People vs. Cagas

Self-defense is unavailable where the accused fails to clearly and convincingly prove unlawful aggression by the victim, and treachery qualifies a killing to murder when the offender, after feigning amity, suddenly stabs a seated victim who has no opportunity to defend or retaliate.

Larry Cagas was charged with the murder of Venecio Elicano under an Information filed on December 18, 1995 before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30. The alleged killing occurred on November 2, 1995 — All Souls Day — at the public cemetery of Bacuag, Surigao del Norte. Cagas was arraigned on June 6, 1996 and entered a plea of not guilty. The case was tried on the merits, with the prosecution presenting eyewitness testimony and the defense interposing self-defense.

Around 2:00 p.m. on November 2, 1995, All Souls Day, Venecio Elicano and his friend Alejandro Jamero, Jr. were seated on a bench at a store near the entrance of the public cemetery of Bacuag, Surigao del Norte. According to the prosecution, appellant Larry Cagas, who was then drunk, approached the victim together with Cocoy Ibarra and two others, told the victim that they were cousins, and after the victim responded and the two shook hands, appellant suddenly stabbed the victim three times with a Batangas knife. The victim was immediately brought to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.

For his part, appellant interposed self-defense. He testified that upon reaching the store to buy an additional candle and cigarette, the victim asked his name and where he was from. Upon learning that appellant came from Barangay Pungtod, the victim suddenly grabbed him by the collar while the victim's companions stood up. Appellant told the victim that they were still relatives, even if they were not, but the victim boxed him twice, and he was able to lean on the table. When the victim boxed him again, appellant, fearing that the victim's two other companions might attack him, grabbed a Batangas knife lying on the table and stabbed the victim three times. He then went to the police. When asked at the witness stand whether he submitted himself for medical examination given his claim of having been boxed several times, appellant answered in the negative, explaining that he was afraid because he was almost shot by a policeman who happened to be a relative of the victim.

The post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Manolo Tan, Municipal Health Officer, showed that the victim suffered four wounds: a clean-cut wound 6 cm in length and 7 cm in depth one centimeter above the suprasternal notch; an open wound 2 cm in length, 4 cm lateral to the midsternal line at the level of the right nipple, directed upward, 4 cm in depth; an open wound 2 cm in length, 3 cm lateral to the right nipple, directed upward, 3 cm in depth; and an open wound 2 cm in length at the lateral distal third of the right arm with a point of exit at the medial distal third of the right arm. Defense witness Tanny Bayang claimed to have seen appellant being boxed by a man he did not know, but did not identify the victim as the assailant. Another defense witness, Pablo Placeros, initially testified that the victim was doing "nothing at all" at the cemetery, but later stated that the victim boxed appellant once, hitting him on the chest, after which appellant staggered and backed away; Placeros then ran away because a commotion ensued. A third defense witness, Max Manliguis, testified only that he saw appellant surrender the knife to SPO2 Tadifa and admitted having no personal knowledge of the stabbing.

The trial court found the self-defense claim devoid of probative value, noting the lack of corroboration from defense witnesses and the absence of any evidence of physical injuries sustained by appellant despite his claim of having been hit on the breast, right arm, and left lower cheek. The trial court convicted appellant of murder, imposed reclusion perpetua, and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, there being no aggravating circumstance to offset it.

• Self-Defense: Appellant argued that the three requisites of self-defense were present, asserting that the defense witnesses' testimonies showed the victim initially boxed him in the presence of companions who positioned themselves in a threatening manner, making it reasonable for him to feel his life was in danger.
• Reasonableness of Means Employed: Appellant maintained that as he was pushed against the table, he had no other recourse but to use the knife lying thereon, which was reasonable under the circumstances given that the victim was in the company of several others.
• Absence of Treachery: Appellant argued that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution having failed to show that he consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the victim's death without risk to himself. He characterized the stabbing as a spur-of-the-moment act ignited by the instinct of self-preservation, noting that the victim's best friend could have gone to his aid at any time and that he could have chosen another time and place had he wished to insure no risk.

• Self-Defense: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting appellant's claim of self-defense.
• Treachery: Whether the trial court erred in convicting appellant of murder when the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Self-Defense: No. Appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving self-defense clearly and convincingly, the defense witnesses being inconsistent and uncorroborated and the nature and number of wounds indicating a determined effort to kill.
• Treachery: No. Treachery attended the killing because appellant feigned amity by introducing himself as a relative and shaking hands with the victim, then suddenly stabbed the seated victim, who had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.

• Self-Defense: When an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove it clearly and convincingly; he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's. Appellant failed to discharge this burden. Defense witness Bayang claimed to have seen someone box appellant but did not identify the victim as the assailant. Defense witness Placeros gave inconsistent testimony — initially stating the victim was doing "nothing at all," then claiming the victim boxed appellant once, after which Placeros ran away without seeing what happened next. No evidence of physical injuries on appellant was adduced despite his claim of having been hit on the breast, right arm, and left lower cheek; his explanation that he feared being shot by a policeman was deemed more imaginary than real, as he was under preventive detention for over a week without being harmed and never filed charges against the policeman. Moreover, the nature and number of wounds inflicted — three successive stab wounds on vital spots (neck and chest) — negated self-defense and indicated a determined effort to kill rather than merely defend.

• Treachery: Treachery requires two elements: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (b) the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means. Both elements were present. Appellant introduced himself to the victim as a cousin and shook hands with him, thereby lulling the victim into a false sense of security; the victim would not have imagined that appellant would harm him. The attack was sudden and unexpected, delivered while the victim was seated and thus more helpless and vulnerable. The risk contemplated by the treachery doctrine pertains to any defense the victim himself might make, not to actions that others might take to aid the victim. The victim was caught off guard and clueless as to the fatal attack, satisfying both elements of treachery.

• Burden of Evidence in Self-Defense — When an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove it clearly and convincingly. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's; failing which, the prosecution's evidence can no longer be disbelieved and the accused can no longer be exonerated. The Court applied this doctrine to reject appellant's claim, as his defense witnesses were inconsistent and uncorroborated and no evidence of physical injuries on his person was presented.

• Elements of Treachery — Treachery requires two concurrence elements: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. The Court found both present where appellant feigned amity by introducing himself as a relative and shaking hands with the victim, then suddenly stabbed the seated victim who had no opportunity to defend himself. The risk element pertains to any defense the victim himself might make, not to actions others might take to aid the victim.

• Requisites of Voluntary Surrender — The requisites are: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; (3) the surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed. For surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities. The Court found the surrender not spontaneous because appellant ran to the upper portion of the cemetery where PO2 Tadifa caught up with him, leaving him no choice but to surrender.

• Nature and Number of Wounds Negate Self-Defense — The infliction of multiple successive stab wounds, especially on vital spots of the body, negates a claim of self-defense and indicates a determined effort to kill rather than merely defend oneself. Three stab wounds on the neck and chest were held to disprove appellant's pretension of self-defense.

• "When an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove it clearly and convincingly. He must rely on its strength and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution, failing which the evidence for the prosecution can no longer be disbelieved and the accused can no longer be exonerated." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on the burden of proof in self-defense claims, frequently cited in Philippine criminal law jurisprudence.

• "Infliction of three successive stab wounds, especially on vital spots of the body, negates appellant's pretensions of self-defense and, in fact, indicates a determined effort on his part to kill and not just defend himself." — This passage articulates the principle that the nature, number, and location of wounds are indicative of intent to kill rather than self-preservation, a recurring evidentiary standard in self-defense cases.

• "The risk pertains to any defense of the victim himself and does not refer to any action that might be taken by other people that might aid the victim." — This passage clarifies the scope of the "risk" element in treachery, distinguishing the victim's own capacity for defense from potential aid by third parties.

• People vs. Marcelo, G.R. No. 140385, April 14, 2004 — Cited for the doctrine that the burden of evidence shifts to the accused invoking self-defense.
• People vs. Damitan, 371 SCRA 629 (2001) — Cited for the proposition that the nature and number of wounds disprove self-defense.
• People vs. Herrera, 371 SCRA 480 (2001) — Cited for the principle that successive stab wounds on vital spots indicate a determined effort to kill.
• People vs. Berdin, G.R. No. 137598, November 28, 2003 — Cited for the definition and elements of treachery.
• People vs. Taraya, 344 SCRA 401 (2000) — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• People vs. Demate, G.R. Nos. 132310 & 143968-69, January 20, 2004 — Cited for the rule that exemplary damages may be awarded when the crime is committed with aggravating circumstances, construed in the generic sense under Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. No. 7659) — Defines murder and prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when committed with treachery, among other attendant circumstances. Applied to qualify the killing as murder and to determine the range of penalties.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides rules for the application of indivisible penalties. Applied to impose the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance that could lower the penalty further.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Allows the award of exemplary damages as part of civil liability when a crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Applied to award ₱25,000.00 in exemplary damages, construing "aggravating circumstance" in its generic sense to include qualifying circumstances such as treachery.

Vitug, J. (on official leave), Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., and Corona, J., concurred.