People vs. Cabuang

A witness's delay in revealing the identity of perpetrators to police authorities, when caused by trauma or shock from a startling occurrence, does not by itself impair the witness's credibility or the probative value of subsequent identification, and positive identification prevails over denial and alibi where the latter are unsupported by corroboration and physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene.

Accused-appellants Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang, together with two unidentified persons designated "John Doe" and "Richard Doe," were charged with the complex crime of robbery with rape and homicide before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. The victim, Maria Victoria Parana, was a 19-year-old student at the Philippine Women's University. The prosecution's principal witness was Evelyn de Vera, the victim's cousin and a barangay mate of both accused, who witnessed the events leading to the victim's abduction.

On the night of 14 October 1988, Evelyn de Vera and her cousin Maria Victoria Parana, both 19 years old, were walking home along an uninhabited stretch of Barangay Buenlag I, Bayambang, Pangasinan, after visiting a common friend. Modesto Cabuang suddenly emerged from the rice paddies with a flashlight and asked where they were going. Evelyn became anxious and walked faster, while Maria Victoria stayed behind talking to Cabuang. When Evelyn was about ten feet ahead, she looked back and saw Cabuang shift his flashlight to illuminate Nardo Matabang, who had appeared behind them from the rice fields. Cabuang then pocketed his flashlight, grabbed Maria Victoria, and covered her mouth. Matabang pursued Evelyn, who ran and hid among plants and shrubs in the yard of a house along the road, where she could observe Matabang but could not be seen. After losing sight of Evelyn, Matabang returned to rejoin Cabuang.

Sometime later, from her hiding place, Evelyn saw a tricycle pass by carrying Maria Victoria, Cabuang, Matabang, the tricycle driver, and another person seated at the back. She heard her cousin crying and pleading for help. After the tricycle passed, Evelyn proceeded to her sister's house, where she was scolded for coming home late. Confused and frightened, she was unable to tell her sister what had happened and attempted without success to sleep in the sala.

The following morning, Maria Victoria was found dead along the road, naked, with stab wounds in various parts of her body including the pubic area. The police investigated and interrogated Evelyn, who was in a state of shock. The initial police blotter entry, made around 11:00 a.m. on 15 October 1988, stated that the assailants were "still unidentified." Later that afternoon, after Evelyn had calmed down, she executed a sworn statement identifying Cabuang and Matabang as the assailants, whom she knew as barangay mates and had seen clearly at close range—Cabuang at about two meters when he emerged from the paddies, and Matabang from her hiding place, the road being illuminated by lights. She subsequently identified them in a police line-up. The tricycle driver and the other passenger remained unknown and at large.

On 17 October 1988, the police found a book and articles of feminine underwear and personal belongings scattered 50 to 100 meters from where the body was first discovered. Evelyn identified these as Maria Victoria's belongings. Examination revealed that P400.00 in cash that Maria Victoria had possessed the night before was missing. Dr. Nario Ferrer conducted an autopsy and found multiple stab wounds, including wounds in the pubic region and between the vagina and anal canal, as well as lacerations and spermatozoa in the vagina, indicating rape and mutilation. Four wounds were identified as mortal, caused by a sharp-edged and pointed object. The cause of death was hypovolemic shock, with death estimated at about six hours before the autopsy.

Cabuang denied involvement and claimed he was at the wake of the daughter of one Ben Juinio in Barangay Buenlag I the entire night of 14 October 1988 until 6:30 the following morning, but offered no corroborating details. Matabang testified that he was at his house in Karanglaan, Dagupan City, with his wife, sister-in-law, and child, and had never left, traveling to Bayambang only the next day. The trial court found Matabang's testimony flawed by discrepancies, inconsistencies, and lack of sufficient corroboration. Neither accused presented independent and reliable corroboration of their claimed whereabouts.

• Credibility of Identification: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in finding that prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera had positively identified Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as the assailants, pointing to the police blotter entry stating that the assailants were "still unidentified" despite being made after Evelyn was questioned by the police.
• Denial and Alibi: Appellants set up the defenses of denial and alibi, Cabuang claiming he was at a wake in the same barangay the entire night, and Matabang claiming he was at home in Dagupan City and had never left.

• Credibility of Identification: Whether the delay in Evelyn de Vera's identification of the accused, as reflected in the police blotter entry stating the assailants were "still unidentified," impaired her credibility and the validity of her positive identification.
• Sufficiency of Alibi and Denial: Whether the defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-appellants were sufficient to overcome the positive identification by the prosecution witness.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt for robbery with rape and homicide.

• Credibility of Identification: No. The delay in Evelyn de Vera's identification did not impair her credibility, the delay being caused by her state of shock and trauma, and settled jurisprudence holding that delay in revealing the identity of offenders does not by itself render testimony unworthy of belief.
• Sufficiency of Alibi and Denial: No. The defenses of alibi and denial cannot prevail over positive identification, the accused having failed to prove physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene or to offer independent corroboration.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. The circumstantial evidence formed an unbroken chain consistent with guilt and inconsistent with every rational hypothesis except guilt, producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt pursuant to Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court.

• Credibility of Identification: The police blotter entry stating the assailants were "still unidentified" was made at around 11:00 a.m. on 15 October 1988, when the police investigator, Pfc. Elegio Lopez, found Evelyn in a state of shock and accordingly deferred further questioning. Evelyn's sworn statement identifying the accused was completed later that afternoon after she had calmed down. The few hours' delay did not erode the intrinsic credibility of her statement. Settled jurisprudence provides that delay in revealing the identity of offenders after a startling occurrence, especially where the witness is related to the victim and has just undergone a traumatic experience, does not affect credibility. Entries in a police blotter are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out and may be incomplete or inaccurate; testimony in open court is more detailed and must be considered alongside all other evidence. Evelyn had no ill motive to testify falsely, and the presumption is that she was not so moved, entitling her testimony to full faith and credit.
• Sufficiency of Alibi and Denial: The doctrine requires that alibi can prosper only if the accused proves both that he was at another place during the commission of the crime and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene. Cabuang claimed to be at a wake in the same barangay where the crime occurred, and Matabang claimed to be at home in Dagupan City, no more than an hour or so by bus from Bayambang. Neither offered independent and reliable corroboration. Positive identification prevails over simple denials and unacceptable alibis, particularly where no ill motive is attributed to the identifying witness.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Although Evelyn did not witness the actual sexual assault, slaying, or taking of the P400.00, circumstantial evidence can support a conviction where multiple circumstances proven are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and every rational hypothesis except guilt. The circumstances forming an unbroken chain were: (1) Cabuang and Matabang suddenly appeared from the rice fields and Cabuang grabbed Maria Victoria while Matabang pursued Evelyn; (2) from her hiding place, Evelyn saw Maria Victoria in a tricycle with Cabuang, Matabang, and two others, crying and pleading for help; (3) Maria Victoria's body was found the next morning in the same barangay traversed by the road on which they had been walking; and (4) the alibis of both accused were not successfully established. These circumstances, considered together, proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Delay in identification does not impair credibility — A witness's delay in revealing to police authorities the identity of offenders, especially when caused by trauma or shock from a startling occurrence, does not by itself render the witness's testimony unworthy of belief. Applied here where Evelyn de Vera, traumatized upon discovering her cousin's brutal death, identified the accused only hours after the initial police blotter entry was made.
• Police blotter entries as prima facie evidence — Entries in official records like a police blotter are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out, as the entries may be incomplete or inaccurate. Trial courts must consider all evidence presented, not merely the police report. Applied to reject the argument that the blotter entry stating assailants were "unidentified" negated Evelyn's subsequent identification.
• Requisites of alibi — Alibi cannot prosper unless the accused proves both (1) that he was at another place during the commission of the crime and (2) that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Neither accused satisfied this test: Cabuang was in the same barangay, and Matabang was in a town no more than an hour or so by bus away.
• Positive identification prevails over denial and alibi — Where there is no evidence of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness, the presumption is that the witness was not so moved, and positive identification prevails over simple denials and unsubstantiated alibis.
• Sufficiency of circumstantial evidence — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction where: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and inconsistent with innocence and every rational hypothesis except guilt (Rule 133, Section 2, Revised Rules of Court).

• "The failure of Evelyn to specify the accused-appellants as the doers of the horrific rape, killing and robbery of Maria Victoria the first time she was questioned by the police, does not adversely affect her credibility. It is firmly settled case law that the delay of a witness in revealing to the police authority what he or she may know about a crime does not, by itself, render the witness' testimony unworthy of belief." — States the ratio decidendi on witness credibility and delay in identification, applying settled jurisprudence to the facts at bar.
• "It is quite understandable when the witnesses do not immediately report the identity of the offender after a startling occurrence more especially when they are related to the victim as they just had a traumatic experience. . . . [A] delay of about a few hours before the identification of the offender by the prosecution witnesses does not thereby affect their credibility." — Quoted from People vs. Savellano, articulating the doctrine that trauma-induced delay in identification does not impair credibility.
• "The firmly settled doctrine is that the defense of alibi cannot prosper, unless the accused is able to prove that he was at some other place during the commission of the crime and that it was impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission." — Canonical formulation of the two requisites of alibi, applied to reject both appellants' defenses.
• "circumstantial evidence can be and often is entirely sufficient to support a conviction, where the multiple circumstances are proven and are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that the accused is innocent, as well as incompatible with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt on the part of the accused." — Defines the standard for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence under Rule 133, Section 2, applied to the unbroken chain of circumstances establishing guilt.

• People vs. Savellano, 198 SCRA 196 (1991) — Followed. Held that delay of a few hours in identifying offenders after a startling occurrence does not affect witness credibility, particularly where the witness is related to the victim.
• People vs. de Guzman, 194 SCRA 626 (1991) — Followed. Held that initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information does not affect credibility, and no law requires testimony to be first reduced to writing to be believed in court.
• People vs. Santito, Jr., 201 SCRA 87 (1991) — Followed. Held that police blotter entries are only prima facie evidence and may be incomplete or inaccurate; trial courts must consider all evidence, not merely the police report.
• People vs. Valdez, 159 SCRA 157 (1988) — Cited. Upheld witness credibility despite delays of 10 and 13 days in giving sworn statements, illustrating that significantly longer delays have been held understandable.
• People vs. Mandapat, 196 SCRA 157 (1991) and People vs. Basilan, 174 SCRA 115 (1989) — Cited for the proposition that delay in revealing the identity of offenders does not by itself impair credibility.
• People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587 (1991) and People vs. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632 (1991) — Cited for the presumption that a witness has no improper motive when none is shown, entitling testimony to full faith and credit.
• People vs. Alabaso, 204 SCRA 458 and People vs. Maravilla, 167 SCRA 645 (1988) — Cited for the sufficiency standard of circumstantial evidence in criminal convictions.

• Rule 133, Section 2, Revised Rules of Court — Governs the standard for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence: there must be more than one circumstance, the facts from which inferences are derived must be proven, and the combination of all circumstances must produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Applied to sustain the conviction based on the unbroken chain of circumstances establishing the accused's guilt.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Nocon, and Campos, Jr., JJ., concurred.