People vs. Borinaga

The Court held that a felony is frustrated, not merely attempted, when the offender performs all acts of execution that should produce the crime as a direct consequence, and the non-consummation results solely from causes independent of the perpetrator’s will. The lodging of a deadly weapon in an intervening object, which prevents physical injury but does not negate the completion of the executionary acts, constitutes a frustrated felony because the subjective phase of the offense has already been passed.

A contractual dispute over the construction of a fish corral precipitated threats against Harry H. Mooney, an American resident of Calubian, Leyte. After Mooney refused to pay the full contract price for unfinished work, contractor Juan Lawaan and his associate Basilio Borinaga issued threats. Later that evening, while Mooney sat in a neighbor’s store with his back to a window, Borinaga approached stealthily and struck at Mooney’s back with a knife. The blade embedded itself in the chair, leaving Mooney unhurt. Borinaga fled, returned ten minutes later to renew the attack, but was deterred when the victim and the store owner illuminated him with a flashlight. Borinaga was subsequently apprehended and charged with frustrated murder.

• The factual antecedents trace to a contract for the construction of a fish corral between Harry H. Mooney and Juan Lawaan, with Basilio Borinaga assisting in the work. On March 4, 1929, Lawaan and his men demanded full payment despite the project being only two-thirds complete. Mooney refused, prompting Lawaan to issue threats. Borinaga was overheard stating his intent to stab Mooney, whom he referred to as an "American brute."
• That evening, Mooney sat on a chair in the store of Perpetua Najarro, his back turned to a window. Borinaga approached from outside and struck at Mooney’s back with a knife. The blade missed Mooney’s body and lodged firmly in the backrest of the chair. The force of the blow caused Mooney to fall, but he sustained no injury. Borinaga fled toward the market.
• Approximately ten minutes later, Borinaga returned with his knife to renew the attack. The victim and the store owner, now on alert, directed a flashlight at Borinaga, which frightened him away. Borinaga was later overheard admitting he had missed his mark and was thwarted by the flashlight. Forensic examination confirmed the knife tip was embedded in the chair. The accused raised an alibi defense at trial, which the trial court found implausible.

• The accused-appellant maintained that his conviction for frustrated murder was legally erroneous because he did not perform all the acts of execution necessary to consummate the crime.
• Appellant argued that because the knife struck the chair instead of the victim’s body, the objective elements of a frustrated felony were absent, rendering the offense merely an attempt to commit murder.
• Appellant relied on the statutory distinction between frustrated and attempted felonies, contending that the failure to inflict a wound indicated incomplete execution, and that the intervening chair constituted a cause that prevented the performance of all executionary acts, not merely the consummation of the crime.

• The People countered that the accused-appellant’s homicidal intent was unequivocally established by his prior declarations, the use of a deadly weapon, and the treacherous manner of the attack.
• The prosecution argued that the accused performed every act required to kill the victim, and the non-consummation resulted solely from the independent cause of the knife lodging in the chair.
• The People maintained that the subjective phase of the criminal act had already passed, satisfying the legal criteria for a frustrated felony under Article 3 of the Penal Code, regardless of the absence of physical injury to the victim.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues: Whether the acts of the accused-appellant constitute frustrated murder or merely attempted murder under Article 3 of the Penal Code, given that the victim sustained no physical injury because the knife lodged in the back of the chair.

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive: The Court ruled that the crime committed was frustrated murder. The Court reasoned that the essential condition for a frustrated felony is that the offender performs all acts of execution that should produce the felony, but the crime fails to consummate due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will. The Court found that nothing remained for the assailant to do to accomplish his purpose. The failure to injure the victim arose from the knife striking the chair, which constituted an independent intervening cause. Because the subjective phase of the criminal act had passed, the offense qualified as frustrated rather than attempted. The Court emphasized that no fine distinctions should be drawn to downgrade the crime, given the clear homicidal intent, treachery, and wanton disregard for human life. The conviction and penalty were affirmed.

• Frustrated vs. Attempted Felony (Article 3 Test) — A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution that should produce the crime as a consequence, but non-consummation results from causes independent of the perpetrator’s will. An attempt exists when the offender commences the felony by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution due to some cause or accident other than voluntary desistance. The Court applied this doctrine by determining that the accused had completed the subjective phase of execution; the intervening chair did not negate the completion of executionary acts but merely prevented the consummation, thus fixing liability at the frustrated stage.
• Treachery (Alevosía) as Qualifying Circumstance — Murder is qualified by treachery when the means, method, or form of execution ensures the commission of the crime without risk to the offender arising from the defense the offended party might make. The Court found treachery present because the accused attacked the victim from behind while he was seated, ensuring the victim could not defend himself, thereby qualifying the homicide as murder.

• "The essential condition of a frustrated crime, that the author perform all the acts of execution, attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work of the assailant completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from further acts. What is known as the subjective phase of the criminal act was passed." — The Court used this formulation to draw the line between frustrated and attempted murder, establishing that the completion of the subjective phase, despite the absence of physical injury, satisfies the statutory requirement for a frustrated felony.
• "No superfine distinctions need be drawn in favor of that accused to establish a lesser crime than that of frustrated murder, for the facts disclose a wanton disregard of the sanctity of human life fully meriting the penalty imposed in the trial court." — This passage underscores the Court’s refusal to apply hyper-technical distinctions that would undermine the gravity of the homicidal intent and the clear statutory framework.

• U.S. v. Eduave (1917), 36 Phil. 209 — Cited as controlling precedent to support the principle that the subjective phase of the criminal act, once passed, establishes a frustrated felony when all executionary acts have been performed.
• People v. Mabugat (1926), 51 Phil. 967 — Cited alongside Eduave to reinforce the jurisprudential standard for distinguishing frustrated felonies from attempts based on the completion of executionary acts and the role of independent intervening causes.

• Article 3 of the Penal Code — The governing provision defining consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. The Court applied the statutory definitions to determine that the accused’s conduct satisfied the elements of a frustrated felony, as he performed all acts of execution and the non-consummation resulted from causes independent of his will.

• Justice Villa-Real (joined by Justices Johnson and Street) — Dissented on the ground that the accused’s acts constituted only an attempt to commit murder, not frustrated murder. The dissent reasoned that the statutory definition of a frustrated felony requires the performance of all acts of execution that should produce the felony. Because the knife struck the chair and never reached the victim’s body, the infliction of a deadly wound—a necessary act to produce death—was never executed. The dissent characterized the chair’s interference as a factor that prevented the performance of all executionary acts, not merely the consummation, thereby fixing liability at the attempted stage.