People vs. Butiong

Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary; it is sufficient for the State to establish (1) the sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and (2) the mental retardation of the victim. The phrase "deprived of reason" in Article 266-A refers to mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, and the deprivation of reason need not be complete.

The accused, Charlie Butiong, was a long-time neighbor of the victim, AAA, a 29-year-old woman with mental retardation. The case was prosecuted under an information alleging rape committed against AAA, a mental retardate, against her will and consent. The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, defines rape and enumerates the circumstances under which carnal knowledge of a woman constitutes rape, including when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.

In the evening of October 7, 1998, AAA, then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was invited by Butiong, her long-time neighbor, to go over to his house because he would give her something. AAA obliged. Butiong locked the door as soon as she had stepped inside his house, and then took off his shorts and the shorts of AAA. He led her to the sofa, where he had carnal knowledge of her. AAA remembered that she then felt pain in her abdomen and became angry at him for what he had done.

Upon reaching home, AAA forthwith told her older sister what had happened. Her sister brought AAA to the police station, and later on to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), where AAA underwent a medico-legal examination by Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Umil. The medico-legal examination revealed that AAA's hymen was intact but "distensible and its orifice wide (2.5 cms. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury." Noticing AAA's disorientation and incoherence, Dr. Soreta-Umil endorsed her to the NBI Psychiatric Section for evaluation.

AAA also underwent a series of psychological tests at the National Mental Hospital. The tests included the Raven's Progressive Matrices Test, Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test, and Draw a Person Test. A Rorschach Psycho-Diagnostic Test was not used because AAA was not able to answer. Another test, the Sack's Sentence Completion Test, was not used because of AAA's inability to comply with the instructions. The results of the psychological tests showed that she had a mild level of mental retardation, and that her mental age was that of a child aged from six to seven years; she was unaware of what went on around her and was interested only in gratifying her own needs.

The Defense presented only one witness in the person of Dr. Natividad Dayan, whom it offered as an expert psychologist. She concluded that the Raven's Progressive Matrices Test and the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test administered on AAA were unreliable for determining the existence of mental retardation. She based her conclusion on James Morizon's DSM-4 Made Easy: The Clinician's Guide for Diagnosis, and Jay Siskin's Coping With Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony. According to her, an individually administered intelligence test, like the Stamp Intelligence Scale or the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale, as well as projective techniques, like the Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test and the Thematic Perception Test, should have been instead administered to appropriately determine AAA's mental age.

The RTC rendered judgment finding Butiong guilty of rape, noting that nothing in Dr. Dayan's testimony on the unreliability of the tests administered on AAA would invalidate the findings of psychologist Nimia de Guzman and Dr. Diana de Castro, both of the National Center for Mental Health, to the effect that AAA had mild level retardation with a mental age of a six- to seven-year old person. The trial judge himself held, based on his personal observation of AAA as a witness in court, that she was a retardate who could narrate what had transpired albeit with some difficulty about how she had been sexually abused. He considered AAA as a competent witness whose behavior and appearance manifested no possibility for her to concoct a story of her defloration at the hands of the accused. Butiong appealed, but the CA affirmed the conviction, considering the State's evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that AAA was mentally retarded.

• Exact Date of Rape: Butiong contended that the State did not establish rape because there was no evidence showing the exact date when the rape occurred.
• Mental Retardation Not Established: Butiong disputed the RTC's conclusion that AAA was a mental retardate by focusing on the inconclusiveness of the findings of psychologist de Guzman brought about by her failure to ascertain AAA's personal history and by her computing AAA's mental age upon inaccurate and unverified information. He noted that two other physicians who had examined AAA, one from the NBI and the other from the National Center for Mental Health, were not presented as witnesses.
• Unreliability of Tests: Butiong emphasized the testimony of Dr. Dayan on the unreliability of the tests administered on AAA, maintaining that the unreliability should be appreciated in his favor in accordance with People vs. Cartuano, Jr., which required that a diagnosis of mental retardation should be made after a thorough evaluation based on history, and physical and laboratory examinations by a clinician.
• Mental Retardate Not Covered by the Law: Butiong posited that the State did not establish the elements of rape, considering that a mental retardate qualified neither as a "woman deprived of reason" nor as "a woman under twelve years of age" as provided under Article 266-A par. 1(b) nor of par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the arguments of the People as plaintiff-appellee beyond the Court's own analysis of the issues raised on appeal.

• Exact Date of Rape and Absence of Spermatozoa: Whether the State's failure to establish the exact date of the rape and the absence of spermatozoa from the victim's genitalia negate the commission of rape.
• Mental Retardation of the Victim: Whether the State sufficiently established that AAA was a mental retardate despite the defense expert's testimony on the unreliability of the psychological tests administered.
• Applicability of People vs. Cartuano, Jr.: Whether People vs. Cartuano, Jr. applies to require clinical evidence as the exclusive means of establishing mental retardation.
• Rape of a Mental Retardate under Article 266-A: Whether carnal knowledge of a mental retardate constitutes rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353.

• Exact Date of Rape and Absence of Spermatozoa: No. The date of the rape need not be precisely proved because date is not an element of rape, and the absence of spermatozoa from the genitalia of the victim does not negate or disprove rape. The basic element of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse, not ejaculation.
• Mental Retardation of the Victim: Yes. The State's witnesses sufficiently explained the psychological tests conducted to establish AAA's mental retardation with the mentality of a six- or seven-year-old, and the trial judge's personal observation of AAA as a witness in court corroborated the clinical findings.
• Applicability of People vs. Cartuano, Jr.: No. People vs. Cartuano, Jr. applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical records to sustain a finding of mental retardation; it does not preclude the presentation by the State of proof other than clinical evidence to establish the mental retardation of the victim.
• Rape of a Mental Retardate under Article 266-A: Yes. Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act, and the phrase "deprived of reason" refers to mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.

• Exact Date of Rape and Absence of Spermatozoa: The Court emphasized that the date of the rape need not be precisely proved considering that date is not an element of rape. Nor did the absence of spermatozoa from the genitalia of AAA negate or disprove the rape. The basic element of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse, not ejaculation. Carnal knowledge is defined as "the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman." The slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. Citing People vs. Campuhan, the Court explained that touching the labia majora or labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape, while a mere grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis is not sufficient. AAA's recollection of the rape, corroborated by the results of the medico-legal examination, was sufficient proof of the consummation of rape.

• Mental Retardation of the Victim: The Court noted that the State's witnesses sufficiently explained the psychological tests conducted to establish AAA's mental retardation with the mentality of a six- or seven-year-old. The trial judge himself reached a conclusion on AAA's mentality from his close personal observation of her as a witness in court, noting that she manifested a difficulty in responding to the questions, especially those bearing on her being sexually abused. The trial judge's observation that she had no notion of the wrong that had been done to her was validated by the clinical findings. The totality of the evidence presented by the State established beyond reasonable doubt AAA's deficient mental condition.

• Applicability of People vs. Cartuano, Jr.: The Court clarified that People vs. Cartuano, Jr. applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical records to sustain a finding of mental retardation, as clarified in People vs. Delos Santos. In direct contrast to Cartuano, this case did not lack clinical findings on the mentality of the victim. Moreover, as clarified in People vs. Dalandas, Cartuano does not preclude the presentation by the State of proof other than clinical evidence to establish the mental retardation of the victim. The courts are not entirely dependent on the results of clinical examinations in establishing mental retardation. In People vs. Almacin, the Court took into consideration the fact that the victim was illiterate and unschooled in concluding that she was mentally incapable of assenting to or dissenting from the sexual intercourse. In People vs. Dumanon, the Court concurred in the trial court's observation and conclusion that the victim was a mental retardate based on her physical appearance and on her difficulty to understand and answer the questions during her testimony.

• Rape of a Mental Retardate under Article 266-A: The Court held that carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish (1) the sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and (2) the mental retardation of the victim. The phrase "deprived of reason" in Article 266-A refers to mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Citing People vs. Dalandas, the Court explained the various levels of mental retardation and noted that AAA's mental age of six to seven years was equated with imbecility under the previous classification, even lower than borderline mental deficiency. The ability of the female to give rational consent to carnal intercourse determines if carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape. The Court cited People vs. Manlapaz, where the victim was a 13-year-old girl with the mentality of a five-year-old, holding that sexual intercourse with a woman who is deprived of reason is rape because she is incapable of giving rational consent to the carnal intercourse.

• Rape of a mental retardate as rape of a woman deprived of reason — Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate constitutes rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code because a mental retardate is not capable of giving rational consent to a sexual act. The phrase "deprived of reason" refers to mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, and the deprivation of reason need not be complete. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary; the State need only establish (1) the sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and (2) the mental retardation of the victim.

• Mental retardation as a defense to consent — A woman suffering from mental deficiency impairing her reason or free will has no will in the legal sense, and her failure to offer resistance to sexual intercourse does not mean consent because she is incapable of giving any rational consent. The absence of will determines the existence of rape, and such lack of will may exist not only when the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental deficiency impairing her reason or free will.

• Date and ejaculation as non-elements of rape — The date of the commission of rape need not be precisely proved because date is not an element of rape. The absence of spermatozoa from the victim's genitalia does not negate or disprove rape because the basic element of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse, not ejaculation. The slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape.

• Proof of mental retardation beyond clinical evidence — Courts are not entirely dependent on the results of clinical examinations in establishing mental retardation. Proof other than clinical evidence may establish mental retardation, including the victim's illiteracy and lack of schooling, physical appearance, difficulty in understanding and answering questions during testimony, and the trial judge's personal observation of the victim as a witness.

• "Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one, the sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the victim." — This passage states the core ratio decidendi of the case, defining the elements the prosecution must prove in rape cases involving mental retardates.

• "The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough. Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape." — This quotation from Justice Aquino's commentary on the Revised Penal Code, adopted by the Court, establishes that partial mental deficiency suffices to render a woman incapable of giving rational consent to sexual intercourse.

• "The ability of the female to given rational consent to carnal intercourse determines if carnal knowledge of a mental retardate like AAA is rape. Indeed, the Court has consistently considered carnal knowledge of a female mental retardate with the mental age below 12 years of age as rape of a woman deprived of reason." — This passage articulates the controlling test for determining when carnal knowledge of a mental retardate constitutes rape, focusing on the victim's capacity for rational consent.

• People vs. Dalandas, G.R. No. 140209, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 433 — Controlling precedent defining mental retardation and its various levels, including the IQ ranges for profound, severe, moderate, and mild retardation, and the traditional terms of idiot, imbecile, and moron. The Court applied this framework to determine that AAA's mental age of six to seven years was equated with imbecility.

• People vs. Manlapaz, G.R. No. L-41819, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 704 — Followed for the principle that sexual intercourse with a woman who is deprived of reason is rape because she is incapable of giving rational consent, citing Spanish and American authorities.

• People vs. Cartuano, Jr., G.R. No. 112457-58, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 403 — Distinguished; applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical records to sustain a finding of mental retardation, and does not preclude proof other than clinical evidence.

• People vs. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 141128, August 30, 2001, 364 SCRA 142 — Followed to clarify the scope of People vs. Cartuano, Jr., upholding a finding of mental retardation where an examining psychiatrist identified the tests administered and explained the results to the trial court.

• People vs. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000, 329 SCRA 270 — Followed for the definition of consummated rape, holding that touching the labia majora or labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape, while mere grazing of the mons pubis does not.

• People vs. Almacin, G.R. No. 113253, February 19, 1999, 303 SCRA 399 — Followed for the principle that courts may consider the victim's illiteracy and lack of schooling in concluding that she was mentally incapable of assenting to or dissenting from sexual intercourse.

• People vs. Dumanon, G.R. No. 123096, December 18, 2000, 348 SCRA 461 — Followed for the principle that a trial court's observation of the victim's physical appearance and difficulty in understanding questions may support a finding of mental retardation.

• Article 266-A, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 — Defines rape and enumerates the circumstances under which carnal knowledge of a woman constitutes rape, including when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious (paragraph 1(b)) and when the offended party is under twelve years of age or is demented (paragraph 1(d)). The Court held that carnal knowledge of a mental retardate falls under paragraph 1(b) because the phrase "deprived of reason" refers to mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.

• Article 266-B, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 — Prescribes the penalty for rape, which the RTC applied in sentencing Butiong to reclusion perpetua.

• Republic Act No. 9262 (The Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) — Cited as the basis for withholding the real names of the victim and her immediate family members, using fictitious initials instead to protect their privacy.

• Corona, C.J. (Chairperson) — Concurred.
• Leonardo-De Castro, J. — Concurred.
• Del Castillo, J. — Concurred.
• Villarama, Jr., J. — Concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided case text.