People vs. Bellaflor

A decision rendered by a Regional Trial Court judge remains valid although promulgated after the judge’s temporary assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction, because the judge has not vacated judicial office and retains authority under Section 9, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. An acquittal that rests solely on the supposed nullity of a prior judgment without expressing the facts and law on which it is based is an empty judgment and does not bar reprosecution.

Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, acting as assisting judge of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, Branch 28, fully heard and tried Criminal Case No. DU-1805 against Reuben Albaño for arson. The parties rested their case before him. On February 4, 1991, he was designated Assisting Judge in the National Capital Judicial Region and directed to hold office at the Office of the Court Administrator in Manila. He subsequently rendered a written decision dated February 6, 1991, convicting Albaño. By May 3, 1991, when the decision was finally promulgated, Judge Rodolfo M. Bellaflor had already taken over as assisting judge at the Mandaue City court.

• Procedural posture: Reuben Albaño was charged with arson in Criminal Case No. DU-1805 before RTC Mandaue City, Branch 28. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits was completed, and the parties rested their case before Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, who presided as assisting judge.

• Judge Fortun’s transfer: On February 4, 1991, while the case was submitted for decision, Judge Fortun was designated via Administrative Order No. 10-91 (amended by A.O. No. 10-91A) as Assisting Judge of the Regional Trial Court in the National Capital Judicial Region, directed to hold office at the Office of the Court Administrator in Manila, and specifically to assist Judge Ricardo Diaz of RTC Branch 27, NCJR.

• Change of presiding judge: On March 13, 1991, Judge Rodolfo M. Bellaflor was assigned as the replacement assisting judge of RTC Mandaue City, Branch 28, where the criminal case was pending.

• Promulgation and motion for reconsideration: Judge Fortun had prepared and signed a decision dated February 6, 1991, convicting Albaño of arson. That decision was not promulgated until May 3, 1991, by which time Judge Bellaflor was already the presiding judge. On May 9, 1991, Albaño filed a motion for reconsideration before Judge Bellaflor, arguing principally that the decision was void because it was promulgated after Judge Fortun had ceased to be the incumbent judge of Branch 28.

• Resolution acquitting accused: On June 26, 1991, Judge Bellaflor issued a resolution that: (a) declared Judge Fortun’s decision null and void for having been promulgated after Fortun had vacated his post; (b) denied the other grounds of the motion for lack of merit; and (c) acquitted Albaño of the crime charged. The resolution contained no discussion of the evidence or the merits of the arson charge; it rested entirely on the supposed nullity of Fortun’s decision. The People moved for reconsideration of this resolution, but it was denied.

• Petition to the Supreme Court: The People, through the Solicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging that Judge Bellaflor acted with grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the conviction and acquitting Albaño. Albaño raised the defense of double jeopardy, asserting that the acquittal had become final and executory.

• Validity of promulgation under Rule 135: The People submitted that Section 9, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court permits a judge who has been transferred or assigned to another court of equal jurisdiction to prepare, sign, and promulgate a decision in a case totally heard by him before the transfer. Judge Fortun remained an RTC judge and had merely been assigned to another RTC; he had not vacated his judicial office, and thus his decision was validly promulgated.

• Grave abuse of discretion: The respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he nullified Judge Fortun’s decision solely on the ground of delayed promulgation and issued an acquittal without evaluating the evidence.

• No double jeopardy: The People contended that double jeopardy could not attach because the acquittal was issued upon Albaño’s own motion for reconsideration, falling within the exception where dismissal is made at the instance of the accused and is not based on a consideration of the evidence or the merits.

• Nullity of Fortun’s decision: Private respondent Albaño, before Judge Bellaflor, argued that the decision was void because it was promulgated after Judge Fortun had ceased to be the incumbent judge of Branch 28, citing jurisprudence that a judgment is invalid if promulgated after the judge has vacated his office.

• Double jeopardy: In the Supreme Court, private respondent contended that the resolution acquitting him had become final and executory, and any reconsideration would place him in double jeopardy.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether respondent Judge Bellaflor acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring null and void Judge Fortun’s decision and acquitting the accused.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the acquittal resolution barring reprosecution under the principle of double jeopardy.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Supreme Court found that Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion. Section 9, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a judge who leaves the province “by transfer or assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction” to prepare and sign a decision anywhere in the Philippines and to send it for filing. Judge Fortun’s assignment was a temporary transfer to another Regional Trial Court of equal jurisdiction; he did not vacate his office as an RTC judge. Consequently, he retained both the judicial authority and the competence to decide the case and to promulgate the decision. The resolution that voided the decision for lack of incumbency rested on a misapplication of the rule and binding precedents, rendering it a grave abuse of discretion.

• Double Jeopardy: Double jeopardy did not attach. The acquittal was procured upon Albaño’s own motion for reconsideration, and it was not based on an assessment of the prosecution’s evidence or the merits of the case. The resolution contained no factual findings or legal analysis on guilt or innocence — it was an empty adjudication, a bare pronouncement of acquittal anchored solely on the supposed invalidity of Judge Fortun’s decision. Such a judgment does not satisfy the constitutional requirement that decisions express clearly the facts and the law on which they are based (Art. VIII, Sec. 14). As the dismissal was at the instance of the accused and did not rest on the merits, it fell outside the protective mantle of double jeopardy.

• Doctrine on promulgation of judgment by a transferred judge — Under Section 9, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, a judge who has been transferred or assigned to another court of equal jurisdiction may validly prepare, sign, and promulgate a decision in a case he totally heard before the transfer. The decision is not rendered void by the mere fact that the judge has physically left the station; what vitiates a judgment is the permanent cessation of incumbency in the judicial office itself, not a temporary reassignment to a court of equal jurisdiction.

• Doctrine of double jeopardy upon accused’s motion — Protection against double jeopardy generally does not attach where the dismissal or acquittal was effected at the instance of the accused. The two recognized exceptions — (1) dismissal based on insufficiency of prosecution evidence, and (2) dismissal due to violation of the right to speedy trial — are exclusive. An acquittal obtained by the accused’s own motion on a purely technical ground, without any evaluation of the evidence of guilt, constitutes an empty judgment and cannot trigger double jeopardy.

• Empty judgment of acquittal — An acquittal that fails to express the facts and the law on which it is based, as required by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, is a bare adjudication and does not carry the finality and protection against reprosecution that attach to a valid judgment of acquittal.

• “Thus, decisions promulgated after the judge who penned the same had been appointed to and qualified in another office are null and void. It is settled that to be binding a judgment must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon. In single courts like the regional trial courts and the municipal trial courts, a decision may no longer be promulgated after the ponente has vacated his office. In the case of Judge Fortun's assignment, however, he was merely transferred from the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue to act as Assisting judge of another Regional Trial Court… Judge Fortun did not vacate his office as judge of a Regional Trial Court which would have otherwise nullified his decision.” — Core ratio distinguishing permanent vacation of judicial office from temporary transfer to a court of equal jurisdiction.

• “It is indubitable that the acquittal of private respondent was not based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case. Furthermore, it is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual findings and legal justifications that led to the conclusions of the court.” — Explanation of why the acquittal was a nullity and could not bar further proceedings.

• Lino Luna v. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 186 (1917) — Foundational rule that a judgment promulgated after the judge has been appointed to and qualified in another office is null and void. Distinguished because Judge Fortun was merely temporarily transferred, not permanently appointed to a different office.

• People v. Soria, 22 SCRA 948 — Reiterated that a sentence is void where the judge had been given an ad interim appointment to another court and qualified to that post before the judgment was filed. Distinguished on the ground that Judge Fortun’s assignment was temporary.

• Jimenez v. Republic, 22 SCRA 622 (1968) and Jandayan v. Ruiz, 95 SCRA 563 (1980) — Both affirmed that a decision must be signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge whose signature appears. Applied and reconciled with the temporary assignment rule.

• Consolidated Bank and Trust Co. v. IAC, 189 SCRA 433 (1990) — Reiterated the rule in single courts that a decision may not be promulgated after the ponente has vacated his office. Distinguished: Judge Fortun had not vacated his office.

• People v. Asuncion, 208 SCRA 231 (1992); People v. Puno, 208 SCRA (1992); Bogo Medellin v. Son, 209 SCRA 329 (1992) — Enumerated the requisites for double jeopardy to attach. Cited to demonstrate that private respondent’s situation did not meet the requirements.

• People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516 (1988) — Enumerated the two exceptions where double jeopardy attaches despite dismissal with the accused’s consent (insufficiency of evidence and violation of right to speedy trial). Applied to show that no exception existed.

• People v. Villon, 192 SCRA 521 — Stated that an appeal by the prosecution from an order of dismissal does not constitute double jeopardy if the dismissal is upon the accused’s motion, is not an acquittal on the merits, and raises a pure legal question.

• Nicos Industrial Corp. v. CA, 206 SCRA 127 (1992) — Established that due process requires that parties be informed of how a case was decided, with an explanation of factual findings and legal justifications. Used to underscore the constitutional flaw in Judge Bellaflor’s bare acquittal.

• Solis v. Court of Appeals, 38 SCRA 53 (1971) — Held that where a decision is invalidly promulgated, the remedy is new adjudication based on existing evidence, not automatic acquittal. Applied to show that even if Fortun’s decision were void, acquittal was the wrong remedy.

• Section 9, Rule 135, Rules of Court — Authorizes a judge who leaves the province by transfer or assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction to prepare and sign his decision anywhere in the Philippines and to send it by registered mail to the clerk of court for filing as of the date of receipt. This provision was the statutory basis for upholding Judge Fortun’s authority to decide and promulgate the judgment.

• Section 14, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Mandates that decisions of courts must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based. Judge Bellaflor’s acquittal resolution failed this requirement, rendering it void and incapable of supporting double jeopardy.

Justices Feliciano, Romero, Melo, and Vitug concurred without separate opinions.