People vs. Bautista

The prescriptive period of an offense remains tolled from the time the complaint is filed with the prosecutor's office until the proceedings are terminated by conviction or acquittal, or unjustifiably stopped for reasons not imputable to the accused; it does not resume running upon the prosecutor's approval of the resolution recommending the filing of an information.

On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent Clemente Bautista and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., resulting in a charge of slight physical injuries. After failed barangay conciliation, the complainant filed a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila. The prescriptive period for slight physical injuries is 60 days.

On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent Clemente Bautista and his co-accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other. The private complainant initially filed a complaint with the Office of the Barangay of Malate, Manila, but no settlement was reached. Consequently, the barangay chairman issued a Certification to file action on August 11, 1999.

Thereafter, on August 16, 1999, the private complainant filed a Complaint for slight physical injuries with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila against the respondent and his co-accused. After conducting a preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a Joint Resolution on November 8, 1999, recommending the filing of an Information against the respondent. This recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, although the date of approval is not found in the records. The Information was ultimately filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000.

Respondent sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the 60-day prescriptive period from the date of the commission of the crime on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed by the time the Information was filed. The MeTC denied the motion, a disposition affirmed by the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari. However, the CA reversed the lower courts and dismissed the case, holding that the proceedings at the OCP were "unjustifiably stopped" under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code due to the unexplained delay in filing the Information, thereby causing the offense to prescribe. The People of the Philippines elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

• Prescription of Offense: Respondent sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that by the time the Information was filed with the MeTC, the 60-day prescriptive period from the date of the commission of the crime had already elapsed.
• Resumption of Prescriptive Period: Respondent maintained that upon the approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the filing of an information, the period of prescription began to run again, leading to the prescription of the offense by the time the Information was filed with the MeTC.

• Prescription of Offense: Whether the prescriptive period for slight physical injuries began to run anew after the investigating prosecutor's recommendation to file an information was approved by the City Prosecutor.

• Prescription of Offense: No. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint is filed with the prosecutor's office until the accused is convicted or acquitted, or the proceedings are unjustifiably stopped for reasons not imputable to the accused.

• Prescription of Offense: Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code states that the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The proceedings against the respondent were not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor until the respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court. While the Office of the Prosecutor incurred delay in filing the information, such negligence should not prejudice the State or the offended party, as the victim's only duty is to file the requisite complaint. The delay occurred in the filing of the Information, not in the conduct of the preliminary investigation or trial in court, so the accused's right to a speedy trial is not violated. The appropriate action for the delay is an administrative disciplinary action against the erring public officials.

• Interruption of Prescriptive Period — The filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office suspends the running of the prescriptive period. The period remains tolled until such time that the accused is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court, or the proceedings are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to the accused. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the delay by the prosecutor in filing the information after approving the resolution did not resume the prescriptive period, as the proceedings before the prosecutor had not yet terminated in a manner contemplated by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

• "The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi, clarifying that the prescriptive period remains interrupted during the entire prosecutorial stage until court proceedings are terminated.
• "it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint." — This explains the policy rationale behind tolling the prescriptive period despite prosecutorial delay.

• People vs. Olarte, 125 Phil. 895 (1967) — Cited to support the rule that it is unjust to deprive the injured party of vindication due to delays not under their control, as the victim's only duty is to file the complaint.
• Arambulo vs. Laqui, Sr., 396 Phil. 914 (2000) — Cited for the well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office suspends the running of the prescriptive period.

• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Governs the computation of prescription of offenses, stating that the period is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information and commences to run again when proceedings terminate without conviction or acquittal, or are unjustifiably stopped for reasons not imputable to the accused. The Court interpreted this to mean that the prescriptive period remains tolled during the pendency of the case with the prosecutor.
• Section 410(c), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Provides for the suspension of prescriptive periods of offenses while the dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration before the barangay. The prescriptive periods resume upon receipt of the certification to file action, with the interruption not exceeding 60 days.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.