People vs. Cadorna

The killing of a child of tender years is deemed ipso facto qualified by taking advantage of superior strength, even without direct evidence of the manner of assault, because the weakness of the minor victim due to tender age results in the absence of any danger or risk to the adult assailant. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction when the circumstances established form an unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

The case involves the prosecution of Ferdinand Cadorna y Decembriano alias "Maco" for the killing of AAA, a 9-year-old child, in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610, the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. The victim's identity was withheld pursuant to RA 7610, RA 9262, and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC. The case arose from an incident on March 19, 2011, in a municipality in the Philippines, where AAA was found dead with a rope tied around his neck.

Ferdinand Cadorna y Decembriano alias "Maco" was charged with murder in relation to Section 10 of RA 7610 for the killing of AAA, a 9-year-old child. The Information alleged that on or about March 19, 2011, Cadorna, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength, attacked and strangled AAA, who was alone in their house, causing death by asphyxia, with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

The prosecution presented BBB, the father of the victim, who testified that Cadorna and his wife Judith confronted him asking for his children because the spouses suspected that his children had something to do with the loss of their hammer. At around 4:00 p.m. of March 19, 2011, BBB went out of their house to look for his children and proceeded to the seashore where he saw his two sons playing. He instructed one of them to get money from his aunt, while he told AAA to go home and fetch water for cooking rice. When AAA left to go home, BBB remained at the seashore to buy fish.

Salvador Bael testified that at almost the same time, while transferring his carabao, he passed by the house of BBB and saw Cadorna rushing out of the said house. Bael went to the rear part of BBB's house and peeped inside where he saw AAA with a rope tied around his neck. Bael shouted for help, but nobody responded, so he went inside the house and started to untie the rope. After untying the rope, Bael noticed that AAA was already dead and had defecated in his pants. BBB, corroborating Bael's testimony, testified that he saw Cadorna exiting from the fence of his house with his head down. Immediately thereafter, BBB heard shouts for help coming from his house, rushed there, and saw Bael untying the rope wrapped around AAA's neck. BBB and Bael tried to revive AAA but to no avail.

AAA was brought to a hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Dr. Manuel S. Pastor, the physician who examined AAA, declared that the latter died of asphyxia due to pressure or strangulation. Dr. Pastor found multiple confluent abrasions in AAA's anterior neck area, consistent with abrasions caused by strangulation with a hammock rope, and concluded that the injury was caused by another person because it was impossible for AAA to have inflicted the injury himself. CCC, AAA's classmate, testified that a few days after the killing, Cadorna approached him and his brother while they were catching birds, pinched his left ear, and told him that being pinched is better than being dead like AAA.

Cadorna did not testify during the trial. Instead, the defense presented Judith and Erlinda Lagando. Judith testified that she was with Cadorna on March 19, 2011, and that at around 3:35 p.m., Cadorna left to transfer his carabao to pasture in another location, which takes about 30 minutes by hiking. At around 4:00 p.m., Judith went home, and Cadorna arrived at 5:15 p.m. At 5:30 p.m., Judith received information that AAA was dead. Judith claimed that their pigpen was just 25 meters away from AAA's house and that there was no misunderstanding or quarrel between her family and the family of BBB. Erlinda corroborated Judith's testimony that Cadorna was at the creek tying the rope of his carabao at around 4:00 p.m., and that Cadorna even accompanied her to bring rice to her mother, with the two parting ways only at around 5:15 p.m.

N/A — The decision does not recount the specific arguments raised by the accused-appellant in his appeal beyond the general assertion of appeal from the CA ruling.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the arguments of the plaintiff-appellee beyond the prosecution's evidence presented during trial.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish Cadorna's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the killing of AAA.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Superior Strength: Whether the killing of AAA was qualified by the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength, thereby raising the crime from homicide to murder.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. The circumstantial evidence formed an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that Cadorna, to the exclusion of all others, was the person responsible for the killing of AAA, satisfying the requisites for conviction based on circumstantial evidence under People vs. Pentecostes.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Superior Strength: Yes. The killing of a child of tender years is deemed ipso facto qualified by taking advantage of superior strength, given the notorious inequality in physical strength between the adult accused and the 9-year-old victim, who was presumed weak and inherently defenseless.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: The Court applied the rule that direct evidence is not indispensable to criminal prosecutions, as most crimes are committed in seclusion. Citing People vs. Pentecostes, the Court enumerated the requisites for conviction based on circumstantial evidence: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court enumerated the circumstances established by the prosecution: (a) Cadorna and Judith confronted BBB looking for his sons because they allegedly took their hammer; (b) Bael saw Cadorna rushing out of BBB's house; (c) Bael saw AAA with a rope tied on his neck; (d) BBB saw Cadorna exiting from the fence of BBB's house; (e) BBB heard Bael's cry for help; (f) BBB saw Bael untying the rope from AAA's neck; (g) Dr. Pastor found that AAA died of asphyxia; and (h) CCC was confronted and pinched by Cadorna who told him that being pinched is better than being dead like AAA. The Court noted that Cadorna was positively identified by both BBB and Bael as the person last seen at or near the place where AAA's dead body was discovered, and that Cadorna's failure to testify in his own behalf, despite being the only person who could make a positive and categorical statement of his whereabouts, meant there was strictly no evidence of alibi for the defense witnesses to corroborate.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Superior Strength: The Court held that conviction for murder requires: (a) that a person is killed; (b) that the accused killed that person; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC, one of which is taking advantage of superior strength; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. The Court disagreed with the RTC's refusal to appreciate the qualifying circumstance for lack of direct evidence. Citing People vs. Haloc, the Court explained that the killing of or assault against a child by an adult assailant is always treated as treacherous because the weakness of the minor victim due to tender years results in the absence of any danger or risk to the adult assailant. The Court found no reason not to apply the same principle to taking advantage of superior strength. Citing People vs. Loreto, the Court held that abuse of superior strength depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis-à-vis the victim and is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim. The Court ruled that there was a notorious inequality in physical strength between AAA and Cadorna, as AAA was a 9-year-old minor presumed weak and inherently defenseless, while Cadorna was an adult naturally physically stronger. The use of a rope to kill an unarmed child was an obvious indicia that Cadorna had taken advantage of his superior strength.

• Ipso facto qualification by abuse of superior strength in killings of children of tender years — The killing of a child of tender years is deemed ipso facto qualified by taking advantage of superior strength, even if the treacherous manner of the assault is not shown, because the weakness of the minor victim due to tender years results in the absence of any danger or risk to the adult assailant. The minor victim cannot be expected to put up any form of effective resistance because of tender age, relatively small frame, and inexperience in combat, and a deadly attack against a minor is easier to execute as the minor can offer little, if any, resistance.

• Circumstantial evidence as basis for conviction — An accused may be convicted when the circumstances established form an unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion and pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The requisites are: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

• Abuse of superior strength — Abuse of superior strength depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis-à-vis the victim and is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim, considering the position of both and the employment of means to weaken the defense. It is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. The appreciation depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.

• Accused's failure to testify — Although the accused's silence and refusal to testify cannot be construed as evidence of guilt, the fact that an accused never testified in his defense even in the face of accusations against him goes against the principle that the first impulse of an innocent man when accused of wrongdoing is to express his innocence at the first opportune time. Where the accused himself, the only person who could make a positive and categorical statement of his whereabouts at the time of the commission of the crime, did not testify, there is strictly speaking no evidence of alibi which the defense witnesses could corroborate.

• "The killing of or assault against a child by an adult assailant is always treated as treacherous, even if the treacherous manner of the assault is not shown. Indeed, the weakness of the minor victim because of his tender years results in the absence of any danger or risk to the adult assailant. The rationale for such treatment is easy to discern - the minor victim cannot be expected to put up any form of effective resistance because of his tender age, relatively small frame, and inexperience in combat. Moreover, a deadly attack against a minor is easier to execute inasmuch as the minor can offer little, if any, resistance, thereby posing no peril to the attacker." — This passage from People vs. Haloc, quoted by the Court, articulates the rationale for treating the killing of a child of tender years as always qualified, which the Court extended to the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.

• "Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime." — This definition from People vs. Reyes, cited by the Court, establishes the standard for appreciating abuse of superior strength, which was applied to the facts of the case.

• "Although [the accused's] silence and refusal to testify, let alone refusal to present evidence, cannot be construed as evidence of guilt, we have consistently held that the fact that an accused never testified in his defense even in the face of accusations against him goes against the principle that 'the first impulse of an innocent man when accused of wrongdoing is to express his innocence at the first opportune time.'" — This passage from People vs. Beriber, quoted by the Court, explains the significance of the accused's failure to testify in the face of positive identification.

• People vs. Pentecostes, 820 Phil. 823 (2017) — Controlling precedent establishing the requisites for conviction based on circumstantial evidence, which the Court applied to find the circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict Cadorna.
• People vs. Haloc, 839 Phil. 1042 (2018) — Followed for the principle that the killing of a child of tender years is always treated as treacherous, which the Court extended to the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.
• People vs. Loreto, 446 Phil. 592 (2003) — Followed for the definition of abuse of superior strength, which depends on the relative strength of the aggressor vis-à-vis the victim, and for the holding that the crime was raised to murder where the accused stabbed a young wisp of a girl.
• People vs. Molas, 291-A Phil. 516 (1993) — Followed as a case where the Court convicted the accused of murder qualified by taking advantage of superior strength for stabbing to death an 8-year-old boy.
• People vs. Gatcho, 190 Phil. 914 (1981) — Followed as a case where the Court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength considering the victim was an innocent and tender baby barely six months old.
• People vs. Beriber, 693 Phil. 629 (2012) — Cited for the principle regarding the accused's failure to testify in his own defense.
• People vs. Lucas, 260 Phil. 334 (1990) — Cited for the principle that where the accused himself did not testify, there is strictly speaking no evidence of alibi for defense witnesses to corroborate.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Cited for the award of damages in cases involving the killing of a child and for the penalty of reclusion perpetua due to RA 9346.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of murder and its qualifying circumstances, including taking advantage of superior strength. The Court applied this provision in convicting Cadorna of murder.
• Section 10, Republic Act No. 7610 — Provides the penalty for murder when the victim is below 12 years old, which shall be reclusion perpetua. The Court noted this provision as the basis for the penalty.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — Increased the penalty for murder to reclusion perpetua to death without qualification as to the age of the offended party. The Court noted this amendment to the penalty structure.
• Republic Act No. 9346 — Prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, resulting in the penalty of reclusion perpetua being imposed. The Court applied this in sentencing Cadorna.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concurred.

N/A — The decision does not mention any dissenting opinion.