People vs. Bello

Passion and obfuscation is a mitigating circumstance even where the accused and the deceased lived together without the benefit of marriage, provided the passion arises from a legitimate, morally defensible emotion — such as the desire for a monogamous relationship — rather than from vicious or unworthy motives. The accused's rage at being publicly humiliated and rejected by his common-law wife, who chose to continue a life of gainful promiscuity, does not fall within the prohibition against passion arising from "vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions."

Guillermo Bello, a widower approximately fifty-four years of age, lived as common-law husband of Alicia Cervantes, a woman about twenty-four years old, from September 17, 1954 until the events leading to her death on May 20, 1958. Bello had no substantial livelihood except making kaingin and was in financial straits; he had induced Alicia to accept employment as an entertainer at Maring's Place, a bar and restaurant in Gumaca, Quezon. The case was tried in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, which convicted Bello of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to death by electrocution, prompting this appeal.

Guillermo Bello, a widower of about fifty-four years, took Alicia Cervantes, a young peasant woman of about twenty-four, as his common-law wife on September 17, 1954. They lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage and bore no children. Bello had no substantial livelihood except making kaingin, and being in financial straits, he induced Alicia to accept employment as an entertainer — a public hostess — at a bar and restaurant known as Maring's Place, situated at the corner of Aguinaldo and Bonifacio Streets in Gumaca, Quezon. Alicia entered that service on May 15, 1958. Infatuated with his young bride, Bello watched her movements at Maring's Place every day. The following day, May 16, he saw Alicia enter the Gumaca theater with a man whom he later found was caressing her inside the movie house. He took her out and warned her to be more discreet in her personal conduct, but Alicia continued to serve at Maring's Place as a public hostess.

On May 20, 1958, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, Bello went to Maring's Place to ask Alicia for some money. Both Maring, the owner, and Alicia refused. Maring told him to forget Alicia completely because he was already an old man, an invalid besides, and should stop bothering her. Having failed to obtain financial assistance, Bello left somewhat despondent and walked home along Bonifacio Street. On the way he met the brothers Justo and Luis Marasigan, who greeted him. Luis remarked to Justo, "So this is the man whose wife is being used by Maring for white slave trade." These words brought grief to Bello, who sought out Paty's place in Gumaca and drank five glasses of tuba. From there he went to Realistic Studio, situated in front of Maring's Place, and watched Alicia's movements from that vantage point.

At about nine o'clock that night, Bello entered Maring's Place and, without much ado, held Alicia from behind with his left hand and stabbed her several times with a balisong. He inflicted four wounds — one in the back, one in the breast, one in the hypogastric region, and one in the left wrist — as shown in the certificate of the Municipal Health Officer. Seeing Alicia fallen and believing her mortally wounded, he fled and went to the municipal building, where he surrendered himself to the police of Gumaca. The trial court found the stab in the back to have been inflicted as Alicia was running away. Both prosecution and defense agreed that the crime committed was not murder but only homicide, though they disagreed on the circumstances.

• Crime and Circumstances: The defense maintained that the crime was only homicide, not murder, and that the accused was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation in addition to voluntary surrender, because the deceased's flat rejection of his entreaties to quit her calling as a hostess and return to their former relation, aggravated by her sneering statement that the accused was penniless and invalid, provoked him into losing his head and stabbing her.

• Crime and Circumstances: The prosecution held that the crime was homicide aggravated by abuse of superior strength, offset by voluntary surrender. The State disputed the defense's claim of passion and obfuscation, relying on the rule that passion and obfuscation cannot be considered when arising from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.

• Qualifying Circumstances: Whether treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength were present to qualify the killing as murder.
• Generic Aggravating Circumstances: Whether nighttime and abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness were properly appreciated as aggravating circumstances.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Passion and Obfuscation: Whether the accused was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation notwithstanding the immoral nature of his common-law relationship with the deceased.

• Qualifying Circumstances: No. Treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength were not established, so the crime could only be homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Generic Aggravating Circumstances: No. Nighttime did not aggravate because the accused did not seek or take advantage of it, the place being bright and well-lighted; abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness found no factual basis in the record.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Passion and Obfuscation: Yes. The accused's passion arose from a morally defensible desire for a monogamous relationship, not from vicious or unworthy motives, and was sufficiently provoked by the deceased's insulting rejection and the public humiliation he suffered.

• Qualifying Circumstances: Treachery could not be imputed because the stab wound in the back was inflicted as Alicia was running away and formed part of a continuous, indiscriminate aggression — the four wounds were inflicted without regard to which portion of the body was attacked. Under People vs. Cañete, 44 Phil. 478, treachery cannot attach where the attack is not deliberately and consciously planned to ensure the victim's defenselessness. Evident premeditation likewise failed because the accused had long carried the balisong as a precaution against drunkards, without any present plan to use it against Alicia; his daily surveillance of her movements manifested jealousy but no evidence showed that a plan to kill sprouted from it. Abuse of superior strength was not established because the accused was old and an invalid, while Alicia was in the prime of her youth; although he was armed with a balisong, the relative physiques of the parties negated any clear superiority, and the emotional excitement of the accused precluded a finding of deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength.

• Generic Aggravating Circumstances: Nighttime did not aggravate the crime because the accused did not seek or take advantage of darkness — Maring's Place was bright and well-lighted — consistent with U.S. vs. Ramos, 2 Phil. 434, and U.S. vs. Bonete, 40 Phil. 958. Abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness found no support in the record: nothing showed that the assailant and his common-law wife reposed any special confidence in one another that could be abused, or that any gratitude was owed by one to the other bearing relation to the crime. The disparity in age and financial capacity between them did not supply this element, since both lived together as husband and wife.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Passion and Obfuscation: The State opposed the mitigating circumstance on the authority of U.S. vs. Hicks, 14 Phil. 217, which bars passion and obfuscation arising from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions. The defense's position was sustained, however, because the accused's passion was provoked by legitimate moral sentiments. The deceased's loose conduct had been previously driven home to the accused when he found her being caressed by a stranger in a movie house, and on the very day of the crime, Marasigan's public remark that she was being used for prostitution deeply wounded him. Alicia's insulting refusal to renew their liaison was not motivated by any desire to lead a chaste life but by her determination to pursue a lucrative profession that permitted her to distribute her favors indiscriminately. The accused's insistence that she live with him again and his rage at her rejection could not be properly qualified as arising from immoral and unworthy passions, because even without benefit of wedlock, a monogamous liaison is morally of a higher level than gainful promiscuity.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery cannot be appreciated where the attack is not deliberately and consciously planned to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to the aggressor. Where stab wounds are inflicted indiscriminately and one wound to the back is inflicted as the victim is running away, the attack is part of a continuous aggression and does not constitute treachery. Applied to reject treachery where the accused stabbed his victim several times without regard to which part of the body was attacked.

• Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation requires proof of a present plan or intent to kill, not merely a jealous disposition or habitual surveillance of the victim. The long possession of a weapon carried for a different purpose (precaution against drunkards) does not establish premeditation to kill.

• Abuse of Superior Strength — Abuse of superior strength requires a deliberate intent to take advantage of superiority, not merely the possession of a weapon. The relative physiques of the parties must be considered; where the aggressor is old and invalid and the victim is young and able, and the aggressor acted under emotional excitement, deliberate intent to exploit superior strength is not shown.

• Nighttime as Aggravating Circumstance — Nighttime aggravates only when the accused deliberately sought or took advantage of darkness to ensure the execution of the crime. Where the scene of the crime was bright and well-lighted, nighttime does not aggravate.

• Passion and Obfuscation — Passion and obfuscation is mitigating when the accused acted upon a provocation sufficiently strong to cause passion, provided the passion does not arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral motives. A monogamous liaison, even without the benefit of marriage, is morally superior to gainful promiscuity; thus, the accused's rage at his common-law wife's insulting rejection of his plea to resume their monogamous relationship and abandon her work as a hostess arises from a morally defensible emotion and qualifies as passion and obfuscation.

• "Even without benefit of wedlock, a monogamous liaison appears morally of a higher level than gainful promiscuity." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for recognizing passion and obfuscation: that the accused's emotional response, rooted in a desire for a monogamous relationship, is morally defensible and not "vicious, unworthy, and immoral" within the meaning of the rule excluding such passions from mitigation.

• "Possession of a balisong gives an aggressor a formidable advantage over the unarmed victim, but the physique of the aggressor ought also to be considered." — This defines the analytical framework for abuse of superior strength, requiring consideration of both the weapon employed and the relative physical condition of the parties, and precluding the circumstance where deliberate intent to exploit superiority is not shown.

• "The four (4) stab wounds ... were inflicted indiscriminately, without regard as to which portion of her body was the subject of attack. The trial court itself found that the stab in the back was inflicted as Alicia was running away. For this reason, treachery cannot be imputed." — This passage states the rule that indiscriminate, continuous aggression — including wounds inflicted as the victim flees — does not constitute the deliberate and conscious employment of means to ensure execution without risk that treachery requires.

• People vs. Cañete, 44 Phil. 478 — Cited as authority for the proposition that treachery cannot be imputed where the attack is not deliberately planned to ensure the victim's defenselessness, particularly where a wound to the back is inflicted as the victim is running away.

• U.S. vs. Ramos, 2 Phil. 434 — Cited for the rule that nighttime does not aggravate when the accused did not seek or take advantage of it, the place of the crime being bright and well-lighted.

• U.S. vs. Bonete, 40 Phil. 958 — Cited alongside U.S. vs. Ramos for the same proposition regarding nighttime as an aggravating circumstance.

• U.S. vs. Hicks, 14 Phil. 217 — Cited by the State for the rule that passion and obfuscation cannot be considered when arising from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions; the Court distinguished and declined to apply the rule on the facts of this case.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes the crime of murder. The trial court convicted the accused under this article, but the Supreme Court found that the qualifying circumstances necessary to elevate homicide to murder were absent.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes the crime of homicide. The accused was found guilty under this article, the killing not being qualified by any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248.

• Mitigating Circumstances under the Revised Penal Code — Voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation were both appreciated as mitigating circumstances, warranting the imposition of an indeterminate sentence within the range of prision mayor.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concurred.