People vs. Benito

When two mitigating circumstances offset two aggravating circumstances in a conviction for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the penalty must be imposed in its medium period — reclusion perpetua — pursuant to Article 64 of the same Code.

The accused, Alberto Benito y Restubog, was a clerk at the Civil Service Commission, while the victim, Pedro Moncayo Jr., served as Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction and Acting Chief of the Administrative Division of the same office. The accused faced criminal and administrative charges involving his honesty and integrity, which he believed were fabricated by the victim. A decision in the administrative case ordering the accused's dismissal had been rendered immediately executory, but the accused appealed and was later exonerated by the Civil Service Board of Appeals in its decision of February 17, 1971. The accused attributed his joblessness and misfortunes to the victim, providing the motive for the killing.

At about 5:30 p.m. on December 12, 1969, the victim Pedro Moncayo Jr., Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction and Acting Chief of the Administrative Division of the Civil Service Commission, was driving his car on P. Paredes Street in front of the Office of the Civil Service Commission in Manila. The accused, Alberto Benito y Restubog, followed the victim's car, and when it was about to turn at the intersection of P. Paredes and Lepanto Streets, the accused shot him eight times with a .22 caliber revolver, causing the victim's death. The victim was then 36 years of age and earning P7,597.80 per annum.

The accused was charged with murder. When the case was called for trial, through counsel de parte, he manifested his desire to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty and substitute it with a plea of guilty without prejudice to proving mitigating circumstances. The prosecution manifested that it would controvert whatever mitigating circumstances the accused would prove and would also prove other aggravating circumstances. The trial court repeatedly explained to the accused the nature and consequences of his plea of guilty to the offense charged and warned him that the maximum penalty imposable is death. Notwithstanding the explanation and warning, the accused, assisted by his counsel de parte, entered a plea of guilty upon re-arraignment. The accused then presented evidence to prove mitigating circumstances, and the prosecution introduced evidence to prove aggravating circumstances not mentioned in the information.

The accused's own declaration, marked as Exhibit "A," narrated fully his several attempts to talk with the deceased regarding his administrative case, how he was rebuffed and even insulted, and that he was jobless after having been dismissed from the office on allegedly fabricated charges made by the deceased. These admissions provided a strong motive for the accused to plan retaliation against the victim. The accused admitted that he had with him a .22 caliber revolver on the afternoon of December 12, 1969, that when he saw the victim driving his car on P. Paredes Street he followed him up to the corner of P. Paredes and Lepanto Streets, and that he shot the victim eight times suddenly and without any warning.

Immediately after the shooting, the accused, having all the opportunity to escape, did not do so but instead called up the Manila Police Department. When the policemen went to the scene to investigate, the accused voluntarily approached them and, without revealing his identity, told them that he would help in connection with the case as he knew the suspect and the latter's motive. When brought to the police station as a possible witness, he confided to the investigators that he was "voluntarily surrendering" and "also surrendering the fatal gun used in the shooting of the victim." The trial court found him guilty as principal in the crime of murder qualified by treachery, with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and disregard of respect due to the offended party on account of his rank, offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, and sentenced him to death.

• Voluntary Surrender: The accused argued that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be credited in his favor, as he did not flee after the shooting but instead called the Manila Police Department, approached the responding officers, and eventually confided that he was voluntarily surrendering together with the fatal weapon.
• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense: The accused contended that the crime was committed in immediate vindication of a grave offense done by the victim, specifically an alleged remark made at about 11:00 a.m. on December 12, 1969, that the Civil Service Commission is a hangout of thieves, which the accused felt alluded to him because he was then facing criminal and administrative charges involving his honesty and integrity.
• Sufficient Provocation or Threat Immediately Preceding the Act: The accused claimed that the victim uttered a provocative statement in Tagalog at about 7:00 p.m. on December 11, 1969 — "Umalis ka na nga diyan baka may mangyari pa sa iyo at baka ipayari kita dito" — which constituted sufficient provocation or threat immediately preceding the act.
• Disregard of Rank: The accused assailed the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank on the ground that at the time of the commission of the murder, he was no longer connected with the Civil Service Commission, as the decision in the administrative case ordering his dismissal had become effective on February 16, 1966.
• Evident Premeditation: The accused argued that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation should not be considered against him because the prosecution's evidence failed to establish its elements, and that the prosecution waived the effect of his unconditional plea of guilty by adducing evidence on the matter.

• Voluntary Surrender: The Solicitor General agreed that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in the accused's favor, acknowledging that the accused's acts after the shooting were strongly indicative of his intent to surrender voluntarily.
• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense: The appellee argued that the victim's remark, even if actually uttered in the presence of the accused, could not be considered a grave offense against the latter, as it was general in nature and not specifically directed to the accused.
• Sufficient Provocation: The appellee contended that provocation or threat, to constitute a mitigating circumstance, must be "sufficient" — that is, adequate to excite the person to commit the wrong, proportionate to its gravity, and must immediately precede the act.
• Disregard of Rank: The appellee maintained that the aggravating circumstance was properly considered, as the accused recognized the deceased as his superior officer when he saw and talked with him regarding his administrative case, and that as a generic aggravating circumstance it could be proven even if not alleged in the information without violating the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the charge.

• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be credited in favor of the accused.
• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense: Whether the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense was established by the alleged insulting remark of the victim.
• Sufficient Provocation or Threat: Whether the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat immediately preceding the act was established by the victim's alleged statement on the night before the killing.
• Disregard of Rank: Whether the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was properly considered against the accused notwithstanding that his dismissal from the service had become effective prior to the commission of the crime and that the circumstance was not alleged in the information.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was properly considered against the accused despite his claim that the prosecution's evidence failed to establish its elements.

• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was credited in favor of the accused, as his acts immediately after the shooting — calling the police, approaching the responding officers, and eventually confiding that he was voluntarily surrendering with the fatal weapon — clearly indicated his intent to surrender.
• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense: No. The victim's remark that the Civil Service Commission is a hangout of thieves was general in nature, not specifically directed at the accused, and at most constituted mere provocation rather than a grave offense; moreover, the killing occurred more than six hours later, negating the element of immediacy.
• Sufficient Provocation or Threat: No. The alleged provocative statement uttered almost twenty-four hours before the killing was not accompanied by any overt act and did not immediately precede the shooting, rendering it inadequate as a mitigating circumstance.
• Disregard of Rank: Yes. The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was properly considered, as the accused recognized the deceased as his superior officer; being a generic aggravating circumstance, it could be proven and appreciated even if not alleged in the information.
• Evident Premeditation: Yes. The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was properly considered, as the accused's own declaration established his motive, planning, and deliberate execution of the killing, and he had pleaded guilty unconditionally after being specifically warned of this aggravating circumstance.

• Voluntary Surrender: The requisites of voluntary surrender were satisfied: the accused had not been actually arrested, he surrendered to a person in authority, and his surrender was spontaneous, indicating his intent to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities. Immediately after the shooting, the accused had every opportunity to escape but did not do so, instead calling the Manila Police Department. When the policemen arrived, he voluntarily approached them and offered to help, and when brought to the police station, he confided that he was "voluntarily surrendering" and surrendering the fatal gun. While he did not immediately identify himself as the assassin — perhaps due to shock from the enormity of his crime — all his acts were strongly indicative of his intent to surrender voluntarily. Both the accused and the Solicitor General were agreed on this point.

• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense: The mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense requires that the offense done by the victim be grave and that the retaliatory act follow immediately or proximately. The victim's alleged remark that the Civil Service Commission is a hangout of thieves was general in nature and not specifically directed at the accused. If the accused felt alluded to, that was his own individual reaction; others who heard the remark could not have known it was directed at him unless they were aware of the pending charges against him. At most, the remark might be considered mere provocation, not a grave offense. Furthermore, the remark was uttered at 11:00 a.m. while the killing occurred at 5:30 p.m. of the same day, giving the accused several hours to reflect and hold his temper. The juridical reason for appreciating this mitigating circumstance is the law's recognition of human weakness such that a sufficiently provoked person would immediately retaliate; but here, the act of killing could not reasonably be attributed to an immediate retaliatory action. The accused's failure to immediately react might even be taken as his ignoring the remark altogether.

• Sufficient Provocation or Threat: For provocation or threat to constitute a mitigating circumstance, it must be "sufficient" — adequate to excite the person to commit the wrong, proportionate to its gravity — and must immediately precede the act. The alleged statement uttered at about 7:00 p.m. on December 11, 1969, was made almost twenty-four hours before the killing. It was not accompanied by any overt act against the accused, and nothing more happened that night. The accused could not have felt sufficiently provoked or threatened so as to immediately react. When he shot the victim the next day, it was a deliberate act of vengeance, not the natural reaction of a human being to ward off a serious threat or to immediately retaliate when provoked. The provocation did not immediately precede the shooting.

• Disregard of Rank: The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was properly appreciated. The accused was a clerk in the Civil Service Commission and the victim was Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the same office. When the accused saw and talked with the deceased regarding his administrative case — which proved to be the motive for the murder — he made it obvious that he recognized the deceased as his superior officer. The fact that the accused's dismissal had been made immediately executory was of no moment, since he appealed that decision and the case was still pending, and he was later completely exonerated. Furthermore, disregard of rank is a generic aggravating circumstance, not a qualifying circumstance, and may be proven and appreciated even if not alleged in the information. Its consideration did not violate the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him for murder.

• Evident Premeditation: The accused's own declaration, Exhibit "A," fully narrated his several attempts to talk with the deceased, how he was rebuffed and insulted, and that he was jobless after dismissal on allegedly fabricated charges made by the deceased. These admissions provided a strong motive for the accused to plan retaliation. The accused pleaded guilty unconditionally after the trial court specifically called his attention to the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation before re-arraignment, and after the fiscal had rejected counsel's proposal to delete this circumstance from the information. The accused was fully aware of the consequences of his plea. His admission that he carried a .22 caliber revolver, followed the victim's car, and shot him eight times suddenly and without warning spoke eloquently of his plan, generated by an all-consuming hatred, to kill the person he considered responsible for his misfortunes. The prosecution successfully proved the existence of evident premeditation, defeating the accused's argument that the plea of guilty waived the need for such proof.

• Voluntary Surrender as a Mitigating Circumstance — Voluntary surrender requires that the accused has not been actually arrested, surrenders to a person in authority, and does so spontaneously, indicating unconditional intent to submit. The accused's acts immediately after the crime — not fleeing despite opportunity, calling the police, approaching responding officers, and eventually declaring that he was voluntarily surrendering with the weapon — satisfied these requisites even though he did not immediately identify himself as the perpetrator.

• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense — For this mitigating circumstance to apply, the offense done by the victim must be grave and the retaliatory act must follow immediately or proximately. A general remark not specifically directed at the accused, which the accused subjectively felt alluded to him, constitutes at most mere provocation and not a grave offense. A lapse of more than six hours between the remark and the killing negates the element of immediacy, as the law recognizes this circumstance based on the weakness of human nature in immediately retaliating when sufficiently provoked.

• Sufficient Provocation or Threat Immediately Preceding the Act — Provocation or threat must be "sufficient," meaning adequate to excite the person to commit the wrong and proportionate to its gravity, and must immediately precede the act. A statement uttered almost twenty-four hours before the killing, unaccompanied by any overt act, does not satisfy the requirement of immediacy; the killing becomes a deliberate act of vengeance rather than a natural reaction to provocation.

• Generic vs. Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances — A generic aggravating circumstance, unlike a qualifying circumstance, does not change the nature or affect the gravity of the crime and may be proven and taken into consideration even if not alleged in the information. Its appreciation does not violate the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, because it affects only the penalty and not the nature of the offense charged.

• Effect of Unconditional Plea of Guilty on Aggravating Circumstances Alleged in the Information — When an accused pleads guilty unconditionally to an offense after being specifically warned of an aggravating circumstance expressly alleged in the information, and the prosecution independently proves the existence of that circumstance through evidence including the accused's own declaration, the aggravating circumstance is properly appreciated. The prosecution's introduction of evidence does not constitute a waiver of the effect of the plea; rather, it reinforces the finding.

• "The juridical reason for appreciating this mitigating circumstance is the implied recognition by the law of the weakness of human nature such that an ordinary human being if sufficiently provoked would immediately retaliate in the unchristian spirit of vindictive retribution." — This passage articulates the doctrinal basis for the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, explaining why the law recognizes human frailty in the face of sufficient provocation and why immediacy is an essential element.

• "provocation or threat to constitute a mitigating circumstance, must, in the language of the law, be 'sufficient', that is, adequate to excite the person to commit the wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity and must also immediately precede the act." — This is the canonical formulation of the requisites for provocation or threat as a mitigating circumstance, defining both the sufficiency and immediacy requirements.

• "this is a generic aggravating circumstance, and not a qualifying circumstance that would change the nature or affect the gravity of the crime committed, but one which is capable of being proven and taken into consideration even if it was not alleged in the information." — This passage distinguishes generic from qualifying aggravating circumstances and establishes that generic aggravating circumstances need not be alleged in the information to be appreciated.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder. At the time of the case, murder was punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The provision was applied to classify the accused's crime as murder qualified by treachery, establishing the range of penalties from which the proper penalty was determined based on the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of penalties when mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present. Pursuant to this provision, when two mitigating circumstances offset two aggravating circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its medium period. The Court applied this rule to reduce the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, the medium period of the penalty prescribed for murder under Article 248.

Fernando, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, and Aquino, JJ., concurred in full. Castro and Teehankee, JJ., concurred in the result. Makalintal, C.J., was on leave.

Barredo, J. (concurring separately) — Was of the opinion that the appellant should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense, which would correspondingly lower the penalty further. In all other respects, concurred with the majority.

Muñoz Palma, J. (concurring separately) — Concurred with the majority except on Part IV regarding the aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," to which disagreement was expressed.