People vs. Bernabe

Unlawful taking of a motor vehicle is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing with intent to gain through violence, even if initial possession was lawful, and an extrajudicial confession made voluntarily to a private individual without police coercion is admissible in evidence.

Artemio Garcia, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe rented a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX from Fernando Ignacio through Joselito Cortez for a trip to Bicol, with Wilfredo Elis as the driver. Four days after their departure, the two were spotted attempting to sell the vehicle for a grossly inadequate price in Tarlac. Upon their apprehension, they failed to produce documents of ownership. Cortez visited them in detention, where they admitted to stabbing Elis and dumping his body after he refused to join their plan to sell the vehicle. Elis's cadaver was later found with fatal stab wounds.

• The Lease: Garcia and Bernabe approached Cortez to borrow his van for a Bicol trip. Cortez instead leased Ignacio's Tamaraw FX for P2,000 a day, sub-leasing it to the accused for P4,000 a day inclusive of the driver's fee. On December 18, 1996, Elis drove the accused to Bicol.
• The Apprehension: On December 23, 1996, police in Tarlac reported two suspicious persons selling a vehicle for P50,000. The accused were traced to Nueva Ecija and apprehended when they failed to produce ownership documents.
• The Admissions and Discovery: In detention, Garcia and Bernabe separately admitted to Cortez that they stabbed Elis and dumped him because he refused to join their plan to sell the vehicle. Garcia pointed to the location, but the body was not immediately found. Cortez found bloodstains and Elis's belongings in the vehicle. On December 29, 1996, Elis's body was found submerged in mud. Autopsy revealed six stab wounds.
• The Defense: The accused claimed Elis bumped a jeepney and they left him on the highway to inform Cortez, while they proceeded to Nueva Ecija to repair the dent. Garcia, however, contradicted Bernabe by testifying there was no such damage.

• Elements of Carnapping: Appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove all elements of carnapping because possession of the vehicle was initially lawful.
• Conspiracy: Appellant maintained that there was no evidence of a prior agreement to commit carnapping.
• Admissibility of Admission: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in admitting his alleged admission to private individuals, claiming he did not make the admission, that his co-accused's admission should not prejudice him, and that any admission was made under duress and intimidation.

• Admissibility of Admission: Respondent countered that the admission was made freely and voluntarily to a private individual, making constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation inapplicable.
• Adoptive Admission: Respondent argued that appellant's silence when his co-accused confessed in his presence constituted an adoptive admission, as it was a situation that naturally called for a comment or denial if untrue.

• Elements of Carnapping: Whether the crime of carnapping was established despite the initially lawful possession of the vehicle.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy to commit carnapping was adequately proven.
• Admissibility of Admission: Whether the extrajudicial admission made to a private individual is admissible against the appellant.

• Elements of Carnapping: The elements of carnapping were established. The unlawful killing of the driver to appropriate the vehicle transformed the initially lawful possession into an unlawful taking through violence. Unlawful taking is complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the vehicle with intent to gain, even without opportunity to dispose of it. It is also immaterial that the victim was the driver and not the owner, as actual possession by the person dispossessed suffices.
• Conspiracy: Conspiracy was proven by circumstantial evidence. The concerted actions of the accused—renting the vehicle, attempting to sell it at a grossly inadequate price, and failing to produce ownership documents—form an unbroken chain indicative of a joint purpose and concurrence of sentiments.
• Admissibility of Admission: The admission was admissible. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation apply only to questioning by authorities and do not bar spontaneous, voluntary statements to private individuals. Furthermore, appellant's silence when his co-accused admitted to the crime in his presence constitutes an adoptive admission under Rule 130, Section 32 of the Rules of Court, as such a declaration naturally calls for a denial if untrue. Bare allegations of duress are insufficient to overturn this presumption.

• Unlawful Taking in Carnapping — Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the vehicle with intent to gain, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Initially lawful possession is radicalized into unlawful taking when violence is employed to appropriate the vehicle. It is not necessary that the person divested of the property be the owner; actual possession by the victim suffices.
• Admissibility of Confessions to Private Individuals — Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution apply only to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state. Spontaneous statements, not elicited through questioning by authorities but given in an ordinary manner to private individuals, are admissible.
• Adoptive Admission by Silence — Under Rule 130, Section 32 of the Rules of Court, an act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing, when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.

• "Unlawful taking is the taking of a vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same."
• "What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, and not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth."
• "In crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed suffices."

• People v. Andan, 336 Phil. 91 (1997) — Followed. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements given in an ordinary manner to private individuals, not elicited through questioning by authorities.
• People v. Panabang, G.R. Nos. 137514-15, 16 January 2002 — Followed. A self-serving statement is insufficient to prove loss of earning capacity; indemnification must be duly proven by evidence.
• People v. Ellasos, 411 Phil 139 (2001) — Followed. Cited for the definition of unlawful taking in carnapping.
• People v. Gavina, 332 Phil. 488 (1996) — Followed. Cited for the rule that it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of property be the owner; actual possession suffices.

• Republic Act No. 6539, Section 2 — Defines "carnapping" as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. Applied to characterize the accused's actions after they killed the driver.
• Republic Act No. 6539, Section 14 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20 — Prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when the owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the course of the carnapping. Applied to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
• Rule 130, Section 32 of the Rules of Court — Provides that an act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing of a party who does or says nothing, when the declaration naturally calls for action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against him. Applied to hold that appellant's silence when his co-accused confessed constituted an adoptive admission.
• Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the rights of a person under investigation for the commission of an offense. Interpreted to apply only against state coercion, not to prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth to private individuals.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.