People vs. Botero

An individual who holds himself out as an officer of an unlicensed, unincorporated recruitment entity and participates in canvassing, processing documents, and promising overseas employment for a fee to three or more persons is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, and is liable as an ostensible corporate officer under Section 25 of the Corporation Code regardless of whether incorporation was consummated.

Patricio Botero, Carlos Garcia, and Luisa Miraples were associated with Ricorn Philippine International Shipping Lines, Inc., an entity purporting to recruit workers for overseas employment, with offices at the Jovan Building, Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Garcia held himself out as president, Botero as vice-president, and Miraples as treasurer. Ricorn was neither licensed by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) nor registered as a corporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The case arose from charges under Article 38(b) and Article 39(a) of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1920 and 2018, for illegal recruitment in large scale constituting economic sabotage.

On various dates in March 1992, sixteen individuals seeking overseas employment as seamen, cooks, waiters, chambermaids, or laundrywomen went to the office of Ricorn Philippine International Shipping Lines, Inc. at Room 410, Jovan Building, 600 Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Six of these complainants — Edgardo Belen, Gloria Silaras, Alfredo Estinoso, Jose Erwin Esclada, Elsa Delubio, and Ariel Rivada — testified for the prosecution. All except Esclada coursed their applications through accused Carlos Garcia, who represented himself as president of Ricorn. Esclada applied directly to accused-appellant Patricio Botero. The applicants were required to submit NBI and police clearances, birth certificates, passports, seaman's books, and Survival of Life at Sea (SOLAS) certificates. Lacking the last three documents, they were each asked to pay P5,000.00 as processing fees, which they paid to Ricorn's treasurer, Luisa Miraples, who issued receipts under Ricorn's heading.

Garcia and Botero assured the complainants of employment after the May 11, 1992 elections. Botero, introduced to the complainants as vice-president of Ricorn and using a table with a nameplate confirming that designation, followed up on the applicants' passports, seaman's books, and SOLAS documents. He told some applicants to wait for their papers and informed others that their papers were in order. After the elections, the complainants returned to Ricorn's office and discovered that it had abandoned the premises for non-payment of rentals. Repeated attempts to recover their money proved futile, as both Garcia and Botero were nowhere to be found. The complainants then filed complaints with the Mandaluyong Police Station and discovered through checks with the SEC and DOLE that Ricorn was neither incorporated nor licensed to engage in recruitment activities.

Garcia testified that he was an electrical engineer by profession and that the group of Teresita Celso, Botero, Alice Mayonte, Miraples, and Edna Hemolaga had approached him at a baptismal party to join Ricorn, asking him to contribute P100,000.00. He claimed he declined an offer to become Ricorn's president and to contribute P20,000.00, asserting he already knew Ricorn was neither licensed by the POEA nor registered with the SEC. He denied issuing receipts to the complainants. Botero, a marine engineer working as a barber at the time of trial, testified that he had initially applied for overseas employment as a machinist and dealt with Garcia, eventually becoming an employee of Ricorn. He claimed his duties consisted merely of following up on applicants' documents and conducting simple interviews, and that he left Ricorn upon discovering it was unlicensed and unregistered. He denied recruiting the complainants or receiving money from them.

On cross-examination, however, Botero admitted that in February 1992, he met Garcia at the TADE recruitment agency, where Garcia convinced him to become one of the incorporators of Ricorn. He gave money to Garcia for Ricorn's registration with the SEC. They held office at Jovan Building from March 2, 1992 to April 20, 1992. The trial court found Garcia and Botero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale constituting economic sabotage, sentencing each to life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00, and ordering them to jointly and severally indemnify each of the six complainants in the amount of P5,000.00. Only Botero appealed.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Botero argued that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, particularly assailing the credibility of prosecution witness Jose Erwin Esclada, who had initially testified falsely about dealing with Garcia before admitting on cross-examination that it was Botero with whom he transacted.
• Lack of Conspiracy: Botero maintained that he did not conspire with co-accused Garcia, asserting he was a mere applicant of Ricorn who eventually became an employee performing only "minimal activities" such as following up on applicants' passports, seaman's books, and SOLAS documents, and conducting simple interviews.
• No Responsibility for Co-Accused's Acts: Botero argued that he was not responsible for the illegal recruitment activities of co-accused Garcia and that he was himself a victim rather than a culprit.
• Credibility of Witness: Botero contended that Esclada's testimony was inadmissible for being inconsistent, highly improbable, and exaggerated, and that the trial court erred in giving it credence while disregarding the defense's evidence.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution's evidence, including the testimony of Jose Erwin Esclada, was sufficient to sustain Botero's conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale.
• Conspiracy: Whether Botero conspired with co-accused Garcia and Miraples in committing illegal recruitment.
• Personal Liability: Whether Botero could be held liable for illegal recruitment activities notwithstanding his claim that he was a mere employee performing minimal tasks.
• Credibility of Witness: Whether Esclada's testimony, given his initial falsehood, should be entirely disregarded under the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. All essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale were proven: Botero engaged in recruitment and placement of workers, Ricorn lacked the required DOLE license, and the offense was committed against three or more persons.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was inferred from the coordinated roles the accused played — Garcia as president, Botero as vice-president, and Miraples as treasurer — each being indispensable to the recruitment scheme.
• Personal Liability: Yes. Botero was liable as an ostensible corporate officer under Section 25 of the Corporation Code, having held himself out as vice-president of Ricorn, procured documents for applicants, and contributed funds for Ricorn's incorporation.
• Credibility of Witness: No, the testimony was not disregarded. The doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is rarely applied in Philippine jurisprudence; a witness's testimony may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, and Esclada's corrected testimony was corroborated on material points.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court applied Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, which defines recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad whether for profit or not," with the proviso that any person or entity offering or promising employment for a fee to two or more persons is deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. The three essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale — as established in People vs. Bautista — were all satisfied: Botero engaged in recruitment and placement, Ricorn had no license from DOLE (a notice in its office even stated its license was still being processed), and the offense was committed against six complainant-witnesses. Ricorn had already entertained applicants and collected fees despite lacking a license, and Botero, as an officer responsible for the violation, was properly held liable under Article 39(d) of the Labor Code.

• Conspiracy: The Court found that conspiracy was established by the concerted acts of the accused. Garcia served as president, Botero as vice-president, and Miraples as treasurer of Ricorn. Each played a distinct part in the recruitment of the complainants and was indispensable to the others. The Court relied on People vs. Alforte in inferring conspiracy from the coordinated roles and acts of the accused, even absent direct proof of an explicit agreement.

• Personal Liability: The Court rejected Botero's claim that he was a mere employee performing minimal tasks. The evidence showed that Garcia introduced him to the complainants as vice-president of Ricorn, he used a nameplate confirming that designation, he procured passports, seaman's books, and SOLAS documents for the applicants, and complainants inquired from him about the status of their applications. He also admitted giving money to Garcia for Ricorn's incorporation. The Court applied Section 25 of the Corporation Code, which provides that all persons who assume to act as a corporation knowing it to be without authority to do so shall be liable as general partners for all debts, liabilities, and damages incurred, and that an ostensible corporation may not use its lack of corporate personality as a defense. Although Ricorn's incorporation was never consummated, Botero and Garcia held themselves out as officers, received money from applicants, and were estopped from denying liability as corporate officials.

• Credibility of Witness: The Court declined to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, noting that under present jurisprudence it is rarely adhered to by courts. Citing People vs. Cura, the Court held that a witness's testimony may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, depending on corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case. Esclada's corrected testimony — given after his conscience bothered him for not telling the truth — was deemed trustworthy and was corroborated on its material points by the testimony of other witnesses.

• Elements of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale — The crime of illegal recruitment in large scale requires three elements: (1) the accused engages in recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article 13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly the securing of a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers; and (3) the accused commits the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. All three were found present, the offense having been committed against six complainant-witnesses.

• Liability of Ostensible Corporate Officers — Under Section 25 of the Corporation Code, all persons who assume to act as a corporation knowing it to be without authority to do so shall be liable as general partners for all debts, liabilities, and damages incurred or arising as a result thereof. An ostensible corporation is estopped from using its lack of corporate personality as a defense. The Court applied this provision to hold Botero liable despite Ricorn's failure to complete incorporation, as he held himself out as vice-president and received money from applicants.

• Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus — The maxim "false in one part, false in everything" is rarely adhered to in Philippine jurisprudence. A witness's testimony may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, depending on corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case. The Court admitted Esclada's corrected testimony because it was corroborated on material points and was given after his conscience prompted him to tell the truth.

• Inference of Conspiracy from Coordinated Acts — Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused showing a common design and coordinated roles, even without direct proof of an explicit agreement. The Court found that the accused played different but indispensable roles — president, vice-president, and treasurer — in the recruitment scheme.

• "the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case." — This passage articulates the Court's rejection of the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus doctrine and establishes the standard for partial credence of witness testimony, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on witness credibility.

• "All persons who assume to act as a corporation knowing it to be without authority to do so shall be liable as general partners for all the debts, liabilities and damages incurred or arising as a result thereof: Provided, however, That when any such ostensible corporation is sued on any transaction entered by it as a corporation or on any tort committed by it as such, it shall not be allowed to use as a defense its lack of corporate personality." — This is the Court's quotation of Section 25 of the Corporation Code, applied to hold Botero liable as an ostensible corporate officer despite Ricorn's failure to incorporate, establishing that individuals holding themselves out as corporate officers cannot escape liability by invoking the entity's lack of legal personality.

• People vs. Bautista, 241 SCRA 216 (1995) — Cited as the source of the three essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, which the Court applied to determine whether Botero's conduct satisfied the offense.
• People vs. Cura, 240 SCRA 203 (1995) — Cited for the proposition that a witness's testimony may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, supporting the Court's admission of Esclada's corrected testimony.
• People vs. Alforte, 219 SCRA 458 (1993) — Cited for the principle that conspiracy may be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused, applied to the coordinated roles of Garcia, Botero, and Miraples.
• Lagunsad vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 596 (1994) — Cited for the principle that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is rarely adhered to in Philippine courts.

• Article 13(b), Labor Code of the Philippines — Defines "recruitment and placement" as any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Applied to classify Botero's acts — promising employment abroad, procuring documents, conducting interviews — as recruitment and placement activities.
• Article 38(b), Labor Code of the Philippines — Defines illegal recruitment in large scale as recruitment committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group. Applied to convict Botero, the offense having been committed against six complainant-witnesses.
• Article 39(a), Labor Code of the Philippines — Prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00 for illegal recruitment in large scale. Applied to affirm the penalty imposed by the trial court.
• Article 39(d), Labor Code of the Philippines — Provides that if the offender is a corporation, partnership, association, or entity, the penalty shall be imposed upon the officer or officers responsible for the violation. Applied to hold Botero liable as an officer of Ricorn.
• Section 25, Corporation Code of the Philippines — Provides that persons who assume to act as a corporation knowing it to be without authority shall be liable as general partners, and that an ostensible corporation may not use its lack of corporate personality as a defense. Applied to hold Botero liable despite Ricorn's failure to complete incorporation.

Regalado, Romero, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concurred.