaste appealed.

• Liability as Principal by Inducement: Whether the appellant's utterance "You had better killed him" constituted inducement sufficient to make him a co-principal by inducement in the crime of murder.

• Liability as Principal by Inducement: No. The alleged inducement was not the determining cause of the crime, as the principal actor had already commenced his attack and was pursuing the victim of his own independent determination before the utterance was made.

• Liability as Principal by Inducement: Two considerations drove the acquittal. First, the determining causes of the crime were Demetrio Caimbre's own determination to kill and his brother Vicente's subsequent inducement ("Finish him, finish him"), not the appellant's alleged utterance. Demetrio had already boloed the victim several times without provocation and was pursuing him when appellant spoke; he then overtook the victim and slashed him anew, but left him prostrate in the ricefield. It was only later, when the victim was moved to higher ground and Vicente noticed he was still alive, that Vicente urged Demetrio to finish him off, whereupon Demetrio severed the victim's neck. The Court noted that it did not affirmatively appear that the wounds inflicted before the decapitation were necessarily mortal. Second, for utterances to constitute inducement sufficient to make a person a co-principal by inducement, it must be shown that the inducement was of such nature and made in such a way as to become the determining cause of the crime, and that it was offered with the intention of producing the result. In this case, there was no evidence that appellant had any reason to have Angel Olimpo killed. Even before the alleged utterance, Demetrio had already attacked the victim multiple times and was pursuing him — obviously needing no exhortation to persuade him to kill. Additionally, there was no evidence that appellant had sufficient moral influence over Demetrio to make the latter obey him blindly. All doubts being resolved in favor of the accused, the acquittal followed.

• Principals by Inducement (Article 17, Revised Penal Code) — A person is a principal by inducement when, among other circumstances, they directly force or induce another to commit a crime. For utterances to constitute inducement sufficient to establish liability as a co-principal by inducement, two requisites must concur: (1) the inducement must be of such nature and made in such a way as to become the determining cause of the crime, and (2) the inducement must be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime. The Court applied this test and found neither requisite satisfied: Demetrio had already commenced his attack and was pursuing the victim of his own volition, so the appellant's words could not have been the determining cause; and there was no evidence of the appellant's motive to have the victim killed or of any moral ascendancy over the principal actor.

• Pro Veritate Re Concessa / Reasonable Doubt — In a criminal case, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. The Court applied this principle as an independent ground for acquittal, noting that the evidence did not affirmatively establish that the wounds inflicted before the decapitation were necessarily mortal, and that nothing linked the appellant's utterance to the fatal act.

• "in determining the acts or utterances of an accused are sufficient to make him guilty as co-principal by inducement, it must be shown that the inducement was of such a nature and made in such a way as to become the determining cause of the crime, and that such inducement was offered precisely with the intention of producing the result." — This passage articulates the two-part test for liability as a principal by inducement: the inducement must be the determining cause of the crime and must be made with the intention of procuring its commission.

• "Obviously he needed no exhortation from appellant to persuade him to kill his victim. To this we must add the circumstance that there is no evidence to show that appellant had sufficient moral influence over Demetrio Caimbre as to make the latter obey him blindly." — This passage explains why the alleged inducement failed to meet the determining-cause standard: the principal actor's independent determination to kill and the absence of any proven moral influence by the appellant negated the causal link.

• Article 17, Revised Penal Code — Defines principals, including principals by inducement, who are those who directly force or induce another to commit a crime. The provision was applied through the Court's articulation of the test requiring that the inducement be the determining cause of the crime and be made with the intention of producing the result.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Paredes, JJ., concurred.