People vs. Belbes

Where a law enforcement officer admits killing a victim but fails to prove self-defense by clear and convincing evidence, and treachery is not established, the crime is homicide, not murder; if the officer acted in the performance of duty but the killing was not a necessary consequence of that duty, the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.

Patrolman Domingo Belbes, a member of the Bacacay police force, was assigned together with Patrolman Jose Pabon by the Bacacay Station Commander to maintain peace and order at the Junior and Senior Prom of Pili Barangay High School in Pili, Bacacay, Albay on the evening of February 16, 1990. Fernando Bataller, a graduating student of the same school, was present at the event in an intoxicated state. The Revised Penal Code's provisions on justifying circumstances, particularly Article 11, paragraph 5 (fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office), and the qualifying circumstance of treachery under Article 14, are central to the disposition.

On the evening of February 16, 1990, Patrolman Domingo Belbes and Patrolman Jose Pabon were assigned by the Bacacay Station Commander to maintain peace and order at the Junior and Senior Prom of Pili Barangay High School in Pili, Bacacay, Albay. Around 9:00 p.m., while Teacher-In-Charge Mila Ulanca, Belbes, Pabon, and Elmo Bes were watching the dance, two students approached Ulanca and reported that somebody was making trouble. Belbes, armed with an armalite rifle (M-16), and Pabon, armed with a .38 caliber revolver, responded to the report.

According to the prosecution's eyewitness, Carlito Bataller, Fernando Bataller — a graduating student who was drunk — was in the company of Carlito and Rosalio Belista. While Fernando was vomiting and holding on to the bamboo wall of the school's temporary building, the bamboo splits broke. At that moment, Belbes and Pabon appeared. Without warning, Belbes fired his gun. Fernando slumped to the ground, bathed in his own blood. Belbes and Pabon then fled the scene. Fernando was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy report showed he suffered multiple gunshot wounds: to the head (right lower face), to the chest (front, left anterolateral area approximately 5 cm below but lateral to the left nipple, with another wound at the left lateral waistline showing tattooing), and to the chest (back, middle back at the level of the lowest rib, and another at the left back, lateral level of the lowest rib, also with tattooing).

Belbes presented a different account. He testified that upon responding to the students' report, he and Pabon found Fernando Bataller destroying the bamboo wall. Fernando appeared drunk and smelled of wine. They identified themselves as policemen, but Fernando ignored them and instead lunged with a knife at Pabon, who avoided the thrust. Fernando then stabbed Belbes, hitting his lower left shoulder. After Belbes fired a warning shot, Fernando grabbed the armalite and they struggled, during which the semi-automatic weapon discharged. Belbes could not recall how many shots were fired. Defense witness Jose Pabon corroborated Belbes's testimony, but on cross-examination, Pabon belied the claim that Belbes fired a warning shot and failed to mention any aggression on the part of Fernando's companions, Carlito and Belista. Pabon only recalled that the companions ganged up on Belbes after he shot Fernando.

The trial court found the defense weak and the prosecution evidence sufficiently strong, convicting Belbes of Murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. Several aspects of the physical evidence undermined Belbes's self-defense claim: the knife allegedly used by Fernando was not subjected to fingerprinting; the wound on Belbes's shoulder was medically examined only after more than twenty-one hours, with the examining physician, Dr. Evelyn Amador, testifying that it was possibly self-inflicted; and the victim was hit sideways, which was inconsistent with a face-to-face struggle. Moreover, Mila Ulanca testified that only about six seconds elapsed from the time Belbes left his seat until she heard the burst of gunshots — a timeframe too compressed to accommodate the sequence of events described by the defense.

• Self-Defense: Belbes argued that he acted in self-defense while performing his official functions as a police officer responding to a report of trouble. He contended that in the absence of intent and voluntariness, he could not be faulted for the death of the deceased.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Belbes questioned the credibility of the sole eyewitness, Carlito Bataller, asserting that Carlito was the cousin and friend of the deceased and thus had a strong motive to falsely testify. He further alleged that Carlito bore moral guilt because he could have prevented the shooting had he prevailed over Fernando's hostility.

• Sufficiency of Self-Defense: Whether the accused-appellant sufficiently established self-defense to avoid criminal liability for the killing of Fernando Bataller.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Whether treachery attended the commission of the crime so as to qualify the offense as murder.
• Incomplete Justifying Circumstance: Whether the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
• Proper Characterization of the Offense: Whether the crime committed was murder, homicide, or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

• Sufficiency of Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not established by clear and convincing evidence, as the physical evidence contradicted the accused's version of a face-to-face struggle and the six-second timeframe rendered the claimed sequence of events implausible.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: No. Treachery was not proven because there was no showing that the shooting was premeditated or that the means of execution were deliberately adopted to ensure the victim's defenselessness; mere suddenness of the attack does not necessarily imply treachery.
• Incomplete Justifying Circumstance: Yes. The first requisite of fulfillment of duty was present, but the second requisite — that the injury be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty — was lacking, as Belbes exceeded his duty by firing without warning; accordingly, the incomplete justifying circumstance was appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
• Proper Characterization of the Offense: Homicide, not murder or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The shooting was intentional, negating reckless imprudence, but treachery was absent, precluding murder.

• Sufficiency of Self-Defense: When an accused admits to killing the victim and invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him. He must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) he was not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. Belbes's claim was undermined by several factors. The knife allegedly used by the deceased was not subjected to fingerprinting. The wound on Belbes's shoulder was examined only after more than twenty-one hours, and the examining physician testified it was possibly self-inflicted. The victim was hit sideways, which was inconsistent with a face-to-face grapple as claimed. Most critically, Mila Ulanca's unrebutted testimony established that only about six seconds elapsed from the time Belbes left his seat until the burst of gunshots — a timeframe too short to accommodate the elaborate sequence of stabbing, warning shot, grabbing, and struggle described by the defense. The testimony of the single prosecution eyewitness, Carlito Bataller, was positive and clear, and his relationship to the deceased did not necessarily diminish his credibility. The trial court's findings on witness credibility were accorded great respect.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution ensuring the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, with no opportunity for the latter to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the means, method, or manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. There was no showing that the shooting was premeditated or that Belbes employed means to ensure execution without risk to himself. Mere suddenness of the attack does not necessarily imply treachery. Absent treachery, the crime could not be qualified as murder.

• Incomplete Justifying Circumstance: Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person incurs no criminal liability when acting in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. Two requisites must concur: (a) the offender acted in the performance of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or office; and (b) the injury or offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office. Only the first requisite was present — Belbes admittedly acted in the performance of his duty to maintain peace and order. The second requisite was lacking because the killing was not a necessary consequence of that duty; Belbes exceeded his duty when he fired his armalite without warning. The incomplete justifying circumstance was appreciated as a mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 13, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Proper Characterization of the Offense: The offense was not reckless imprudence resulting in homicide because the shooting was intentional — Belbes intended to fire at the victim and hit only the victim. Illustrations of reckless imprudence involve negligent or accidental discharge, such as exhibiting a loaded revolver to a friend, discharging a firearm from a window and killing a neighbor who happened to lean over, or firing at the ground to stop a fistfight with a ricochet hitting a bystander. None of those scenarios applied. With treachery absent and the shooting intentional, the proper characterization was homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, mitigated by the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty.

• Burden of Evidence in Self-Defense — Where the accused admits killing the victim but claims self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused. He must prove by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence the elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and (3) reasonable means employed to prevent or repel the aggression. The accused cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence but must stand on the strength of his own.

• Credibility of Witnesses; Relationship to Victim — The testimony of a single witness, if positive and clear, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even for murder. The relationship of a witness to the victim does not necessarily diminish the witness's credibility. Findings of the trial court on witness credibility deserve great respect, as it is in the best position to observe the demeanor of witnesses.

• Incomplete Justifying Circumstance of Fulfillment of Duty — Under Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, two requisites must concur: (a) the offender acted in the performance of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or office; and (b) the injury or offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty. Where only the first requisite is present, the justifying circumstance is incomplete and may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 1.

• Treachery; Requisites — Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Two conditions must concur: (a) employment of means, methods, or manner of execution ensuring the malefactor's safety from defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the latter no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, methods, or manner. Mere suddenness of the attack does not necessarily imply treachery.

• "Where the accused owns up to killing the victim in self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him. He must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger." — This passage states the fundamental doctrine governing the burden of proof in self-defense claims, which is central to the Court's rejection of Belbes's defense.

• "He cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence, 'for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing.'" — This formulation, quoting precedent, articulates the principle that an admitting accused must stand on the strength of his own evidence and cannot exploit the prosecution's weakness.

• "Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing as conclusively as the killing itself." — This passage defines the standard of proof required for treachery, which the prosecution failed to meet, resulting in the downgrade from murder to homicide.

• "But we must stress there are two requisites for this justifying circumstance: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right: and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office." — This passage sets out the two-part test for the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty, the incomplete satisfaction of which led to its appreciation as a mitigating circumstance.

• People vs. Navarro, 297 SCRA 331 (1998) — Cited for the proposition that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and clear, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even for murder.
• People vs. Uycoque, 246 SCRA 769 (1995) — Cited for the rule that findings of the trial court on witness credibility deserve great respect, and that the relationship of a witness to the victim does not necessarily diminish credibility.
• People vs. Manalo, 229 SCRA 479 (1994) — Cited reinforcing the rule that trial court findings on witness credibility are accorded great respect.
• People vs. Gutual, 254 SCRA 37 (1996) — Cited for the doctrine that where an accused admits killing the victim and claims self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him.
• People vs. Pay-an, 84 SCRA 353 (1978) — Cited for the principle that an accused who admits the killing cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence but must prove self-defense on the strength of his own evidence.
• People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943) — Cited for the two requisites of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under Article 11, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Santos, 255 SCRA 309 (1996) — Cited for the concept of mitigating circumstance as founded on leniency in favor of an accused who has shown less perversity in the commission of an offense.
• People vs. De Leon, 262 SCRA 446 (1996) — Cited for the requisites of treachery as a qualifying circumstance and the rule that mere suddenness of attack does not necessarily imply treachery.

• Article 11, paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code — Defines the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office. The Court found only the first requisite present (Belbes acted in the performance of duty) while the second was absent (the killing was not a necessary consequence of duty), resulting in an incomplete justifying circumstance appreciated as mitigation.
• Article 13, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides that incomplete justifying circumstances may be appreciated as mitigating circumstances. Applied to reduce the penalty for homicide by reason of the incomplete fulfillment-of-duty circumstance.
• Article 14, Revised Penal Code (Treachery) — Defines treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The Court found it absent because the prosecution failed to prove deliberate adoption of means ensuring the victim's defenselessness.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of homicide. The Court convicted Belbes under this article, imposing the penalty of reclusion temporal, modified by the mitigating circumstance.
• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Defines reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The Court distinguished this from the present case, holding that the shooting was intentional and therefore not reckless imprudence.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor minimum to 14 years of reclusion temporal minimum, given one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.