People vs. Buenviaje

A rape conviction may rest on the lone, credible testimony of the complaining witness, provided it is clear, positive, convincing, and consistent with human nature; force or intimidation need not be irresistible, and the victim’s failure to resist or escape does not make the sexual congress voluntary.

Jenneth Bachao, an applicant for employment at Loyola Life Plan in Tacloban City, Leyte, was interviewed by Augusto Buenviaje y Reyes on January 15, 1996, after she had gone to the office on January 11, 1996 and was advised by Regional Director Michael Grandeza to return for an interview. Buenviaje told her that she was on the priority list but would have to undergo training in Manila for three to five days; he said she would receive allowances during training, would return to Tacloban to a good salary, and that the company would shoulder the trip expenses. When she asked why the training would be in Manila and not Tacloban, Buenviaje retorted that she should not make such inquiry because she was just an applicant. Jenneth accepted the offer but said she needed her parents’ permission. Buenviaje asked her to meet him at 12:00 noon at Encore Corporation, accompanied her home to tell her parents about the job offer, and her parents agreed to the conditions. Before he left, he told her they would meet at Philtranco at 3:30 in the afternoon that same day.

They boarded a bus bound for Manila at 4:00 in the afternoon and arrived in Naga City the following day, January 16, 1996, at around 4:00 in the afternoon. Jenneth asked why they were alighting in Naga when the seminar was in Manila; Buenviaje responded that he needed to collect payment for encyclopedias he sold in Naga City. In Naga, Jenneth did not see Buenviaje collect any payment from customers. Buenviaje called for a tricycle and suddenly pulled her inside. While inside the tricycle, he pulled out a balisong from his attache case, poked it at her, and told her not to move or escape or else she would be killed. He brought her to a lodging house in Naga. She could not move or ask for help because the balisong was pointed at her. Inside the room, Buenviaje closed the door and immediately embraced her, kissed her several times, and touched her private parts. She fought back, but he was too strong and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Whenever he would leave the room, he locked the door from outside. He gave her a plastic urinal for her to use when she felt like answering the call of nature and did not allow her to go out of the room.

After they stayed in the Naga lodging house for three to four days, Buenviaje brought Jenneth to Daet under the same threatening situation. He even gave her a tablet that she was forced to take. In Daet, he would ask her to take a bath before every sexual contact. It was also in Daet that Buenviaje prepared a draft letter for her to copy and send to her parents, to the effect that she and Buenviaje had fallen in love, that she understood his state of life, and that she was truly in love with him. In Daet, they were accompanied by an old woman whom Buenviaje introduced as his mother. They all slept in the same room, with Buenviaje and Jenneth on one side and the old woman on the other. Buenviaje had sexual contact with Jenneth even in the presence of the old woman, and the old woman did not make any move to help her even when she pleaded for help.

From Daet, Buenviaje brought Jenneth to San Pablo City. They stayed in a lodge called Cruz Lodge. During their stay in San Pablo, Jenneth was sick and running a high fever. Inside a room, Buenviaje asked her to take off her clothes; when she was undressed, he also undressed. He placed both her hands under her head, leveled her legs on his shoulder, placed his fingers one by one inside her vagina, and rotated all four fingers inside her vagina; after that, he inserted his penis inside her vagina and had sexual intercourse with her. The sexual assault happened many times that she could no longer remember how often.

On February 1, 1996, they left Cruz Lodge and Buenviaje brought Jenneth to a house owned by Elsa Arnisto. During their stay there, Jenneth gathered enough courage to tell Buenviaje that if he would rape her again, she would scream and ask help from the neighbors adjacent to the room they were staying in. On February 2, 1996, she was able to talk to Elsa Arnisto and asked for help so she could talk to her sister in Tacloban City. She learned from her sister that her parents and sister did not receive the letter Buenviaje had forced her to write. She revealed to Elsa that Buenviaje was not her husband and that she was being raped by him. Elsa instructed her to go to another house in Sampalok Lake belonging to Elsa’s cousin so she could be away from Buenviaje. Elsa and her cousin then accompanied Jenneth to the police headquarters for investigation, where she gave her salaysay. On February 9, 1996, Assistant City Prosecutor Guillermo E. Sunega of San Pablo City, Laguna filed with the RTC a Criminal Complaint for rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code based on Jenneth’s salaysay dated February 2, 1996.

At trial, Buenviaje claimed that he and Jenneth were sweethearts and that the sexual union between them from Naga to San Pablo City was mutual and voluntary. He harped on his assertion that Jenneth did not offer resistance when they had sexual intercourse at Cruz Lodge and when he asked her to level her legs on his shoulder so he could insert his fingers in her vagina, which according to him proved consent. He further argued that Jenneth had several chances to escape when she was left alone in the lodging houses in Naga, Daet, and San Pablo City, and the owner of the lodge in Daet, Angel de Mesa, testified that he saw Jenneth buying soft drinks twice at their counter alone. The defense presented Angel de Mesa and Antonio Cabrera, the managers and owner of the motels where Buenviaje took Jenneth, but they were not able to produce receipts for the rooms rented in Naga and Daet. The defense did not present Buenviaje’s mother, who had been with them inside the motel rooms. The trial court found Jenneth’s testimony credible, natural, and convincing, consonant with the course of normal behavior.

• Credibility of the Complainant: Accused-appellant argued that the lower court erred in convicting him despite facts and circumstances supported by evidence that cast grave doubts on the veracity and credibility of Jenneth Bachao’s testimony.
• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Accused-appellant argued that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• Sweetheart Defense / Consent: Accused-appellant argued that the lower court failed to consider defense evidence that the sexual intercourse was mutual and voluntary between him and Jenneth because they were sweethearts; he pointed to her lack of resistance and alleged opportunities to escape, including Angel de Mesa’s testimony that he saw Jenneth buying soft drinks alone at the lodge counter in Daet.

• Credibility of the Complainant: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to Jenneth Bachao’s testimony despite alleged facts and circumstances casting grave doubts on her veracity and credibility.
• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to sustain the accused’s conviction for rape beyond reasonable doubt.
• Sweetheart Defense / Consent: Whether the sexual intercourse was mutual and voluntary because the accused and the victim were sweethearts, such that the trial court erred in failing to consider the defense evidence.

• Credibility of the Complainant: No. The trial court’s assessment of credibility is entitled to great weight and respect absent overlooked facts of weight and substance; the lone testimony of a credible witness is sufficient to justify conviction.
• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Yes. The prosecution established rape beyond reasonable doubt through Jenneth’s credible testimony; force or intimidation need not be irresistible, and absence of resistance does not make the sexual congress voluntary.
• Sweetheart Defense / Consent: No. The sweetheart defense was not established; accused’s claim of mutual and voluntary intercourse was not convincing, and the victim’s conduct was consistent with fear and intimidation.

• Credibility of the Complainant: In rape, only two persons are normally privy to the occurrence, and the credibility of the complaining witness generally resolves the case. Trial court judges are in the best position to observe demeanor and conduct, so their assessment of credibility is entitled to great weight and respect absent a showing that facts or circumstances of weight and substance were overlooked that would affect the result. The testimony of a lone witness, if credible, is sufficient to justify conviction. The SC found no overlooked facts and upheld the trial court’s finding that Jenneth testified in a credible, natural, and convincing manner consonant with normal behavior. The SC also invoked the principle that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on it; no woman would openly admit rape and undergo the trauma and humiliation of examination and public trial if she was not raped.
• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The SC held that the prosecution evidence sufficiently established rape. Resistance is not an element of rape and need not be established by the prosecution; failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make sexual congress voluntary. Force or intimidation need not be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is enough that it is sufficient to consummate the accused’s purpose. The force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the crime. The SC rejected accused’s reliance on Jenneth’s lack of resistance at Cruz Lodge and on her alleged chances to escape, because the accused took her to places completely unknown to her, he was familiar with Naga, Daet, and San Pablo City as a roving salesman, and she was unfamiliar with the people and places and under threats on her life; the door was also locked from outside when he left. The SC noted that people react differently to a startling experience and that not every rape victim can be expected to act conformably to usual expectations.
• Sweetheart Defense / Consent: The SC rejected accused’s defense that he and Jenneth were sweethearts and that their sexual union was mutual and voluntary. Accused’s claim rested on his own assertion, and the SC was not convinced. The SC did not believe defense witnesses Angel de Mesa and Antonio Cabrera, the managers and owner of the motels, because they did not produce receipts for the rooms rented in Naga and Daet and could very well be accused’s good friends. The SC also noted that if the sexual acts were mutual, the one person who could testify to this was accused’s mother, who was with them inside the motel rooms, but the defense did not present her.

• Credibility of the Complaining Witness and the Lone-Witness Rule — In rape, the credibility of the complaining witness generally resolves the case because only two persons are normally privy to the occurrence. The trial court’s assessment of credibility is entitled to great weight and respect absent overlooked facts of weight and substance, and the lone testimony of a credible witness is sufficient to justify conviction. The SC applied this by upholding Jenneth Bachao’s credible, natural, and convincing testimony and affirming the conviction based on her lone testimony.
• Force and Intimidation in Rape — Force or intimidation need not be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; all that is required is that it be sufficient to consummate the purpose the accused had in mind. Resistance is not an element of rape, and failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make sexual congress voluntary. The SC applied this by rejecting accused’s argument that Jenneth’s lack of resistance proved consent.
• Different People React Differently — There is no standard form of behavioral response when a person is confronted with a strange or startling experience; some may shout, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may openly welcome the intrusion. The SC applied this by refusing to measure Jenneth’s conduct against a fixed expectation of resistance or escape.
• Sweetheart Defense — The claim that the accused and the victim were sweethearts and that intercourse was mutual and voluntary must be established; it cannot rest on the accused’s bare assertion. The SC rejected the defense because accused’s claim was not convincing and the defense evidence was weak.
• Sufficiency of the Rape Victim’s Testimony — The accused may be convicted on the lone uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim provided that her testimony is clear, positive, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. The SC applied this by finding Jenneth’s testimony credible and sufficient for conviction.
• No Woman Would Admit Rape Without Being Raped — No woman would openly admit that she was raped and subject herself to examination of her private parts, the trauma and humiliation of a public trial, and the need to narrate in detail how she was raped if she was not in fact raped. The SC applied this as a corroborating reason to believe Jenneth.

• "It must be stressed that the resistance of the victim is not an element of the crime, and it need not be established by the prosecution. In any event, the failure of the victim to shout or to offer tenacious resistance does not make the sexual congress voluntary." — The SC rejects lack of resistance as proof of consent in rape.
• "It is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed be so great or of such character as could not be resisted because all that is required is that it be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind…" — The SC defines the degree of force or intimidation required in rape.
• "The testimony of a lone witness, if credible, is sufficient to justify a judgment of conviction." — The SC states the lone-witness rule applied to the complainant’s testimony.
• "when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof." — The SC states the credibility principle governing rape prosecutions.

• People vs. Buendia, 314 SCRA 655, 666 (1999) — Cited for the rule that resistance is not an element of rape and that failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make sexual congress voluntary.
• People vs. Barcelona, 325 SCRA 168, 176 (2000), citing People vs. Paranzo, 317 SCRA 367 (1999) — Cited for the rule that force or intimidation need not be so great as could not be resisted; it is enough that it is sufficient to consummate the accused’s purpose.
• People vs. Travero, 342 Phil. 263, 275 (1997) — Cited for the rule that force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the crime and need not be irresistible.
• People vs. Campos, G.R. Nos. 133373-77, September 18, 2000; People vs. Sancha, 324 SCRA 646, 663 (2000) — Cited for the rule that the accused may be convicted on the lone uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim if it is clear, positive, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
• People vs. Bali-Balita, G.R. No. 134266, September 15, 2000 — Cited for the principle that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on it.
• People vs. Aloro, G.R. No. 129208, September 14, 2000; People vs. Pagupat, 355 Phil. 225, 260 (1998) — Cited for the principle that no woman would openly admit she was raped and subject herself to examination, trauma, humiliation, and public trial if she was not in fact raped.
• People vs. Alfeche, 355 Phil. 776, 797 (1998); People vs. Pontilar, Jr., 341 Phil. 333, 353 (1997) — Cited for the maxim that people react differently to emotional stress and there is no standard behavioral response to a startling experience.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes rape; the criminal complaint charged accused with rape under this article, and the SC affirmed his conviction for the crime.