People vs. Cachola

Mere presence in a vehicle with the perpetrators, intercepted nearly two hours after the commission of the crime, does not constitute the community of design or the performance of previous or simultaneous acts required to hold a person liable as an accomplice, and absent any evidence linking such persons to the criminal design, their acquittal is warranted notwithstanding their proximity to the principals at the time of arrest.

On 28 December 1999, four members of the Barnachea and Lolarga families were killed inside a residence in Barangay Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union. Eight individuals — Dominador Cachola, Ernesto Amay, Nestor Marquez, Benjamin Laegen, Rodolfo Sagun, Rodemir Guerzo, Mellke Ignacio, and Nelson Echabaria — were charged with four counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67. The informations alleged the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. The case reached the Supreme Court on automatic review, the trial court having imposed the death penalty.

At around 6:00 p.m. of 28 December 1999, 12-year-old Jessie Barnachea was about to leave his house in Barangay Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union, to watch cartoons at his uncle's house next door, when two armed men suddenly entered through the front door. The men ordered Jessie to drop to the floor and struck him on the back with the butt of a long gun. Without further ado, they shot and killed Jessie's uncle, Victorino V. Lolarga, who was in the living room. Jessie crawled and hid under a bed, from where he saw the feet of a third man who had also entered. The men proceeded to the kitchen and continued shooting. When the rampage ended and the malefactors had departed, Jessie emerged and found his mother Carmelita Barnachea, his brother Felix Barnachea, Jr., and his cousin Rubenson Abance — all dead.

Jessie's eldest brother, Robert, was at their uncle's house watching television when he sensed a commotion outside. Upon stepping out, he saw armed men running toward the Barnachea residence. One turned and pointed a gun at him, prompting Robert to flee and hide behind his uncle's house. From his vantage point, Robert observed a stainless jeep with blue rims and the marking "fruits and vegetables dealer" parked in front of the fence. Three armed men wearing bonnets — with only their noses and eyes exposed — stood behind the jeep. Robert then heard gunshots and saw men running from the house; they boarded the jeep and sped away.

Neighbors also noticed the jeep. Russel Tamba, standing about 100 meters from the Barnachea residence near Roda's Store, saw the jeep pass slowly toward the residence and noted it bore the marking "El Shaddai" in front, in addition to "fruits and vegetables dealer" on the sides. Francisco Andrada, five meters from Roda's Store near the Calumbaya Barangay Hall, likewise observed the jeep with the "El Shaddai" marking pass by. Shortly after, both heard gunshots and then saw the jeep pass again, this time at high speed.

The incident was immediately reported to the police, and the description of the "El Shaddai" jeep was relayed through radio to police stations across La Union. At around 7:45 p.m., the jeep was intercepted at a checkpoint set up by the Aringay police force. All eight appellants were on board; no firearms were recovered. The jeep and the appellants were brought to the Aringay police station and then turned over to the Bauang police. When Bauang Chief of Police Benjamin M. Lusad learned of the apprehension, he proceeded to the Barnachea residence, where he discovered that Jessie was an eyewitness. Lusad invited Jessie to ride with him to identify the suspects. While Lusad supervised the boarding of the suspects into a vehicle, Jessie — positioned in another police car with PO3 Juan Casern, Jr. — pointed to Dominador Cachola and Ernesto Amay as the two armed men who entered his house and killed his relatives. Jessie again identified Cachola and Amay during a police line-up at the Bauang Police Station, and the following day identified them a third time from photographs. A paraffin test was conducted on all eight appellants; only the right hands of Cachola and Amay yielded positive results for gunpowder nitrates.

The death certificates reflected the severity of the attack. Carmelita sustained one gunshot wound to the head and three to the body. Felix, Jr. suffered two gunshot wounds to the head and body and stab wounds to the chest and arms. Victorino sustained two gunshot wounds to the head, three to the body, and had his penis excised. Rubenson suffered one gunshot wound to the head and a stab wound that lacerated his liver. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense counsels orally sought leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence, which the trial court denied outright, setting the schedule for the defense's evidence. Instead of presenting evidence, the appellants filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court. The trial court rendered its decision on 26 September 2000, convicting Cachola and Amay as principals of four counts of murder and sentencing them to death in each count, and convicting the remaining six as accomplices with an indeterminate penalty.

• Conspiracy: Appellants Cachola, Sagun, Ignacio, and Marquez contended that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy among them and their co-appellants.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Appellants Cachola, Sagun, Ignacio, and Marquez argued that the trial court erred in finding proof beyond reasonable doubt of their guilt.
• Illegal Arrest and Due Process: Appellants Cachola, Sagun, Ignacio, and Marquez asserted that the trial court erred in not dismissing the informations outright despite a motion before arraignment, there having been a clear illegal arrest and denial of due process.
• Amay's Guilt as Principal: Appellants Amay, Guerzo, Laegen, and Echabaria asserted that the trial court erred in finding Amay guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of murder.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Appellants Amay, Guerzo, Laegen, and Echabaria argued that the trial court erred in not acquitting Guerzo, Laegen, and Echabaria for insufficiency of evidence and on reasonable doubt.

• Accomplice Liability: Whether the six co-accused — Marquez, Laegen, Sagun, Guerzo, Ignacio, and Echabaria — could be held liable as accomplices based on their presence in the jeep with Cachola and Amay when intercepted nearly two hours after the killings.
• Sufficiency of Evidence Against Principals: Whether the prosecution established the guilt of Cachola and Amay beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the four counts of murder.
• Credibility of Eyewitness: Whether the testimony and identification by 12-year-old Jessie Barnachea was credible and sufficient to sustain conviction, notwithstanding alleged inconsistencies and the claim that the malefactors wore bonnets.
• Demurrer to Evidence Without Leave of Court: Whether the trial court erred in not allowing the appellants to present evidence after they filed a demurrer to evidence without prior leave of court.
• Legality of Arrest: Whether the question of illegal warrantless arrest could be raised for the first time on automatic review before the Supreme Court.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Whether treachery, evident premeditation, ignominy, and dwelling were properly appreciated in qualifying the killings as murder and in determining the proper penalty.

• Accomplice Liability: No. The six co-accused were acquitted, neither community of design nor previous or simultaneous acts having been proved; their mere presence in the jeep with the principals two hours after the killings did not establish accomplice liability.
• Sufficiency of Evidence Against Principals: Yes. The credible testimony and positive identification by Jessie Barnachea, corroborated by positive paraffin test results on the right hands of Cachola and Amay, constituted sufficient evidence to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Credibility of Eyewitness: Yes. The trial court's assessment of Jessie's credibility was upheld, the alleged inconsistencies being minor and not detracting from his unwavering identification of Cachola and Amay, and no ill motive having been imputed to him.
• Demurrer to Evidence Without Leave of Court: No. Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, filing a demurrer to evidence without express leave of court constitutes a waiver of the right to present evidence.
• Legality of Arrest: No. The question of illegal arrest should have been raised before arraignment; entering a plea constituted a waiver of the right to question the arrest.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery was appreciated as a qualifying circumstance; evident premeditation was not; ignominy was not appreciated because the victim was already dead when dismembered; dwelling was appreciated as an aggravating circumstance for the killings of Carmelita and Felix, Jr.

• Accomplice Liability: To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (1) community of design, meaning the accomplice knows of and concurs with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. Neither element was proved. No prosecution witness identified any of the six co-accused as among the malefactors at the Barnachea residence. The only basis for implicating them was their presence with Cachola and Amay on board the jeep intercepted in Aringay nearly two hours after the killings. Mere company of the principals, without any evidence of knowledge of or assent to the criminal design, does not constitute community of design. Nor does presence in a vehicle two hours after the crime constitute a previous or simultaneous act. Absent any link between the crime and their presence in the jeep, they could not even be held liable as accessories. The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, acquittal was warranted.

• Sufficiency of Evidence Against Principals: The prosecution presented the credible testimony and positive identification of Jessie Barnachea, who witnessed the killings from inside the house. The trial court observed his demeanor on the witness stand and found no indication of falsehood, noting his readiness to answer questions, consistency on cross-examination, and spontaneous recital of events. This testimony was corroborated by forensic evidence: the paraffin tests conducted on the same night of the shooting yielded positive results for gunpowder nitrates on the right hands of Cachola and Amay. While the presence of nitrates is not conclusive of guilt, it bolsters the eyewitness testimony that the accused fired a gun. The appellants' reliance on People vs. Teehankee was misplaced, as in that case the paraffin test was conducted more than 72 hours after the shooting, whereas here it was conducted within hours, increasing its reliability.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: The alleged inconsistencies in Jessie's testimony were minor and did not detract from his credibility. The discrepancy regarding the number of malefactors was explained by the fact that the third man followed the first two and Jessie did not see his face. The claim that Jessie's identification contradicted Robert's testimony that the men wore bonnets was resolved by the fact that the brothers saw different men, and Robert himself stated that one of the men did not have his head covered. The improbability of lookouts wearing bonnets while the shooters were unmasked, or of the malefactors sparing Jessie, was not so incredible as to cast reasonable doubt. Jessie identified Cachola and Amay barely two hours after the killings, with the memory of their faces still fresh, and repeated the identification at the police station and in open court without faltering. No ill motive was imputed to Jessie for testifying, rendering his testimony trustworthy and entitled to full faith and credit.

• Demurrer to Evidence Without Leave of Court: Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that when the accused files a motion to dismiss (demurrer to evidence) without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the prosecution's evidence. The trial court had denied the oral motion for leave outright, yet the appellants proceeded to file the demurrer anyway. The waiver was clear: the trial court postponed hearings on the demurrer and granted extensions, but at no time prior to the automatic review did the appellants attempt to retract the waiver. To allow them to belatedly claim denial of due process would permit them to wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints dictated by convenience.

• Legality of Arrest: The legality of a warrantless arrest pertains to the trial court's jurisdiction over the person of the accused and must be raised before arraignment. The appellants' claim that they objected to the arrests prior to arraignment was unsubstantiated. Their assertion that they requested an extension of time to file a motion to quash, which the trial court allegedly denied, could not save their position, as no such motion was in fact filed before arraignment. Even assuming the arrest was illegal, the appellants' act of entering a plea during arraignment constituted a waiver of the right to question the arrest.

• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery was present because the assailants suddenly barged in and immediately went on a shooting rampage; a sudden and unexpected attack constitutes treachery, and this single qualifying circumstance suffices to qualify the killing as murder. Evident premeditation was absent because there was no evidence of planning or preparation to kill, much less of the time when the plot was conceived. Ignominy was not appreciated regarding the excision of Victorino's penis, because the information stated the sexual organ was severed after he was shot, and there was no allegation that it was done to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act; where the victim was already dead when dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the accused. Dwelling was appreciated as an aggravating circumstance for the killings of Carmelita and Felix, Jr., as it was alleged in the information and proved during trial that they were killed inside their house, and the appellants violated the sanctity of the victims' home. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death; under Article 63, when the law prescribes two indivisible penalties and one aggravating circumstance is present with no mitigating circumstance, the greater penalty of death shall be imposed. Accordingly, death was imposed for the murders of Carmelita and Felix, Jr., and reclusion perpetua for the murders of Victorino and Rubenson, where no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was present.

• Accomplice Liability — Requisites — Two elements must concur to hold a person liable as an accomplice: (1) community of design, meaning the accomplice knows of and concurs with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. The Court applied this test to the six co-accused and found that neither element was satisfied, as their mere presence in a vehicle with the principals two hours after the crime did not establish knowledge of or assent to the criminal design, nor did it constitute a previous or simultaneous act.

• Demurrer to Evidence Without Leave of Court — Waiver — Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, when the accused files a demurrer to evidence without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the prosecution's evidence. The Court held that the appellants' filing of the demurrer without prior leave constituted a clear waiver, and they could not belatedly claim denial of due process.

• Waiver of Right to Question Illegal Arrest — An objection to the legality of a warrantless arrest must be raised before arraignment; entering a plea during arraignment constitutes a waiver of the right to question the arrest. The Court held that the appellants could not raise the illegality of their arrest for the first time on automatic review.

• Credibility of Eyewitness — No Ill Motive — Where there is no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the testimony is trustworthy and should be accorded full faith and credit. The Court applied this principle to uphold Jessie Barnachea's identification of Cachola and Amay.

• Treachery — Sudden and Unexpected Attack — When the attack is sudden and unexpected, there is treachery. The presence of even this single qualifying circumstance is sufficient to qualify the killing to murder.

• Ignominy — Victim Already Dead — For ignominy to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the offense must be committed in a manner that tends to make its effect more humiliating, adding to the victim's moral suffering. Where the victim was already dead when his body or a part thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the accused.

• "The mere presence of the six appellants in the company of appellants Cachola and Amay on board a jeep is not evidence of their knowledge of, or assent to, the criminal design to perpetuate the massacre." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for the acquittal of the six co-accused, establishing that mere association with principals after the fact does not suffice for accomplice liability.

• "When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution." — This quotation reproduces the controlling rule on demurrer to evidence under Section 15, Rule 119, which the Court applied to reject the appellants' due process claim.

• "Even assuming that their arrest was illegal, their act of entering a plea during their arraignment constituted a waiver of their right to question their arrest." — This passage states the doctrine that pleading to the information waives objections to the legality of arrest, a principle frequently cited in Philippine criminal procedure.

• "Where the victim was already dead when his body or a part thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the accused." — This passage defines the limitation on ignominy as an aggravating circumstance, clarifying that post-mortem mutilation does not aggravate the offense where there is no showing it was intended to humiliate the victim.

• People vs. Teehankee, G.R. Nos. 111206-08, 6 October 1995, 249 SCRA 54 — Distinguished. Appellant Cachola relied on this case to argue that negative paraffin results do not preclude guilt, but the Court distinguished it on the ground that the paraffin test there was conducted more than 72 hours after the shooting, whereas in the present case the test was conducted within hours, increasing its reliability.

• People vs. De Vera, G.R. No. 128966, 18 August 1999, 312 SCRA 640 — Cited as authority for the two-element test of accomplice liability: community of design and performance of previous or simultaneous acts not indispensable to the commission of the crime.

• People vs. Sayaboc, G.R. No. 147201, 15 January 2004 — Cited in support of the proposition that mere presence with the principals does not establish knowledge of or assent to the criminal design.

• People vs. Echegaray, 335 Phil. 343 (1997) — Referenced regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty under Republic Act No. 7659; three members of the Court maintained adherence to separate opinions that the death penalty is unconstitutional but submitted to the majority ruling.

• People vs. Turingan, 347 Phil. 97 (1997) — Cited for the principle that a party cannot wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience, applied to reject the appellants' belated due process claim.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines murder and prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied this provision to qualify the killings as murder, treachery being present, and to determine the range of penalties.

• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be imposed when one aggravating circumstance is present and no mitigating circumstance offsets it. The Court applied this provision to impose the death penalty for the murders of Carmelita and Felix, Jr., where dwelling was appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, and reclusion perpetua for the murders of Victorino and Rubenson, where no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was present.

• Section 15, Rule 119, Rules of Court — Governs demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, providing that filing a demurrer without express leave of court waives the right to present evidence. The Court applied this provision to hold that the appellants waived their right to present a defense.

• Section 4, Rule 129, Rules on Evidence — Cited in connection with the admission by the defense of the P177,000 in actual damages claimed by Felix Barnachea, Sr., sustaining the award despite the absence of official receipts.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concurred. Three members of the Court maintained their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is unconstitutional, but submitted to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.