People vs. Bibat

Evident premeditation is sufficiently established where the accused's determination to commit the crime was overheard by an eyewitness at least two hours before the killing, manifesting overt acts of clinging to that resolution and affording sufficient time for reflection. The defense of alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by a credible eyewitness, and delay in reporting a crime attributable to fear of reprisal does not impair a witness's credibility.

Gari Bibat, a student at Arellano University and a member of the United Ilocandia fraternity, was charged with the murder of Lloyd del Rosario, who was allegedly targeted in retaliation for a prior fraternity-related death connected to the Samahang Ilocano group. The prosecution's case rested on the testimony of an eyewitness, Nona Avila Cinco, a laundry woman who collected bets for PBA games, and Rogelio Robles, a neighbor of the alleged Samahang Ilocano president Tonton Montero, in whose house Bibat's group allegedly met and stored weapons before the killing.

On October 14, 1992, at around 11:30 in the morning, Nona Avila Cinco, a laundry woman who also collected bets for PBA games, was at Funeraria Gloria along G. Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, waiting for a bettor. From about one meter away, she overheard a person speaking to the accused, Gari Bibat, saying: "O pare, anduon na. Puntahan mo na. Siguruhin mo lang na itumba mo na," to which Bibat replied, "Oo ba. Ganito ba, ganito ba?" while gesturing with his arms. Cinco then left for Honrades Street to see another bettor, and along the way she walked alongside Bibat, who was entering an alley; they even looked at each other.

At around 1:30 in the afternoon, the victim, Lloyd del Rosario, was waiting for a ride on his way to school at the corner of G. Tuazon and Ma. Cristina Streets. According to Cinco, who was then about four to five meters away, Bibat hurried toward the victim, drew a pointed object from a notebook, and stabbed him twice in the left chest. Bibat fled, but upon hearing the victim shout for help, he returned and stabbed him again in the middle part of the chest. The victim was brought to the United Doctors Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Cinco reported the incident to the authorities only on July 20, 1993, explaining that she had been afraid.

Florencio Castro, who worked at Funeraria Gloria, corroborated that he saw Bibat together with four others inside the memorial homes on the same day. One of them used the telephone to call someone, asking "kung nasaan," while another opened a notebook containing a stainless knife. The group then left in the direction of Balic-Balic. Rogelio Robles testified that Bibat's group had been meeting at his house at 424 Berdad Street, Sampaloc, because the Samahang Ilocano president, Tonton Montero, was his neighbor. Robles stated that before the incident, Montero told him about a school rumble in which somebody died, and that Bibat's group planned to take revenge against Lloyd del Rosario. Robles further testified that six or seven group members arrived at his house after the killing, all carrying bladed weapons, and that Bibat had a "tres-cantos" or "veinte nueve" tucked in his waistline. He also stated that the group had hidden guns and "tusok" in his house even before the day Lloyd died.

For the defense, Bibat testified that on October 14, 1992, he was at his house at 629 Reten Street, Sampaloc, Manila, his mother's birthday. He claimed to have been reviewing lessons from 7:00 to 10:00 in the morning for his final oral examination in Computer 2 at Arellano University. After lunch, he and his friend Marte Soriano left for school at around 12:35 noon, arriving without passing by Funeraria Gloria. He said he had a group study with classmates until 1:45 p.m., then took the final examination from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m., receiving a grade of 2.25. Marte Soriano corroborated that he was at Bibat's house for the birthday party and that they went to Arellano University together, with Bibat entering the classroom at around 2:00 p.m. Lino Asuncion III, a classmate, testified that he saw Bibat at school at about 1:00 p.m. and that they both took the final oral examination in Computer 2, leaving the room at 4:30 p.m. Rogelio Robles was recalled to the stand by the defense and recanted his earlier testimony, claiming he did not actually witness the killing and had merely assisted the victim's parents because they were from the same place, basing his prior testimony on a handwritten statement given to him by the victim's father.

The trial court found Bibat guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, with indemnification of ₱49,786.14 as actual damages and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the alleged eyewitnesses Nona Avila Cinco and Rogelio Robles. He faulted Cinco for reporting the incident only after nine months and for her apparent indifference during the crime. He also claimed that Cinco lied about collecting bets for a PBA game on a Wednesday, asserting that PBA games are held only on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, and reasoned that if she lied on a minor matter, she could lie on a bigger scale. He further attacked Robles's testimony as inherently incredible, contending that it defies human experience for a group planning a killing to openly discuss it in the presence of another person and to hide guns and bladed weapons in that person's house.
• Defense of Alibi: Appellant maintained that he was not at the scene of the crime when it happened, asserting he was at Arellano University reviewing for and taking a final oral examination in Computer 2, corroborated by his friend Marte Soriano and classmate Lino Asuncion III.
• Evident Premeditation: Appellant argued that the trial court erroneously appreciated evident premeditation, contending that it was based solely on the testimony of Rogelio Robles, which was retracted and not credible. He maintained that the crime, if committed by him, was Homicide, not Murder, because the qualifying circumstance was not proved as convincingly as the crime itself.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Solicitor General countered that persons do not necessarily react uniformly to a given situation, and that it was natural for Cinco, a woman confronted by an armed assailant, to remain at the sidelines. The delay in reporting was explained by fear of reprisal, which is a valid cause for a witness's momentary silence. The Solicitor General also pointed out that collecting PBA bets a day or two before the actual games was not farfetched, and that the alleged lie pertained to an insignificant matter not affecting the material details of the stabbing.
• Alibi and Positive Identification: The prosecution maintained that Cinco positively identified the appellant as the culprit, and that Robles's recantation did not by itself render his previous testimony false, as the original testimony appeared credible. Affidavits of recantation were characterized as exceedingly unreliable.
• Evident Premeditation: The prosecution contended that all three requisites of evident premeditation were established: the determination to kill was overheard by Cinco at 11:30 a.m., overt acts manifested clinging to that resolution, and two hours elapsed between determination and execution, sufficient for reflection.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of eyewitnesses Nona Avila Cinco and Rogelio Robles.
• Defense of Alibi: Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider the accused's version that he was not at the scene of the crime when it occurred.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. The trial court's credibility assessment was binding, there being no showing it was reached arbitrarily or that material facts were overlooked. Cinco's nine-month delay was adequately explained by fear of reprisal, and her detailed recollection was credible given her proximity to the events.
• Defense of Alibi: No. Alibi is inherently weak and must be established by proof of physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene. The crime scene was near Arellano University, and no class card or grading sheet was presented to substantiate the claim of taking an examination. Positive identification by a credible eyewitness prevails over alibi and denial.
• Evident Premeditation: No. All three requisites were satisfied: the determination to kill was overheard by Cinco at 11:30 a.m.; overt acts — hurrying toward the victim and drawing a weapon from a notebook — manifested clinging to that resolution; and two hours elapsed between determination and execution, sufficient for reflection.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The factual findings of the trial court on witness credibility are received on appeal with the highest respect, the trial judge having personally observed the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying. This assessment is binding in the absence of a clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court overlooked facts of substance that might affect the result. Appellant's attack on Cinco's nine-month delay was rejected because delay in divulging the perpetrator's name, if sufficiently reasoned, does not impair credibility; fear of reprisal is a valid cause for momentary silence. Her detailed recollection was deemed plausible because she was only about one meter from the accused when she overheard the plan and four to five meters away during the stabbing. The alleged falsehood regarding PBA bet collection on a Wednesday was dismissed as pertaining to an insignificant matter, and the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus was held not to be a mandatory rule of universal application but one to be applied only where the false portion pertains to a material point with conscious and deliberate intent to falsify. Robles's recantation was held not to render his prior testimony false, as the original testimony appeared credible, and affidavits of recantation are exceedingly unreliable, often secured from poor and ignorant witnesses for monetary consideration.

• Defense of Alibi: Alibi is an inherently weak defense due to the facility with which it can be fabricated. For alibi to prevail, it must be established by positive, clear, and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The trial court noted that the crime scene was not far from Arellano University, such that even granting the accused was initially at the university, he could have easily returned to the scene. The claim of taking an examination was unsubstantiated by documentary evidence such as a class card or grading sheet. Positive identification by Cinco, categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive, prevails over alibi and denial, which are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight when not substantiated by clear and convincing proof.

• Evident Premeditation: The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation requires three requisites: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow reflection upon the consequences. Appellant argued that the first requisite was based solely on Robles's retracted testimony. However, even without Robles's testimony, the first requisite was independently established by Cinco's account: at 11:30 a.m. she personally overheard the plan to kill someone at Funeraria Gloria, and at 1:30 p.m. she saw Bibat hurry toward the victim, draw a weapon from a notebook, and stab him. These overt acts clearly evinced clinging to the resolution to kill. Two hours elapsed between the overheard determination and the actual perpetration, sufficient for reflection. The Court cited People vs. Dumdum, where evident premeditation was appreciated with only one hour between conception and execution; here, two hours had elapsed.

• Trial Court's Credibility Assessment — The factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are received on appeal with the highest respect and are binding in the absence of a clear showing that they were reached arbitrarily or that the trial court overlooked facts of substance or value that might affect the result. The trial judge is in the best position to assess credibility, having personally observed the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying. Applied here to uphold the trial court's acceptance of Cinco's and Robles's testimonies.
• Delay in Reporting Due to Fear of Reprisal — Delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator, if sufficiently reasoned, does not impair the credibility of a witness or destroy the probative value of the testimony. Fear of reprisal is a valid cause for momentary silence. Applied here to sustain Cinco's credibility despite her nine-month delay in reporting.
• Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus — This maxim is not a positive rule of law of universal application and is not mandatory. It should not be applied to portions of testimony corroborated by other evidence, particularly where the false portions could be innocent mistakes. To completely disregard a witness's testimony on this ground, the testimony must have been false as to a material point, and the witness must have had a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify. Applied here to reject the argument that Cinco's alleged lie about PBA betting days invalidated her entire testimony.
• Requirements of Alibi — Alibi is inherently weak due to the facility of fabrication. To prevail, it must be established by positive, clear, and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, not merely that he was somewhere else. Applied here to reject Bibat's alibi because the crime scene was near Arellano University.
• Positive Identification over Alibi and Denial — Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness, prevails over alibi and denial, which are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Applied here where Cinco positively identified Bibat as the culprit.
• Unreliability of Affidavits of Recantation — Affidavits of recantation are exceedingly unreliable because they can be easily secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, and are most likely to be repudiated afterwards. A recantation does not by itself render prior testimony false or perjured where the original testimony appears credible and worthy of belief. Applied here to Robles's recantation.
• Requisites of Evident Premeditation — There is evident premeditation when: (1) the time when the offender determined (conceived) to commit the crime is shown; (2) an act manifestly indicates that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution allows the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The essence is that the execution is preceded by cool thought and reflection during a space of time sufficient to arrive at calm judgment. Applied here where two hours elapsed between the overheard plan and the killing.

• "In the matter of credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should be respected. The judge a quo was in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified and observed their deportment and manner of testifying." — This passage articulates the doctrinal basis for deference to trial courts on witness credibility, a principle central to the Court's resolution of the first issue.
• "Well-settled is the rule that for alibi to prevail, it must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that he was somewhere else." — This states the canonical formulation of the standard alibi must meet, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the defense of alibi.
• "The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment." — This defines the core of evident premeditation, distinguishing it from impulsive killing, and is the formulation applied to determine whether the two-hour interval sufficed.
• "Delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of the crime, if sufficiently reasoned out, does not impair the credibility of a witness and his testimony nor destroy its probative value. It has become judicial notice that fear of reprisal is a valid cause for the momentary silence of the prosecution witness." — This establishes that delayed reporting, when justified by fear, does not undermine credibility, directly addressing appellant's challenge to Cinco's nine-month silence.

• People vs. Dumdum, 92 SCRA 198 (1978) — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that evident premeditation may be appreciated where the accused conceived of the assault at least one hour before its perpetration. The Court used this as a benchmark, noting that in the present case two hours had elapsed.
• People vs. Pacapac, 248 SCRA 77 (1995) — Cited for the doctrine that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a positive rule of universal application and should not be applied where the false portions could be innocent mistakes.
• People vs. Morales, 241 SCRA 267 (1995) — Cited for the established rule that the trial court's factual findings on witness credibility are binding on appeal, having been reached with the advantage of personal observation of the witnesses.
• People vs. Magana, G.R. No. 105673 (1996) — Cited for the formulation that alibi must be established by proof of physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene, not merely that the accused was elsewhere.
• People vs. Amonia, 248 SCRA 486 (1995) — Cited for the doctrine that positive identification prevails over alibi and denial where the identification is categorical and consistent and no ill motive is shown.

• Revised Penal Code, Article 248 (Murder) — The crime of Murder, as charged in the Information, was committed with the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. The trial court sentenced the accused to reclusion perpetua, the penalty for Murder under the Revised Penal Code as then in force.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 14, paragraph 13 (Evident Premeditation) — The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was appreciated under this provision, the Court finding all three requisites satisfied: determination to commit the crime, overt acts manifesting clinging to that determination, and sufficient lapse of time for reflection.

Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Romero, and Kapunan, JJ., concurred.