People vs. Bernabe

The positive identification of the accused by credible eyewitnesses, whose testimonies are consistent on material points despite minor inconsistencies, suffices to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and prevails over bare defenses of denial, alibi, and physical incapacity; the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of cruelty having been proved, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under Republic Act No. 9346.

In the evening of 25 May 2005, Darwin Bernabe invited minors Alvin Tarrobago, Jomar Butalid, and three girls to his house in Las Piñas City for a drinking spree. The guests stayed overnight. Early the next morning, Bernabe woke Alvin and, while outside buying cigarettes, encountered Jann Michael Olivo. Bernabe accused Olivo of spying on him, forced him into his house, and subjected him to interrogation and escalating violence that ended in Olivo’s death by strangulation. Tarrobago and Butalid witnessed the killing and, after being threatened with death, helped dispose of the body. They later surrendered to the authorities and implicated Bernabe.

• The Incident: On the night of 25 May 2005, accused-appellant Darwin Bernabe invited Alvin Tarrobago (then 17 years old), Jomar Butalid (then 16 years old), and three girls to his house for a drinking spree. The guests slept over. At about 2:00 a.m. on 26 May 2005, Bernabe roused Alvin and asked him to come along to buy cigarettes. Outside, they met Jann Michael Olivo. Bernabe poked a gun at Olivo and ordered him back to his house.

• The Interrogation and Assault: Inside the house, Bernabe demanded, “Sino ang nagbayad sa iyo na subaybayan ako,” to which Olivo answered that no one had sent him. Jomar, from the bedroom, heard punching sounds and Olivo pleading, “Kuya Bong parang awa niyo na ho kahit dito na lang ako tumira sa inyo, huwag mo lang akong patayin.” Bernabe retorted, “Hindi naman kita papatayin, aminin mo lang sa akin kung sinong nagbayad sa iyo para subaybayan ako.” Peeping from the bedroom, Jomar saw Bernabe hit Olivo thrice with a piece of wood until it broke. Bernabe then ordered the weakened Olivo to undress, fetched lotion and a toothbrush from the kitchen, applied lotion on Olivo’s buttocks, and inserted the toothbrush into his anus, causing Olivo to scream in pain.

• The Killing: Bernabe continued interrogating Olivo and hit him twice on the head with a metal pipe. Olivo lost consciousness. Bernabe tied Olivo’s hands with a plastic straw, placed a gray shirt over his head, and strangled him with a G.I. wire (“alambre”). Bernabe called Alvin and Jomar to hold the struggling victim’s feet. Once Olivo stopped breathing, Bernabe placed the body inside two sacks, stored it in a corner of the house, and covered it with G.I. sheets.

• Disposal of the Body and Threats: On the afternoon of 26 May 2005, Bernabe and Alvin borrowed a sidecar from Prudencio Aristan. At dawn on 27 May 2005, Bernabe ordered Alvin and Jomar to load the body onto the sidecar and dump it. The two disposed of the corpse in a vacant lot on Guyabano Street, Golden Acres Subdivision, Talon Uno, Las Piñas. Bernabe then threatened to kill them if they reported the incident. Alvin and Jomar separated and went into hiding.

• Autopsy Findings: The body was recovered on 27 May 2005. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Ruperto J. Sambilon, Jr. disclosed ligature marks on the neck and wrists, a fractured trachea, Tardieu’s spots in the heart and lungs, and lacerations. The cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation.

• Surrender of Witnesses and Arrest of Accused-Appellant: On 3 June 2005, relatives arranged the surrender of Alvin and Jomar to the authorities. They narrated the events and executed Sinumpaang Salaysay on 4 June 2005. Accused-appellant was arrested on the evening of 3 June 2005 at his hideout in Las Piñas.

• Stipulations: The parties stipulated to the expert qualifications of Dr. Sambilon and the cause of death; the victim’s employment and burial expenses; the lack of personal knowledge of the arresting officer; and that accused-appellant and Alvin borrowed Aristan’s sidecar.

• Defense Version: Accused-appellant maintained that he allowed Alvin and Jomar to stay at his house to help clean the backyard, left them there while he visited his gamecocks, and upon returning at 2:00 a.m. found them arguing with an unknown man (the victim). He pacified the group, sent the victim away, and slept. The next day he noticed Alvin was nervous and later gave the two minors money from scrap sales before they left for Cavite. He denied killing the victim and claimed he could not strangle anyone because of a previous operation on his left hand’s 4th and 5th metacarpal bones in 2003. The Medical Records Supervisor produced the Record of Operation, and Dr. Francisco Raura testified that the affected fingers accounted for only a small percentage of hand function, leaving the first, second, and third fingers functional.

• Inconsistencies in Eyewitness Testimonies: Accused-appellant argued that the guilt of the accused had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because of material inconsistencies in the testimonies of Alvin and Jomar. Alvin testified that he saw the victim outside accused-appellant’s house, but on cross-examination stated they encountered him on Chico Street. Alvin claimed he witnessed the incident from inside the bedroom through a window facing the living room, yet on cross-examination admitted it was impossible to see the sala from that window. Jomar did not claim they were locked inside the room and stated he went out and saw the events. Accused-appellant contended these discrepancies rendered the testimonies unworthy of belief.

• Physical Incapacity: Accused-appellant maintained that he could not have strangled the victim because the bones of two fingers on his left hand had been broken in a surgical operation and he had lost total function of that hand.

• Conduct Indicative of Innocence: Accused-appellant stressed that Alvin and Jomar went into hiding after the incident, whereas he remained in his house, a behavior inconsistent with guilt. He argued that if he had been responsible, he would have fled.

• Credibility of Eyewitnesses: The prosecution countered that the inconsistencies were on minor details and did not impair the credibility of Alvin and Jomar on the central issue—that accused-appellant struck the victim with a metal pipe on the head and strangled him with a G.I. wire. The apparent attempt of both witnesses to downplay their own involvement did not destroy the probative weight of their consistent identification of the perpetrator.

• Treachery and Cruelty Attended the Killing: The prosecution established that the victim was unarmed, suddenly attacked, and deprived of any real chance to defend himself, satisfying treachery. Cruelty was present because accused-appellant deliberately augmented the victim’s suffering by subjecting him to gratuitous indignities and injuries beyond those necessary to cause death, such as inserting a toothbrush into his anus while he was already weakened.

• Alibi and Physical Incapacity Were Unsubstantiated: The alibi failed to prove physical impossibility; the manukan and Manuyo II were within Las Piñas City, only a few streets away. Dr. Raura’s testimony proved that the surgery did not incapacitate the first, second, and third fingers, leaving accused-appellant with sufficient hand function to strangle the victim.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the inconsistencies in the testimonies of eyewitnesses Alvin Tarrobago and Jomar Butalid negated accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Appreciation of Treachery and Cruelty: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstance of cruelty were properly appreciated.

• Defenses of Alibi and Physical Incapacity: Whether accused-appellant’s alibi and claim of physical incapability to commit strangulation warranted his acquittal.

• Penalty and Damages: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and the awards of civil indemnity, moral, exemplary, and temperate damages were correctly imposed.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of Alvin and Jomar did not impair their credibility. Both witnesses consistently identified accused-appellant as the one who struck the victim on the head with a metal pipe and strangled him with a G.I. wire. The discrepancies—such as whether they were locked inside the room or saw the crime from a window—were collateral to the principal occurrence and were attributable to their attempt to minimize their own participation. The trial court’s assessment of credibility was accorded great weight. The positive identification by the eyewitnesses prevailed over accused-appellant’s bare denial and alibi.

• Appreciation of Treachery and Cruelty: Treachery was established because the attack was sudden and unexpected, the victim was unarmed, and accused-appellant employed means—striking the legs to immobilize the victim, hitting the head with a pipe to render him unconscious, and then strangling him—that ensured execution without risk to the aggressor and without provocation. Cruelty as an aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 21 of the Revised Penal Code was also present. Accused-appellant deliberately augmented the victim’s suffering by inflicting humiliating injuries unnecessary for the killing, such as forcibly inserting a toothbrush into the victim’s anus while he was already weak and pleading for his life.

• Defenses of Alibi and Physical Incapacity: The defense of alibi failed because accused-appellant did not prove physical impossibility of his presence at the scene. The places he claimed to have been were only a few streets away in the same city. Alibi and denial, being inherently weak and easily fabricated, cannot overcome positive identification by credible witnesses. The claim of physical incapacity was contradicted by the testimony of Dr. Francisco Raura, who stated that only the fourth and fifth metacarpal bones were affected and that the first, second, and third fingers remained functional, leaving accused-appellant capable of using his left hand.

• Penalty and Damages: Murder under Article 248 is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. With treachery qualifying the killing and the aggravating circumstance of cruelty present with no mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty was death. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, however, the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. The awards of damages were modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence: civil indemnity was fixed at ₱75,000.00, moral damages increased to ₱75,000.00, exemplary damages raised to ₱30,000.00, and temperate damages retained at ₱25,000.00, all with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality until full payment. The claim for loss of earning capacity was denied for insufficient proof.

• Credibility of Eyewitnesses Despite Inconsistencies — Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant. Slight contradictions, far from destroying probative value, may even indicate that the responses are honest and unrehearsed.

• Alibi and Physical Impossibility — For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Distances of two, three, or even five kilometers are not regarded as precluding presence at the crime scene, even on foot.

• Treachery — Treachery exists when the offender commits the crime against a victim who has not been afforded an opportunity to defend himself; it is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation that qualifies the killing to murder.

• Aggravating Circumstance of Cruelty — Under Article 14, paragraph 21 of the Revised Penal Code, cruelty is present when the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing another wrong not necessary for its execution, or when the offender inhumanly increases the victim’s suffering or outrages or scoffs at his person or corpse. The test is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing injury beyond what was needed to commit the felony.

• Penalty Under Republic Act No. 9346 — Where the imposable penalty for a crime is death but such penalty is prohibited by R.A. No. 9346, the sentence is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

• Damages in Murder Cases — Upon a conviction for murder, civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00, moral damages of ₱75,000.00, exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00, and temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 are awarded when actual damages are less than ₱25,000.00, all with legal interest.

• "The Court has held that although there may be inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details, they do not impair their credibility where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants." — This passage encapsulates the rule on assessing testimonial inconsistencies.

• "The test in appreciating cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission and inhumanly increased the victim’s suffering or outraged or scoffed at his/her person or corpse." — This defines the standard applied in finding the accused’s acts constituted cruelty.

• "It is jurisprudentially-embedded that where the distance between the scene of the crime and the alleged whereabouts of the accused is only two (2) kilometers, three (3) kilometers, or even five (5) kilometers, the same are not considered to be too far as to preclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis." — This sets the threshold for physical impossibility in alibi defenses.

• "Different people react differently to a given situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, or frightful experience." — Used to reject the argument that the witnesses’ flight and hiding indicated their guilt.

• People v. Togahan, G.R. No. 174064, 8 June 2007 — Followed for the principle that minor inconsistencies in witness testimony do not dilute credibility and may even indicate honest, unrehearsed responses.

• People v. Simon, G.R. No. 130531, 27 May 2004 — Relied upon to reject a standard behavioral expectation for witnesses; the Court reiterated that different persons react dissimilarly to traumatic events, and delay or reluctance in reporting does not automatically impair credibility.

• People v. Crisanto, G.R. No. 120701, 19 June 2001 — Cited to emphasize that distances of a few kilometers are insufficient to establish physical impossibility for the purpose of alibi.

• People v. Bonito, G.R. No. 128002, 10 October 2000 — Applied to affirm the appreciation of cruelty where the victim was already weak and near death and the accused further inserted a foreign object into a bodily orifice, inhumanly increasing suffering.

• People v. Regalario, G.R. No. 174483, 31 March 2009 — Used to fix the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in accordance with current jurisprudence.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder; the provision imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The killing of Jann Michael Olivo was found to be qualified by treachery, bringing it within this provision.

• Article 14, paragraph 21, Revised Penal Code — Defines cruelty as an aggravating circumstance; it was applied because the accused deliberately augmented the victim’s suffering by inserting a toothbrush into his anus while the victim was already defenseless and pleading for mercy.

• Article 12, Revised Penal Code — Provides exempting circumstances, including compulsion of irresistible force or uncontrollable fear. The trial court invoked this provision to explain that even if Alvin and Jomar had held the victim’s legs, they would have been exempt from criminal liability because they acted under fear.

• Republic Act No. 9346 — “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.” Because the presence of treachery and cruelty warranted the death penalty, the statute mandated reduction of the sentence to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, and Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin concurred. Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro served as Acting Chairperson of the First Division.

None.