People vs. Bugarin

Self-defense is an affirmative defense that must be proved with clear and convincing evidence, and it relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; if no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded. The burden of evidence shifts to the accused who admits the killing, and the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's case.

The accused-appellant Nestor Bugarin y Martinez was charged with two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder arising from a shooting incident on May 30, 2008 in Cebu City. The victims were members of the Pontanar family, with whom the Bugarins had been harboring ill-feelings. Bugarin was married to Anecita, whose brother was Esmeraldo Pontanar, making Cristito Pontanar, the 72-year-old father of Esmeraldo, the father-in-law of the accused. The case involved the application of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code on murder, the rules on self-defense under the Revised Penal Code, and Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 on the use of unlicensed firearms.

Nestor Bugarin y Martinez was charged with two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder for a shooting incident on the evening of May 30, 2008 in Cebu City. The victims were Esmeraldo B. Pontanar, who died from hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple gunshot wounds; Cristito C. Pontanar, the 72-year-old father-in-law of the accused, who died from hemorrhagic shock secondary to gunshot wound; and Maria Glen Neis Pontanar, who survived a through-and-through gunshot wound in the distal third of her left thigh. The accused was married to Anecita, whose brother was Esmeraldo, making the victims his relatives by marriage.

Upon arraignment, Bugarin pleaded not guilty but admitted having shot all three victims, insisting that he acted in self-defense. A reverse trial ensued pursuant to Section 11(e), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Bugarin contended that on the night of the incident, he was watching television when his wife Anecita went out to walk their dogs. He heard her having an altercation with Maria Glen. He then saw his brother-in-law Esmeraldo approaching, carrying a 9 mm pistol, a .45 caliber gun, and an M16 rifle. Esmeraldo shouted in front of their house, challenging him to go out. Bugarin initially hesitated but went out when his son convinced him to help his mother. He shouted angrily at Esmeraldo, who began to draw his gun, prompting Bugarin to draw his own gun and shoot Esmeraldo twice. When Esmeraldo was thrown backwards and about to fall, Bugarin shot him one more time. Thereafter, his father-in-law Cristito came rushing towards his son, confronted Bugarin, and tried to slap him, but Bugarin avoided the blow. Cristito then looked at his son's body on the ground. Believing that Cristito would get his son's firearm and shoot him, Bugarin shot him first. Esmeraldo's son Paulo threw stones at Bugarin, angering him, so he shot him as well. Finally, he saw Maria Glen with a pipe about to strike Anecita, so he shot her, hitting her in the leg.

The prosecution alleged that the Pontanars and the Bugarins had been harboring ill-feelings towards each other. On the evening of May 30, 2008, the spouses Esmeraldo and Maria Glen were on their way to the house of Cristito, which was near the house of the Bugarins. When they were close to the Bugarins' house, Anecita started throwing gravel and sand at them. Esmeraldo asked her to stop but she refused. Thereafter, Bugarin came out of their house and suddenly shot Esmeraldo several times. Esmeraldo sustained two gunshot wounds in the back and one in his left side, which later took his life. Maria Glen immediately ran and hid behind a parked car. She then saw her father-in-law Cristito running out of his house towards Esmeraldo's direction, raising his hands and begging Bugarin to stop shooting. But Bugarin also shot him, causing his death. Bugarin then looked for Maria Glen and when he found her, he shot her, hitting her in the thigh.

The trial court found Bugarin's testimony incoherent, incredible, and specious, while finding Maria Glen's testimony more convincing. As the lone surviving victim, she affirmed that Bugarin suddenly fired at them without any provocation. The trial court also noted that Anecita herself testified that she did not see Esmeraldo carrying anything and that he merely held the railings of their gate when Bugarin shot him. Bugarin failed to explain what happened to the other firearms he claimed Esmeraldo was carrying. The medical report showed that Esmeraldo was shot in the back twice and in his left side. Bugarin himself admitted that when Esmeraldo was thrown backwards and about to fall to the ground, he shot him again to make sure he was "finished." Bugarin also stated that he shot Cristito "dahil konsintidor, hindi marunong makisama, magsama na silang mag-ama, because he is siding (sic) his son," manifesting his intent to kill the father.

• Self-Defense: Bugarin argued that he acted in self-defense, claiming that Esmeraldo was carrying three firearms and was about to draw his gun when Bugarin shot him, that Cristito attempted to slap him and was about to get his son's firearm, and that Maria Glen was about to strike Anecita with a pipe.
• Lack of Treachery: Bugarin maintained that the attacks were not treacherous, asserting that the victims had provoked the incident and that he merely reacted to the perceived threats against him and his family.
• Credibility of Testimony: Bugarin contended that his version of events should be credited over the prosecution's version, particularly regarding the alleged unlawful aggression of the victims.

• Unlawful Aggression: The prosecution argued that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victims, as Maria Glen testified that Bugarin suddenly fired at them without provocation, and Anecita herself testified that she did not see Esmeraldo carrying anything.
• Treachery: The prosecution maintained that treachery attended all three attacks, as the victims were unarmed, unsuspecting, and given no opportunity to defend themselves.
• Special Aggravating Circumstance: The prosecution asserted that the use of an unlicensed firearm should be appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance in all three cases.

• Self-Defense: Whether Bugarin validly invoked self-defense to exculpate himself from criminal liability.
• Treachery in the Killing of Esmeraldo: Whether treachery attended the killing of Esmeraldo Pontanar, qualifying the crime to murder.
• Treachery in the Killing of Cristito: Whether treachery attended the killing of Cristito Pontanar, qualifying the crime to murder rather than homicide.
• Treachery in the Shooting of Maria Glen: Whether treachery attended the shooting of Maria Glen, qualifying the crime to attempted murder rather than attempted homicide.
• Special Aggravating Circumstance of Unlicensed Firearm: Whether the use of an unlicensed firearm should be appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance in all three cases.
• Penalties and Damages: Whether the penalties and damages imposed by the lower courts were proper in light of the applicable law and jurisprudence.

• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not established because Bugarin failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victims, which is the first and foremost element of self-defense.
• Treachery in the Killing of Esmeraldo: Yes. Treachery attended the killing of Esmeraldo, as he was shot in the back twice and in his left side, giving him no means of retaliation or escape, and Bugarin shot him again when he was about to fall to ensure he was "finished."
• Treachery in the Killing of Cristito: Yes. Treachery attended the killing of Cristito, as the attack was sudden and unexpected on an unarmed 72-year-old victim who had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming and no chance to mount a defense.
• Treachery in the Shooting of Maria Glen: Yes. Treachery attended the shooting of Maria Glen, as she was unarmed, defenseless, and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace, and Bugarin's attack commenced with a manifest intent to kill.
• Special Aggravating Circumstance of Unlicensed Firearm: Partially. The use of an unlicensed firearm was properly appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance in the two murder cases, but not in the attempted murder case, where the applicable law at the time did not allow its consideration for attempted crimes.
• Penalties and Damages: The penalties for the two murder cases were affirmed as reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, with increased damages; the penalty for attempted murder was modified to an indeterminate sentence of four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, with corresponding damages.

• Self-Defense: Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that offers exculpation from liability only if satisfactorily proved. Having admitted the shooting, the burden shifted to Bugarin to prove with clear and convincing evidence: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on his part. All three elements must concur, but self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression. The trial court found Bugarin's testimony incoherent, incredible, and specious, while finding Maria Glen's testimony more convincing. Anecita testified that she did not see Esmeraldo carrying anything and that he merely held the railings of their gate when Bugarin shot him. Bugarin failed to explain what happened to the other firearms he claimed Esmeraldo was carrying. Maria Glen never actually struck or attempted to strike Anecita with the steel pipe. Cristito's alleged act of trying to slap Bugarin and staring at his wounded son's body could not be considered unlawful aggression. Bugarin simply assumed and imagined that Cristito would get his son's gun to shoot him. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is extremely doubtful by itself, and the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.

• Treachery in the Killing of Esmeraldo: There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods, or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Treachery is not presumed but must be proved as conclusively as the crime itself. Bugarin suddenly fired at Esmeraldo without reason or warning. The medical report established that Esmeraldo was shot in the back twice and in his left side, giving him no means of retaliation or escape and without any risk to Bugarin. Bugarin himself admitted that when Esmeraldo was thrown backwards and about to fall to the ground, he shot him again to make sure he was "finished." The finding of treachery was based on clear and convincing evidence as conclusive as the fact of killing itself.

• Treachery in the Killing of Cristito: The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. Bugarin's attack on Cristito was sudden and unexpected. The alleged provocation on Cristito's part was uncorroborated and not proven. While Bugarin claimed that Cristito attempted to slap him, Anecita testified that she did not see this as she was already inside their house. The trial court gave more credence to Maria Glen's narration that Cristito was raising his hands and pleading for Bugarin to stop when the latter shot him at close range. Bugarin himself stated that when he shot Cristito in the chest, the latter was looking down at the dead body of his son sprawled on the ground. He shot him "dahil konsintidor, hindi marunong makisama, magsama na silang mag-ama, because he is siding (sic) his son," clearly manifesting that he knowingly chose his mode of attack and intended it to accomplish his wicked intent of likewise killing the father. The requisites of treachery are: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it. Cristito was unarmed and had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming. The deliberate swiftness of Bugarin's attack significantly diminished the risk to himself that may be caused by the retaliation of the victim. The Court reinstated the murder conviction for Cristito's death, noting that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives his constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the entire case open to the review of the appellate court.

• Treachery in the Shooting of Maria Glen: While Maria Glen was forewarned of the danger to her life after seeing what Bugarin had done to her husband and father-in-law, and she managed to flee and hide after she was shot, treachery may still be appreciated where the victim was unarmed, defenseless, and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace. Bugarin already commenced his attack with a manifest intent to kill Maria Glen but failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., poor aim. Maria Glen was not in any position to defend herself or repel the attack since she was unarmed. The trial court aptly appreciated treachery as a circumstance to qualify the crime to attempted murder.

• Special Aggravating Circumstance of Unlicensed Firearm: Bugarin admitted that he used an unlicensed .45 caliber gun in shooting the victims. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, treats the unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special aggravating circumstance. The same cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance such as voluntary surrender. In both murder cases, the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was properly appreciated. However, in the attempted murder case, the lower court should not have appreciated the use of the unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance since at the time the tragic incident took place, R.A. No. 8294 on illegal possession of firearm was the applicable law, and as held in People vs. Ladjaalam, the use of unlicensed firearm may only be considered if the same is used in the killing. Hence, in the absence of the special aggravating circumstance and any other aggravating circumstance, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of Bugarin.

• Penalties and Damages: The penalty for attempted murder is prision mayor, which is two degrees lower from the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for consummated murder. Since the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is present in the attempted murder case, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the minimum period of prision mayor which is six years and one day to eight years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty shall be taken from any of the periods of the penalty next lower in degree which is prision correccional. Thus, the penalty of four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as maximum, would be appropriate. The damages were modified according to the most recent jurisprudence, with the Court increasing the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in the murder cases to ₱100,000.00 each, and awarding ₱25,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in the attempted murder case.

• Self-Defense — An affirmative defense that offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if satisfactorily proved. The accused must establish with clear and convincing evidence: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. All three elements must concur, but self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression; if no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded. The burden of evidence shifts to the accused who admits the killing, and the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. In this case, the defense failed because the prosecution's evidence, credited by the trial court, showed that Bugarin suddenly fired at the victims without provocation.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The requisites are: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. Treachery is not presumed but must be proved as conclusively as the crime itself. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow. In this case, treachery was established in all three attacks because the victims were unarmed, unsuspecting, and given no opportunity to defend themselves.

• Special Aggravating Circumstance of Use of Unlicensed Firearm — Under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, the unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder is treated as a special aggravating circumstance. It cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance such as voluntary surrender. However, pursuant to People vs. Ladjaalam, the use of unlicensed firearm may only be considered if the same is used in the killing; hence, it cannot be appreciated in attempted crimes. In this case, the special aggravating circumstance was properly appreciated in the two murder cases but not in the attempted murder case.

• Review of the Entire Case on Appeal — When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives his constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the entire case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to him. This principle allowed the Court to review the downgrading of Cristito's killing to homicide by the CA and reinstate the murder conviction.

• "Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if satisfactorily proved." — This passage establishes the foundational principle that self-defense must be proved by the accused, setting the standard for evaluating the defense in this case.

• "One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of proving the aforementioned elements. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on self-defense, emphasizing that unlawful aggression is the primordial element that must first be established.

• "The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on the unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims." — This passage defines the essence of treachery and was applied to all three attacks in this case.

• "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow." — This passage further elaborates the definition of treachery, emphasizing that even a frontal attack can be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim.

• People vs. Gutierrez, 625 Phil. 471 (2010) — Cited as controlling precedent for the elements of self-defense and the rule that self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression, and that the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence.
• Guevarra vs. People, 726 Phil. 183 (2014) — Cited for the elements of self-defense that must be established with clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Placer, 719 Phil. 268 (2013) — Cited for the definition of treachery and the rule that in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that treachery attended the killing, the crime is homicide, not murder.
• Cirera vs. People, G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014, 730 SCRA 27 — Cited for the rule that a finding of treachery must be based on clear and convincing evidence as conclusive as the fact of killing itself.
• People vs. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469, August 13, 2014, 733 SCRA 158 — Cited for the rule that when an accused appeals, he waives his constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the entire case open to review.
• People vs. Amora, G.R. No. 190322, November 26, 2014, 742 SCRA 667 — Cited for the requisites of treachery and the rule that even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim.
• People vs. Fieldad, et al., G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014, 757 SCRA 455 — Cited for the rule that treachery may still be appreciated where the victim was unarmed, defenseless, and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.
• People vs. Ireneo Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016 — Cited as the most recent jurisprudence for the modification of damages in murder and attempted murder cases.
• Palaganas vs. People, 533 Phil. 169 (2006) — Cited for the rule that the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance such as voluntary surrender.
• People vs. Ladjaalam, 395 Phil. 1 (2000) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that the use of unlicensed firearm may only be considered as a special aggravating circumstance if the same is used in the killing, and not in attempted crimes.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines murder and was applied to qualify the killings of Esmeraldo and Cristito Pontanar as murder, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance.
• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Referenced in the definition of murder as the provision on parricide, from which murder is distinguished.
• Section 11(e), Rule 119, Rules of Court — Authorized the reverse trial in this case, where the accused admitted the shooting and claimed self-defense.
• Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 — Treats the unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder as a special aggravating circumstance; applied to the two murder cases but not to the attempted murder case.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in determining the penalty for attempted murder, with the minimum penalty taken from the period of the penalty next lower in degree.

Carpio, J. (Chairperson), Mendoza, J., Leonen, J., and Martires, J. concurred in the decision.