People vs. Butler

A youthful offender under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, tried and convicted before the amendment of P.D. 603 by P.D. 1179, is entitled to suspension of sentence under the original Article 192 of P.D. 603, and the amendatory provision excluding offenders convicted of offenses punishable by death cannot be applied retroactively to deprive the minor of that right. The trial court should not have pronounced judgment of conviction but should have suspended all further proceedings and committed the minor to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare or a responsible person.

Michael J. Butler was an American Negro seaman enlisted in the U.S. Navy on February 3, 1975, and assigned to the USS Hancock (CV-10) since June 10, 1975. The victim, Enriquita Alipo alias "Gina Barrios," was a twenty-six-year-old hospitality girl residing at 8 Fontaine Extension, Olongapo City. At the time of the offense, the governing statute on youthful offenders was P.D. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which provided for mandatory suspension of sentence for offenders over nine but under twenty-one years of age. P.D. 603 was subsequently amended by P.D. 1179 on August 15, 1977, which inter alia excluded from the benefit of suspension those convicted of offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment.

On the evening of August 7, 1975, at about 10:30 p.m., Michael J. Butler, an American Navy seaman stationed aboard the USS Hancock, and Enriquita Alipo alias "Gina Barrios," a hospitality girl in Olongapo City, were seen together at the Colonial Restaurant by Lilia de la Paz, an entertainer and friend of the victim, and by Rosemarie Juarez, another friend. At about 1:00 a.m., Butler and the victim left the restaurant, after the victim had invited Juarez to come to her house that night.

Emelita Pasco, the victim's housemaid, testified that at about 11:30 p.m. the victim arrived home with Butler and the two immediately entered the victim's bedroom. Shortly thereafter, the victim emerged holding an identification card and a piece of paper on which she had copied the name "MICHAEL J. BUTLER, 44252-8519 USS HANCOCK" from the ID card. The victim told Pasco she was copying the name because she knew Butler would not be coming back to her, then returned to her bedroom after instructing Pasco to wake her the following morning. Before retiring, Juarez arrived, had a brief conversation with the victim, and left.

The following morning, August 8, 1975, at about 4:00 a.m., Pasco knocked on the bedroom door to wake her mistress as instructed. She found the victim lying face down on the bed, naked from the waist up, legs spread apart, with a broken porcelain figurine beside her head. Pasco immediately called the landlord and the authorities. Patrolman Rudyard de los Reyes, Fiscal Llamado, and Corporal Sobrepeña arrived at about 6:00 a.m. Pasco informed them that Butler had slept with the victim and handed over the paper bearing his name.

A latent print examination conducted by fingerprint technician Jesus Bensales revealed that one of three fragmentary latent prints lifted from the cellophane wrapping of the broken figurine was identical with Butler's left middle fingerprint on thirteen points. On the same day, the Olongapo Police notified the Naval Investigation Services Resident Agency (NISRA) at Subic Bay that Butler was a murder suspect. NISRA special agents Jerry Witt and Timothy Watrous went aboard the USS Hancock, informed the ship's legal officer, located Butler, and brought him to the legal office. Witt identified himself, showed his credentials, informed Butler he was a suspect in a murder case, and apprised him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. Butler was then searched, handcuffed, and taken to the NISRA office.

At the NISRA office, investigator James Cox began the interrogation at about 2:55 p.m. Cox testified that before questioning he identified himself, informed Butler of his constitutional rights and his rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and asked whether Butler needed a lawyer. Butler stated he understood his rights and did not need a lawyer. The investigation lasted approximately one and a half hours, after which yeoman James Beaver reduced the oral statement into writing. The resulting three-page document, signed and initialed by Butler on every page, contained a written waiver of constitutional rights and a narration of the events of August 7, 1975. In the statement, Butler recounted that after drinking gin and beer, he went home with the victim, engaged in sexual intercourse with her, fell asleep, and later awoke to discover that a five-peso note had been taken from his sock. An argument ensued, during which the victim struck him and he struck her back. When she appeared to threaten him with a karate chop, he grabbed a statue of Jesus Christ from the bedside stand and hit her in the head. She fell flat on her face. Butler stated he did not intend to kill her but was mad and wanted to hurt her. He then retrieved his watch from the next room, dressed, and left.

Dr. Angeles Roxas, medico-legal officer of the Olongapo Police Department, examined the corpse and issued an autopsy report finding the cause of death to be asphyxia due to suffocation. The report noted broken pieces of porcelain on top of the victim's head, fine short curly hairs in the anal region with blood between the anal folds, fine pieces of porcelain on the teeth and gums, and a slight abrasion at the junction of the anal mucous membrane and the skin. No fracture of the skull or intracranial hemorrhage was found. Dr. Roxas testified that anal intercourse had been had with the victim after her death, as indicated by the partly opened anus and the presence of spermatozoa, and that the anus would have automatically and completely closed had the intercourse occurred while the victim was still alive. He also testified that the victim died of asphyxia due to suffocation when extreme pressure was exerted on her head, pressing her nose and mouth against the mattress.

The trial court rendered judgment on December 3, 1976, finding Butler guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse, and sentencing him to death. Butler was born on September 4, 1957, in Orlando, Florida, making him seventeen years, eleven months, and four days old at the time of the offense. The trial court refused to consider his minority because the proof submitted was not duly authenticated as required by the Rules of Court, and because the accused was found guilty of a capital offense. After the Supreme Court admitted the certified copy of Butler's Certificate of Live Birth on June 4, 1981, Butler filed a Verified Motion to Dismiss, presenting progress reports from the Ministry of Social Services and Development attesting to his good behavior and rehabilitation during his confinement at the U.S. Naval Base brig since August 11, 1975.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Accused-appellant maintained that his extrajudicial confession (Exhibit H) was obtained in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution and the doctrine in Miranda vs. Arizona, arguing that he was taken from his ship by NISRA special agents, handcuffed, informed he was a suspect in a murder case before being warned of his rights, placed in a police-dominated incommunicado interrogation, given a mimeographed warning without explanation of its contents, never informed that his statements could be used against him in a Philippine court, and interrogated for an extended period without rest.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Abuse of Superior Strength: Accused-appellant argued that abuse of superior strength must be deliberately and purposely utilized to assure accomplishment of the criminal purpose without risk to the offender, and that no evidence or testimony supported the finding that the victim was rendered unconscious by the figurine strike before her head was pressed against the mattress; he further maintained that the brittle porcelain statue could not produce physical injury or render the victim unconscious.
• Simultaneous Appreciation of Treachery and Abuse of Superior Strength: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in appreciating treachery and abuse of superior strength simultaneously and separately.
• Medico-Legal Findings: Accused-appellant contended that the findings of the medico-legal officer were inadequate and inconclusive.
• Suspension of Sentence Under P.D. 603: Accused-appellant maintained that as a minor at the time of the offense, he was entitled to suspension of sentence and commitment to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare pursuant to Article 192 of P.D. 603 before its amendment by P.D. 1179, and that his confinement in the brig should be treated as equivalent to the period of commitment under the DSWD.

• Prior Dismissal as Bar: The Solicitor General argued that the prior dismissal for lack of merit of the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. L-48788 barred the accused from raising or litigating anew the issue of his minority.
• Age at Time of Trial: The prosecution contended that an offender is not entitled to the benefit of suspension of sentence if at the time of trial he could no longer qualify as a minor offender, citing People vs. Capistrano and People vs. Estefa.
• Exclusion Under Amended P.D. 603: The prosecution argued that under Article 192 of P.D. 603 as amended by P.D. 1179, the accused was not entitled to suspension because he was convicted of an offense punishable by death, and that the retroactive application of the amended articles was proper because they are procedural in nature and there is no vested right in rules of procedure.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Whether the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of the accused and appreciating it against him.
• Qualification and Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse of the victim.
• Simultaneous Appreciation of Circumstances: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating treachery and abuse of superior strength simultaneously and separately.
• Medico-Legal Testimony: Whether the trial court erred in accepting the testimony of the medico-legal officer that asphyxiation by suffocation was the cause of death.
• Suspension of Sentence: Whether the trial court erred in denying the accused the benefits of Article 192 of P.D. 603 before its amendment by P.D. 1179.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court did not err in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses, three of whom identified the accused as the person last seen with the victim, and the fingerprint examination corroborated their testimony.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: No. The confession was admissible, the accused having voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel after being duly informed thereof; the Miranda doctrine finds no application where a valid waiver has been made.
• Qualification and Aggravating Circumstances: Partially. Murder qualified by abuse of superior strength was correctly found, but treachery was not proven for lack of an eyewitness account; the aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse was sustained based on evidence of posthumous anal intercourse.
• Simultaneous Appreciation of Circumstances: No. Treachery was rejected, and only abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance and scoffing at the corpse as an aggravating circumstance were appreciated.
• Medico-Legal Testimony: No. The trial court correctly accepted the medico-legal officer's testimony, the accused having failed to present clear and positive evidence to overcome the scientific findings.
• Suspension of Sentence: Yes. The trial court erred in denying the accused the benefits of Article 192 of P.D. 603 before its amendment, the accused being a youthful offender under twenty-one at the time of the offense, trial, and promulgation of judgment.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great respect on appeal, the trial court being in the best position to observe the demeanor and manner of testimony of witnesses. Three persons — Emelita Pasco, Lilia de la Paz, and Rosemarie Juarez — identified Butler as the person last seen with the victim on the night in question. The fingerprint examination showed that one of three fragmentary latent prints lifted from the cellophane wrapping of the figurine used to strike the victim was identical with Butler's left middle fingerprint on thirteen points. The accused-appellant failed to present clear and positive evidence to overcome the scientific and specific findings of the medico-legal officer.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: The accused-appellant contended that the Miranda doctrine was violated, but the evidence showed no manhandling or moral coercion. NISRA special agent Jerry Witt testified, without contradiction, that Butler was informed of his constitutional rights as the very first thing before being searched and handcuffed, and that the warning was given in the presence of the ship's legal officer. NISRA investigator James Cox testified that before interrogation he apprised Butler of his constitutional rights and his rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, asked whether he needed a lawyer, and Butler stated he understood his rights and did not need a lawyer. Butler signed and initialed each page of the confession, showing no signs of tremor. The Miranda doctrine does not apply where the accused has validly waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel after being duly informed. The naked denial of the accused cannot overwhelm the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, there being no visible indication for his fellow Americans to fabricate their declarations.

• Qualification and Aggravating Circumstances: Abuse of superior strength was properly appreciated. Under People vs. Cabiling, the test requires evaluation of the physical conditions of the protagonists, the arms or objects employed, and the incidents constituting the total development of the event. Butler was 6 feet tall and weighed 155 lbs., while the victim was only 4 feet 11 inches tall. He wielded superior strength in striking her with the figurine and in shoving her head and pressing her mouth and nose against the mattress with sufficient force to suffocate her, without risk to himself. Treachery, however, was not proven because there was no eyewitness account of the killing, and the extrajudicial confession merely described a struggle. The aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse was sustained, the medico-legal officer having testified that anal intercourse occurred after death, as indicated by the partly opened anus and the presence of spermatozoa confirmed by the laboratory report. Although this aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the information, a generic aggravating circumstance not alleged may be proven during trial and appreciated in imposing the penalty, serving only to aid the court in fixing the limits of the penalty without changing the character of the offense.

• Simultaneous Appreciation of Circumstances: The Court rejected the presence of treachery for lack of an eyewitness account and because the medical report showed no skull fracture or intracranial hemorrhage. Only abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance and scoffing at the corpse as an aggravating circumstance were appreciated, thus resolving the issue of simultaneous appreciation by eliminating treachery altogether.

• Medico-Legal Testimony: The accused-appellant failed to present clear and positive evidence to overcome the scientific and specific findings and conclusions of the medico-legal officer. The testimony that the victim died of asphyxia due to suffocation, caused by extreme pressure on her head pressing her nose and mouth against the mattress, was corroborated by the physical evidence and the autopsy report.

• Suspension of Sentence: At the time of the commission of the crime on August 8, 1975, Butler was seventeen years, eleven months, and four days old, having been born on September 4, 1957. The applicable law was P.D. 603, Article 192, which mandated that upon a finding that the youthful offender had committed the acts charged, the court shall determine the imposable penalty but, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, shall suspend all further proceedings and commit the minor to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare or a responsible person until he reaches twenty-one years of age. The trial court erred in refusing to apply Article 192 on the ground that the proof of minority was insufficiently authenticated and that the accused was convicted of a capital offense. The records showed the vigorous plea of the accused for application of Article 192 in his Motion for New Trial and Motion for Reconsideration. The certified copy of his Certificate of Live Birth was subsequently admitted by the Supreme Court. P.D. 1179, which amended Article 192 to exclude offenders convicted of offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment, took effect on August 15, 1977 — after the trial and conviction of the accused — and cannot be applied retroactively to deprive the minor of the right accorded under the original provision. The accused was below twenty-one at the time of trial and even at the time judgment was promulgated on December 3, 1976. His confinement in the U.S. Naval Base brig was treated as equivalent to commitment under the DSWD, the Commander of the U.S. Naval Base being considered a responsible person under Article 192. The Ministry of Social Services and Development had regularly visited and counselled Butler and submitted favorable progress reports attesting to his rehabilitation, good behavior, and capability to be a useful member of the community.

• Abuse of Superior Strength — To properly appreciate abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance, it is necessary to evaluate not only the physical conditions of the protagonists and the arms or objects employed by both sides, but also the incidents and episodes constituting the total development of the event. The essence is that advantage is taken by the offender of physical strength relatively superior to that of the offended party. The fact that the offender is strong does not of itself prove its existence; it must be shown that the accused is physically stronger than the victim or that the relative strength of the parties was proved, and that the superior strength was deliberately selected or taken advantage of in the commission of the crime. Applied here where the accused was 6 feet tall and 155 lbs. while the victim was 4 feet 11 inches, and he used excessive force in striking her and pressing her face into the mattress without risk to himself.

• Waiver of Constitutional Rights During Custodial Investigation — The Miranda doctrine does not apply where the accused has voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel after being duly informed thereof. A written waiver signed and initialed by the accused on every page of the confession, coupled with testimony that he was informed of his rights and stated he understood them and did not need a lawyer, constitutes a valid waiver. The naked denial of the accused that he was threatened or coerced cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses, absent any visible indication of fabrication.

• Generic Aggravating Circumstance Not Alleged in the Information — A generic aggravating circumstance not alleged in the information may be proven during trial over the objection of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the penalty. Such circumstances serve only to aid the court in fixing the limits of the penalty but do not change the character of the offense.

• Suspension of Sentence for Youthful Offenders Under P.D. 603 — Under the original Article 192 of P.D. 603, a youthful offender over nine but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is entitled to suspension of sentence. Upon finding that the youthful offender committed the acts charged, the court shall determine the imposable penalty including civil liability but, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, shall suspend all further proceedings and commit the minor to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare, a training institution, or a responsible person until he reaches twenty-one years of age. The amendatory provision of P.D. 1179 excluding offenders convicted of offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment cannot be applied retroactively to deprive a minor of the right accorded under the original law where the offense, trial, and conviction all occurred before the amendment. Confinement in a military brig under the custody of a responsible person may be treated as equivalent to commitment under the DSWD where the minor has been regularly visited and counselled by social welfare officers and has demonstrated rehabilitation.

• "We hold and rule that the lower court erred in not applying the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603 suspending all further proceedings after the court had found that the accused had committed the acts charged against him, determined the imposable penalty including any civil liability chargeable against him. The trial court should not have pronounced judgment convicting the accused, imposing upon the penalty of death." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the entitlement of the youthful offender to suspension of sentence under the original Article 192 of P.D. 603, constituting the principal basis for the dismissal and discharge of the accused.

• "To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attached. This circumstance should always be considered whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime." — This is the canonical formulation of the test for abuse of superior strength as articulated in People vs. Cabiling, quoted and applied in this decision, and frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment." — This is the amendatory provision of P.D. 1179 quoted in the decision, the retroactive application of which the Court rejected in favor of the accused, establishing the principle that amendatory procedural provisions cannot adversely affect rights accorded under the original law when the offense and conviction preceded the amendment.

• "The dismissal of the case against the accused Michael Butler is, therefore, meritorious and justifiable. We hereby order his final discharge therefrom. His final release, however, shall not obliterate his civil liability for damages in the amount of P24,000.00 to the heirs of the victim which We hereby affirm." — This passage articulates the Court's disposition balancing the rehabilitative purpose of the Child and Youth Welfare Code against the preservation of civil liability, a principle codified in Article 198 of P.D. 603.

• People vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285 — Followed. Provided the controlling guideline for determining abuse of superior strength, requiring evaluation of the physical conditions of the protagonists, the arms or objects employed, and the incidents constituting the total development of the event. The guideline was quoted verbatim and applied to find that Butler's notorious advantage in height and strength, wielded in striking the victim and suffocating her, constituted abuse of superior strength.

• People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil. 385 — Followed. Held that to properly appreciate abuse of superior strength, it must be shown that the accused is physically stronger than the victim or that the relative strength of the parties must be proved.

• People vs. Casillar, 30 SCRA 352 — Followed. Stated that the essence of abuse of superior strength is that advantage is taken by the offender of physical strength relatively superior to that of the offended party, and that the mere fact that the offender is strong does not of itself prove the circumstance.

• Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 — Distinguished. The doctrine on custodial interrogation was invoked by the accused-appellant but found inapplicable, the Court holding that the accused had validly waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel after being duly informed thereof.

• People vs. Martinez Godinez, 106 Phil. 597 — Followed. Established that a generic aggravating circumstance not alleged in the information may be proven during trial and appreciated in imposing the penalty, applied to sustain the aggravating circumstance of scoffing at the corpse despite its absence from the information.

• People vs. Capistrano, 92 Phil. 127 — Cited by the prosecution but rejected. The prosecution relied on this case for the proposition that an offender is not entitled to suspension of sentence if he could no longer qualify as a minor at the time of trial; the Court found the citation without merit because Butler was below twenty-one at the time of trial and at the promulgation of judgment.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder. At the time of the offense, murder was punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Applied to classify the killing of Enriquita Alipo as murder qualified by abuse of superior strength.

• Article 68, Revised Penal Code — Provides the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, reducing the penalty by one degree for offenders under eighteen years of age but over nine years. Applied to reduce the penalty from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period.

• Articles 189 and 192, P.D. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) — Article 189 defines a youthful offender as one over nine but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. Article 192, in its original form, mandates suspension of sentence and commitment of the youthful offender to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare or a responsible person until he reaches twenty-one. Applied to entitle Butler to suspension of sentence and final discharge, the trial court having erred in pronouncing judgment of conviction instead of suspending proceedings.

• P.D. 1179, Section 2 (effective August 15, 1977) — Amended Articles 192 and 193 of P.D. 603 by adding the requirement that the youthful offender apply for suspension and by excluding from its benefits those convicted of offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment. The Court held that this amendment, passed during the pendency of the appeal, could not be applied retroactively to deprive the accused of the right accorded under the original provision.

• Section 20, Article IV (Bill of Rights), 1973 Constitution — Embodies the constitutional rights of persons under custodial investigation against self-incrimination. The accused-appellant invoked this provision to challenge the admissibility of his extrajudicial confession, but the Court found that he had validly waived his rights after being duly informed.

• Article 198, P.D. 603 — Provides that the final release of a youthful offender shall not obliterate civil liability for damages. Applied to preserve Butler's civil liability of P24,000 to the heirs of the victim notwithstanding his discharge.

Fernando, C.J., Concepcion Jr., De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concurred.

• Aquino, J. — Concurred in the finding that Butler committed murder qualified by abuse of superiority and that the extrajudicial confession was admissible, but dissented from the ponente's ruling that Butler should have been given a suspended sentence and released. Justice Aquino argued that the aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse should not be appreciated, because the prosecution was bound by Butler's confession which indicated that sexual intercourse occurred while the victim was alive, not after death; the speculations of the medico-legal officer and trial judge regarding posthumous sodomy were unwarranted. He further contended that Butler's confession showed intoxication and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, warranting additional mitigating circumstances. On the issue of suspension of sentence, Justice Aquino maintained that Butler had taken inconsistent positions — repudiating his confession and pleading not guilty while simultaneously seeking a suspended sentence, a remedy that presupposes guilt. Because Butler was twenty-five years old at the time of the decision, the question of entitlement to a suspended sentence had become moot and academic. He should instead be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to eleven years of prision mayor as maximum, with full credit for his confinement in the stockade and possible conditional pardon or parole. Justice Makasiar joined this dissent. Justice Abad Santos reserved his vote. Justice Teehankee took no part.