People vs. Cabacan

Treachery cannot be appreciated where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was triggered by sudden anger from a prior altercation that already placed the victim on guard against possible retaliation, even if the stab wound was inflicted from behind.

Restituto Cabacan and the victim, Nestor Vibas, were acquaintances who found themselves among guests at a drinking session at the house of Romeo Lundang in Sitio Camelot Stable, Barangay San Miguel, Tarlac, Tarlac. Cabacan was personally known to the victim's wife, Susana Vibas, as he had previously stayed at the house of her brother-in-law, and he bore a distinctive physical defect in one of his feet that facilitated his identification.

On January 14, 1995, at about 5:00 p.m., Nestor Vibas was invited by his friend Romeo Lundang to a drinking session with ten other guests at Lundang's house in Sitio Camelot Stable, Barangay San Miguel, Tarlac, Tarlac. At about 6:30 p.m., Restituto Cabacan and Edmundo Corpuz were likewise invited to join the session. During the drinking, an altercation erupted between Cabacan and Vibas, culminating in Vibas boxing Cabacan on the face. Romeo and the other guests pacified the parties, after which Romeo brought Vibas to the latter's house about four hundred meters away, leaving Cabacan behind at the Lundang residence.

Despite his wife Susana's advice to stay inside and rest, Vibas opted to sit outside along the road in front of their house, his back towards the street, about twenty paces from where Susana was watching a game of chance. Some thirty minutes later, at about 8:00 p.m., Susana heard her husband shout as if struck. She rushed toward him and, from about four paces away, saw Cabacan making a thrusting motion at her husband's back, causing Vibas to fall to the ground. Not yet realizing her husband had been stabbed, Susana berated Cabacan, saying, "You, son of a bitch. You had already boxed him and still you had to push him." Cabacan ignored her, mounted his bicycle, and immediately pedaled away. When Susana tried to help her husband up, she noticed blood oozing from his side. She called for help; the victim's uncle Carlos Tunday and neighbors responded and rushed Vibas to St. Martin de Porres Hospital, and later to Tarlac Provincial Hospital, but he died en route. Susana identified Cabacan as the assailant, aided by a light about ten paces from the scene and her familiarity with Cabacan, who had a defect in one foot.

Dr. Allan Vengco, resident physician at Tarlac Provincial Hospital, testified that the victim was brought in at about 8:45 p.m. with a two-to-three-centimeter stellated stab wound at the level of the sixth intercostal space, left midscapular area, and was dead on arrival. Dr. Reynaldo Patriarca, who conducted the autopsy, found the cadaver already in rigor mortis and confirmed a single stab wound at the back, left lower part of the scapular area, with the cause of death being traumatic shock and internal and external hemorrhages due to the stab wound. PO3 Renato Tiglao investigated the scene that night and learned Cabacan had fled northbound. Barangay Captain Dick Reyes apprehended Cabacan at about 11:00 p.m.; the bladed weapon had been turned over by Cabacan to his mother for safekeeping, and she voluntarily surrendered it to the police.

Cabacan denied responsibility and offered a different account. He claimed that after the altercation at Lundang's house, he went with Corpuz to change his blood-stained T-shirt. On his way home, he took a route passing by the victim's house — though he admitted it was not the usual road to his place. Upon seeing Vibas on the street, he alighted from his bicycle about ten meters away, whereupon Vibas allegedly approached and again attacked him with fist blows. Cabacan stated he could not retaliate because Vibas was bigger, and when he noticed people approaching, he quickly rode his bicycle and fled. He insisted the victim had assaulted him because he had prevented Vibas from buying four more bottles of gin.

• Treachery: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in declaring that treachery attended the killing of the victim.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Appellant maintained that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, asserting his innocence and presenting a version of events in which the victim was the aggressor.

• Prior Altercation: The Solicitor General noted that about an hour before the stabbing, the victim and appellant had an altercation which led the victim to box appellant in the face, placing the victim on guard against possible retaliation — a circumstance relevant to the appreciation of treachery.

• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing of the victim.
• Guilt: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

• Treachery: No. Treachery was not proved beyond reasonable doubt because the attack was triggered by sudden anger from a prior altercation and was not consciously and deliberately adopted as a mode of attack to facilitate the killing without risk to the accused.
• Guilt: Modified. Appellant is guilty of homicide, not murder, the qualifying circumstance of treachery having been absent; the positive identification by the prosecution's eyewitness was credited over appellant's denial.

• Treachery: For treachery to be appreciated, there must be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. Here, about an hour before the stabbing, the victim and appellant had an altercation in which the victim boxed appellant in the face. That prior incident must have placed the victim on guard against possible retaliation. Appellant stabbed the victim when he chanced upon him sitting alone by the roadside — an act that could have been driven by rash and impetuous impulse rather than a deliberate act of the will, even though the victim was stabbed from behind. The victim was already aware of appellant's hostile attitude before the attack and was thus forewarned of impending danger. The rule that a sudden attack constitutes treachery, whether frontally or from behind, does not apply where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was first triggered by sudden anger. Treachery having been absent, the crime is homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, not murder under Article 248.

• Guilt: The trial court's credibility assessment was affirmed. Susana Vibas positively identified appellant as the person she saw making a thrusting motion at her husband's back from about four paces away, in a place illuminated by a light ten paces distant. She knew appellant personally and could identify him by his defective foot. The medical findings of Dr. Patriarca — a single stab wound at the back, left lower scapular area — corroborated her testimony. Appellant's version was rejected as incredible: he claimed the victim mauled him again but fled when people approached, which was inconsistent with innocence — flight being indicative of guilt. Nobody else was implicated as a possible suspect. Between the widow's positive assertions and appellant's negative averments, the former deserved more credence. The trial court did not err in concluding that appellant was responsible for the killing; it erred only in qualifying the killing as murder.

• Treachery (alevosia) — For treachery to qualify a killing as murder, the prosecution must prove that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. A stabbing from behind does not automatically constitute treachery where the attack was impelled by sudden anger arising from a prior altercation that had already placed the victim on guard. The rule that a sudden attack constitutes treachery, whether frontally or from behind, does not apply where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was first triggered by sudden anger.

• Flight as indicative of guilt — The unexplained flight of the accused from the scene of the crime is an indicium of guilt. Where the accused claims he was the one being attacked, his hurried departure when people were approaching is inconsistent with innocence, as there would be no need to flee if he were truly the victim of aggression.

• Credibility of eyewitness identification — The positive identification of the accused by an eyewitness who is familiar with the accused, who observed the incident under adequate illumination, and whose testimony is corroborated by medical findings, prevails over the accused's bare denial and self-serving version of events.

• "In order that treachery may be considered as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the accused has consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself." — This passage states the controlling standard for treachery and frames the ratio decidendi for downgrading the conviction from murder to homicide.

• "Treachery cannot be appreciated in this case where appellant could have stabbed the victim by way of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate act of the will, even though the victim was stabbed from behind." — This formulation distinguishes impulsive retaliation from deliberate treachery and is the key holding on why the prior altercation negated treachery.

• "The rule that a sudden attack by the assailant constitutes treachery, whether frontally or from behind, does not apply where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was first triggered evidently by a sudden anger of the accused." — This is the canonical statement of the doctrine applied, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the relationship between prior provocation and treachery.

• People vs. Quitlong, G.R. No. 121562, 292 SCRA 360 (1998) — Cited for the proposition that treachery requires proof of conscious adoption of a mode of attack to facilitate the killing without risk to the accused.
• People vs. Navarro, G.R. No. 125538, 295 SCRA 139 (1998) — Cited for the principle that treachery cannot be appreciated where the stabbing could have been driven by rash and impetuous impulse rather than deliberate intent.
• People vs. Rivera, G.R. No. 101798, 221 SCRA 647 (1993) — Cited for the proposition that the victim's awareness of the accused's hostile attitude before the attack forewarns him of impending danger, negating treachery.
• People vs. Academia, Jr., G.R. No. 129251, 307 SCRA 229 (1999) — Cited for the rule that a sudden attack does not constitute treachery where it was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was triggered by sudden anger.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (as amended) — Defines and penalizes murder, which was the charge originally filed and the basis of the trial court's conviction. The Supreme Court found that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proved, so Article 248 did not apply.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide, which the Supreme Court applied after finding treachery absent. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal; with neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty was fixed at reclusion temporal in its medium period.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the imposable penalty: prision mayor as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum, yielding a sentence of 10 years of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.

Bellosillo, Acting C.J. (Chairman), Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concurred.