People vs. Bulfango

Treachery is present when the attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, leaving the unarmed victim no chance to resist or escape; a prior verbal tussle three hours before the killing does not necessarily negate treachery.

The charge was murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659. The case turned on the testimony of Helenia Pagapulaan, who was present at the Gold City Coliseum and along Osmeña Street on the date of the incident.

On April 6, 1997, Joemari A. Bedua and accused-appellant Marlon Bulfango y Peñafiel figured in a heated argument at 3:30 in the afternoon at the bleachers of the Gold City Coliseum along Osmeña Street in Cagayan de Oro City. Helenia Pagapulaan testified that Joemari was in front of her while Bulfango was closely seated at her right side. At around 6:30 that evening, after leaving the coliseum and while waiting for a motorela along Osmeña Street, Helenia saw Bulfango throw a stone at Joemari, who was crossing the road; the stone hit Joemari at the back. Just then, another person whom Helenia failed to recognize threw a stone at Joemari, hitting him at the back of his head and causing him to fall on the pavement. Bulfango then pulled a knife and stabbed Joemari once on the chest. Petrified, Helenia immediately fled from the crime scene.

Dr. Tammy Uy, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in Cagayan de Oro City, certified that the cause of Joemari's death was hemorrhage, severe, secondary to stab wound on the chest, which was directed "backward, upward, slightly medially . . . piercing the pericardium and right ventricle of the heart with an approximate depth of 9.5 cm."

Bulfango interposed denial and alibi. He averred that on April 6, 1997, he was in front of the basketball court of Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City, where he acted as "banker" in the cara y cruz game; his co-players were a certain Bingbing, his compadre, and a certain Edwin. He admitted using the aliases Judy, Marlon Navarro, and Sagal but denied using Freddie, which is the name of his elder brother. Roberta Bebura corroborated his alibi.

Helenia admitted that Joemari was once her caretaker in her ricefield, but she failed to identify him by name as the person involved in the verbal tussle inside the coliseum. On cross-examination, she testified that she went to the coliseum to see their remaining cocks fight after her husband died on March 8, 1997; the defense sought to clarify her and her husband's usual routine when he was still alive. The prosecution did not present Ricky Babor, who was Joemari's companion during that night, as a witness.

The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's evidence. It found Bulfango's alibi weak because his alleged place of residence and the Gold City Coliseum in Cagayan de Oro City were only 7 kilometers from the basketball court in Cugman where he allegedly played cara y cruz, and the places were linked by criss-crossing concrete streets plied by vehicles; April 6, 1997 being a Sunday, it could be presumed that there was no traffic jam. It also found Helenia's testimony credible despite the alleged inconsistencies.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in convicting him based on the conflicting and incredible testimony of the prosecution witnesses. He pointed to Helenia's admission that Joemari was once her caretaker but her failure to identify him as the person in the verbal tussle, and to her inconsistent testimony about why she was at the coliseum.
• Treachery: Accused-appellant argued that treachery was not present because Joemari was not taken by surprise, since the prior heated argument should have placed him on guard.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Accused-appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He also contended that the prosecution's failure to present Ricky Babor, Joemari's companion that night, was fatal because Ricky was a vital witness who could have known who killed Joemari.
• Judicial Bias: Accused-appellant decried the trial court's "extreme partiality" as shown by its statement that he had been "born a loser" and was "graduating or graduated to heinous crime."

• Credibility of Helenia: The Solicitor General observed that Helenia may have known Joemari only by face and not by name, and that whether she knew his name prior to the incident did not alter the fact that she witnessed the stabbing.

• Judicial Bias: Whether the trial court's remarks about accused-appellant showed extreme partiality warranting reversal.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant based on the allegedly conflicting and incredible testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
• Denial and Alibi: Whether accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi should prevail over the prosecution's positive testimony.
• Suppression of Evidence: Whether the prosecution's failure to present Ricky Babor as a witness constituted suppression of evidence.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing despite the prior heated argument between accused-appellant and Joemari.
• Damages: Whether the awards of actual, civil, moral, and exemplary damages were proper.

• Judicial Bias: No. The trial court's remarks were unnecessary but based on accused-appellant's admitted criminal record and made after full trial; no indication of bias was shown.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. The alleged inconsistencies were minor and did not affect Helenia's credibility; the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is respected.
• Denial and Alibi: No. Denial and alibi are weak against positive testimony; the alibi failed to show physical impossibility to be at the crime scene.
• Suppression of Evidence: No. The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to choose witnesses; Ricky Babor's testimony would be merely corroborative.
• Treachery: Yes. The attack was swift, deliberate, and unexpected; the victim was hit with stones, fell, and was then stabbed, and the prior argument three hours earlier did not negate treachery.
• Damages: Partly yes. Actual damages were reduced to P11,000; civil indemnity of P50,000 and moral damages of P50,000 were affirmed; exemplary damages of P25,000 were awarded due to treachery.

• Judicial Bias: The trial court's statements were unnecessary but had basis in the records, which showed that accused-appellant himself admitted having been thrice convicted of theft and had several pending cases ranging from grave oral defamation to carnapping, apart from the present murder case. The statements were made after full-blown trial, long after the trial court had reached a conclusion on guilt. The SC found no indication of bias from the records and transcripts, and accused-appellant failed to show any other instance of partiality.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Helenia's failure to identify Joemari by name despite knowing him as a former caretaker did not destroy her credibility; it was possible that she knew him only by face and not by name, especially where there were several workers. Whether she knew his name prior to the incident did not alter the fact that she witnessed the stabbing. The cross-examination inconsistency about her husband was a simple misunderstanding: she was referring to what she was doing at the coliseum after her husband's death, while defense counsel was trying to clarify her and her husband's usual routine when he was still alive. The minor inconsistency was inconsequential and, if at all, manifested truthfulness and candor and erased any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. The trial court's assessment of credibility was entitled to great weight and respect.

• Denial and Alibi: Denial is an inherently weak defense against the positive and categorical assertions of prosecution witnesses. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially when it comes from a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. For alibi to prevail, it must be established by positive, clear, and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that he was somewhere else. Accused-appellant failed to meet this standard; the trial court found that his alleged location and the Gold City Coliseum were only 7 kilometers apart, linked by concrete streets, and that April 6, 1997 was a Sunday with no expected traffic jam.

• Suppression of Evidence: The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses. It need not present each and every witness but only as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of other witnesses may be dispensed with if they are merely corroborative in nature. The non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and is not fatal to the prosecution's case. Ricky Babor's testimony would have been merely corroborative.

• Treachery: The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. Joemari was crossing the street when accused-appellant, together with a cohort, commenced the attack by throwing a stone that hit the unsuspecting Joemari at the back. A second stone hit Joemari at the back of his head and caused him to fall. While Joemari was struggling to move and probably dazed, accused-appellant swiftly exploited his vulnerable position and delivered the coup de grace with a well-placed thrust to the chest aiming for the heart. The fact that three hours had elapsed since the verbal tussle may even have relaxed Joemari's guard. The manner by which Joemari was killed was treacherous.

• Damages: The trial court's award of P40,500 as actual damages was reduced to P11,000, the amount substantiated by receipts representing funeral expenses and services. The amount of P29,500 representing various expenses was contained only in a certification by Joemari's wife, Vienna Rose Bedua; this list was not competent proof and could not replace the probative value of official receipts. The certification was self-serving and did not meet the requirement that a party seeking actual damages must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. Only substantiated and proven expenses, or those genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake, or burial of the victim, are recognized. The awards of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages were affirmed in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Exemplary damages of P25,000 were proper because of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as held in People vs. Samson and People vs. Catubig.

• Treachery — The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. The SC applied it where Bulfango and a cohort first hit Joemari with stones, causing him to fall, and then Bulfango stabbed him in the chest while he was vulnerable; the prior verbal tussle three hours earlier did not negate treachery.
• Denial and Alibi — Denial is an inherently weak defense against positive and categorical prosecution testimony. Alibi must be established by positive, clear, and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene at the time, not merely that he was somewhere else. Bulfango failed to meet this standard.
• Credibility of Witnesses and Minor Inconsistencies — Trial courts' findings on witness credibility command great weight and respect because the trial judge can observe demeanor, conduct, and attitude. Minor inconsistencies do not destroy credibility; they may manifest truthfulness and candor and erase suspicion of rehearsed testimony. The SC applied this to Helenia's testimony.
• Prosecution's Prerogative to Determine Witnesses — The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses and need not present every witness, only as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof. Non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence. The SC applied this to Ricky Babor.
• Actual Damages — A party seeking actual damages must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify the award; only substantiated and proven expenses, or those genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake, or burial, are recognized. A self-serving certification is not competent proof. The SC reduced actual damages to P11,000.
• Exemplary Damages in Murder — Exemplary damages may be awarded when the qualifying circumstance of treachery attends the killing. The SC awarded P25,000 exemplary damages.
• Civil Indemnity and Moral Damages — The SC affirmed P50,000 civil indemnity for death and P50,000 moral damages in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

• "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape." — This defines the controlling rule on treachery applied to the stone-throwing and stabbing of Joemari.
• "The fact that three (3) hours had elapsed since accused-appellant and Joemari figured in a verbal tussle may even have relaxed Joemari’s guard for he could have left the coliseum much sooner had he feared an impending attack from accused-appellant." — This rejects the argument that the prior argument negated treachery.
• "Denial is an inherently weak defense vis-à-vis the positive and categorical assertion of prosecution witnesses." — This states the rule on denial versus positive testimony.
• "The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses. The prosecution need not present each and every witness but only as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt." — This supports the rejection of the suppression-of-evidence argument regarding Ricky Babor.

• People vs. Liwanag, G.R. No. 120468, August 15, 2001 — Cited to support the rule that denial is an inherently weak defense against positive and categorical prosecution testimony.
• People vs. Baniega, G.R. No. 139578, February 15, 2002 — Cited for the requirement that alibi must be established by positive, clear, and satisfactory proof of physical impossibility to be at the crime scene.
• People vs. Mallari, G.R. No. 103647, July 20, 1999 — Cited for the rule that minor inconsistencies do not destroy credibility and that non-presentation of corroborative witnesses is not suppression of evidence.
• People vs. Aranjuez, G.R. No. 121898, January 29, 1998 — Cited for the respect accorded to trial courts' factual findings and for the essence of treachery.
• People vs. Bonifacio, G.R. No. 133799, February 5, 2002 — Cited for the requirement of competent proof to justify actual damages.
• People vs. Marquez, G.R. No. 136736, April 11, 2002 — Cited for the award of civil indemnity for death.
• People vs. Samson, G.R. No. 124666, February 15, 2002 — Cited for the award of exemplary damages where treachery attends the killing.
• People vs. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001 — Cited for the award of exemplary damages where treachery attends the killing.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder. The SC applied it because the killing was attended by treachery.
• Article 63(2), Revised Penal Code — Provides for the lesser penalty when there is no modifying circumstance. The SC applied it to impose reclusion perpetua instead of death.
• R.A. 7659 — The information charged violation of Article 248 in relation to R.A. 7659; the SC referred to the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for murder.